III. The Effect of the Evidence and Verdict.
Under the common law formerly, a coroner’s inquisition was equivalent to an indictment by a grand jury upon which the accused might be tried. But in this country no person can be tried upon a coroner’s inquisition, yet the inquisition of a coroner’s jury finding a person guilty of murder has about the same force against him, until the grand jury passes upon his case, that an indictment found by them has thereafter, prior to his trial.
Coroner has Power to Issue Process of Apprehension.—If a person is charged with the crime in the inquisition, the coroner has power and he issues his process for the apprehension of the accused when not in custody solely upon the inquisition. The inquisition, though taken in the absence of the prisoner, and upon the testimony of witnesses he could not cross-examine, settles the question of his guilt until the grand jury passes upon the case. It justifies the commitment of the prisoner to jail, in the same manner that the testimony of witnesses does taken before a justice of the peace. The coroner can only examine the prisoner in the same manner as upon a warrant of arrest or on information, and is not authorized to examine witnesses either against the prisoner or for him, when he is apprehended by virtue of process issued subsequent to the finding of the inquisition by the jury, or in custody of the coroner without process at the time the same is found.
Privilege of Prisoner upon Arrest.—The prisoner has the privilege of telling his own story before the coroner, which is to be returned with the inquisition, and that is all. He cannot be discharged on it, however plausible it may be; and he has not the privilege of proving it true before the coroner. He should, therefore, not be discharged, and he cannot have the case investigated again before it is passed upon by the grand jury.[555]
Under the provisions of the New York Criminal Code the defendant against whom an inquisition has been found by a coroner’s jury is entitled to a hearing before a magistrate, whether he has been arrested before the inquisition has been filed or is arrested after such filing. Under the provisions of sec. 779, in the case of a defendant who has been arrested before the inquisition can be filed, the prisoner is entitled to be examined before the magistrate, before whom he may be brought, as provided in sec. 781, and in the case of a prisoner who has not been arrested until after the inquisition was filed, under secs. 781 and 783 the defendant is entitled to be heard before a magistrate in all respects as upon a warrant of arrest on an information. The magistrate must proceed to examine the charge contained in the inquisition, and hold the defendant to answer or discharge him therefrom.[556] The information is the allegation made to a magistrate that a person has been guilty of some designated crime.[557]
When Evidence taken before Coroner of a Party Charged with Crime Admissible in Evidence upon His Trial Subsequently.
There is nothing which distinguishes between the proceedings of a coroner’s inquest and any other official proceedings taken and returned in the discharge of official duty as to their admissibility in evidence. A witness, therefore, may be contradicted by the production of a deposition thus given by him before a coroner.[558] But the line is sharply drawn in what cases the testimony of a witness examined before a coroner’s inquest can be used on his subsequent trial, and in what cases it cannot. When a coroner’s inquest is held before it has been ascertained that a crime has been committed, or before any person has been arrested charged with the crime, and a witness is called and sworn before the coroner’s jury, the testimony of that witness, should he afterward be charged with the crime, may be used against him on his trial, and the mere fact that at the time of his examination he was aware that a crime was suspected, and that he was suspected of being the criminal, will not prevent his being regarded as a mere witness, whose testimony may be afterward given in evidence against himself. If he desires to protect himself he must claim his privilege. But if, at the time of his examination, it appears that a crime has been committed, and that he is in custody as the supposed criminal, he is not regarded merely as a witness, but as a party accused, called before a tribunal vested with power to investigate preliminarily the question of his guilt, and he is to be treated in the same manner as if brought before a committing magistrate, and an examination not taken in conformity with the statute cannot be used against him on his trial for the offence.[559] So the doctrine as to silence being taken as an implied admission of the truth of allegations spoken or uttered in the presence of a person, does not apply to silence at a judicial proceeding or hearing, and since the proceedings at a coroner’s inquest are of a judicial character, what there transpired must be considered as a part of the proceedings.[560] The leading cases which have been before the New York Court of Appeals upon this important question, and from which that court has finally deduced that rule, may be here referred to.
Hendrickson Case.—In the first case the wife of the defendant died suddenly in the morning, and in the evening of the same day a coroner’s inquest was held. The defendant was called and sworn as a witness upon the inquest. At that time it did not appear that any crime had been committed, or that the defendant had been charged with any crime, or even suspected, except so far as the nature of some of the questions asked of him might indicate such a suspicion. On his subsequent trial on an indictment for the murder of his wife, the statements made by him at the coroner’s inquest were held admissible, on the ground that he was not examined as a party charged with the crime, that it had not appeared even that a crime had been committed, and that he had simply testified as a witness on the inquiry as to the cause of the death.[561]
McMahon Case.—Following this came the McMahon Case, in which it appeared that the defendant was arrested by a constable, without warrant, on a charge of having murdered his wife. The constable took him before the coroner, who was holding an inquest on the body, by whom he was sworn and examined as a witness. It was held that the evidence thus given was not admissible on the prisoner’s trial for the murder, and his conviction was reversed upon that ground.[562]
Teachout Case.—The doctrine of this case was more clearly defined and somewhat limited in a later case, the Teachout Case. In that case the defendant appeared at the coroner’s inquest in pursuance of a sub-pœna to testify, and voluntarily attended; he was not under arrest, but was informed by some one that it was charged that his wife had been poisoned and that he would be arrested for the crime. Before he was sworn he was informed by the coroner that there were rumors that his wife came to her death by foul means and that some of those rumors implicated him, and that he was not obliged to testify unless he chose. He said he had no objection to telling all he knew. The Court in delivering its opinion preludes it by a reference to these facts as showing that the statements made were voluntary in every legal sense, and held that a mere consciousness of being suspected of a crime did not so disqualify him that his testimony, in other respects freely and voluntarily given before the coroner, could not be used against him on his trial on a charge subsequently made of such crime. On that ground it held the evidence properly admitted, at the same time referring with approval to the McMahon Case, and distinctly limiting the rule of exclusion to cases within its bounds.[563]
Mondon Case.—Then followed the Mondon Case, where on the finding of the body of the deceased, the defendant was arrested without warrant as the suspected murderer. While he was thus in custody the coroner empanelled a jury and held an inquest, and the defendant was called as a witness before the inquest and was examined by the district attorney and by the coroner. The prisoner was an ignorant Italian laborer unfamiliar with the English language. He was unattended by counsel, and it did not appear that he was in any manner informed of his rights, or that he was not bound to answer questions tending to criminate him He was twice examined; on the first occasion the examination was taken by questions put either by the district attorney or by the coroner, and the result written down by the coroner, who then read the evidence over to him, line by line, and asked him if he understood it and if it was the truth, and he said it was, and the coroner then reswore him to the deposition. The coroner, after taking the defendant’s testimony on the first day, came to the conclusion that the defendant did not understand English well enough to be examined, and that it ought to be taken through an interpreter, which was done, in order that they might get it a little better and a little fuller. It was held that the defendant’s testimony was not admissible upon his trial on the indictment.[564] It will be seen that this latter case follows in direct line with the rule announced in the McMahon Case and clearly distinguishes another case, the McGloin Case, upon the authority of which the trial court held the testimony of the prisoner in the Mondon Case admissible.
McGloin Case.—The case of McGloin was not that of the examination of a prisoner on oath before a magistrate before whom he was taken involuntarily, while in custody, and interrogated by the magistrate, who to all appearance had power to require him to answer, but while under arrest the prisoner said to the inspector of police who had him in charge that he would make a statement. The inspector then said that he would send for a coroner to take it. The coroner was then sent for and came to police headquarters and took down in writing the confession dictated by the prisoner, the coroner asking no questions and not acting in any official capacity, but as a mere amanuensis to take down the confession and prove the contents. It was held that the confession of the prisoner was admissible in evidence upon his trial for murder.[565]
Rule in Pennsylvania.—The rule in Pennsylvania is substantially that when the testimony given by the prisoner under oath before a coroner’s inquest, previous to him being charged or suspected of the murder of the individual upon whose body the inquest was sitting, may afterward be given in evidence against him, on his trial for the murder of such person.[566]
Rule in Nebraska.—The statements of a prisoner to be competent evidence must have been voluntarily made. In cases of declaration made on an examination before a coroner’s inquest by a person under arrest or charged with the crime and also under oath, they are not admissible. But when the person, although he be subsequently charged with the offence, appears voluntarily, and gives testimony, before any accusation has been made against him, his statements are admissible in evidence against him on the trial of an indictment for the crime.[567]
MEDICO-LEGAL AUTOPSIES.
BY
H. P. LOOMIS, A.M., M.D.,
Professor of Pathology in the University of the City of New York; Visiting Physician
and Curator to Bellevue Hospital, New York; Pathologist to the
Board of Health, New York City; President New
York Pathological Society, etc., etc.