FOOTNOTES:
[125] Not (as stated by Diehl vol. 2 p. 116, Zenker p. 61) 1852.
[126] Proudhon "Propriété" p. 295 [212. Bracketed references under Proudhon are to the collected edition of his "Œuvres complètes," Paris, 1866-83.—The passage quoted above is probably the first case in history where anybody called himself an Anarchist, though the word had long been in use as a term of reproach for enemies].
[127] Pr. "Justice" 1. 182-3 [1. 224-5].
[128] Pr. "Justice" 1. 184-5 [1. 227].
[129] Ib. 1. 73 [132? but there he says must be, not is].
[130] Ib. 1. 185 [1. 228].
[131] Ib. 1. 195 [1. 235].
[132] Ib. 1. 185 [1. 228].
[133] Pr. "Justice" 1. 195 [1. 235].
[134] Ib. 3. 45 [3. 276, but with the bracketed sentence much abridged. For the phrase "rebel against right," remember that in French right and common law are one and the same word].
[135] Pr. "Propriété" p. 18 [24-5].
[136] Pr. "Idée" 147-8 [136-7]
[137] Ib. 149 [138].
[138] Pr. "Idée" pp. 149-50 [138].
[139] Pr. "Principe" p. 64 [44].
[140] Pr. "Idée" p. 235 [215].
[141] Pr. "Principe" p. 64 [44].
[142] Pr. "Idée" p. 343 [312].
[143] Pr. "Idée" pp. 342-3 [311-12].
[144] Pr. "Confessions" p. 8 [29].
[145] Ib. p. 6 [23].
[146] Pr. "Propriété" p. 301 [216].
[147] Ib. pp. 298-9 [214].
[148] Pr. "Solution" p. 54 [39].
[149] Pr. "Confessions" p. 7 [24].
[150] Ib. p. 7 [25-6].
[151] Pr. "Propriété" p. 301 [216], "Confessions" p. 68 [192], "Solution" p. 119 [87].
[152] Pr. "Principe" p. 67 [46].—Proudhon's teaching was not, as asserted by Diehl vol. 2 p. 116, vol. 3 pp. 166-7, and Zenker p. 61, Anarchism till 1852 and Federalism thenceforward; his Anarchism was Federalism from the start, only he later gave it the additional name of Federalism.
[153] Pr. "Propriété" pp. XIX-XX [10-11].
[154] Pr. "Idée" pp. 235-6 [215-16].
[155] Pr. "Solution" p. 119 [87].
[156] Pr. "Propriété" pp. 301-2 [216].
[157] Pr. "Confessions" p. 65 [180-3; bracketed words a paraphrase.]
[158] Pr. "Confessions" pp. 65-6 [183-4, except bracketed words].
[159] Ib. pp. 66-8 [185-9].
[160] Pr. "Confessions" p. 68 [191-2].
[161] Pfau pp. 227-31, Adler p. 372, Zenker pp. 26, 41, fail to see this, being influenced by the improper sense in which Proudhon uses the word "property" for a contractually guaranteed share of goods. [Eltzbacher's statement, on the other hand, is not so much drawn from Proudhon himself as deduced from a comparison of Eltzbacher's definition of property with the statement that Proudhon admits no law but the law of contract. I do not think this last statement is correct; I think Proudhon would have his voluntary contractual associations protect their members in certain definable respects—among others, in the possession of goods—against those who stood outside the contract as well as against those within. Then this would be, by Eltzbacher's definitions, both law and property.]
[162] Pr. "Contradictions" 2. 303-4 [2. 237-8].
[163] Pr. "Propriété" pp. 285-90 [205-9].
[164] Pr. "Propriété" p. 293 [211].
[165] Ib. pp. 1-2 [13].
[166] Ib. p. 283 [204].
[167] Ib. p. 311 [223].
[168] Ib. p. 311 [223].
[169] Ib. p. 311 [223].
[170] Ib. pp. XVIII-XIX [10; consult the passage].
[171] Ib. pp. XIX-XX [11].
[172] Pr. "Contradictions" 2. 234-5 [2. 184].
[173] Pr. "Droit" p. 50 [230].
[174] Pr. "Justice" 1. 302-3 [1. 324-5].
[175] Ib. 303 [1. 325].
[176] Pr. "Idée" p. 235 [215]; "Principe" p. 64 [44].
[177] Pr. "Contradictions" 1. 51 [1. 74].
[178] Ib. 1. 53 [1. 75].
[179] Ib. 1. 55. [1. 76-7].
[180] Ib. 1. 68 [1. 87].
[181] Ib. 1. 68 [1. 87].
[182] Ib. 1. 83 [1. 98-9].
[183] Pr. "Justice" 1. 302-3 [1. 325].
[184] Pr. "Contradictions" 2. 528 [2. 414].
[185] Pr. "Organisation" p. 5 [93].
[186] Pr. "Banque" pp. 3-4 [260].
[187] Pr. "Justice" 1. 515 [2. 133].
[188] Ib. 1. 515 [2. 133].
[189] Pr. "Confessions" p. 71 [201].
[190] Pr. "Justice" 1, 515 [2, 133. Eltzbacher finds the sense "all will be enlightened" where I translate "everything will be cleared up." Eltzbacher's view of the sense—that to those who say "Enlightenment must come by the Revolution" Proudhon replies, "No, the Revolution must come by enlightenment"—correctly gives the thought brought out in the context].
[191] Pr. "Justice" 1. 466 [2. 90].
[192] Ib. 1. 470-71 [2. 94].
[193] Ib. 1. 515 [2. 133-4].
[194] Pr. "Confessions" p. 69 [196].
[195] Ib. p. 72 [203].
[196] Ib. p. 69 [196].
[197] Ib. p. 69 [196].
[198] Ib. pp. 69-70 [197].
[199] Pr. "Confessions" p. 70 [197-8].
[200] [French dictionaries leave us somewhat in the lurch as to commercial usages which differ from the English. Eltzbacher translates 8, "investment as silent partner"; 12, "balancing accounts.">[
[201] Pr. "Banque" pp. 5-20 [261-77].
[202] Pr. "Confessions" p. 72 [202-3].
[203] Pr. "Justice" 1. 509 [2. 128-9].
[204] Ib. 1. 510 [2. 129].
[205] Pr. "Idée" pp. 196-7 [181].
[206] Ib. p. 197 [181].
[207] Ib. p. 277 [253].
[208] Ib. pp. 195, 197 [180-81].
CHAPTER V
STIRNER'S TEACHING 1.—GENERAL
1. Johann Kaspar Schmidt was born in 1806, at Bayreuth in Bavaria. He studied philosophy and theology at Berlin from 1826 to 1828, at Erlangen from 1828 to 1829. In 1829 he interrupted his studies, made a prolonged tour through Germany, and then lived alternately at Koenigsberg and Kulm till 1832. From 1832 to 1834 he studied at Berlin again; in 1835 he passed his tests there as Gymnasiallehrer. He received no government appointment, however, and in 1839 became teacher in a young ladies' seminary in Berlin. He gave up this place in 1844, but continued to live in Berlin, and died there in 1856.
In part under the pseudonym Max Stirner, in part anonymously, Schmidt published a small number of works, mostly of a philosophical nature.
2. Stirner's teaching about law, the State, and property is contained chiefly in his book "Der Einzige und sein Eigentum" (1845).
—But here arises the question, Can we speak of such a thing as a "teaching" of Stirner's?
Stirner recognizes no ought. "Men are such as they should be—can be. What should they be? Surely not more than they can be! And what can they be? Not more, again, than they—can, i. e. than they have the ability, the strength, to be."[209] "A man is 'called' to nothing, and has no 'proper business,' no 'function,' as little as a plant or beast has a 'vocation.' He has not a vocation; but he has powers, which express themselves where they are, because their being consists only in their expression, and which can remain idle as little as life, which would no longer be life if it 'stood still' but for a second. Now one might cry to man, 'Use your power.' But this imperative would be given the meaning that it was man's proper business to use his power. It is not so. Rather, every one really does use his power, without first regarding this as his vocation; every one uses in every moment as much power as he possesses."[210]
Nay, Stirner acknowledges no such thing as truth. "Truths are phrases, ways of speaking, words (logos); brought into connection, or arranged by ranks and files, they form logic, science, philosophy."[211] "Nor is there a truth,—not right, not liberty, humanity, etc.,—which could subsist before me, and to which I would submit."[212] "If there is a single truth to which man must consecrate his life and his powers because he is man, then he is subjected to a rule, dominion, law, etc.; he is a man in service."[213] "As long as you believe in truth, you do not believe in yourself; you are a—servant, a—religious man. You alone are truth; or rather, you are more than truth, which is nothing at all before you."[214]
If one chose to draw the extreme inference from this, Stirner's book would be only a self-avowal, an expression of thoughts without any claim to general validity; in it Stirner would not be informing us what he thinks to be true, or what in his opinion we ought to do, but only giving us an opportunity to observe the play of his ideas. Stirner did not draw this inference,[215] and one should not let the style of the book, which speaks mostly of Stirner's "I," lead him to think that Stirner did draw it. He calls that man "blinded, who wants to be only 'Man'."[216] He takes the floor against "the erroneous consciousness of not being able to entitle myself to as much as I want."[217] He mocks at our grandmothers' belief in ghosts.[218] He declares that "penalty must make room for satisfaction,"[219] that man "should defend himself against man."[220] And he asserts that "over the door of our time stands not Apollo's 'Know thyself,' but a 'Turn yourself to account!'"[221] So Stirner intends not only to give us information about his inward condition at the time he composed his book, but to tell us what he thinks to be true and what we ought to do; his book is not a mere self-avowal, but a scientific teaching.
3. Stirner does not call his teaching about law, the State, and property "Anarchism." He prefers to use the epithet "anarchic" to designate political liberalism, which he combats.[222]
