OF THE LEGAL RIGHT OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS TO RECOVER COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES.
Liability to Pay for Services.—An important matter for physicians and surgeons is the question as to who is responsible, or liable to pay for their services. If there is an express contract this question does not arise; but in most instances the person performing the services renders them upon call, and it is necessary for him to understand his legal right to recover pay for services in the absence of an express contract.
Person Treated, and not Person calling in Physician, Employs Him and is Liable.—In the first place, it must be stated as a general proposition that the person for whom the services are actually rendered, or upon whom the operation is performed, is bound to pay for them, if otherwise capable in law of making contracts and incurring obligations. And secondly, that one who calls a physician or surgeon to attend a patient is not presumed to have contracted to pay for the services rendered, unless his relations with the patient are such that he would be obligated in law to pay, even if he had not himself called in the medical man.
In the first case it is presumed that the patient is liable, because he receives the benefit of the services, and nothing less than a distinct understanding that he was not to pay will relieve him from this obligation.
Married Women and Infants Generally Not Liable.—Where such a person is a married woman, unless the case arises in States or countries where married women have been declared by statutes to be liable the same as if single, this rule does not obtain. Nor is an infant personally liable when he is living with his parent or guardian. Hull v. Connelly, 3 McCord (S. C.), 6; Klein v. La Amoreaux, 2 Paige Ch., 419; Atchinson v. Bruff, 50 Barb., 384; Wilcox v. Smith, 26 Barb., 341. But the contract of an infant for medicine and medical attendance is deemed a contract for necessaries, and will be held valid and enforced against his estate if there is no person standing in loco parentis who can be held liable. 3 Barn. & Cress., 484; 2 Kent Com., 236. In cases when the parent of the infant or the husband of the married woman is liable, this liability obtains because the services rendered are deemed necessary, and fall within the common-law obligation of such persons to provide and pay for necessaries for those whom they are bound to support and maintain.
Burden upon Physicians Treating Minors to Show Services Necessary.—But even in such cases the burden is upon the person performing the services, to show that they were necessary, and it is his duty to know, or learn, the true legal status of the patient, and the true legal relations of the patient to the person other than the patient from whom payment is to be claimed. As said in the case of Crain v. Baudouin (55 N. Y., 256-261), “in the case of minor children even, the law imposes this duty upon those who would furnish them with necessaries, relying upon the credit of their fathers, and seeking to charge them. (Hunt v. Thompson, 3 Scam., 179; Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, 13 J. R., 480).” “A fortiori, it is so in the case of an adult married daughter living with her husband.” And as to the liability of the husband of a married woman in the absence of statute giving her legal capacity to contract and charge her separate estate. Consult Moody v. Osgood, 50 Barb., 628; Potter v. Virgil, 67 Barb., 578; Crain v. Baudouin, 55 N. Y., 256-261.
Mother of Infant probably Liable after Father’s Death.—It has been a much disputed question whether after the father’s death the mother becomes responsible for necessaries furnished for her minor children. The theory of law upon which a father is made liable proceeds upon the ground that he is bound to support the child and has a right to the child’s services during its minority.[168] It has been held that the mother after the death of the father is entitled to those services. Campbell v. Campbell, 3 Stock. (N. J.), 265; Cain v. Dewitt, 8 Iowa, 116; Furman v. Van Size, 56 N. Y., 435-439, disapproving Bentley v. Richtmeyer (4 Comstock, 38), and approving In re Ryder, 11 Paige, 185. If she is entitled to the services of her child, she must be bound to support and care for it; and so it was held in Furman v. Van Size cited above.
Estates of Insane Persons Liable in a Proper Case.—Persons of unsound mind are liable for necessaries furnished for their benefit, and can be made to pay therefor at reasonable and proper rates, but they cannot make contracts for a specific rate. It is always a question of fact as to what sum should be charged against their estates, if they have any.
Master Not Liable for Services Rendered Servant without Special Contract.—In the case of master and servant, while at common law as between a master and servant the master was bound to provide medicine and food for the servant when the servant was an inmate of the master’s house, this is an obligation which a third person could not enforce, and the master can only be held liable for services rendered to the servant, upon proof of a specific contract with him to pay for them.
Case of Crain v. Baudouin Considered.—The case of Crain v. Baudouin, supra, affords an interesting discussion before the highest court of New York State, as to the question as to how far a father calling a physician for an adult child for whom he is not bound to provide, although lying sick at the father’s house, can be held liable for the services rendered upon such call. In that case the plaintiff attended as a physician upon the daughter of the defendant, who was sick at his house. The daughter was of full age, married and living with her husband, but was brought from that of her husband to that of her father in order that she might be under the care of her mother. Defendant was present when plaintiff made his calls, gave the latter a history of the patient’s illness, and received directions as to her treatment. He told others of the frequency and length of the plaintiff’s visits, and of his opinion of the case, without any disclaimer of liability. The Court held, however, that these facts were insufficient to imply a promise on the father’s part to pay for the services, and that the additional facts that the defendant consented to the calling in of a consulting physician, and that a bill was sent in by the plaintiff, unless acknowledged and acquiesced in by defendant, or that he had before this employed other physicians, were also insufficient to raise an implication of law of such a promise to pay. The plaintiff relied in his argument upon the fact that the patient was a daughter of the defendant, but the Court held that any presumption which might arise from this had the daughter been under age, was overcome by the fact that she was past a majority, and was married and lived with her husband and children. The plaintiff also relied to support his cause of action upon the interest exhibited by the defendant in the course of treatment pursued, and the other facts as to the presence of the defendant when the plaintiff made his professional calls alone and in consultation; his receiving directions as to treatment; his recognition to others of the fact that the plaintiff was in attendance; his reciting to others a knowledge of the frequency and length of the visits of plaintiff without any disclaimer on the part of the defendant of liability. The Court said as to these facts: “It is true that particular acts will sometimes give rise to particular obligations, duties and liabilities. But the party whose acts are thus to affect him must be in such predicament as that those acts have, of legal necessity, a significance attached to them, at the time, which he may not afterward repel.... It has been held that a special request by a father to a physician to attend upon his son, then of full age but lying sick at the father’s house, raised no implied promise on the part of the father to pay for the services rendered.” See Boyd v. Sappington, 4 Watts (Pa.), 247; and so in Veitch v. Russell, 3 Ad. & Ell. (N. S.), 927, it is said: “A physician attends in every case on request; that fact alone is not enough for the inference of a special contract;” and see Sellen v. Norman, 4 Carr. & P., 284. Still less where there has been no special request by the father to the physician, and no more than acquiescence in his calls. As it would be unnatural for the parent of an invalid child, though legally emancipated, or for an intimate and confidential friend of hers, not to know the rise and course of her malady, not to be interested in the state of it as disclosed at any time to skilled inspection, not to be so anxious as to be in waiting when scientific skill was to be applied for its cure, not to be ready to receive directions for treatment in the intervals; so it is not to be implied in the one case more than in the other that, from these manifestations, because unaccompanied with an express repudiation of liability, a liability may be implied. They are to be referred to natural affection and friendly sympathy, rather than to an acquiescence in the rendition of a personal benefit, or counted as acts done under a sense of legal obligation.” The Court further said that “even if it should be assumed that the usage exists that the physician called to consult with him who is in attendance, with the consent of the person who has employed the latter, is in contemplation of law in the hire of that person, still the assent of the defendant to the calling in of the consulting physician, and his expression of desire to be present when he came—until he is shown to have employed the plaintiff—is a basis too weak for an implication of law, that he promised to pay his consultation fees. Still less it is a fact from which to imply a promise to pay the plaintiff.” This case is, however, close to the border line, and it may be well criticised and denied its apparent full weight of authority, notwithstanding the very great learning and ability of the learned Judge Folger, who wrote the opinion, upon the ground that it appears that the father had as a witness expressly denied calling in the plaintiff or authorizing anybody to call him in, or authorizing the employment of a consulting physician, and that on the trial the Court had found upon the whole testimony in the case that the defendant had never employed the plaintiff. Taking the decision as a whole it cannot be regarded as determining that upon such a set of circumstances as is there disclosed, the father could not in any event have been held liable, but rather that the trial court having found upon the whole testimony that the defendant was not liable, having witnesses before it fully able to judge of their capability, the appellate court could not say as a matter of law that a finding in favor of the defendant should be overruled. This case is considered here at some length chiefly for the purpose of affording an illustration to physicians and surgeons which will suggest to them the advisability of care in ascertaining in all cases who is responsible for their charge for services. See also Bradley v. Dodge, 45 How Pr. (N.Y.), 57; Smith v. Riddick, 5 Jones (N. C.), 42.
Liability of Third Persons Calling a Physician—General Rule.
As to liability for services rendered, when the medical man is called by one person to attend another, it may be stated as a general rule that in order to create such a liability it must appear that the person calling either actually intended to become responsible, or acted in such a manner that the physician was led to suppose that he so intended.
Liability of Railway Company Calling Physician in Case of Accident to Employees, etc.—Another more troublesome question has arisen where physicians and surgeons have been called in by employees of a railway company in case of sudden accident or injury. In one case in New York, the Superior Court of New York City held, that although the general superintendent of a railroad company testified that he had general authority to hire and discharge men, and that he had employed a physician, the railroad company was not liable.[169]
This doctrine seems to be opposed to the weight of authority. See cases collated in Vol. 18, “Am. and Eng. Cyclopædia of Law,” p. 434 et seq., some of which are: Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rodrigues, 47 Ill., 188; Same v. Prince, 50 Ill., 26; Indianapolis, etc., R. R. v. Morris, 67 Ill., 295; Cairo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mahoney, 82 Ill., 73; Atchison, etc., R. R. v. Beecher, 24 Kansas, 228.
Same Rule does Not Prevail in United States in Case of Accidents to Passengers.—The cases just noted were all cases of employees. In the cases of injured passengers it has been doubted whether the same rule applied, some State courts holding that in that case there is no obligation to furnish medical and surgical attendance, but that the physician attending must look to the persons whom they attended. Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Beatty, 35 Kansas, 265; Brown v. Missouri, 67 Missouri, 122.
Different in England.—In England a different rule prevails—one more humane and in consonance with the moral obligation imposed by the relationship of the parties. In Walker v. The Great Western R. R. Co., a recent case (Law Reports, 2 Exch., 228), Chief-Justice Kelley, in the course of the argument, made this remark: “Must a board be convened before a man who has his legs broken can have medical attendance?”
But in Cox v. The Midland Counties R. R. Co. (3 Wellsby, H. & G., 268), the station master, employed as the chief officer of the passenger and other departments, called in a surgeon to perform an operation upon a passenger injured by a train. The road was held not liable.
On the other hand, in Langan v. Great Western R. R. Co. (30 Law Times, N. S., 173), a sub-inspector of railway police was held to have implied power to employ a surgeon for an injured employee. But in Arkansas an attorney for a railroad company was held not authorized to do so. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hoover, 53 Ark., 377.
Doctrine in Indiana the More Sensible One.—The more sensible doctrine seems to be established in this country, in the State of Indiana at least, in the case of Terre Haute R. R. Co. v. McMurray (98 Ind., 358), in which the Court held that where there was great necessity for the employment of a surgeon, the conductor of a train has authority to employ the surgeon, if the conductor is the highest officer in rank on the ground at the time. But in that case the Court expressly states that this liability grows out of the exigencies of the case; not out of any theory of general authority.
Authority of Railroad Physician to Employ Nurses, etc., Doubtful.—It has also been disputed whether the authority of the company’s physician extended far enough to render the company liable for services performed by nurses employed by him, or for board and lodging engaged by him for injured employees. In Bingham v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. (79 Iowa, 534), it was held that the authority was sufficient, but in that case testimony appeared tending to show that an agent of the company who had authority to employ the physician had authorized him to employ two nurses. The converse doctrine—namely, that the fact that a physician of the company was authorized to buy medicines on the credit of the company does not authorize the inference that he has power to render the company liable by a contract for board and nursing of a person injured on the company’s road—was held in Maber v. The Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 75 Missouri, 495; Brown v. The Missouri R. R., 67 Missouri, 122. To the same effect, see Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. McVeigh, 98 Ind., 391; Cooper v. N. Y. C. & C., 6 Hun, 276; and St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hoover, 53 Arkansas, 377. 2 Redfield on Railways, 114:
On the other hand, where a physician and surgeon has been duly employed by a sub-officer or servant of the railroad company, ratification of this employment, by those having authority to employ him and to render the company liable, will be inferred from slight circumstances.
Such was the case of Louisville R. R. Co. v. McVeigh, which has been cited.
And in another case where information of the fact of the employment had been conveyed to the company’s general manager, and he had neglected and omitted to repudiate the employment or to terminate it, and the surgeon went on and performed services, it was held that from these facts a ratification will be inferred. Indianapolis R. R. Co. v. Morris, supra. See also Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rodrigues, supra; Same v. Prince, supra; Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stockwell, 118 Ind., 98.
Presentation and Retention of Doctor’s Bill Raises No Presumption of Liability.—The presentation of a bill to a person containing charges against him for services rendered another person, and his retention of that bill without disclaimer of liability, does not raise a presumption of liability, for it is not necessarily an account stated. To constitute an account stated, there must be not only a statement of account, but acquiescence in it; mere retention of the account is not sufficient.
Bills Presented Not Conclusive as to Amounts Charged.—On the other hand, if a bill is presented which contains charges which are not acquiesced in, the person making out and presenting the bill is not absolutely bound by the charges therein contained, although such a bill affords some evidence as to the value of the services rendered.[170]
Claims Against Estates of Deceased Persons.—A bill for a physician’s services constitutes a claim against the estate of a deceased person, like any other debt. In some States it is a preferred claim.[171] In this connection it should be observed that short statutes of limitation exist in most countries and States applicable to such cases, shorter than the ordinary limitation imposed by law upon the right to sue upon claims for services rendered (which is six years). In order to preserve his legal rights, the physician should as soon as possible after the death of the person for whom his services have been rendered, ascertain who is the administrator or executor of the estate of such person, and file with such representative, personally, proof of his claim.
Patient who Receives Benefit of Services of Consulting Physician Liable.—The liability of a patient for the services of a consulting physician is generally governed by the same rules as his liability to the physician in immediate charge of the case.[172]
Where the patient accepts the services of a consulting physician, although he has not directly requested them, he must pay for them if he receives the benefit of them without objecting, because it will be presumed that he ratified the act of the physician who was in charge of the case, in calling the other physician into consultation.[173]
But, however this may be, it is a principle of professional ethics, which has almost acquired the authority of legal doctrine, that a physician in charge of a case should obtain the full assent of a patient, or of his family and friends, if he is too ill to give his own consent, to the calling of another physician in consultation.
No Other Stranger can be Called into Sick-Room without Assent of Patient.—A limitation upon the authority and right of an attending physician is, that if he desires or attempts to call in a stranger not a physician, he must obtain his patient’s consent. The obligation of a physician toward his patient of secrecy and confidence is regarded as very strict, and if a physician should call in a student or other stranger, without first consulting his patient, or those who are in some measure related to him and connected with him, it would be a very severe stretch of morals and possibly of law. In fact, in a recent case in Michigan, a physician was held liable for damages who called in a stranger, an unmarried man, who was an unprofessional man, to be with him while he was in attendance on a confinement case. In that case both the physician and the person so called in, and who was present at that time, were held liable in damages; and it was further held that the right to recover was not affected by the fact that the patient supposed that the person so called in was a medical man, and therefore submitted to his presence without objection.[174]
The statutes which create the privilege as to professional communications and information necessary to enable the physician to prescribe, might not apply to students or other strangers, and this is probably the reason for the rule of law laid down in the Michigan case. The obligation to preserve inviolate a communication as a privileged communication, including in the meaning of the word “communication” all knowledge or information received while in attendance upon a case, would be held to have been broken by the act of the physician in bringing in a stranger who would not be privileged from testifying.
Measure of Recovery for Services Rendered.
Terms of Express Contract Govern—Reasonable Worth the Rule in Implied Contracts.—In case of an express contract its terms necessarily measure the amount of the charges. In the absence of an express contract fixing the value of the services to be rendered, the measure of damages for breach of payment is like that in any other case of personal services, the reasonable worth and value of the services performed. So likewise if medicines or appliances are furnished, which are not reasonably to be expected and furnished, according to the custom of the school to which the physician or surgeon belongs, the reasonable worth and value at the time of furnishing them, and at the place of furnishing them, is the measure fixed by the law to determine what shall be recovered for them.[175]
Value—How Proved.—When the medical man is compelled to go into court to enforce payment for his services, it has been questioned whether he can testify to the services rendered, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the patient at the time of the treatment, because it has been claimed that he could not do so without violating the statute against the disclosure by physicians of information received which is necessary to enable them to prescribe. The tendency of the later decisions, however, seems to be that the breach of the patient’s contract to pay relieves the physician from his obligation of secrecy, and consequently, that if it is necessary for him to go into court and prove the value of his services, he may testify, within reasonable limitations, to all matters necessary to inform the court fully as to the nature and extent of the disease or injuries of the patient, in order that he may show the responsibility imposed upon him and the extent of the services that he has rendered. This subject will be fully considered under the head of “Privileged Communications.” The usual course of practice where there is not an express contract fixing the charges, is to prove the facts and circumstances showing the treatment and services, and then to produce other physicians who, in answer to a hypothetical question stating the facts and circumstances in the case, assuming them as true, are allowed, if they state they know the value of such services, to give an expert opinion as to what that value is.[176] It has also been said (Ordronaux, “Jurisprudence of Medicine,” § 43), that if a fee-bill of charges for such services has been established by an association of physicians recognized by law, such as a county medical society or a State medical society, incorporated pursuant to statute, such fee-bill can, if properly authenticated as having been adopted by the association, be offered in evidence on behalf of the patient and against the physician. But such a fee-bill in such a case would not be held to be conclusive evidence of the value of the services, but will be received in evidence, if at all, merely for the purpose of showing what was the usual and ordinary charge in such cases. As we shall see later on, under “Malpractice,” a judgment for services rendered, however small, is a bar to an action of malpractice, because a judgment for the value of the services rendered involves proof on the part of the plaintiff, and a finding on the part of the court, that the services had value and were skilfully performed and properly rendered.[177]
Custom of Physicians to Treat Each Other Gratis, Enforceable.—Physicians frequently treat each other, and it has been held, where the custom exists to do so without charge, that such a custom is binding. Of course, this rule does not prevent physicians from making an express contract to waive the custom and agreeing that the services be compensated.
Elements to be Proved in an Action for Service, etc.—General Advice.—The result of these rules may be thus summarized, viz.: The elements to be established in an action for services by a physician against a patient are three in number—(1) the employment; (2) the performance of the services;[178] and (3) the value of the services, that value being either a fixed value determined by the terms of the contract between the parties, or the reasonable worth and value of the services determined by evidence of experts upon that subject. It is, therefore, important that physicians and surgeons should be advised, when entering upon the practice of their profession, to keep a record of their transactions and of their business generally. Because, if they are compelled to go into court to recover for their services, they will be called upon to describe with minuteness the character and extent of the services they have performed in order that the value thereof may be correctly ascertained and determined in the suit. Any person in active practice who is not blessed with a most tenacious and particular memory is liable to forget a great many details which, with a record in hand, properly kept, could be brought to his memory and be testified to with absolute truthfulness and conviction. And the record itself, when properly shown to be a book of original entry, is generally receivable in evidence, as a memorandum of the transaction.[179]