OF THE CONTRACTUAL RELATION BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT.
Employment and Rights in Regard To Compensation.
Legal Character of the Employment.—Whatever may have been the theories of the Roman civil law, and following it of the early English common law, as to the character of the employment of physicians and other professional men, it is now so well settled that the reciprocal duties and obligations arising between physician and patient, or attorney and client, and the like, are to be classed under and governed by the law of contracts, that any extended discussion of these theories is unnecessary here.[162] Mr. Ordronaux, in the second chapter of his interesting work on the “Jurisprudence of Medicine,” has considered them fully, and has quoted amply from the books of the earlier and later text-writers, and from the expressions of the judges, to show what these theories and rules were; and he and all later authorities agree that the ancient notion, that professional services are always gratuitous unless a special contract to pay for them is made, has long been abandoned. He observes (pp. 13 and 14): “But in our day the increase in the number of professional practitioners, and their exclusive devotion to a special class of services as a means of living, has essentially modified the practical character of the contracts with their patrons. Although in legal acceptation a mandate, yet from force of circumstances growing out of an altered state of society, the mandate is practically changed into a contract of hire (locatio operis). This doubtless reduces professions to the status of artisanship, and places them on a par with manual labor, conjoined to the special skill of a particular calling. But it also simplifies the contract, removes it from the category of innominate or imperfect obligations, requiring the intervention of legal fictions to furnish a means for their enforcement, and brings it within the pale of consensual agreements based upon a sufficient consideration.”
The physician’s right to sue on contract in England was declared by legislative enactment by Chap. 90 (Sec. 31), 21 and 22 Victoria. It has never been denied in the United States. Adams v. Stephens, 26 Wend., 451-455.
Physicians’ and Surgeons’ Service in a Sense Voluntary.—Though it is true, as in the case of many other doctrines of ancient law which were formulated under social conditions far different from those which prevail in modern times, that these rules and theories have long since lost their potency as distinct rules governing actions at law, nevertheless the legal aspect of the peculiar relationship between physician and patient, is still affected by the idea that the service on the part of the physician is voluntary—that is, the physician or surgeon is not bound to come and perform services whenever or wherever he is called. He is at liberty to refuse any and every patient who attempts to employ him.
Patients may Cease Employing at Any Time, unless there is a Contract for a Certain Period.—And when he is employed, the patient may at any moment discharge him, without incurring liability in damages, unless a special contract has been entered into between them that the services shall be rendered for a fixed period.
Service once Begun by Physician must be Continued until Notice of Intention to Cease is Given by Him.—If, however, the services are begun, they must be continued until notice has been given of the intention to discontinue them, and a reasonable time allowed the patient to obtain the services of another person. The reasons for this rule will be considered more fully below.
Contracts either Express or Implied.—The contract between the physician and patient may be an express one, that is, one in which all the terms are agreed upon or expressed between the parties, or it may be what is called an implied contract, or one in which the patient, or another person, simply calls on the physician or surgeon to come and perform services, and neither party specifically stipulates or agrees upon any of the terms of the employment.
Express Contracts may Include any Stipulation Not Contrary to Public Policy.—In the case of an express contract the agreement of the parties settles and determines their mutual obligations, whether it be written or merely verbal. But an express contract may also be made in such a form that certain conditions are required to be performed by the physician before he becomes entitled to any compensation for his services. It may also embody an agreement that the patient shall pay certain sums at certain times as the treatment goes on, or that no other physicians shall be employed without the consent of the attending physician, or if so employed that they shall be under the direction of the attending physician.
Almost anything may be stipulated which is not contrary to public policy, and a breach of any such stipulation entitles the aggrieved party to rescind the contract and cease from performing it.[163]
Qualifications of the Rule that Express Contracts may Include any Stipulation.—Some qualifications of this rule of law must, however, be noted. A breach by the patient of any one of these stipulations would entitle the physician to treat the engagement as terminated like any other contractual relation, and to bring his action for a recovery for services rendered up to the time of the breach; but it is doubtful whether he would have any action for damages for failure to permit him to perform further services. This doubt arises from the legal doctrine, hereinbefore referred to, that a patient is always at liberty to dismiss his physician at any time without notice, and without assigning any cause, which recognizes and grows out of the fact that if the trust and confidence of the patient are destroyed, or impaired, no matter how unreasonably or unjustly, the relation between them must thereafter be unprofitable to both parties, and dangerous to the patient. On the other hand there is little doubt but that whenever an express contract is made by a physician to treat a patient for a certain length of time for a particular disease or injury, the physician is not at liberty to arbitrarily terminate that relation or his connection with the case, unless he has in the contract specifically reserved the right so to do.
Contracts Making Payment Contingent upon Successful Treatment Valid.—The express contract between the parties may also contain a stipulation, by which the physician makes his compensation contingent upon his effecting a cure. Smith v. Hyde, 19 Vt., 54; Mack v. Kelly, 3 Ala., 387. See also Coughlin v. N. Y. Cen. R. R. Co., 71 N. Y., 443. In such a case, however, if the patient does not permit the physician opportunity to treat him during the time named in the contract, or for a reasonable time, if no specific time is fixed, the courts would probably permit the physician to recover a reasonable compensation for his services for the time during which he treated his patient.
Physician must Allow Reasonable Time to Supply his Place if he Quits his Patient.—In any event, whether the contract be express or implied, conditional or unconditional, the law through motives of public policy, and with a just regard for the welfare of the sick and injured, undoubtedly requires that if a physician has once taken charge of a case, and determines to abandon it, he must give the patient reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to supply his place. If he fails to do this he is liable in damages for the results that follow as the proximate consequence of his abandoning the case.
This Rule True even in the Case of a Charity Patient.—This is true, it is believed, even when the patient is a charity patient, and the services are gratuitous. Shiels v. Blackburn (1 H. Blacks., 159). For any other rule less strict might entail the most serious consequences. Ordronaux, “Jur. of Med.,” 13 and 14, citing Inst., lib. 3, 26, 11; Pothier, “Du Contrat Mandat,” Chap. I., § 4.
Elements of the Contract Between Physician and Patient.
Duties of Physician.—When the relations between physician and patient are not defined otherwise by express contract, the implied contract is, and the law presumes, that the physician contracts, first, to use the necessary care and attention; second, to use the necessary skill; third, in case the physician furnishes his own medicines (and the obligation to furnish them would probably be imposed, if it was the custom of the school or class of physicians to which the particular physician belonged to do so), that the medicines are proper and suitable. As a corollary of these duties it necessarily follows, also, that the physician contracts that the instruments or appliances which he uses are free from taint or contagion, and are suitable and proper for the uses to which they are put. Upon this theory an action could be maintained against a physician for using impure vaccine.
Duties of Patient.—The patient on his part contracts, first, to give the physician information concerning the facts and circumstances of the case, and full opportunity to treat him properly; second, to obey his instructions and follow his directions, and, third, to pay him the reasonable worth and value of his services. The different branches of this contract are reciprocal. The failure of either party to fulfil the obligation of any one of them which is imposed upon him, would bar him of his remedies against the other party to recover damages for any breach, or any proximate result of his breach, of such obligations. The necessary care and attention required of the physician in such a case are measured by the requirements of the case and the physician’s duties to his other patients, modified, however, by the rule that the physician is presumed to know, at the time he takes up the case, the condition and situation of his other patients at that time. Consequently, if those who have first employed him are so situated at the time that his services for them are likely to be soon and continuously required, he cannot without making himself liable in damages undertake another case and then neglect it, but he should either decline to take it, or should with the full knowledge and consent of the patient make provision for the temporary substitution of some other physician, during the time that his prior obligations engross his attention. Nevertheless, if the situation and condition of those to whom he has first contracted his services is such that he had, although he exercised due professional knowledge and skill, no reason to apprehend that these patients would need his exclusive service, and by a sudden development, arising from those occult causes which obtain in all serious diseases and injuries, any of his prior patients suffer a sudden and dangerous relapse, or from an accession of new and dangerous symptoms and conditions so that he must fly to their aid, he would not be liable to another patient, to whom he had afterward contracted his services, for neglecting his case; still he should in such instances use extra means to obtain the services of some other and equally skilful man.
Only Ordinary and Usual Skill Required.—The degree and character of necessary skill contracted for has been variously defined by the courts. When malpractice is discussed, a more extended consideration of this matter will be required. At present the doctrine laid down in Shearman and Redfield on “Negligence,” paragraphs 433-435, may be adopted. It is as follows:
“Although a physician or surgeon may doubtless by express contract undertake to perform a cure absolutely, the law will not imply such a contract from the mere employment of a physician. A physician is not an insurer of a cure, and is not to be tried for the result of his remedies. His only contract is to treat the case with reasonable diligence and skill. If more than this is expected it must be expressly stipulated for.... The general rule, therefore, is, that a medical man, who attends for a fee, is liable for such want of ordinary care, diligence or skill on his part as leads to the injury of his patient. To render him liable, it is not enough that there has been a less degree of skill than some other medical man might have shown, or a less degree of care than even himself might have bestowed; nor is it enough that he himself acknowledged some degree of want of care; there must have been a want of competent and ordinary care and skill, and to such a degree as to have led to a bad result.... But a professed physician or surgeon is bound to use not only such skill as he has, but to have a reasonable degree of skill. The law will not countenance quackery; and although the law does not require the most thorough education or the largest experience, it does require that an uneducated, ignorant man shall not, under the pretence of being a well-qualified physician, attempt recklessly and blindly to administer medicines or perform surgical operations. If the practitioner, however, frankly informs his patient of his want of skill, or the patient is in some other way fully aware of it, the latter cannot complain of the lack of that which he knew did not exist.”[164]
Average Standard of Skill of any Professed School must be Attained.—It is also a rule that one who professes to adhere to a particular school must come up to its average standard, and must be judged by its tests, and in the light of the present day. Thus a physician who would practise the reckless and indiscriminate bleeding which was in high repute not very many years ago, or should shut up a patient in fever and deny all cooling drinks, would doubtless find the old practice a poor excuse for his imbecility. So, if a professed homœopathist should violate all the canons of homœopathy, he would be bound to show some very good reasons for his conduct, if it was attended with injurious effects. Upon many points of medical and surgical practice all of the schools are agreed, and indeed common sense and universal experience prescribe some invariable rules, to violate which may generally be called gross negligence. Yet the patient cannot justly complain if he gets only that quality and kind of service for which he bargains. If he employs a cheap man, he must expect cheap service. Puffendorf, in his “Law of Nature and Nations,” observes: “We read a pleasant story of a man who had sore eyes and came to a horse-doctor for relief. The doctor anointed his eyes with the same ointment he used among his horses, upon which the man falls blind, and the cause is brought before the judge, who acquits the physician. For if the fellow, says he, had not been an ass he had never applied himself to a horse-doctor.” See also Jones on Bailments, 100; 1 Field’s “Lawyers’ Briefs,” sub. Bailments, Sec. 573; Musser v. Chase, 29 Ohio St., 577; Lanphier v. Phipos, 8 Carr. & Payne, 478.
Degree of Care and Skill Used a Question of Fact.—In an action at law, whether brought by a physician to recover for his services, or by a patient to recover for malpractice or neglect, it is always a question of fact, to be determined by the jury under proper instructions as to the measure of care and skill required, whether or not the physician has in a given case used that degree of care and displayed that amount of skill which might reasonably be expected of a man of ordinary ability and professional skill. These same rules apply to the surgeon. He must possess and exercise that degree of knowledge and sense which the leading authorities have announced, as a result of their researches and experiments up to the time, or within a reasonable time before, the issue or question to be determined is made.[165]
Rule in Leading Case of Lanphier v. Phipos.—In the case of Lanphier v. Phipos, 8 C. & P., 478, already cited, Chief Justice Tyndall enunciated the rule as to the degree of skill required of a physician or surgeon, which has been followed by all the courts since then. He said: “Every person who enters into a learned profession undertakes to bring to the exercise of it a reasonable degree of care and skill. He does not, if he is an attorney, undertake at all events to gain the cause, nor does a surgeon undertake that he will perform a cure; nor does the latter undertake to use the highest possible degree of skill, as there may be persons of higher education and greater advantages than himself; but he undertakes to bring a fair, reasonable and competent degree of skill. And in an action against him by a patient, the question for the jury is whether the injury complained of must be referred to a want of proper degree of skill and care in the defendant, or not. Hence he is never presumed to engage for extraordinary skill, or for extraordinary diligence and care. As a general rule, he who undertakes for a reward to perform any work is bound to use a degree of diligence, attention and skill, adequate to the performance of his undertaking; that is, to do it according to the rules of the art; spondet peritiam artis. And the degree of skill arises in proportion to the value and delicacy of the operation. But he is in no case required to have more than ordinary skill, for he does not engage for more.”
Physician Must Instruct Patient how to Care for Himself, etc.—A corollary of these rules is, that the physician must give proper instruction to his patient how to take care of himself, how to manage a diseased or injured member, when and how to take any medicines that may be prescribed, what diet to adopt, and that in case the physician fails to give these instructions he is liable for any injuries that result from this failure. Carpenter v. Blake, supra.
Patient Must Inform Physician Fully Concerning his Case—His Communications Privileged.—On the other hand, as we have already stated, the patient owes the duty to his physician of informing him fully of all the varied symptoms of his disease, or the circumstances attending his injury, and to freely and with due confidence answer all questions concerning his past history which would tend to throw any light upon his present condition. To battle with the occult forces which play so important a part in determining the course or consequences of disease, it is absolutely essential that the physician should know all that is possible to be known of the patient’s history, and of the history of the patient’s family. As we shall see later on, all such communications are, in most of the States of the Union and elsewhere, by statutory enactment made privileged, and without the consent of the patient the physician or surgeon is absolutely forbidden to divulge any communication or information which he receives in order to enable him to prescribe. This rule applies equally whether the physician or surgeon is acting for hire or is treating the person as a charity patient, and it has been extended by construction by the courts in some States, so as to include examinations made by jail physicians or other physicians sent by the prosecuting officials of the State to examine a prisoner, for purpose of giving evidence, but who allowed the prisoner to suppose that they were there simply to treat him in their professional capacity. People v. Murphy, 101 N. Y., 126. At the same time the courts have been careful to make an exception in the case of advice given for the purpose of enabling the person receiving the advice to commit a crime, and of any information received by the physicians while the persons asking for it were engaged in a criminal attempt. All of these interesting questions will be examined and treated of at length hereafter.[166]
Conditions of Contract Between Physician and Patient Further Considered.—It has been observed that the contract between the physician and patient may be conditional or unconditional. By this it is meant that limitations upon the reciprocal obligations between them may be imposed, or extensions of such obligations made, by special agreement. The physician may contract to cure, and may make the cure a condition precedent to receiving any reward for his services or medicaments, and a breach of such a contract will be enforced by the courts as a bar to an action for services rendered or medicines furnished. The patient may agree to come to the physician’s home or to a hospital or other place agreed upon between them, for the purpose of being treated, or of being operated upon by a surgeon, and a failure to perform such an agreement on the part of the patient absolves the medical man from carrying out his agreement to treat the patient. In the case already suggested of a request by the medical man for information as to the patient’s past history, or that of the patient’s family, or the circumstances concerning the injury or symptoms of the disease, if the patient should give false information, or should wilfully neglect to give true information, the physician would have a right, upon giving reasonable and due notice, and opportunity to employ some one else, as already intimated, to decline to proceed further with his care of the case, and might sue and recover pay for the services rendered.
Physicians Cannot Contract that they shall Not be Responsible for Want of Ordinary Care and Skill.—An important and salutary exception to the general rule that all parties may contract freely as between themselves stipulations measuring their reciprocal obligations, doubtless applies to the relations between physician and patient. It is an exception which has been applied to the contract relations existing between a common carrier and a shipper or a passenger. This is that persons contracting to perform services which are to a certain extent public in their nature, and which, as in the case of the common carrier or in the case of the physician or surgeon, are founded upon conventional relations, and affect the public welfare, are not permitted, from reasons of public policy, to contract for a release or escape from liability arising out of their own negligence or wrong. In short, a physician or surgeon cannot contract with a patient that the patient shall waive any claim for damages growing out of his want of ordinary care and skill. Nevertheless, the physician or surgeon may frankly inform his patient of his want of knowledge and experience as to the particular kind of treatment required by any special and unusual disease or injury. If after full information on this point, and full opportunity to employ some one else, the patient insists that the physician or surgeon go on with such treatment as he is able to give to the case, and injuries result which a more skilful and experienced practitioner might have avoided, it is probable that the courts would hold that the practitioner was not liable under such circumstances, or that such circumstances could be pleaded in mitigation of damages. But it would be the duty of the practitioner in such a case to be exceedingly careful in performing any surgical operations, and not administer any powerful drugs with the strength and medicinal qualities of which he was not acquainted. If he should assume to perform such operations or administer such drugs instead of confining himself to modifying the ravages of disease by the use of well-known simple remedies, or protecting against the consequences of severe injury by the use of ordinary antiseptic dressings and treatment, he would no doubt be liable for any resulting damage, and could not recover pay for his service.
Experiments Not to be Tried on Patients—This Rule Applies to Charity Patients.—For like reasons of public policy it has been held that a physician has no right to try experiments on his patient.[167] In this respect a charity patient will be protected by law and compensated for damages received from experiments on his health and person, just as much as a person from whom a large fee could be expected. Humanity and public policy both forbid that experiments should be tried upon one class of patients any more than another. However this may be, in a case of extreme danger, where other resorts have failed and everything else done that could reasonably be required, and if the patient and his family consent after full information of the dangerous character of the operation, or the unknown qualities and powers of the drug to be administered, the practitioner would be justified and protected if some new methods of treatment not entirely developed or known to the profession, but supposed to be efficacious, should be adopted, although the result might prove unfavorable. In such a case, however, it would be extremely perilous for the physician to stand upon his own judgment alone. He should consult the best talent in his profession available, and abide by the judgment of his colleagues or a fair majority of them; and even then should apply to his course of action the maxim. When in doubt run no risks; better let a patient perish from disease or injury, than while attempting uncertain experiments with the surgeon’s knife or the use of dangerous drugs. The safe rule is to take no chances, unless there is a consensus of judgment of several physicians. It may be objected that if no experiments are tried no new medicines or surgical devices could be discovered, or their effects observed. The answer to this objection is that vivisection, and other experiments upon live animals, permit of experimentation to a considerable degree, and often effectually point out the proper course of treatment of the human subjects. In the case of drugs and medicines the practice is well known of physicians trying the effects thereof upon their own persons, in their zeal and anxiety to give to the world new discoveries. But, as heretofore observed, the law does not recognize the right of the medical or surgical practitioner to tamper with his patients’ health by the use of untried experiments, without imposing upon the practitioner liability for all injuries proximately resulting from their use. All of such matters will, however, fall more properly under consideration when the liability of the physician and surgeon for malpractice is considered.