SUMMING UP.
Mr. Justice Maule. Gentlemen of the Jury—Pedro de Zulueta is indicted for an offence against an Act of Parliament made for the prevention of the slave trade, for employing a vessel for the purpose of accomplishing objects declared to be illegal by that Act; that is to say, dealing in slaves, and also having loaded goods on board a vessel for that purpose.
Now, although this case has occupied a very considerable portion of time, I do not think it will be necessary for me to add much to it in the observations I shall think it necessary to make to you with respect to the evidence. It is not very long, and the points to which it goes are not very numerous—I mean the evidence on the substance of the charge. The case occupied about fifteen hours on Friday and Saturday, but the evidence did not occupy much above four hours. It will not be necessary for me to occupy much time in observations upon it, and I should think it will not be necessary for me to read over the evidence.
The offence, as I have told you, is put in these two shapes—the employing a vessel, and the loading goods for a purpose prohibited by the statute; that is, for the purpose of dealing in slaves. The charge is not, it does not necessarily import, nor is it necessary to support it, that it should be proved that the ship in question, the Augusta, was intended to be used for the conveyance of slaves from the coast of Africa. If there was a slave adventure—if there was an adventure of which the object was that slaves should be brought from the coast of Africa, that there should be slave trading there, and if this vessel was dispatched and employed for the purpose of accomplishing that object, although it was intended to accomplish that object otherwise than by bringing home the slaves in that vessel, that is within the Act of Parliament. So, if the goods were loaded for the purpose of accomplishing the slave trade—whether it was intended to bring back the slaves in the vessel in question, or that they should be brought away in some other vessel, or whether that was a matter left undecided at the commencement of the adventure, and to be determined according as matters might turn out to be convenient for the accomplishment of it—in any of these cases the crime charged in this indictment would be committed, the allegations in the indictment would be supported, and the prohibition of the Act of Parliament would be violated. The Act would have been very imperfect indeed, if it had prohibited slave trading and had not prevented any dealing of that description, except where the same vessel was to bring home the slaves; if, at all events, it went out for the purpose of carrying goods which were to be bartered for them. From one of the witnesses, who, in the course of his public duty was conversant with what takes place on this slave coast of Africa, we hear that it frequently happens that the slaves are got away by a different vessel from that which carries out the goods which formed the fund for their purchase. That is the nature of the offence.
Gentlemen, I do not think there will be any great difficulty in some of the preliminary questions you will have to decide upon this occasion. One is, whether the prisoner at the bar did at all dispatch, did at all employ this vessel, the Augusta, or did at all load any goods on board; because, though a person may employ a vessel and load goods—he may do that quite innocently—the fact, that he employed a vessel and loaded goods, is by no means conclusive of his guilt till you go further and show that he did it for the illegal purpose charged in the indictment. If it had not been shown that the prisoner at the bar did employ the vessel, or load the goods, the inquiry would have been stopped; for the purpose never could have been brought in question, and there would have been an end, or rather there would have been no beginning of this enquiry: but with respect to that branch of the case, there appears to have been no doubt made on the part of the prisoner that he did employ this vessel. He says he did it as the agent of Pedro Martinez & Co., and that he did it without knowing what the purpose was for which the vessel was employed, or whether it was employed in the slave trade; and that he did load the goods on board the ship—and there appears to be to the value of a good many thousand pounds, a considerable cargo (the value I get only from the cockets), a considerable quantity of goods. The vessel undoubtedly was dispatched with the knowledge of the prisoner and through his agency to carry goods to the coast of Africa. So much does not seem to be a matter in dispute.
Then the matters in dispute are two—one, whether this vessel was dispatched for the purpose of slave trading at all; if it was not, there is an end of all question. If it appears that there was no slave trading, or intention of slave trading, no person is guilty of the violation of the law charged in this indictment. There is no offence on the part of any one, if a slave adventure was not contemplated by the persons engaged in this transaction. Unless you decide that question in the affirmative, that is to say, unless you think there was such an adventure, there is no case made at all against the prisoner at the bar. It has been contended, and strenuously—not in a separate form, but mixed up with the other point in the case to which I will next draw your attention—it has been contended on the part of the prisoner, that there was no slave adventure, that the ship Augusta went to the Gallinas loaded in this way not for the purpose of dealing in slaves, or for any unlawful purpose, but that she went either for some lawful purpose, or else without any purpose of dealing at all: you will say whether there could be any such possibility. It has been contended that at any rate the ship did not go for the purpose of slave trading. If you are of opinion there was no slave trading contemplated, that that was not the object of the voyage, there is an end of that question; but, supposing you should think there was slave dealing intended, and the vessel went out for the purpose of slave dealing, then there is another important question—and that is the object of the evidence to character—whether, supposing there was a slave trading intended, the prisoner was cognizant of it?
It appears from the evidence, that the Gallinas is a place described by some witnesses of great experience—two captains in the navy, and Colonel Nichol, who was the governor of a district in the neighbourhood, whose employment was mainly to watch the slave coast of which the Gallinas forms a part, and to contribute to the putting down the slave trade—that the Gallinas is a place of slave trading, and of no other trade at all. It seems that the Gallinas is a river navigable for vessels of some size about twelve miles, that there were some barracoons for slaves which were destroyed by Captain Denman—destroyed, as it is alleged, by Captain Denman some time ago—there being about six establishments called barracoons, which seem to be very large buildings in which five or six hundred negroes may be confined, and are confined when brought from the country till they can be exported in vessels carrying on this trade. These barracoons have, by way of appendages to them, store-houses for the various stores that may be wanted for those negroes, and also some places of residence for the Europeans, who appear to be some thirty in number, who live there; there is nobody else living there, except that there are two or three negro villages or towns, not places of any trade, but inhabited by those uncivilised savages. The country produces nothing, and exports nothing but slaves—that is the description of the place given by that gentleman. It is said, and I think with great probability, that the Gallinas is not generally known as a slave trading place, in fact, it seems very little known at all; it seems to be a place where any other description of felons may resort to concert their schemes and hide their stolen goods, and which, of course, they do not make public, and which is not likely to be known by honest and true people. Except those employed as police or otherwise in aid of justice, as these captains were, of course it would not be spoken of at all. There might be slave traders in London knowing it very well, but they would be perfectly silent probably, and hardly mention it by name even in speaking one to another. It is very probable, therefore, that the place was not very well known; that when these persons spoke of the Gallinas, they might say the Gallinas on the coast of Africa; and a person might be very conversant with the geography of Africa in an honest way, who had not been active in putting down the slave trade, and yet might not know where it was, except that it was on the coast of Africa. It is important to show not only that it is on the coast of Africa, but that it is itself a slave trading place; and that fact appears to be very evident from the case on the part of the prosecution. Probably those honest persons, those honestly dealing persons who know best about it, are those who have been called upon by their public duty to ascertain it. Such persons have been called, and they give it this character and description, and they state that it is distinguished from other parts of the coast of Africa; for on other parts of that coast it is said slaves are sold as one article of export, but that other things, such as palm oil—I believe that is the principle thing—and ivory, and wood, and other things, are sold in immense quantities on the coast of Africa; but that that is not the case at the Gallinas. They might be carrying out goods to other parts of Africa, intending to bring home palm-oil or slaves, as might be most profitable; they might intend to bring home an honest commodity, and not have to do with this dishonest and perilous commodity; but it appears difficult to conceive what a person carrying a cargo of goods to the Gallinas could intend to do with it, unless he intended to have those goods employed in the slave trade. The prisoner might say they were to be employed by others in the slave trade; that would be plain and simple: it is wrong, but it is a plain and simple account of that which was intended to be done. It is a place, as it appears, without any trade; and if there be an obvious plain interest in a person carrying goods to that place, it appears to me that it may be taken that they were for the purpose of the slave trade. If that be the plain and obvious inference, it appears to me that might be the inference very properly drawn by Colonel Nichol, that this was a slave adventure, unless the contrary were proved.
It is possible that this might be an adventure, not slave trading; if so, nothing can be more simple than to prove it; Martinez & Co. might prove that it is an honest adventure. If it was a dishonest adventure, it could not be expected that Martinez & Co. should be called to give evidence at all; but if it were an innocent adventure it would be very easy for them to be called. It is true that persons are to be convicted, not by evidence they did not produce, but by evidence produced against them; not on suspicion, but on conviction; but where such evidence is offered of the trade being slave trading, as is offered here, namely, that the vessel was loaded with goods, that a cargo of goods was dispatched to a place where slave trading is the only known object for which vessels ever go, a slave mart and nothing but a slave mart, you have a case, though it is an answerable case; but if the answer, which if it exist could be easily given, is not given, it may very fairly be inferred that the vessel was proceeding on a slaving voyage, a voyage either for the purpose of bringing home slaves, or of landing those goods for the purchase of slaves. That, Gentlemen, is the first question you have to consider. You will say whether, considering the nature of this charge, and considering that the vessel is chartered to go from this place to the Gallinas, that being the place and the only place mentioned in the charter-party for the outward voyage, she might have been subsequently employed in voyages to the West Indies or Madeira, at the discretion of the charterers; but it will be for you to say whether, in your judgment, in your opinion, on this occasion the vessel did not sail for the purpose of her being employed, or the goods on board her being employed, for the trading in slaves. If you are not satisfied of that, it will be your duty to give a verdict of not guilty. You need not trouble yourselves to go further, but the prisoner must be acquitted.
Gentlemen, I have not read over to you the evidence which establishes these facts I have mentioned to you, namely, that the vessel was chartered. You have heard the charter-party, and you have heard what Mr. Zulueta says in his evidence, that he did dispatch the vessel, and that the house were the agents in sending the vessel abroad, and in putting the goods on board; and you have heard the remainder of the evidence. I suppose I need not read the evidence which the captains gave at such great length.
Foreman of the Jury. No, my Lord.
Mr. Justice Maule. These are facts not disputed, except that it is disputed that the vessel went out for the purpose of slave trading—that is an inference to be drawn or not from the evidence.
Then the next question, and an important question is, whether the prisoner at the bar, Pedro de Zulueta, is a person who was cognizant of that fact. It certainly is a very grave and serious charge, and one of a very highly penal nature. It is, however, a trade, which till a recent period was lawful for persons in this country, and many persons of very good character certainly did engage in that trade, and a great number of persons justified it. I suppose those same persons would now say it is not to be engaged in, because it is a prohibited thing—it is a regulation of trade enforced by very severe penalties made by this country—but that the dealing in slaves is in itself a lawful, right, good, and proper thing, which ought not to be prohibited. Those persons would now consider slave trading as a thing prohibited only by positive regulation. There is no one who does not at once perceive that practical distinction between them. There is no person who, in point of feeling and opinion, does not perceive the difference there is between a thing which is prohibited by positive law, and that kind of thing, against which, if there were no law at all against it, the plain natural sense and conscience of mankind would revolt. This trading in slaves, in the opinion of a great many persons, is itself an abomination, a thing which ought to be considered with the greatest horror, whether prohibited or not; but those who think it was right when it was not prohibited, probably do not think it so very bad if it be committed now, since it has been prohibited by law, only that it is to be avoided on account of the penalty to which it subjects the individuals engaged in it.
This has some bearing on the question of how far considerations of character would have weight with respect to such an offence; but it is necessary undoubtedly on the part of the prosecution that there should be a case made of knowledge on the part of the prisoner, of the purpose for which this adventure was meant. Now, with respect to that, it is taken partly from what he says before the Committee of the House of Commons, and partly what is given in evidence here, that the house of Zulueta & Co., (of which the prisoner appears to be an active member, and with the whole proceedings of which in this matter he appears certainly according to the statement he himself made to the Committee of the House of Commons to have been quite conversant)—and it is admitted that the house of Zulueta were the doers in this country of whatever was done with respect to this vessel, the Augusta—the Augusta had been called the Gollupchik, had been captured as a slaving vessel, and she was then fitted up with the apparatus fitted to that traffic; she was brought to this country and proceeded against, and ultimately sold, whether sold under a condemnation which turned out effectual or not does not distinctly appear. Some one has said that the Russian Government claimed her, and she was given up to the Russian Government. It appears, however, that she was sold at Portsmouth; I think she was sold to Mr. Emanuel, or some person for whom he acted, for 600l., and the expenses, which were about 30l. Then she was bought with money furnished by Zulueta & Co., the amount being 650l.—it does not exactly appear by whom—according to the testimony one would say, bought by Jennings, who was employed as captain on the voyage in question, a letter having been previously written by the prisoner’s house, stating to Jennings that they could not give more than 500l., but it appears that ultimately 660l. was paid for her. On the occasion on which that money was paid, the witness says, “I sold her to Jennings and Bernardos; Bernardos came with Jennings—they came together and paid the money.” Now, probably you must not take that quite to the letter. This was a ship sold, not by means of a written instrument as the subject of a British registry, but as any other British chattel might be sold, such and such a bale of goods, merely by agreement altogether verbally, that one should have the goods and the other the money, the article being handed over when it was so sold. All that the seller cares for is, that he shall have his money. Whether there are one or a dozen persons present he may very properly, as a matter of business, leave it to them whether one or all of them is to pay the money. The witness who is called, Mr. Emanuel, seems to have thought that Bernardos and the other bought the vessel; but it seems, according to the charter-party, that the other party, Jennings, is the only purchaser. According to a representation I think made at the bar by Mr. Kelly, the real purchasers were Pedro Martinez & Co., who wanted Jennings for some purpose to appear as colourable owner, and wanted Jennings to command the vessel. An Englishman could not by the laws of Spain command a Spanish owned vessel, and Jennings therefore, if he was to command her, should be apparently made the owner of her, and that is the reason suggested why Jennings was made the owner (if he was the owner) by the desire of Pedro Martinez & Co.
At the end of the charter-party there is a recital, that whereas the owner, Jennings, is indebted to the charterer in a certain sum of money, as appears by an acknowledgment elsewhere, he consents that the earnings of the vessel shall be a lien for the money. Now that refers you see to another document, which other document, if we had it, would throw some light upon the transaction, but it is not called for or produced. The circumstance of Jennings being the commander, and made owner for the purpose of being the commander in apparent consistency with the law of Spain, may account for that which has been put very powerfully on the part of the prisoner as having been inexplicable on the supposition that any slave trade was intended; for, they say, if the slave trade was intended, why not have a Spanish captain; because then, though perhaps within the terms of the treaties there might be a power of search on the part of British cruizers, no power was given by foreigners which was not watched by those who gave that power, and such power might be exceeded by those who exercised it, who were not lawyers or special pleaders; and it is said it would be much more convenient in case of search to have that difficulty thrown in the way than the total absence of all difficulty which exists when a ship professes to be British owned. But if Jennings was an adventurer, if he were, as suggested, a very clever and intelligent person, and very conversant with every thing to be done on this occasion, a competent master of the vessel, supposing the slave trade to be intended, a thing which requires qualities one is sorry to see exercised so ill—a great deal of courage, sagacity, and presence of mind, and an unscrupulous readiness to employ them for the commission of this felony, not to be found in every body—a man of such a description would be the paramount object of a slave trader, whose aim would be, whoever the owner may be, to elude all search, so to manage the thing as that the cruizers of any country shall not stop him. Probably, if the adventure succeeds, it must succeed by such means; so that one sees a perfectly good reason why, consistently with this being a slave trading voyage, it may have been English owned.
The sale is negotiated in the first instance by Zulueta & Co.; they say they do it for Martinez. The vessel was bought by Bernardos or Jennings. I do not know whether I called your attention to that, that Bernardos was the man who commanded the vessel on an undoubted slave voyage when she was seized and brought into Portsmouth. Whether Pedro Martinez or the captain bought the ship, or however it was bought, that transaction appears to have been managed by Zulueta & Co., and through the intervention of Jennings.
Then there comes the transaction of chartering. The vessel was chartered subject to this proviso at the end of it, and the charter-party is negotiated entirely by Zulueta. Whatever Pedro Martinez & Co., supposing there were such persons (and it may be taken that there were such persons, though the evidence of there being such persons is, that Mr. Zulueta says so in his evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, and it is a fact the negative of which could easily have been proved, but it has not been proved); you may fairly assume, therefore, that there are such persons as Pedro Martinez & Co., for that observation of the learned counsel for the prisoner on the statement of Mr. Zulueta before the Committee is as far as it applies to that particular part of the evidence well founded, namely, that if it were not true the contrary might be proved; but that is not true in the generality to which Mr. Kelly applied it, for there might be a great many statements in that evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons which were not true, but which the prosecutor would not be allowed to prove were not true—I mean those not connected with this particular transaction. There are many things stated in that evidence, which I apprehend, if false, the prosecutor would not be entitled to prove the falsehood of; but I apprehend that does not apply to the existence of Pedro Martinez & Co. But they appear to have existed and to have employed as their agents in this country Pedro Zulueta & Co., and whatever is done in this country by Pedro Martinez is done by Pedro Zulueta & Co. just as much as if they had done it themselves; they knew as much about the matter as the parties themselves; they negotiated this charter-party, and they dispatched the vessel and put on board all the goods. The goods appear by the cockets to have been entered in the name of Captain Jennings; I do not know that that is a circumstance of any suspicion; it is not proved to be out of the way, and I do not see any good reason for suspecting the integrity of the transaction arising out of that particular circumstance. It seems to me, therefore, that Zulueta & Co. do stand in a very different situation from that put a considerable number of times to you by the learned counsel for the prisoner, namely, the situation of a person who is simply the manufacturer or dealer in goods, and who has those goods ordered, such a weight of gunpowder, and who inquiring, “Where shall I send it?” is answered, “Send it on board the Augusta, now lying at Liverpool.” It would be a strong thing from that circumstance to infer that a person sending that gunpowder had any thing to do with slave trading: but that appears not to be the nature of this transaction. In regard to there being a slave trading, all that is done, is done by Zulueta & Co. It is not merely that they had goods sent on board the ship, but they chose the number of the goods to be sent on board the ship—goods which they had bought, for which they had negotiated, and they made out such charter-party, and that charter-party provides that the ship shall proceed to Gallinas, on the coast of Africa.
Gentlemen, that is I think pretty nearly all the evidence that there is in the case. You have the evidence of the captains on the subject. If you think that this was a slaving voyage, you will consider the conduct of Zulueta & Co. in buying, and chartering, and loading it, and dispatching it. Now, Zulueta & Co. are shown to be merchants with very extensive connexions and concerns, and the prisoner particularly is a person of great knowledge and education, and generally speaking one would say that as merchants, though that is a matter for you to consider, I do not know that I can put it higher than this, that they are persons of great skill and great experience. The prisoner had the whole management and direction of the voyage to a particular place to carry goods to that place, that being a place not without suspicion; the vessel itself also being a vessel which had been used for the slave trade, though it might be innocently used afterwards; but, still your attention has been directed to that circumstance, and it has been particularly directed to the circumstance that every thing applicable to slave apparatus was ordered to be removed before the vessel was dispatched. That would be a thing of course to be done, whether the vessel was going on a slave expedition or not, for as has been suggested, the officers of Government always examine a vessel, particularly on going to the coast of Africa. With a view to this, I should think it would be quite a matter of course, even if the vessel was intended to be sent to promote the slave trade, that she should not go out with shackles or leagers, or any thing of that kind on board, for if they are on board, the vessel would be at the mercy of any Custom-house officer; it would be quite advertising the adventure. And there being found these shackles and these leagers on board the vessel at Portsmouth, and their being so dealt with, I do not think at all helps on the case for the prosecution, for the vessel undoubtedly had been a slave vessel, it had been fitted up with these things, and would naturally have them on board her, and as naturally, whether she was intended to be sent out on a slave expedition or not, these things would be taken from on board her; and you find that they were taken from on board. The fact of their having been on board, when the schoolmaster and the cooper saw them on board, does not appear to me to be any thing against her, for she had been a slave vessel. On the other hand, the circumstance of their being taken out and landed before she sailed on her voyage does not appear to be any thing for her, for both these circumstances would have taken place whether the voyage was an innocent or a guilty voyage; those circumstances, in my opinion, have no bearing on the question. Whether the vessel was intended to be engaged in slave trading or not, that is a point I have already put to you in considering whether the voyage was a slave voyage, or for the accomplishment of the slave trade. I did not before advert to the circumstance of these things being on board, and I mention it now only, as it has a sort of colourable look, to show why it is I do not lay any stress upon it.
I was observing that though people in general might not be well aware of this trade being intended to be carried on, yet persons not extremely simple, but skilful people, may be fairly taken to know what the object is with which a voyage is undertaken when they themselves are the agents, supplying, chartering, loading, and dispatching a ship for the voyage. It may be that the object may be concealed from them, or that they may not know that this voyage to the Gallinas was a slaving expedition. A simple person, who knew nothing about these matters and had not some special acquaintance with the trade, might know nothing at all about it, they might not know the nature of the trade carried on at this place. The mention of Gallinas on the coast of Africa would not convey to the mind of an ordinary person that it was to a mere den where this traffic and nothing else was carried on; but this vessel is sent to the Gallinas by these gentlemen, who are very skilful persons, who negotiate the whole transaction. Now, it may very generally be taken that people know what they are about, unless they can show there was some particular concealment, some hinderance to their knowing to this extent that this was a place connected with the slave trade, and so exclusively engaged in the slave trade as it really seems to be; but, supposing that a case is made which requires an answer, if it is shown that there was a slave trade, and that a person did employ a vessel in that business, and did load it for that business, that certainly is a case raising some degree of presumption against the person who has been engaged, and one would be very glad if the case were of a description in which it had been met by a decisive answer in point of fact.
It is said on the part of the prisoner, first, that this was not a slaving voyage. Now, if it had been a slaving voyage—it is possible that there might be a case, which unless fairly answered would lead to the presumption that that was the object—in which an answer might exist, but where it would be impossible for the prisoner to get it, you would feel a difficulty in acting on such a case; but in the present case, supposing that this was not a slaving expedition, the answer exists, and the answer might be given with the greatest ease. There appears to me no reason why it should not be given. The house of Martinez & Co. have a house at Cadiz, and a house at the Havannah, and if they did not send this vessel for the purpose of the slave trade, and they were quite innocent in this matter, any one of them or their clerks might with the greatest ease be called. There is no deficiency of funds here, and it would put an end to all question if they could say, “This was not for the slave trade; these goods were to be employed for—and then they might fill up the blank, I do not know how, but by some words expressing an innocent purpose, and that would be a full answer; but there is an absence of all answer that bears on the question whether there was slave trading intended or not.
Now, supposing you should be of opinion that there was no slave trading intended, there is an end of the case. I think you may perhaps be of opinion this vessel was intended for slave trading. Supposing you are of that opinion, then you come to that which is the anxious and important question, namely, whether the prisoner was cognizant of that fact. It is alleged that the prisoner is not the exclusive manager of the concerns of the house; it is not very likely he should be; he appears to have been fully cognizant of this particular matter; and, supposing that considering the exclusive part taken by these gentlemen in this transaction of dispatching the vessel, supposing you should think that a case requiring an answer, then you will consider whether it should not have an answer, if one exists. Now, it appears that the prisoner is not exclusively cognizant of all the transactions of this house. There are two other partners; there are—though it is not in evidence, but it may be presumed that there are—clerks and persons employed in the house of Zulueta, all or any of whom might have been called. It is alleged that the profit on this transaction would be extremely small. I do not think that the petty gain of this one transaction is the matter, for it appears that Pedro Martinez & Co. do a great deal of business, and it is possible that whenever persons have a large and valuable business to conduct, there is some small portion that the correspondent and agent would willingly get rid of if he could; but he is not allowed to pick and choose, but he must take the whole. That is one of the grounds they put; the other is as to character.
Now, inasmuch as there are two other partners, and it is probable there might be some other persons in the concern, there arises this consideration. It is true, supposing that there were a case made, but that the prisoner was innocent of it, that he could not call Martinez & Co. on that supposition as he might on the supposition of there being no slave trading, for Martinez & Co. would not be innocent persons, and they would not be willing to come into this country and say, “We carried on the slave trading, but it was disguised from our correspondent Zulueta & Co.” If you think there is a case requiring an answer, the question then is, would there have been any difficulty in the prisoner calling his two partners and others conversant with the business of the firm, and proving that Zulueta & Co. knew nothing at all about this, that they had not the least suspicion, that Martinez & Co. never communicated the fact to them, and that the illegal purpose was utterly unknown to them, for some reasons which the prisoner cannot give, but which his partners could? It would be extremely desirable they should do it, if the defence existed in point of fact.
Supposing the case made to require an answer, there are two modes of answering a charge. The one is, that of calling a great number of persons to prove that it was unlikely, from the high character of the firm, that they should engage in such a transaction; that is one. Another mode, is calling three or four persons, who if he were guilty must know it, and who will prove that he was not. The former of these modes has been adopted on this occasion. You have, however, the case before you. I do not think it necessary to go any further into the evidence, having, I conceive, stated the effect of it sufficiently. If you are satisfied that there was a slave trading, you will consider whether Zulueta, the prisoner, was cognizant of it, and shipped these goods, and dispatched the ship for the purpose of accomplishing the object of slave trading; and then, in considering that, you will consider the observations, as far as they are entitled to attention, and the evidence of the very high character of the prisoner—a character I should say very strong indeed, and almost conclusive, supposing the case were one that did not admit of an answer in point of fact. If he has the means of showing that he did not do that with which he is charged, and he only says, I will prove that I am extremely unlikely to do it; I do not say how far you should give weight to that sort of evidence. You ought to be well satisfied of a fact of this sort, before you find him guilty of such a charge as this.
Foreman of the Jury. We beg to retire, my Lord.
A Juryman. May we find on any particular count?
Mr. Justice Maule. You will consider the charge as that of employing a vessel, or loading goods on board, for the purpose of accomplishing the slave trade. The great question is, the knowledge and intention of the prisoner. If the thing was done with his knowledge and intention, and it was for the purpose of slave trading, there is no doubt that he bought and dispatched the ship, and loaded the goods. I do not see why you should trouble yourselves with any particular count.
[The Jury withdrew at Twenty Minutes before Twelve, and returned into Court at Ten Minutes after One, finding a verdict of “Not Guilty.”
Mr. Serjeant Bompas. My Lord, there is another indictment against the prisoner for a misdemeanour. It appears to me that it involves necessarily the very same question, and therefore, as far as I can judge of it, and of course with the authority of the prosecutor, I feel that it would be wrong to put the prisoner again on his trial for that offence. It seems to me that it will depend upon the same evidence, and I cannot but conclude that the Jury will come to the same conclusion. I will take the opportunity of saying one word. Observations having been made with respect to myself when the former case was going on, when I could not interfere, I can merely say, that with regard to myself, the prosecutor, and of every person connected with the prosecution, there was no possible fact or document which I could have admitted, which could have done the prisoner the slightest benefit.
Mr. Justice Maule. That observation was made in Mr. Kelly’s address.
Mr. Serjeant Bompas. It was impossible we could have any view but that the Jury should have the whole before them, and we rejoice in the result.
Mr. Kelly. With regard to what has fallen from my learned friend, Mr. Serjeant Bompas, I am greatly obliged to my learned friend for making that observation to his Lordship. As far as respects that part of what has fallen from my learned friend, which respected the other indictment, it will be desirable in the course of the present session—I do not say to-day or to-morrow—but in the course of the present session, to empannel a Jury, and that the prisoner, Mr. Zulueta, should be acquitted in respect of that indictment. With regard to the other observation which has fallen from my learned friend, I beg to assure him, which I do with the utmost possible sincerity, that I never intended to say any thing which could be construed in the slightest degree as disrespectful to him. There is no gentleman at the bar less deserving of any disrespectful observation than my learned friend.
Mr. Serjeant Bompas. Your observations were made in public, and therefore I felt it necessary to say what I did. Your Lordship will order the expenses to be paid?
Mr. Justice Maule. Certainly: I think that it was a very proper case for inquiry. The most convenient course will be just to swear the Jury in the second case, and take a verdict.
Mr. Serjeant Bompas. If the Jury have no objection.
The Jury were sworn to try the Indictment for Conspiracy.
(The Jury were charged with the Prisoner in the usual way.)
Mr. Serjeant Bompas. Gentlemen, you have heard what I stated to the learned Judges. The case has been already before you, and I am quite satisfied with your decision; you will, therefore, find the prisoner Not Guilty.
The Jury immediately pronounced the Prisoner “Not Guilty.”
LONDON:
C. WOOD & CO., PRINTERS, POPPIN’S COURT, FLEET STREET.