FURTHER REASONS WHY UNITY IS NOT A CATEGORY.
Consequently, in speaking of (beings) other than (essence itself), as, for instance, of man, we say simply "man" (without adding to it the idea of unity[312]); if however we say "a man," it is to distinguish him from two; if however we use the word one in still another sense, it is by adding to it "some" (as, "someone"). Not so is it with essence; we say, "being one," conceiving of "being" ("essence") and one, as if forming a single whole, and in positing essence as one, we emphasize its narrow affinity with the Good. Thus conceived, essence becomes one;[313] and in the one finds its origin and goal. Nevertheless it is not one as unity itself, but rather in a different manner, in this sense that the (unity of essence) admits priority and posteriority. What then is (the unity of essence)? Must it not then be considered similar in all the parts (of essence), as something common to all (and consequently, as forming a genus)? But in the first place, the point is also something common to all the lines, and nevertheless it is not a genus; in the numbers, unity is something common to all, and is not any more of a genus. Indeed, the unity which is found in the monad, in the dyad (or pair), and in other numbers, cannot be confused with unity in itself. Then, nothing hinders there being in essence some anterior, and other posterior parts, both simple and compound ones (which would be impossible for the One in itself). Even if the unity found everywhere in all the parts of essence were everywhere identical, by the mere fact that it would offer no difference, it could not give rise to species, and consequently, it could not be a genus.
BY TENDING TOWARDS THE ONE, EVERYTHING TENDS TOWARDS THE GOOD.
12. We therefore assert (that by moving towards unity everything moves towards the Good). How can it be, however, that Goodness should consist in coming closer to unity, even for number, which is inanimate?[314] This question might as well be asked about any inanimate object whatever. If we were told that such (beings) do not enjoy (existence), we might answer that we are here treating of beings according to their proximity to unity only. If, for instance, we were asked how a point can participate in the Good, we might answer by a retort, asking whether we are dealing with the Point in itself. Then we would answer by the observation that the state of affairs was the same for all things of the same kind. If however we were pressed about the point considered as existing in some object, as, for instance, in the circle, we would answer that for such a point, the Good is the good of the circle (of which it forms part); that such is the Good towards which it aspires, and that it seeks that as far as possible through the intermediation of the circle.