AN INTERVIEW WITH THE RIGHT HON. SIR CHARLES DILKE.
By Raymond Blathwayt.
No man in England, few even on the Continent, are better qualified than Sir Charles Dilke to judge of the merits or demerits of the other articles which have called forth so much criticism both here and on the Continent. With him these subjects have been a matter of life-long study; to their consideration he has devoted all the energies of a singularly clear and powerful mind. There are few men, even in these days when the balance of education is so much more even than it used to be in the past, who have so thoroughly, and from so scientific a point of view, grasped the great political problems which now confront the thoughtful men in all civilised nations. The splendid potentialities that lie within an energetic and resolute Imperialism; the knitting and welding together of the mother country with her colonies and dependencies, the accurate knowledge and estimation of the means of attack and defence that belong respectively to our own country, and to the great Continental Powers; these and many other of the great questions, a proper comprehension of which is absolutely essential to every well-trained, well-furnished statesman, have for many years received from Sir Charles Dilke the most careful thought and attention. No English statesmen and few soldiers, even on the Continent, know more of the relative strength and capacity of foreign armies than this quiet student and calm observer in Sloane Street.
THE RIGHT HON. SIR CHARLES DILKE.
To no better authority, therefore, could the clever and interesting brochure be submitted for judgment and criticism than Sir Charles.
A little older and greyer, a shade more thoughtful and careworn than when I last saw him some few years ago, upon the occasion of some political gathering, when he delivered a speech of much brilliance, and clear, well-defined, consecutive thought, he yet impressed me as he impressed me then, with a sense of wonderful versatility, and a plenitude of knowledge of the subject upon which I had come to talk.
‘I feel some little hesitation in replying to your request,’ he began, ‘but since the Editor is evidently anxious that I should do so, I will endeavour to give you my views as briefly and clearly as I can. Mind you, I don’t think it is either an easy or a gracious task to criticise the work of the brilliant staff of experts who have fought this Great War. Any strictures therefore that I may have to offer will deal entirely with generalities, or with political and military considerations; the details of the War seem to me to have been admirably carried out; and nothing else could have been expected, considering who are the men who have had part in it. Then, too, I feel that the Editor was justified, when he wanted to make a war, in making a war which lent itself to literary and dramatic treatment, instead of the war which might be more natural but less picturesque. One of my criticisms also goes to the root of the whole matter, and must necessarily seem a little by the way. It is that we are assured that a Great War ‘will probably occur in the immediate future.’ I do not think so, and have indeed, during all the alarms of the last seventeen years, been an obstinate believer in the probabilities of peace.’
‘In which the writers clearly differ from you, Sir Charles,’ I replied; ‘I was much struck, however, by the clever manner in which they caused the war to break out in a small, insignificant country like Bulgaria, and then spread like a prairie fire, till the whole world was in a blaze. Do you consider that was a good and probable beginning?’
‘Well,’ replied Sir Charles, as he leaned forward and began to rapidly sketch out a little map of the Continent, to which he made constant subsequent reference, ‘it was, perhaps, more ingenious than either scientific or probable. For my own part, I do not believe that the next great war, when it does come, will arise from events in the Balkan Peninsula. Of course, Russia can cause a war whenever she wishes to do so, but I don’t think she does so wish. The writers of this brochure state that they have striven to make the imaginary conflict spring from the most likely source of conflicts. They therefore chose Bulgaria, and I think with a good deal of reason from their point of view. But, for all that, Russia has pursued an adventurous and indefensible policy with regard to these States, and however irritating her conduct may have been, she means peace at heart. Therefore it is, I think, they are wrong.’
‘It is quite fair then, Sir Charles, that I should ask you where you would have applied the match, had you been writing this war?’
‘Quite fair,’ he replied, with a very genial laugh, as he placed his finger on the Franco-German frontier. ‘The most probable cause of a war, which I nevertheless think wholly improbable, will be a frontier incident between Germany and France, exaggerated by the newspapers, and subject to the difficulty, as between two great Powers of equal strength and spirit, of making excuses. It is easy for excuses to be made by one side when there is obvious disparity of strength, and when that side, whether the stronger or the weaker, does not desire to face the risks of war; but, as I have pointed out in an article on the French grand manœuvres of last year, neither side could now make such efforts for peace as were made by the Emperor William I. a few years ago, when frontier incidents of the kind to which I allude occurred.’
‘Very good, Sir Charles, your war would obviously have very materially differed from ours; but now, given the causes of ours, what do you think of the strategy supposed?’
‘There again,’ was the reply of this keen politician, and endeavour as best I might I could not puzzle him for a single moment, ‘there again I have a criticism to offer. I cannot see why Russia should attempt a descent near Varna, when a descent near Constantinople would so much better suit her purpose. The garrison of Constantinople is not, numerically speaking, a strong one. It is very deficient in effective field artillery, and its infantry, numbering perhaps 18,000 men, could not make much of a defence, unsupported as they are by a real system of land fortification, against a Russian rush from the Black Sea coast by land, accompanied by another landing on the Asiatic side, and a vigorous naval attack against the Therapia batteries.’
‘Talking of Turkey, Sir Charles, should we be certain of her as an ally if France joined Russia, and we supported Germany?’
‘By no means,’ was his emphatic reply; ‘although I grant you that actual temporary circumstances in the Mediterranean would have a great bearing on their attitude, the Turks would look to the possibilities of the moment. If we could terrorise them—yes; if not——’ and here my companion smilingly shook his head.
‘Was Black and White right in sending English troops to Belgium on the outbreak of a Franco-German war?’ I next asked.
‘I think not,’ slowly replied Sir Charles. ‘It is not likely that public opinion in England would force the British Government to such a course. And then again,’ he continued, ‘I think the writers wrong in another important movement. It seems incredible to me that the Russians should expose themselves to the three defeats which they met with in your War. It is much more probable, in my opinion, that when the time comes when they have to fight the battles described, against the Turks near Erzeroum, and against the Austrians on the Galician frontier, they will fight without having the young Emperor William at the same moment in the field against them. They will fight under conditions which will enable them to clear the Black Sea coast of the Turks and the Galician plain of the Austrian forces.’
‘And now, Sir Charles, quitting the storied “War of 189—” for a moment, I would like to ask you a question or two as to the character of the warfare of the future, the circumstances under which it will be carried out, the kind of men best suited for it. Smokeless powder will doubtless revolutionise all past methods of attack and defence, don’t you think so? Again, who will be the General of the future—the student Moltke or the dashing Skobeleff; the politician, the chemist, or the fighter?’
Sir Charles laughed outright as he replied: ‘Rather Moltke than Skobeleff, but not the politician,—and there is no real political soldier in France, for instance,—nor the chemist, nor the man of genius; but the cool-headed man, with plenty of force and of physical strength to stand the five or six days’ battles which will be the result of smokeless powder; dash won’t go for much. Few realise the changes that will be brought about by this smokeless powder. For instance, the officers will inevitably be picked off. The puzzle to me is how in such cases vast masses of men will be induced to advance without their leaders.’
‘And as to the ethical intent of our War?’ I queried, mindful of the severe strictures passed by worthy, but ultra-timid old ladies of either sex upon it when its noiseless cannon first disturbed the journalistic peace of Europe.
‘Oh,’ said Sir Charles, with an easy laugh, ‘I cannot see how your articles could do anything but good; certainly they have done no harm—that is, from a moral point of view; but, as regards certain other aspects of their teaching, I am not quite so certain. I am afraid that people will say only, “Here are great experts who give us the victory,” and will imagine, therefore, whatever you may say, that our state of preparation must be excellent, and our enormous expenditure upon defence not thrown away. It should be borne in mind that you have given us a victory in the Mediterranean by procuring for us an Italian alliance; but that there is, and always must be, a grave risk of our having some day to find ourselves at war with France, or with France and Russia without any European alliance, and on questions which do not interest Continental Powers. Again, the Poland resuscitation is prehistoric. If you leave out the aristocracy and a few townspeople, there is no part of the Russian Empire in which the Russian Government is less unpopular than in Poland, and no Polish force could be collected except one composed of nobles and that small middle-class which really consists of the little nobility. The capture of Sierra Leone by France was capital, for under the present circumstances it would be, of course, inevitable, and it is well that attention has been so ably called to this point, which involves grave risk to the Cape route. I cannot think, however, that the Canadian Pacific route is a very safe one to employ, as our enemies, by spending a little money in sparsely-settled portions of the United States, could easily break up the line by bands of hired raiders. And here my criticisms come to an end. But I would like to say again that in my opinion the War as conceived by your contributors has been admirably carried out. With few exceptions, the consequences flow well and naturally, and in perfect logical sequence from the foundation in facts.’
Printed by T. and A. Constable, Printers to Her Majesty, at the Edinburgh University Press.