THE WORLD WAR
Paris throbs with the Marseillaise—A British railway conductor refuses a five-pound note—Americans panic-stricken in London—A special committee to aid Americans in Europe—The embassy committee—Mr. and Mrs. Herbert C. Hoover—Impressions of Earl Grey and Waldorf Astor—England's "White Paper" is issued—Sir Edward Grey—Russian autocracy's effect on Allied cause—I am urged to state British views to American newspapers—We return home—James Speyer gives a dinner—I broach the subject of mediation to Bernstorff—A flying trip to Washington; mediation interviews with Bryan, Spring-Rice, and Jusserand—A letter from Earl Grey—Germany's insincerity is exposed—New Year messages to warring nations—Roosevelt's warnings—An effort to persuade President Wilson to confer with ex-Presidents—Prominent Jews of German origin condemn Germany's attitude—America enters war—Final visits with Theodore Roosevelt—His death—Pilgrims to Sagamore Hill.
Touring through Normandy late in July, 1914, we met some friends who had just come from Paris who told us that war was imminent and from best reports would break out within a very few days. Accordingly we hurried to Paris and in the course of twenty-four hours the whole aspect of the city had changed. From the windows of our hotel on the Place Vendôme and on the principal boulevards of the city we saw youths of military age marching to headquarters. The air throbbed with the Marseillaise. Everywhere there were crowds, but they were neither boisterous nor hilarious. Everywhere there was an air of tension and determination, vastly unlike the usual mood of jovial, happy Paris.
Starting at once for London, we found the trains so overcrowded that it was impossible to get accommodations, so we motored to Dieppe and reached there in time to take the boat that left at three o'clock in the morning for Newhaven. The ordinary capacity of the boat was five hundred passengers, but it was packed from stem to stern with some two thousand persons on this voyage, mainly Americans. The Calais-Dover crossing of the Channel had already been suspended.
On board the train from Newhaven to London, a curious incident occurred that indicated the derangement of things. I had four fares to pay, amounting to about three pounds. I handed the conductor a five-pound Bank of England note. He took it, but shortly returned with it, saying he could accept nothing but gold. I expostulated with him, told him I had no gold, and since a bank note was valid tender I insisted upon its acceptance. But the upshot was that he preferred to take my card with my London address!
It would appear that my credit at that moment was better than that of the Bank of England.
We arrived in London on Sunday, August 2d. At the Hyde Park Hotel, to which we went, a typewritten notice was posted announcing a meeting on the following day at the Waldorf Hotel on the Strand. The persons who signed the notice were unknown to me, and at first I was inclined to pay no attention to it. However, I did go, and found gathered inside and in front of the hotel several thousand stranded Americans. The main hall and all approaches to it were packed. Several persons in the crowd recognized me and made a passageway so that I could get into the room where the meeting was being held. Upon my entrance I was lifted upon a table that served as a platform, and was asked to speak. I made a short address to the panic-stricken assembly, assured them they had nothing to fear and were as safe in London as if they were in New York, and that our committee would remain with them and help them get suitable transportation as early as practicable. There was loud cheering and my words seemed to have a comforting effect.
Immediately thereafter a group of us came together and organized a special committee for the aid of Americans in Europe. There were Frederick I. Kent, one of the vice-presidents of the Bankers' Trust Company; W. N. Duane, another vice-president of the Bankers' Trust Company; Theodore Hetzler, a vice-president of the Fifth Avenue Bank; Joseph P. Day, a prominent real estate auctioneer of New York City; William C. Breed, an officer of the Merchants' Association; Chandler P. Anderson and James Byrne, prominent American lawyers, several others, and myself. We arranged for headquarters at the Hotel Savoy, where several of the largest salons were placed at our disposal so that we had room for the various departments that needed to be formed to attend to the wants of the many terrified Americans who were pouring into London from all over the Continent. Mr. Hetzler was chairman of the general committee, Mr. Duane secretary, and Robert W. DeForest, vice-president of the American Red Cross, was member ex-officio. I was made chairman of the embassy committee of which Ambassador Page was honorary chairman, and the American ambassadors to France, Germany, Austria, and the ministers to Holland and Belgium were made advisory members. We found many willing helpers, including a number of professors from American universities and other public-spirited men and women.
The necessary sub-committees were speedily formed: Mr. Day was made chairman of the transportation committee and got in touch with the managers of all the transatlantic steamship companies. Mr. Kent was chairman of the finance committee, and through his banking connections was able to get a limited amount of gold to advance to those who could not convert their foreign money, notwithstanding the moratorium that had been declared which made it impossible for several days to get ready money; foreign bills were not being accepted by the banks. With the declaration of the moratorium we at once called a meeting of the managers of the hotels where most of the Americans were stopping, and without exception these men were very accommodating. They agreed not to require payment from their American guests for the time being, and as far as possible to advance them a little money to meet their immediate requirements.
Our embassy was crowded from morning to night with hundreds of citizens, most of whom wanted to make application for passports, for the steamship companies required the exhibition of passports before arranging for transportation. The rooms at the embassy were not large enough to accommodate the crowds that filled them, so we transferred the passport division to the Hotel Savoy, and Ambassador Page assigned to me several clerks to facilitate the handling of our business. I am sorry to say there was a tendency on the part of many American travelers to find fault with our ambassador and the embassy. This was not at all justified, and I took every occasion to assure them that the ambassador was doing all in his power with his limited staff, and that our committee had his fullest coöperation and was getting his aid in every possible way. I consulted with Ambassador Page almost every day, and together we planned for arranging for money and the many other requirements of our citizens.
In those first hectic days, some of us worked all day and far into the night, or rather into the next morning. Many British friends who visited our rooms marveled at the promptness and efficiency with which we dispatched business under the circumstances, and were solicitous for the health of "the unofficial ambassador," as I was being called, and his staff.
After the committee had been going a few days, it secured the coöperation of Mr. and Mrs. Herbert C. Hoover. He was chairman of an American benevolent society, of the woman's committee of which Mrs. Hoover was at the head. As the members of our relief committee returned home, the work was by degrees turned over to Mr. and Mrs. Hoover and their associates, until by August 27th we put all of the remaining work and funds into the hands of their society.
One day Earl Grey paid me a visit at our headquarters, and with him was Mrs. Waldorf Astor, now Viscountess Astor, who reminded me that "all work and no play makes Jack a dull boy," and insisted that Mrs. Straus and I spend the week-end at Cliveden, their residence, a short distance by rail out of London. Other guests were Earl Grey, Geoffrey Robinson, editor of the London "Times," and several others connected with the editorship of "The Round Table," a political quarterly.
Mr. Waldorf Astor was an earnest, modest young man, then about thirty-four years old, unspoiled by his enormous wealth. On the contrary, he was and still is devoting much of his wealth as well as his parliamentary activities to philanthropic work, including the treatment and prevention of tuberculosis, and in this connection had been in touch with my brother Nathan in regard to milk pasteurization.
There were several subsequent week-ends at Cliveden. On one of these visits, a dozen or more young men were there, members of England's foremost families. They enjoyed themselves at tennis and other games and on Monday were to join the colors. It is sad to record that most of these fine fellows, with the exception of two or three, were killed or seriously wounded within the next few months.
When England entered the war, the diplomatic correspondence was published in what was called the British "White Paper." Sir Edward Grey, now Viscount Grey, had made a speech in Parliament, of which I read the published version in this "White Paper." It happened that on that very day Earl Grey, cousin to Sir Edward, was lunching with me at my hotel, and I took the occasion to point out to him the necessity of making clear, especially for the American public, that the reason England had joined the Allies was not only on Belgium's account, but to uphold the sanctity of international obligations. This concerned not alone the belligerent nations, but all the nations. Without the sanctity of international obligations the war, no matter how it ended, would cause a reversion to a state of international barbarity. Earl Grey suggested that I discuss the subject with his cousin, and arranged for a meeting. A few days later we three sat down to a simple and informal luncheon at Earl Grey's home on South Street, in Park Lane.
Sir Edward Grey spoke earnestly and frankly. He felt the great responsibility of the decision that brought England into the war, and said he had often asked himself whether he could have done otherwise. There was nothing chauvinistic in either his attitude or his arguments. It was plain that he had weighed the entire issue carefully. His open-mindedness, his simplicity and straightforwardness of manner, his great ability and humanitarian zeal, impressed me very much.
I called his attention to the importance of having Russia grant civil and religious rights to her subject nationalities; the failure of such action would weaken the moral cause of the Allies, and also from an American point of view it was important that Russia give some evidence of a liberal spirit, otherwise it might be feared that victory for the Allies would redound mainly to the advantage of autocracy in Russia. I contended that it was not a question of humanity, but plain state policy, and that it was important that the Governments of Great Britain and France bring Russia, as their ally, into line. I had received several cables from prominent men in New York and Boston who had thus expressed the American point of view.
The conversation ran on for an hour and a half in a very informal way. Earl Grey then made the suggestion, in accordance with my remarks of a few days before about the necessity of making clear England's position in entering the war, that I give out an interview to the American press covering the substance of our conversation. I demurred. Naturally I hesitated to state publicly the delicate and critical questions that the British Minister of Foreign Affairs had so frankly discussed with me. However, Sir Edward himself said he would appreciate my doing so, for he had perfect confidence in my doing it without embarrassment to his country. I therefore agreed to it, with the proviso that he approve the interview before it was released for publication.
I got in touch with the representatives of the American papers in London and that evening gave out the interview. The next morning I sent a copy to Sir Edward, who returned it to me without a single change, saying he approved both its form and content. The matter was then cabled to America, published in our leading papers on August 15th, and cabled back for republication in the British papers.
Thereafter the London papers came to me for further interviews, and in a subsequent statement I dwelt more specifically on the importance of Russia's fair treatment of her subject nationalities, particularly the Jews, who had suffered most. The press representatives asked whether they might show my interview to Lord Weardale and if possible get his comment, to which I gladly consented.
Lord Weardale had been head of the Parliamentary deputation that visited Russia the year before and had an intimate knowledge of Russian conditions. He told me later that he had already written the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonoff, along the identical lines of my interview. He supplemented what I had stated, with an interview, saying, among other things:
It would be an immense step in the path of progress of Russia herself and would create a profound sentiment of satisfaction in the civilized world if the Tsar at such a juncture were to give emphatic endorsement to his already declared intention to give full religious liberty to all his peoples. It is not enough to be powerful in the battlefield; it is even more important to conquer the approval of the human conscience.
The Government and people of Great Britain were very solicitous at that time regarding public opinion in America and the probable attitude of our Government. In many quarters there was a feeling of uncertainty and even of misgiving toward the statement by President Wilson respecting an offer of mediation at the opportune moment, in accordance with the provisions of the Hague Treaty. Because of this and other considerations, Sir Edward Grey and others recognized the importance of having Russia give evidence of a more enlightened spirit.
We left London at the end of August, and upon arrival home went up to Hartsdale, a short distance out of New York, to visit with our son. A few days afterward Mr. James Speyer, whose summer home was but a few miles distant, at Scarboro, telephoned, inviting Mrs. Straus and myself to dine with him. Mrs. Speyer had not returned from abroad; the guests were Mr. and Mrs. Frank A. Vanderlip and Count von Bernstorff. As Mrs. Straus was rather worn out by her London experience, I went alone. There were several other neighbors, Mr. Frank H. Platt and Mr. Frank Trumbull and perhaps one other, about eight of us, of whom Mrs. Vanderlip was the only lady.
Bernstorff I had known for a number of years. I had first met him in 1888 when I was on my first mission to Turkey and he was attaché of the German embassy. Later he came to Washington as ambassador when I was in the Cabinet, and we met frequently there.
The conversation at dinner was general, although it was inevitable that we discuss the war. Bernstorff voiced the usual claim of the Germans, that they did not want war, and that the Kaiser and the German Government stood for peace. When he had dilated upon that theme I asked him:
"Is that the present sentiment and attitude of your country?"
He replied that it certainly was when he left Berlin only two weeks before, on returning to America from his leave of absence.
Knowing how anxious President Wilson was to use any proper opportunity that might present itself for ending the war, I asked Bernstorff whether his Government would entertain a proposition for mediation.
He answered me promptly: "Speaking for myself, I certainly would entertain such a proposition." But he added that he could not speak officially, since cable communication with his Government had been cut off for a week or more.
I asked him whether in his opinion his Government would give favorable consideration to such a proposal. He said that before leaving Berlin he had discussed with the Chancellor the possibility of mediation, following the report of President Wilson's statement that he was ready to offer his services as mediator to both parties, and the Chancellor had said that the war had but begun and it was too early to instruct regarding mediation until the offer was presented. On my questioning him further, the ambassador said his personal opinion was that his Government would accept an offer of mediation. I remarked that I could not but regard his statement as significant, and asked him if I might use it in such a manner as I saw fit. He replied that he had no objection.
As we rose from the table, I made sure of my understanding of his statements, and then the thought occurred to me that the best thing to do was to report the conversation to Secretary of State Bryan, so that he might, if he saw fit, bring it before the President. I so informed Bernstorff, and again he told me he had no objection.
I looked at my watch. It was ten-fifteen. I announced that I would go to Washington on the midnight train. My host suggested that I "sleep on it and don't hurry"; but I concluded that if there was anything I could do to shorten the war by even a few hours I would have to charge myself with neglect of duty if on account of personal convenience I had refrained from doing so. The next day was Sunday; the day after was Labor Day; and all the while thousands were falling on the battlefield. Several of the guests agreed with my decision, so I bade them good-night, called my motor, and caught the midnight train for Washington.
Sunday morning I telephoned to Mr. Bryan at once and made an appointment to meet him at his home. I repeated my conversation with Bernstorff precisely as it had occurred, and Bryan believed, as I did, that it might pave the way to mediation. I suggested that he have the German ambassador come to Washington and speak with him. He communicated with the German embassy, and Bernstorff arrived the following morning.
Bryan presented the subject to the President, who expressed himself as pleased with the possibility of a favorable outcome. The Secretary advised me to have a conference with the British ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, and with the French ambassador, M. Jusserand. He had already informed them what had taken place and of my presence in Washington. Sir Cecil asked whether I would kindly come to the embassy, and I replied I would do so, and suggested that he arrange to have the French ambassador also present. This he did.
When I reached the embassy, M. Jusserand had not yet arrived, and Sir Cecil and I indulged in reminiscences. He too had been in Constantinople during my first mission, as secretary of the British embassy. Soon we were joined by M. Jusserand, whom also I had known well for many years, for he had been in Washington since 1902, and I had seen much of him during my Cabinet days.
When we took up the proposal regarding which we had come together, both of these gentlemen agreed that it was deserving of serious attention, but Sir Cecil had little confidence in Bernstorff, who had been his colleague at Cairo, where they had represented their respective Governments. He asked whether I thought an ambassador would make such a statement as Bernstorff's without authority from his Government. I replied that both he and M. Jusserand were better qualified to answer that question, upon which M. Jusserand said that he knew that no ambassador under the German system would dare make such remarks without previous authority from his Government.
"That is so much the better," I commented.
Sir Cecil declared that German diplomacy was peculiar and that the Foreign Office had no conscience in disavowing statements by its ambassadors if it suited Germany's purpose.
After we had gone over the whole subject, both ambassadors stated that if it held one chance in a hundred of shortening the war, it was their duty to entertain it. I replied that I hoped they would entertain it cordially.
Jusserand in his usual happy manner said, "'Cordially,' that is a little too strong."
"Well, sympathetically, then," I said.
"Yes, sympathetically, yes." And with that we parted, both ambassadors expressing their thanks and appreciation of my services.
I had been scrupulously careful to be absolutely accurate in all my statements, and it was therefore gratifying, after the Bryan-Bernstorff conference, to have the Secretary tell me that the ambassador's report of the Scarboro incident was in every detail in accord with mine, and to have the ambassador also confirm the correctness of Mr. Bryan's understanding from my report. Naturally I was anxious to avoid misunderstandings or misconceptions of any kind. The issue was too important.
Both Secretary Bryan and Ambassador Bernstorff cabled to Berlin, and for the time the subject rested there. My remaining in Washington was unnecessary, and I returned to New York. But before leaving, I called by appointment at both the French and British embassies, which also had communicated events in detail to their Governments. Both ambassadors expressed their high appreciation for my services and hoped I would keep in close touch with them regarding the matter, both for their sake and for the sake of our respective Governments. I told them I would regard myself as "messenger boy" for mediation. Sir Cecil replied, "Ambassador extraordinary." He promised to keep me informed, and two days later wrote me:
I have not yet received any intimation from my Government, nor do I expect one unless something definite is before them. But I need not tell you how heartily my sympathy is with your humanitarian efforts, and you know Grey well enough to be sure that, while scrupulously faithful to all his engagements, he will do everything possible in the cause of peace.
Throughout these negotiations we took great care to keep the matter secret. Despite that fact it leaked out in some way, and the correspondent of the London "Times" reported it in such a way as to give the impression that I had been duped by the wily German ambassador; and there were one or two other papers which took that view. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice was incensed at this interpretation and wrote me on October 3d:
I am sure no one who knows you and knows the facts would ever think that you were either duped or the secret agent of Germany. I am quite positive that Sir Edward Grey would never have such an idea. What you did—and what I hope you will continue to do—is a work of pure philanthropy.
On October 15th he wrote me again on this subject, saying that when the London "Times" representative returned to Washington from New York, he would set him right as to the facts with a view to having the report corrected, and adding:
We used to say at school, "Blessed are the peace makers, for they get more kicks than half-pence!" It represents a melancholy truth, but, however, I am sure every well-thinking person must appreciate your beneficent efforts.
But in general the press of Great Britain expressed its appreciation of the services I had rendered in lifting the latch of the door to mediation.
A letter from Sir Edward Grey concerning the negotiations sheds important light upon the British attitude:
Foreign Office, London, S.W.
Saturday, 26 September, 1914Dear Mr. Straus:
Thank you for your letter of the 9th. I am so busy that I have not time to write at any length; but do not let that make you suppose that I am out of sympathy with what you say.
First of all, however, we must save ourselves and the West of Europe, before we can exercise any influence elsewhere. The Prussian military caste has dominated Germany, and the whole of the West of Europe is in danger of being dominated by it. The German Government, in the hands of this military caste, prepared this war, planned it, and chose the time for it. We know now that the war has revealed how thoroughly the German preparations had been made beforehand: with an organization and forethought which is wonderful, and would have been admirable had it been devoted to a praiseworthy purpose. Not one of the other nations now fighting against Germany is prepared in the same way.
Now, we wish to have three things: Firstly, to secure our own liberty as independent States, who will live and let live on equal terms; secondly, the establishment somehow of a Germany not dominated by a military caste; a nation who will look at liberty and politics from the same point of view as we do, and who will deal with us on equal terms and in good faith; thirdly, reparation for the cruel wrongs done to Belgium; to get that is a matter of honour and justice and right.
The statements made by Wolff's Bureau in Europe deny that Germany is yet ready for peace. If she is ready for peace, then I think that her ambassador in Washington ought not to beat about the bush. He ought to make it clear to President Wilson that he is authorized to speak on behalf of his Government; and state to the President that Germany does wish to make peace. In that case, President Wilson could approach all the others who are engaged in this war and bring them into consultation with one another and with him. But at present we have no indication that Germany wishes to have peace, and no indication that she would agree to any terms that would give reparation to Belgium and security to the rest of Europe that the peace would be durable.
Yours very truly
E. Grey
The history of those negotiations is presented somewhat at length because my friend of many years, the late Ambassador Page, in his recently published letters also expressed the feeling that I had been used as a dupe to throw the blame for continuing the war upon Great Britain, though he expressed great confidence in me and friendship for me. I may say I was not unmindful of this contingency; but I felt that if the negotiations did not result as we hoped, they would serve to expose the insincerity of the German Government with regard to its peace professions. And this is precisely what happened, as the answer of the German Chancellor, received by the State Department on September 22d, confirms:
The Imperial Chancellor is much obliged for America's offer. Germany did not want war, it was forced upon her. Even after we shall have defeated France we shall still have to face England and Russia. England, France, and Russia have signed a convention to make peace solely in mutual agreement with each other. England, that is, Mr. Asquith, the London Times, and English diplomatic officers, have on various occasions ... [sic] that England is determined to conduct the war to the utmost and that she expects success from it lasting a long time. It is therefore up to the United States to get our enemies to make peace proposals. Germany can only accept the peace which promises to be a real and lasting peace and will protect her against any new attacks from her enemies. If we accepted America's offer of mediation now our enemies would interpret it as a sign of weakness and the German people would not understand it. For the nation which has been willing to make such sacrifices has a right to demand that there shall be guarantees of rest and security.
Secretary Bryan, in his instruction to Ambassador Page on September 8th, had anticipated Germany's refusal to accept mediation. The instruction concluded:
We do not know, of course, what reply the German Emperor will make, but this war is so horrible from every aspect that no one can afford to take the responsibility for continuing it implacably. The British and French ambassadors fear that Germany will not accept any reasonable terms, but even a failure to agree will not rob an attempt at mediation of all its advantages because the different nations would be able to explain to the world their attitude, the reasons for continuing the war, the end to be hoped for and the terms upon which peace is possible. This would locate the responsibility for the continuance of the war and help to mould public opinion. Will notify you as soon as answer is received from Bernstorff.
On September 29th all the British papers served by the Central News War Service carried a cable from New York detailing the negotiations, which ended:
It is believed by those concerned that an important step has been taken to pave the way for mediation, when the opportune moment arrives. In other words, the bolt on the door of mediation has been thrown back so that it will be possible for the door to be opened without either side being forced to take the initiative. Time will doubtless show that the initiative so fortuitously taken by Mr. Straus will prove of real service in the interests of ultimate peace negotiations, and any endeavors to deprecate those services as having been made in Germany's interests are not only contrary to all the facts, but are most unfortunate.
Note: The censor does not object to the publication of the foregoing details, but insists that publication should be accompanied by a footnote pointing out that since these occurrences took place the German Government have disavowed their ambassador.
Had Germany's oft-reiterated peace professions been sincere, she would have accepted this offer for mediation. By her refusal the falsity of her professions was exposed not only in Great Britain and in our own country, but in all the neutral countries; and the exposé served as added proof to all peace-loving and neutrally-minded persons that the responsibility for the war and its continuance rested upon the German Government.
In America many of us continued to hope that some way might be found to bring the representatives of the warring nations into a conference, thereby removing misunderstanding and misconception and paving the way for an early peace. On December 31st the New York representative of the Central News of London asked several Americans to write New Year's messages to the warring nations of Europe, to be cabled to all the chief newspapers of the continent. Messages were given by Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, Andrew Carnegie, Bishop David Greer, and myself, and they were all substantially of the same tenor, as a passage from each will show:
Bishop Greer: It is the earnest hope and prayer of all Christian people in America that the awful and deplorable war now raging may soon reach an end which will insure lasting peace and one satisfactory in character to all the nations involved.
Andrew Carnegie: I am convinced that the next effort of lovers of peace should be to concentrate the world over in demanding that this unparalleled slaughter of man by man shall be the last war waged by civilized nations for the settlement of international disputes. War dethroned—Peace enthroned.
President Butler: May it be in America's fortunate lot to bind up the wounds of the war and to set the feet of her sister nations once more in the paths of peace, international good-will and constructive statesmanship.
I said: For the past five months each of the nations has been seeking victory in the trenches of death; but it has not been found there. Only through wise counsels can the victory of permanent peace be obtained. President Wilson and His Holiness the Pope have offered their offices to open the door of mediation. Will not the Kaiser and King George give the mandate so that the door may be opened and this delusion be dispelled, thereby earning the blessings of a bleeding and suffering world?
These statements are cited as evidence of how slowly we in America came to realize the ruthless designs for conquest which the German militarists had prepared and fostered for forty years, not only strategically, but even in shaping the psychology of the child in school and the man in the street to conform to their design.
For a year or more events marched on, tragically, like a malignant disease. On February 2, 1917, I lunched with Roosevelt at the Hotel Langdon, on Fifth Avenue and Fifty-Sixth Street, where Roosevelt was in the habit of stopping when in New York. The German Government two days before had announced her submarine blockade of the British, French, and Dutch coasts, and our own entrance into the war seemed likely.
We were discussing the crisis, and Roosevelt said he did not think we should be involved; the President would probably find some way out and arrange to have Germany's pledge, not to destroy merchant ships of neutrals or belligerents without warning, whittled down so as to apply only to ships flying the American flag. He told us that he had engaged passage on one of the United Fruit Company steamers to Jamaica for Mrs. Roosevelt and himself. Mrs. Roosevelt needed a change, and they would start in a few days. Regarding the war, he could do nothing more. He had done all he could. He had made an offer to the Secretary of War to raise a division, and had a whole card catalogue of names of men who had volunteered to serve in it.
His relations with the President were far from friendly. He had violently criticized him in articles contributed to the "Metropolitan Magazine" and in several public addresses had urged preparedness and compulsory military training. I asked him, in view of the German blockade, what he would do if he were President. He said he would promptly assemble our fleet, put marines on the interned German ships, and show Germany that we were in dead earnest; that unless she recalled her decision to sink merchant ships without observing the rules of modern warfare we should take immediate steps to protect our rights.
"If we continue to back down we will become Chinafied, without any rights that other nations will respect," said Roosevelt emphatically.
In such critical times, personal differences might be laid aside, I suggested, and I wanted him to write the President and let him have the benefit of his views. I went further: I suggested that I could write the President about it. But in Roosevelt's opinion, Wilson would conclude that Roosevelt had himself urged me to do this because of my close association with Roosevelt.
My own relations with the President were always agreeable, I might even say most friendly. He had written me sometime before, that he would consider it a favor if I would keep him informed of developments that came under my observation regarding important matters. It occurred to me that on the eve of war it would be a fine thing if he consulted with his two surviving predecessors, as Monroe had done in consulting with Jefferson and Madison before issuing the doctrine which bears his name. In the crisis we were facing such a step would allay partisan differences and serve to solidify the Nation. With these ideas in mind I sent the President the following telegram:
Every patriotic American should support you in this great crisis in the history of our country. May I suggest the course followed by Monroe under a crisis involving many of the same principles, to confer with the two surviving ex-Presidents, whose advice, I feel sure, will be most helpful and serve to patriotically solidify the country behind you?
I informed Roosevelt of my action. He felt sure the President wanted neither advice nor cooperation, though he himself was ready to give him the fullest coöperation should Wilson desire it. He thought the same was true on the part of Mr. Taft. The telegram, to my surprise, was given out at Washington to the press a day or two later, but nothing ever came of it.
On February 7th the country was more or less agreeably surprised by the fact that Count von Bernstorff had been given his passports and Ambassador Gerard at Berlin had been instructed to demand his. I say the country was surprised because the President had so long delayed and avoided such a step—even after the sinking of the Lusitania and the Sussex following his "strict accountability" and other strong statements—that it was generally believed he did not mean to take it.
Roosevelt, of course, thought that we should have taken such action long before. His contention was always that had we taken prompt and decisive steps after the Lusitania tragedy, we should have been spared the submarine invasions. In fact, he thought we should have acted when Germany announced her submarine blockade and possibly saved ourselves from the Lusitania horror. Now that diplomatic relations were broken off, he canceled his trip to Jamaica, not wishing to be out of the country when war was likely to be declared at any moment.
At about this time the impression was current that the Jews of America were anti-Ally, a fact that had a prejudicial effect in France and England. It probably grew out of the fact that three of the largest Jewish banking houses of the country were of German origin, and further that the Yiddish press was anti-Russian in its sympathies as a result of the treatment of Jews in Russia.
After a careful investigation of these reports, a group of us met at the home of Eugene Meyer, Jr., later chairman of the War Finance Corporation. Among those I recall at this meeting were: Fabian Franklin, of the "New York Evening Post"; George L. Beer, the historian; Rabbi Stephen S. Wise; Professor Richard Gottheil, of Columbia University. M. Stephane Lauzanne, editor of "Le Matin" of Paris, and Professor Henri Bergson, both of whom were then in New York, had also been consulted. It was decided that the most practical way of correcting this erroneous impression was for me to write to the French and British ambassadors at Washington.
Accordingly I wrote to Ambassadors Spring-Rice and Jusserand that the impression was unfounded, that our investigations and observations showed a large preponderance of pro-Ally sympathy among the Jews, and I cited a number of leading citizens in business and the various professions, who were representative of their class, whom I knew personally to be pro-Ally. I stated further that in one of the largest Jewish clubs, whose membership consisted almost entirely of Jews of German origin, the pro-Ally sentiment was so strong as to be practically unanimous.
The ambassadors were grateful for this information, which they communicated to their Governments; and through the agency of M. Lauzanne and with the consent of the ambassadors, the letters were given in full to the French and British press.
On the very day that Congress declared war against Germany, April 6, 1917, we were giving a dinner at our home to Professor Henri Bergson. Among our guests were James M. Beck, author of "The Evidence in the Case" and "The War and Humanity"; ex-Senator Burton of Ohio; former Governor and Mrs. John M. Slaton, of Georgia; Adolph S. Ochs, of the "New York Times," and Mrs. Ochs. Bergson was regarded as the unofficial representative of France in our country at the time. Of course, our thoughts and conversation were dominated by the great event of the day. Professor Bergson and Mr. Beck drank and responded to toasts with eloquent fervor. It was felt by all that the entrance into the war of the United States would prove a decided factor in winning it for democracy and constitutional liberty.
Just before Christmas, 1918—to be specific, on December 22d—I called on Roosevelt at the Roosevelt Hospital, where he was convalescing from his seven weeks' illness, believed to have been inflammatory rheumatism. He was dressed in his robe de chambre and was seated in an armchair with a pile of books before him. He looked neither enfeebled nor emaciated, though he showed signs of illness. When I asked him how he had been since my last visit, for I had called on him frequently during his illness, he told me that he had had an attack of embolism—I think that was the ailment—which showed in his wrists, and that his fever had gone up to 104. But that was all gone and he was again feeling fine. He was planning to return to Sagamore Hill to spend Christmas, which he subsequently did.
He inquired particularly about my son Roger, of whom he was very fond, and who was then in Siberia, where he had served for some months as captain and assistant intelligence officer on the staff of General William S. Graves, in command of the American Expeditionary Forces. I told him we had had a cable from Roger from Blagoveschensk that he was well. In his last letter he had expressed a desire to come home, since the war was over. Roosevelt agreed that that was right. He would not want his own sons to endanger their lives in the civil war raging in Russia, and he would not have Roger do so. "Let the Russians settle their own internal affairs; that is not our business," he added.
By way of amusing and interesting Roosevelt, I told him of a curious incident narrated in one of Roger's letters. He had been sent as the official representative of the army into the Amur Province, of which the governor was Alexandre Alexiefsky, who had been a member of the Constitutional Assembly of the Kerensky Government. When Roger called, the governor repeated his name familiarly and then asked: "Are you related to His Excellency by that name in the Cabinet of President Roosevelt?" When Roger told him he was my son, the governor immediately expressed a readiness to help him in every possible way, because as the latter said he owed his life to me. As Roger expressed it, "He was courteous before, but after that he was ready to give me his undershirt."
ROGER W. STRAUS
First Lieutenant, afterwards Captain, on the Staff of General W. S. Graves, American Expeditionary Force in Siberia. Now Major in the Reserve Corps, U. S. A."
Alexiefsky had told Roger the story of his case. In the autumn of 1908, several Russians whom the Czar had exiled to Siberia as political prisoners made their escape and came to the United States. The Russian Government discovered this and engaged one of the leading New York law firms to secure the extradition of the refugees, which was demanded on the specious charge of murder. Secretary Root, in the midst of his many important duties, favored the extradition, and the papers were referred by the State Department to Attorney-General Bonaparte. Application for deportation was also made to me under the immigration laws.
Meanwhile several prominent men and women interested in the case—Miss Lillian Wald, of the Henry Street Settlement House, New York, and James Bronson Reynolds, chairman of the American Society for Russian Freedom, foremost among these—supplied the intelligence and the proof that these men were not criminals in any sense, but political refugees. When Roosevelt spoke to me about them, I told him that I had declined to deport them because it was clear to me that they were political refugees. At that moment Bonaparte joined us. Roosevelt requested him to return the papers in the case, and shortly directed that the men were not to be deported.
Roosevelt said he vividly recalled all this. His face beamed as he said: "Is n't that fine! Very fine! I'm delighted to hear it!"
"You did that," I said to him; "without your sustaining me these men would have been either extradited or deported, which would have meant death."
"Both of us did it; it's fine! I'm delighted to hear it," he commented, his face glowing with its usual vivacity.
The next day Roosevelt left the hospital to return to his home in Oyster Bay. He apparently gave every indication that soon he would be entirely well again and be with us for many years. Certainly that is what we all expected. He was only sixty.
Exactly two weeks later, on January 6, 1919, I received a telephone call at seven o'clock in the morning from Miss Striker, secretary to Mr. Roosevelt, announcing that he had died early that morning. For thirteen years or more he had had a large and affectionate share in our lives and thoughts, and Mrs. Straus and I felt as though we had been stricken with the loss of a member of our immediate family. I can truly say that I never had a more loyal or a dearer friend. He always treated me and mine as if we were among his nearest relatives.
On January 8th my wife, my son's wife, and I motored to Oyster Bay to attend the funeral in the little Episcopal Church. It had been Roosevelt's wish that he be buried from the little church that was the place of worship of his family. The building held only about three hundred and fifty persons, so that none but his family and close friends could be present. There was a committee from the United States Senate headed by Vice-President Marshall; a committee from the House; several former members of the Cabinet—Elihu Root, Truman H. Newberry, Henry L. Stimson, James R. Garfield, Mrs. Garfield, ex-President Taft, Governor Hughes. William Loeb, Jr., and Captain Archie Roosevelt were ushers. The other sons, Theodore and Kermit, were still in France. The church was filled with a company of sincere friends and bereaved mourners. The regular Episcopal service was begun at twelve-forty-five, and lasted about twenty-five minutes, when we all accompanied the body to the little cemetery on the side of the hill half a mile away.
Hardly a day passes without its scores of pilgrims to that grave. They come from near and far. Many lay flowers on the grave. On holidays and Sundays they come by the hundreds. Two years ago the intimate friends of Roosevelt, who had been officially or personally associated with him, formed the Roosevelt Pilgrimage, an association whose purpose is to keep alive the ideals and personality of Theodore Roosevelt by an annual visit to his grave and a simple ceremony. The idea and organization originated with Mr. E. A. Van Valkenburg of the Philadelphia "North American." On January 6, 1922, some sixty persons made the pilgrimage, headed by Dr. Lyman Abbott, permanent chairman of the association. James R. Garfield read Roosevelt's Nobel Peace Prize address, delivered in Christiania in 1910, at the conclusion of which some wreaths were laid on the grave. Mrs. Roosevelt invited us all to luncheon, and the old-time hospitality and friendliness of the Roosevelt home brought many memories of our departed leader.
After luncheon the annual meeting of the Pilgrimage took place in the great North Room, where Roosevelt had so often received his friends and guests. Dr. Abbott made a brief and feeling address, and Mrs. Richard Derby (Ethel Roosevelt) read from original manuscript Roosevelt's proclamation of 1912 which called into being the Progressive Party. Hermann Hagedorn read a poem entitled "The Deacon's Prayer," by Samuel Valentine Cole, which had especially appealed to Roosevelt. The last stanza of this poem is as follows:
"We want a man whom we can trust
To lead us where thy purpose leads;
Who dares not lie, but dares be just—
Give us the dangerous man of deeds!"
So prayed the deacon, letting fall
Each sentence from his heart; and when
He took his seat the brethren all,
As by one impulse, cried, "Amen!"