UNION OF THE SOUL AND THE BODY.
Ammonius, teacher of Plotinos, thus explained the present problem (the union of soul and body): "The intelligible is of a nature such that it unites with whatever is able to receive it, as intimately as the union of things, that mutually alter each other in uniting, though, at the same time, it remains pure and incorruptible, as do things that merely coexist.[367] Indeed, in the case of bodies, union alters the parts that meet, since they form new bodies; that is how elements change into composite bodies, food into blood, blood into flesh, and other parts of the body. But, as to the intelligible, the union occurs without any alteration; for it is repugnant to the nature of the intelligible to undergo an alteration in its essential nature. It disappears, or it ceases to be, but it is not susceptible of change. Now the intelligible cannot be annihilated; otherwise it would not be immortal; and as the soul is life, if it changed in its union with the body, it would become something different, and would no longer be life. What would the soul afford to the body, if not life? In her union (with the body, therefore), the soul undergoes no alteration.
Since it has been demonstrated that, in its essential nature, the intelligible is immutable, the necessary result must be that it does not alter at the same time as the entities to which it is united. The soul, therefore, is united to the body, but she does not form a mixture with it.[368] The sympathy that exists between them shows that they are united; for the entirely animated being is a whole that is sympathetic to itself, and that is consequently really one.[369]
What proves that the soul does not form a mixture with the body, is the soul's power to separate from the body during sleep; leaving the body as it were inanimate, with only a breath of life, to keep it from dying entirely; using her own activity only in dreams, to foresee the future, and to live in the intelligible world.
This appears again when the soul gathers herself together to devote herself to her thoughts; for then she separates from the body so far as she can, and retires within herself better to be able to apply herself to the consideration of intelligible things. Indeed, being incorporeal, she unites with the body as closely as the union of things which by combining together perish because of each other, (thus giving birth to a mixture); at the same time, she remains without alteration, as two things that are only placed by each others' side; and she preserves her unity. Thus, according to her own life, she modifies that to which she is united, but she is not modified thereby. Just as the sun, by its presence, makes the air luminous, without itself changing in any way, and thus, so to speak, mingles itself therewith, without mingling itself (in reality), so the soul, though united with the body, remains quite distinct therefrom. But there is this difference, that the sun, being a body, and consequently being circumscribed within a certain space, is not everywhere where is its light; just as the fire dwells in the wood, or in the wick of the lamp, as if enclosed within a locality; but the soul, being incorporeal, and not being subjected to any local limitation, exists as a whole everywhere where her light is; and there is no part of the body that is illuminated by the soul in which the soul is not entirely present. It is not the body that commands the soul; it is the soul, on the contrary, that commands the body. She is not in the body as if in a vase or a gourd; it is rather the body that is in the soul.[370]
The intelligible, therefore, is not imprisoned within the body; it spreads in all the body's parts, it penetrates them, it goes through them, and could not be enclosed in any place; for by virtue of its nature, it resides in the intelligible world; it has no locality other than itself, or than an intelligible situated still higher. Thus the soul is within herself when she reasons, and in intelligence when she yields herself to contemplation. When it is asserted that the soul is in the body, it is not meant that the soul is in it as in a locality; it is only meant that the soul is in a habitual relation with the body; and that the soul is present there, as we say that God is in us. For we think that the soul is united to the body, not in a corporeal and local manner, but by the soul's habitual relations, her inclination and disposition, as a lover is attached to his beloved. Besides, as the affection of the soul has neither extension, nor weight, nor parts, she could not be circumscribed by local limitations. Within what place could that which has no parts be contained? For place and corporeal extension are inseparable; the place is limited space in which the container contains the contained. But if we were to say, "My soul is then in Alexandria, in Rome, and everywhere else;" we would be still speaking of space carelessly, since being in Alexandria, or in general, being somewhere, is being in a place; now the soul is absolutely in no place; she can only be in some relation with some place, since it has been demonstrated that she could not be contained within a place. If then an intelligible entity "be in relation with a place, or with something located in a place, we say, in a figurative manner, that this intelligible entity is in this place, because it tends thither by its activity; and we take the location for the inclination or for the activity which leads it thither. If we were to say, That is where the soul acts, we would be saying, "The soul is there."
B. NOTICE OF AMMONIUS BY HIEROCLES.[371]
Then shone the wisdom of Ammonius, who is famous under the name of "Inspired by the Divinity." It was he, in fact, who, purifying the opinions of the ancient philosophers, and dissipating the fancies woven here and there, established harmony between the teaching of Plato, and that of Aristotle, in that which was most essential and fundamental.... It was Ammonius of Alexandria, the "Inspired by the Divinity," who, devoting himself enthusiastically to the truth in philosophy, and rising above the popular notions that made of philosophy an object of scorn, clearly understood the doctrine of Plato and of Aristotle, gathered them into a single ideal, and thus peacefully handed philosophy down to his disciples Plotinos, the (pagan) Origen, and their successors.
[PLOTINIC STUDIES IN SOURCES, DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCE.]
[I. DEVELOPMENT IN THE TEACHINGS OF PLOTINOS.]
It was only through long hard work that the writer arrived at conclusions which the reader may be disposed to accept as very natural, under the circumstances. It is possible that the reader may, nevertheless, be interested in the manner in which the suggestion here advanced was reached.
The writer had for several years been working at the premier edition of the fragments of Numenius, in reasonably complete form, with translation and outline. After ransacking the accessible sources of fragments, there remained yet an alleged treatise of Numenius on Matter, in the library of the Escoreal, near Madrid. This had been known to savants in Germany for many years; and Prof. Uzener, of Bonn, in his criticism of Thedinga's partial collection of fragments, had expressed a strong desire that it be investigated; it had also been noticed by Zeller, and Bouillet, as well as Chaignet. If then I hoped to publish a comparatively reliable collection of the fragments of Numenius, it was my duty, though hailing from far America, and though no European had shown enough interest therein to send for a photographic copy, to go there, and get one, which I did in July, 1913. I bore the precious fragment to Rostock and Prof. Thedinga in Hagen, where, however, we discovered that it was no more than a section of Plotinos's Enneads, iii. 6.6 to end. The manuscript did, indeed, show an erasure of the name of Plotinos, and the substitution of that of Numenius. After the first disappointment, it became unavoidable to ask the question why the monk should have done that. Had he any reason to suppose that this represented Numenian doctrine, even if it was not written by Numenius? Having no external data to go by, it became necessary to resort to internal criticism, to compare this Plotinian treatment of matter with other Plotinian treatments, in other portions of the Enneads.
This then inevitably led to a close scrutiny of Plotinos's various treatments of the subject, with results that were very much unlooked for. This part that we might well have had reason to ascribe to Numenian influence, on the contrary, turned out to be by far more Plotinian than other sections that we would at first have unhesitatingly considered Plotinian, and, as will be seen elsewhere, the really doubtful portions occur in the very last works of Plotinos's life, where it would have been more natural to expect the most genuine. However, the result was a demonstration of a progress in doctrines in the career of Plotinos, and after a careful study thereof, the reader will agree that we have in this case every element of probability in favor of such a development; indeed, it will seem so natural that the unbiased reader will ask himself why this idea has not before this been the general view of the matter.
*****
First a few words about the distinction of periods in general. Among unreflecting people, for centuries, it has been customary to settle disputes by appeals to the Bible as a whole. This was always satisfactory, until somebody else came along who held totally different views, which he supported just as satisfactorily from the same authority. The result was the century-long bloody wars of the Reformation, everywhere leaving in that particular place, as the orthodox, the stronger. Since thirty years, however, the situation has changed. The contradictions of the Bible, so long the ammunition of scoffers of the type of Ingersoll, became the pathfinders of the Higher Criticism, which has solved the otherwise insoluble difficulties by showing them to rest on parallel documents, and different authors. It is no longer sufficient to appeal to Isaiah; we must now specify which Isaiah we mean; and we may no longer refer to the book of Genesis, but to the Jehovistic or Elohistic documents.
This method of criticism is slowly gaining ground with other works. The writer, for instance, applied it with success to the Gathas, or hymns of Zoroaster. These appear in the Yasnas in two sections which have ever given the editors much trouble. Either they were printed in the meaningless traditional order, or they were mixed confusedly according to the editor's fancy, resulting of course in a fancy picture. The writer, however, discovered they were duplicate lives of Zoroaster, and printing them on opposite pages, he has shown parallel development, reducing the age-long difficulties to perfectly reasonable, and mutually confirming order.
Another case is that of Plato. It is still considered allowable to quote the authority of Plato, as such; but in scientific matters we must always state which period of Plato's activities, the Plato of the Republic, or the more conservative Plato of the Laws, and the evil World-soul, is meant.
Another philosopher in the same case is Schelling, among whose views the text-books distinguish as many as five different periods. This is no indication of mental instability, but rather a proof that he remained awake as long as he lived. No man can indeed continue to think with genuineness without changing his views; and only men as great as Bacon or Emerson have had the temerity to discredit consistency when it is no more than mental inertia.
There are many other famous men who changed their views. Prominent among them is Goethe, whose Second Faust, finished in old age, strongly contrasted with the First Part. What then would be inherently unlikely in Plotinos's changing his views during the course of half a century of philosophical activity? On the contrary, it would be a much greater marvel had he not done so; and the burden of proof really lies with the partisans of unchanging opinions.
For example: in ii. 4 we find Plotinos discussing the doctrine of two matters, the physical and the intelligible. In the very next book, of the same Ennead, in ii. 5.3, we find him discrediting this same intelligible matter. Moreover, in i. 8.7, he approves of the world as mixture; in ii. 4.7 he disapproves of it. What do these contradictions mean? That Plotinos was unreliable? That he was mentally incoherent? No, something much simpler. By consulting the tables of Porphyry, we discover of the first two, that the first statement was made during the Amelian period, and the latter during the Porphyrian. Another case of such contradiction is his assertion of positive evil (i. 8) and his denial thereof (ii. 9). The latter assertion is of the Porphyrian period, the former is Eustochian; while of the latter two, the first was Eustochian; and the second Amelian. It is simply a case of development of doctrines at different periods of his life.
*****
Let us now examine Plotinos's various treatments of the subject of matter.
The first treatment of matter occurs in the first Ennead, and it may be described as thoroughly Numenian, being treated in conjunction with the subject of evil. First, we have the expression of the Supreme hovering over Being.[372] Then we have the soul double,[373] reminding us of Numenius's view of the double Second Divinity[374] and the double soul.[375] Then we have positive evil occurring in the absence of good.[376] Plotinos[377] opposes the Stoic denial of evil, for he says, "if this were all," there were no evil. We find a threefold division of the universe without the Stoic term hypostasis, which occurs in the treatment of the same topic elsewhere.[378] Similar to Numenius is the King of all,[379] the blissful life of the divinities around him,[380] and the division of the universe into three.[381] Plotinos[382] acknowledges evil things in the world, something denied by the Stoics,[383] but taught by Numenius, as is also original, primary existence of evil, in itself. Evil is here said to be a hypostasis in itself, and imparts evil qualities to other things. It is an image of being, and a genuine nature of evil. Plotinos describes[384] matter as flowing eternally, which reminds us unmistakably of Numenius's image[385] of matter as a swiftly flowing stream, unlimited and infinite in depth, breadth, and length. Evil inheres in the material part of the body,[386] and is seen as actual, positive, darkness, which is Numenian, as far as it means a definite principle.[387] Plotinos also[388] insists on the ineradicability of evil, in almost the same terms as Numenius,[389] who calls on Heraclitus and Homer as supporters. Plotinos[390] as reason for this assigns the fact that the world is a mixture, which is the very proof advanced by Numenius in 12. Plotinos, moreover,[391] defines matter as that which remains after all qualities are abstracted; this is thoroughly Numenian.[392]
In the fourth book of the Second Ennead the treatment of matter is original, and is based on comparative studies. Evil has disappeared from the horizon; and the long treatment of the controversy with the Gnostics[393] is devoted to explaining away evil as misunderstood good. Although he begins by finding fault with Stoic materialism,[394] he asserts two matters, the intelligible and the physical. Intelligible matter[395] is eternal, and possesses essence. Plotinos goes on[396] to argue for the necessity of an intelligible, as well as a physical substrate (hypokeimenon). In the next paragraph[397] Plotinos seems to undertake a historical polemic, against three traditional teachers (Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus) under whose names he was surely finding fault with their disciples: the Stoics, Numenius, and possibly such thinkers as Lucretius. Empedocles is held responsible for the view that elements are material, evidently a Stoical view. Anaxagoras is held responsible for three views, which are distinctly Numenian: that the world is a mixture,[398] that it is all in all,[399] and that it is infinite.[400] We might, in passing, notice another Plotinian contradiction in here condemning the world as mixture, approved in the former passage.[401] As to the atomism of Democritus, it is not clear with which contemporaries he was finding fault. Intelligible matter reappears[402] where we also find again the idea of doubleness of everything. As to the terms used by the way, we find the Stoic categories of Otherness or Variety[403] and Motion; the conceptual seminal logoi, and the "Koinê ousia" of matter; but in his psychology he uses "logos" and "noêsis," instead of "nous" and "phronesis," which are found in the Escorial section, and which are more Stoical. We also find the Aristotelian category of energy, or potentiality.
In the very next book of the same Ennead,[404] we find another treatment of matter, on an entirely different basis, accented by a rejection of intelligible matter.[405] Here the whole basis of the treatment of matter is the Aristotelian category of "energeia" and "dunamis," or potentiality and actuality, Although we find the Stoic term hypostasis, the book seems to be more Numenian, for matter is again a positive lie, and the divinity is described by the Numenian double name[406] of Being and Essence ("ousia" and "to on").
We now come to the Escorial section.[407] This is by far the most extensive treatment of matter, and as we are chiefly interested in it in connection with its bearing the name of Numenius at the Escorial, we shall analyze it for and against this Numenian authorship, merely noting that the chief purpose is to describe the impassibility of matter, a Stoic idea.
For Numenius as author we note:
a. A great anxiety to preserve agreement with Plato, even to the point of stretching definitions.[408]
b. Plato's idea of participation, useless to monistic Stoics, is repeatedly used.[409] Numenius had gone so far as to assert a participation, even in the intelligibles.[410]
c. Matter appears as the curse of all existent objects.[411] It also appears as mother.[412]
d. Try as he may, the author of this section cannot escape the dualism so prominent in Numenius;[413] the acrobatic nature of his efforts in this direction are pointed out elsewhere. We find here a thoroughgoing distinction between soul and body, which is quite Numenian, and dualistic.[414]
e. Matter is passive, possessing no resiliency.[415]
f. We find an argument directed[416] against those who "posit being in matter." These must be the Stoics, with whom Numenius is ever in feud.
g. Of Numenian terms, we find "sôteria,"[417] God the Father.[418] Also the double Numenian name for the Divinity, Being and Essence.[419]
Against Numenius as author, we note:
a. The general form of the section, which is that of the Enneads, not the dialogue of Numenius's Treatise on the Good. We find also the usual Plotinic interjected questions.
b. Un-Numenian, at least, is matter as a mirror,[420] and evil as merely negative, merely unaffectability to good.[421] While Numenius speaks of matter as nurse and feeder, here we read nurse and receptacle.
c. Stoic, is the chief subject of the section, namely the affectibility of matter. Also, the allegoric interpretation of the myths, of the ithyphallic Hermes, and the Universal Mother, which are like the other Plotinic myths, of the double Hercules, Poros, Penia, and Koros. We find[422] the Stoic idea of passibility and impassibility, although not exactly that of passion and action. We find[423] connected the terms "nous" and "phronêsis," also "anastasis." The term hypostasis, though used undogmatically, as mere explanation of thought, is found.[424] Frequent[425] are the conceptual logoi of the divine Mind (the seminal logoi) which enter into matter to clothe themselves with it, to produce objects. We also have the Stoic category "heterotês,"[426] and the application of sex as explanation of the differences of the world.[427]
d. Aristotelian, are the "energeia" and "dunamis."[428]
e. Plotinic, are the latter ideas, for they are used in the same connection.[429] Also the myths of Poros, Penia and Koros, which are found elsewhere in similar relations.[430]
On the whole, therefore, the Plotinic authorship is much more strongly indicated than the Numenian.
The next treatment of matter in the Fourth Ennead, is semi-stoical.[431] The opposite aspects of the Universe appear again as "phronesis" and "phusis." We find here the Stoic doing and suffering, and[432] hypostasis. Nevertheless, the chief process illustrated is still the Platonic image reproduced less and less clearly in successively more degraded spheres of being. Plotinos seems to put himself out of the Numenian sphere of thought, referring to it in abstract historical manner, as belonging to the successors of Pythagoras and Pherecydes, who treated of matter as the element that distinguished objects in the intelligible world.
The last treatment of matter[433] seems to have reached the extreme distance of Numenianism. Instead of a dualism, with matter an original, positive principle, Plotinos closes his discussion by stating that perhaps form and matter may not come from the same origin, as there is some difference between them. He has just said that Being is common to both form and matter, as to quality, though not as to quantity. A little above this he insists that matter is not something original, as it is later than many earthly, and than all intelligible objects. As to the Numenian double name of the Divinity, Being and Essence, he had taken from Aristotelianism the conceptions of "energeia" and "dunamis," and added them as the supreme hypostasis, so as to form in theological dialect the triad he, following Numenius and Plato, had always asserted cosmologically (good, intellect, and soul): "The developed energy[434] assumes hypostasis, as if from a great, nay, as from the greatest hypostasis of all; and so it joins Essence and Being."
Reviewing these various treatments of matter we might call the first[435] Numenian; the next[436] Platonic (as most independent, and historically treated); the next[437] as Aristotelian; the Escorial Section as semi-Stoic;[438] as also another short notice.[439] The last treatment of matter, in vi. 3.7, is fully Stoic, in its denial of the evil of matter.
How then shall we explain these differences? Chiefly by studying the periods in which they are written, and which they therefore explain.
*****
When we try to study the periods in Plotinos's thought, as shown in his books, we are met with great difficulties, which are chiefly due to Porphyry. Exactly following the contemporary methods of the compilers of the Bible, he undiscerningly confused the writings of the various periods, so as to make up an anthology, grouped by six groups of nine books each, according to subjects, consisting first of ethical disquisitions; second, of physical questions; third, of cosmic considerations; fourth, of psychological discussions; fifth, of transcendental lucubrations; and sixth, of metaphysics and theology.[440] As the reader might guess from the oversymmetrical grouping, and this pretty classification, the apparent order is only illusory, as he may have concluded from the fact that the discussions of matter analyzed above are scattered throughout the whole range of this anthology. The result of this Procrustean arrangement was the same as with the Bible: a confusion of mosaic, out of which pretty nearly anything could be proved, and into which almost everything has been read. Compare the outlines of the doctrines of Plotinos by Ritter, Zeller, Ueberweg, Chaignet, Mead, Guthrie, and Drews, and it will be seen that there is very little agreement between them, while none of them allow for the difference between the various parts of the Enneads.
How fearful the confusion is, will best be realized from the following two tables, made up from the indications given in Porphyry's Life of Plotinos.
Porphyry gives three lists of the works of the various periods. Identifying these in the present Ennead arrangement, they are to be found as follows:
The works of the Amelian period are now i. 6; iv. 7; iii. 1; iv. 2; v. 9; iv. 8; iv. 4; iv. 9; vi. 9; v. 1; v. 2; ii. 4; iii. 9; ii. 2; iii. 4; i. 9; ii. 6; v. 7; i. 2; i. 3; i. 8.
The works of the Porphyrian period are now vi. 5, 6; v. 6; ii. 5; iii. 6; iv. 3–5; iii. 8; v. 8; v. 5; ii. 9; vi. 6; ii. 8; i. 5; ii. 7; vi. 7; vi. 8; ii. 1; iv. 6; vi. 1–3; iii. 7.
The works of the latest or Eustochian period are: i. 4; iii. 2, 3; v. 3; iii. 5; i. 8; ii. 3; i. 1; i. 7. (For Eustochius, see Scholion to Enn. iv. 4.29, ii. 7.86, Creuz. 1, 301 Kirchhof.)
A more convenient table will be the converse arrangement. Following the present normal order of the books in Enneads, we will describe its period by a letter, referring to the Amelian period by A, to the Porphyrian by P, and the Eustochian by E. I: EAAEPAEAA. II: PAEAPAPPP. III: AEEAEAPPA. IV: AAPPPPAAA. V: AAEAPPAPA. VI: PPPPPPPPA.
This artificial arrangement into Enneads should therefore be abandoned, and in a new English translation that the writer has in mind, the books would appear in the order of their periods, while an index would allow easy reference by the old numbers. Then only will we be able to study the successive changes of Plotinos's thought, in their normal mutual relation; and it is not difficult to prophesy that important results would follow.
*****
Having thus achieved internal proof of development of doctrines in Plotinos, by examination of his views about Matter, we may with some confidence state that the externally known facts of the life of no philosopher lend themselves to such a progress of opinions more readily than that of Plotinos. His biographer, Porphyry, as we have seen, had already given us a list of the works of three easily characterized periods in Plotinos's life: the period before Porphyry came to him, the period while Porphyry staid with him, and the later period when Plotinos was alone, and Porphyry was in retirement (or banishment?) in Sicily.
An external division into periods is therefore openly acknowledged; but it remains for us to recall its significance.
In the first place, the reader will ask himself, how does it come about that Plotinos is so dependent on Porphyry, and before him, on Amelius? The answer is that Plotinos himself was evidently somewhat deficient in the details of elementary education, however much proficiency in more general philosophical studies, and in independent thought, and personal magnetic touch with pupils he may have achieved. His pronunciation was defective, and in writing he was careless, so much so that he usually failed to affix proper headings or notice of definite authorship.[441] These peculiarities would to some extent put him in the power, and under the influence of his editors, and this explains why he was dependent on Porphyry later, and Amelius earlier.[442] These editors might easily have exerted potent, even if unconscious or merely suggestive influence; but we know that Porphyry did not scruple to add glosses of his own,[443] not to speak of hidden Stoic and Aristotelian pieces,[444] for he relied on Aristotle's "Metaphysics." Besides, Plotinos was so generally accused of pluming himself on writings of Numenius, falsely passed off as his own, that it became necessary for Amelius to write a book on the differences between Numenius and Plotinos, and for Porphyry to defend his master, as well as to quote a letter of Longinus on the subject;[445] but Porphyry does not deny that among the writings of the Platonists Kronius, Caius, and Attikus, and the Peripatetics Aspasius, Alexander and Adrastus, the writings of Numenius also were used as texts in the school of Plotinos (14).
Having thus shown the influence of the editors of Plotinos, we must examine who and what they were. Let us however first study the general trend of the Plotinic career.
His last period was Stoic practise, for so zealously did he practise austerities that his death was, at least, hastened thereby.[446] It is unlikely that he would have followed Stoic precepts without some sympathy for, or acquaintance with their philosophical doctrines; and as we saw above, Porphyry acknowledges Plotinos's writings contain hidden Stoic pieces.[447] Then, Plotinos spent the last period of his life in Rome, where ruled, in philosophical circles, the traditions of Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.
That these Stoic practices became fatal to him is significant when we remember that this occurred during the final absence of Porphyry, who may, during his presence, have exerted a friendly restraint on the zealous master. At any rate, it was during Porphyry's regime that the chief works of Plotinos were written, including a bitter diatribe against the Gnostics, who remained the chief protagonists of dualism and belief in positive evil. Prophyry's work, "De Abstinentia," proves clearly enough his Stoic sympathies.
Such aggressive enmity is too positive to be accounted for by the mere removal to Rome from Alexandria, and suggests a break of some sort with former friends. Indications of such a break do exist, namely, the permanent departure to his earlier home, Apamea, of his former editor, Amelius. We hear[448] of an incident in which Amelius invited Plotinos to come and take part in the New Moon celebrations[449] of the mysteries. Plotinos, however, refused, on the grounds that "They must come to me, not I go to them." Then we hear[450] of bad blood between this Amelius and Porphyry, a long, bitter controversy, patched up, indeed, but which cannot have failed to leave its mark. Then this Amelius writes a book on the Differences between Plotinos and Numenius, which, in a long letter, he inscribes to Porphyry,[451] as if the latter were the chief one interested in these distinctions. Later, Amelius, who before this seems to have been the chief disciple and editor of Plotinos, departs, never to return, his place being taken by Porphyry. It is not necessary to possess a vivid imagination to read between the lines, especially when Plotinos, in the last work of this period, against the Gnostics, section 10, seems to refer to friends of his who still held to other doctrines.
Now in order to understand the nature of the period when Amelius was the chief disciple of Plotinos, we must recall who Amelius was. In the first place, he hailed from the home-town of Numenius, Apamea in Syria. He had adopted as son Hostilianus-Hesychius, who also hailed from Apamea. And it was to Apamea that Amelius withdrew, after he left Plotinos. We are therefore not surprised to learn that he had written out almost all the books of Numenius, that he had gathered them together, and learned most of them by heart.[452] Then we learn from Proclus (see Zeller's account) that Amelius taught the trine division of the divine creator, exactly as did Numenius. Is it any wonder, then, that he wrote a book on the differences between Plotinos and Numenius at a later date, when Porphyry had started a polemic with him? During his period as disciple of Plotinos, twenty-four years in duration, Plotinos would naturally have been under Numenian influence of some kind, and we cannot be very far wrong in thinking that this change of editors must have left some sort of impress on the dreamy thinker, Plotinos, ever seeking to experience an ecstasy.
*****
In this account of the matter we have restrained ourselves from mentioning one of the strangest coincidences in literature, which would have emphasized the nature of the break of Amelius with Plotinos, for the reason that it may be no more than a chance pun; but that even as such it must have been present to the actors in that drama, there is no doubt. We read above that Amelius invited Plotinos to accompany him to attend personally the mystery-celebrations at the "noumênia," a time sacred to such celebrations.[453] But this was practically the name of Numenius, and the text might well have been translated that Amelius invited him to visit the celebrations as Numenius would have done; and indeed, from all we know of Numenius, with his initiation at Eleusis and in Egypt, that is just of what we might have supposed he would have approved. In other words, we would discover Amelius in the painful act of choice between the two great influences of his life, Numenius, and Plotinos. Moreover, that the incident was important is revealed by Porphyry's calling Plotinos's answer a "great word," which was much commented on, and long remembered.
*****
In thus dividing the career of Plotinos in the Amelian, the Porphyrian, and Eustochian (98) we meet however one very interesting difficulty. The Plotinic writings by Porphyry assigned to the last or Eustochian period are those which internal criticism would lead us to assign to his very earliest philosophising; and in our study of the development of the Plotinic views about Matter, we have taken the liberty of considering them as the earliest. We are however consoled in our regret at having to be so radical, by noticing that Porphyry, to whom we are indebted for our knowledge of the periods of the works, has done the same thing. He says that he has assigned the earliest place in each Ennead to the easier and simpler discussions;[454] yet these latest-issued works of Plotinos are assigned to the very beginning of each Ennead, four going to the First Ennead, one to the Second, three to the Third, and one only to the Fifth. If these had been the crowning works of the Master's life, especially the treatise on the First God and Happiness, it would have been by him placed at the very end of all, and not at the beginning. Porphyry must therefore have possessed some external knowledge which would agree with the conclusions of our internal criticism, which follows.
These Eustochian works make the least use of Stoic, or even Aristotelian terms, most closely following even the actual words of Numenius. For instance, we may glance at the very first book of the First Ennead, which though of the latest period, is thoroughly Numenian.
The first important point is the First Divinity "hovering over" Being,[455] using the same word as Numenius.[456] This was suggested by Prof. Thedinga. However, he applied the words "he says" to Numenius; but this cannot be the case, as a Platonic quotation immediately.
The whole subject of the Book is the composite soul, and this is thoroughly Numenian.[457]
Then we have the giving without return.[458]
Then we find the pilot-simile as illustration for the relation of soul to body,[459] although in Numenius it appears of the Logos and the world.
We find the animal divided in two souls, the irrational and the rational,[460] which reminds us of Numenius's division into two souls.[461]
The soul consists of a peculiar kind of motion, which however is entirely different from that of other bodies, which is its own life.[462] This reminds us of Numenius's still-standing of the Supreme, which however is simultaneously innate motion.[463]
Referring to the problem, discussed elsewhere, that these Plotinic works of the latest or Eustochian period, are the most Numenian, which we would be most likely to attribute to his early or formative stage, rather than to the last or perfected period, it is interesting to notice that these works seem to imply other works of the Amelian or Porphyrian periods, by the words,[464] "It has been said," or treated of, referring evidently to several passages.[465] Still this need not necessarily refer to this later work, it may even refer to Plato, or even to Numenius's allegory of the Cave of the Nymphs,[470] where the descent of the souls is most definitely studied. Or it might even refer to Num. 35a, where birth or genesis is referred to as the wetting of the souls in the matter of bodies.
Moreover, they contain an acknowledgment, and a study of positive evil, something which would be very unlikely after his elaborate explaining away of evil in his treatise against the Gnostics, of the Porphyrian period, and his last treatment of Matter, where he is even willing to grant the possibility of matter possessing Being. The natural process for any thinker must ever be to begin with comparative imitation of his master, and then to progress to independent treatment of the subject. But for the process to be reversed is hardly likely.
Moreover, when we examine these Eustochian works in detail, they hardly seem to be such as would be the expressions of the last years of an ecstatic, suffering intense agony at times, his interest already directed heavenwards. The discussion of astrology must date from the earliest association with Gnostics, in Alexandria, who also might have inspired or demanded a special treatment of the nature of evil, which later he consistently denied. Then there is an amateurish treatment of anthropology in general, which the cumulatively-arranging Porphyry puts at the very beginning of the First Book. The treatise on the First Good and Happiness, is not unlike a beginner's first attempt at writing out his body of divinity, as George Herbert said, and Porphyry also puts it at the beginning. The Eros-article is only an amplification of Platonic myths, indeed making subtler distinctions, still not rising to the heights of pure, subjective speculation.
These general considerations may be supplemented by a few more definite indications. It is in the Eros-article that we find the Platonic myth of Poros and Penia. Yet these reappear in the earliest Amelian treatment of matter (ii. 4), as a sort of echo, mentioned only by the way, as if they had been earlier thoroughly threshed out. Here also we find only a stray, incidental use of the term "hypostasis," whereas the Stoic language in other Amelian and Porphyrian treatises has already been pointed out.
We are therefore driven to the following, very human and natural conclusion. Plotinos's first attempts at philosophical writing had consisted of chiefly Numenian disquisitions, which would be natural in Alexandria, where Numenius had probably resided, and had left friends and successors among the Gnostics. When Plotinos went to Rome, he took these writings with him, but was too absorbed in new original Amelian treatises to resurrect his youthful Numenian attempts, which he probably did not value highly, as being the least original, and because they taught doctrines he had left behind in his Aristotelian and Stoic progress. He laid them aside. Only when Porphyry had left him, and he felt the increasing feebleness due to old age and Stoic austerities, did his attendant Eustochius urge him to preserve these early works. Plotinos was willing, and sent them to Sicily where Porphyry had retired. And so it happened with Plotinos, as it has happened with many another writer, that the last things became first, and the first became last.
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The idea of classifying the works of Plotinos chronologically, therefore, has so much external proof, as well as internal indications, to support it, that, no doubt, in the future no reference will be made to Plotinos without specifying to which period it refers; and we may expect that future editions of his works will undo the grievous confusion introduced by Porphyry, and thus render Plotinos's works comparatively accessible to rational study.
There are besides many other minor proofs of the chronological order of the writings of Plotinos, most of which are noticed at the heading of each succeeding book; but the most startling human references are those to Amelius's departure as a false friend;[466] to Porphyry's desire to suicide at his departure,[467] and to his own impending dissolution,[468] each of these occurring at the exact time of the event chronologically, but certainly not according to the traditional order.