CHAPTER XVII.
ON THE GOVERNMENT OF VERBS.
[§ 558]. The government of verbs is of two sorts, (1.) objective, and (2.) modal.
It is objective where the noun which follows the verb is the name of some object affected by the action of the verb,—as he strikes me; he wounds the enemy.
It is modal when the noun which follows the verb is not the name of any object affected by the verb, but the name of some object explaining the manner in which the action of the verb takes place, the instrument with which it is done, the end for which it is done, &c.
The government of all transitive verbs is necessarily objective. It may also be modal,—I strike the enemy with the sword=ferio hostem gladio.
The government of all intransitive verbs can only be modal,—I walk with the stick. When we say, I walk the horse, the word walk has changed its meaning, and signifies make to walk, and is, by the very fact of its being followed by the name of an object, converted from an intransitive into a transitive verb.
The modal construction may also be called the adverbial construction; because the effect of the noun is akin to that of an adverb,—I fight with bravery=I fight bravely: he walks a king=he walks regally. The modal (or adverbial) construction (or government) sometimes takes the appearance of the objective: inasmuch as intransitive verbs are frequently followed by a substantive; which substantive is in the objective case. Nevertheless, this is no proof of government. For a verb to be capable of governing an objective case, it must be a verb signifying an action affecting an object: and
if there be no such object, there is no room for any objective government. To break the sleep of the righteous, is to affect, by breaking, the sleep of the righteous: but, to sleep the sleep of the righteous, is not to affect by sleeping the sleep of the righteous; since the act of sleeping is an act that affects no object whatever. It is a state. We may, indeed, give it the appearance of a transitive verb, as we do when we say, the opiate slept the patient, meaning thereby, lulled to sleep; but the transitive character is only apparent.
To sleep the sleep of the righteous is to sleep in agreement with—or according to—or after the manner of—the sleep of the righteous, and the construction is adverbial.
In the grammars of the classical languages, the following rule is exceptionable—Quodvis verbum admittit accusativum nominis sibi cognati. It does so; but it governs the accusative case not objectively but modally.
[§ 559]. Modal verbs may be divided into a multiplicity of divisions. Of such, it is not necessary in English to give more than the following four:—
1. Appositional.—As, she walks a queen: you consider me safe. The appositional construction is, in reality, a matter of concord rather than of gender. It will be considered more fully in the following section.
2. Traditive.—As, I give the book to you=do librum tibi. I teach you the lesson=διδάσκω σὲ τὴν διδασκάλιαν. In all traditive expressions there are three ideas; (1.) an agent, (2.) an object, (3.) a person, or thing, to which the object is made over, or transferred, by the agent. For this idea the term dative is too restricted: since in Greek and some other languages, both the name of the object conveyed, and the name of the person to whom it is conveyed are, frequently, put in the accusative case.
3. Instrumental.—As, I fight with a sword=pugno ense=feohte sweorde,—Anglo-Saxon.
4. Emphatic.—As, he sleeps the sleep of the righteous.
[§ 560]. Verb and nominative case.—No verb governs a nominative case. The appositional construction seems to require such a form of government; but the form is only apparent.
It is I.
It is thou.
It is he, &c.
Here, although the word is is followed by a nominative case, it by no means governs one—at least not as a verb.
It has been stated above that the so-called verb substantive is only a verb for the purposes of etymology. In syntax, it is only a part of a verb, i. e., the copula.
Now this fact changes the question of the construction in expressions like it is I, &c., from a point of government to one of concord. In the previous examples the words it, is, and I, were, respectively, subject, copula, and predicate; and, as it is the function of the copula to denote the agreement between the predicate and the subject, the real point to investigate is the nature of the concord between these two parts of a proposition.
Now the predicate need agree with the subject in case only.
1. It has no necessary concord in gender—she is a man in courage—he is a woman in effeminacy—it is a girl.
2. It has no necessary concord in number—sin is the wages of death—it is these that do the mischief.
3. It has no necessary concord in person—I am he whom you mean.
4. It has, however, a necessary concord in case. Nothing but a nominative case can, by itself, constitute a term of either kind—subject or predicate. Hence, both terms must be in the nominative, and, consequently, both in the same case. Expressions like this is for me are elliptic. The logical expression is this is a thing for me.
Rule.—The predicate must be of the same case with its subject.
Hence—The copula instead of determining[[60]] a case expresses a concord.
Rule 1.—All words connected with a nominative case by the copula (i.e., the so-called verb-substantive) must be nominative.—It is I; I am safe.
Rule 2.—All words in apposition with a word so connected must be nominative.—It is difficult to illustrate this from the English language from our want of inflexions. In Latin, however, we say vocor Johannes=I am called John, not vocor Johannem. Here the logical equivalent is ego sum vocatus Johannes—where—
1. Ego, is nominative because it is the subject.
2. Vocatus is nominative because it is the predicate agreeing with the subject.
3. Johannes, is nominative because it is part of the predicate, and in apposition with vocatus.
N.B. Although in precise language Johannes is said to agree with vocatus rather than to be in apposition with it, the expression, as it stands, is correct. Apposition is the agreement of substantives, agreement the apposition of adjectives.
Rule 3.—All verbs which, when resolved into a copula and participle, have their participle in apposition (or agreeing) with the noun, are in the same condition as simple copulas—she walks a queen=she is walking a queen=illa est incedens regina.
Rule 4.—The construction of a subject and copula preceded by the conjunction that, is the same in respect to the predicate by which they are followed as if the sentence were an isolated proposition.
This rule determines the propriety of the expression—I believe that it is he as opposed to the expression I believe that it is him.
I believe=I am believing, and forms one proposition.
It is he, forms a second.
That, connects the two; but belongs to neither.
Now, as the relation between the subject and predicate of a proposition cannot be affected by a word which does not belong to it, the construction is the same as if the propositions were wholly separate.
N.B. The question (in cases where the conjunction that is not used), as to the greater propriety of the two expressions—I believe it to be him—I believe it to be he—has yet to be considered.
[§ 561]. The verb and genitive case.—No verb in the present English governs a genitive case. In Anglo-Saxon certain verbs did: e.g., verbs of ruling and others—weolde thises middangeardes=he ruled (wealded) this earth's. Genitive cases, too, governed by a verb are common both in Latin and Greek. To eat of the fruit of the tree is no genitive construction, however much it may be equivalent to one. Fruit is in the objective case, and is governed not by the verb but by the preposition of.
[§ 562]. The verb and accusative.—All transitive verbs govern an accusative case,—he strikes me, thee, him, her, it, us, you, them.
The verb and dative case.—The word give, and a few others, govern a dative case. Phrases like give it him, whom shall I give it, are perfectly correct, and have been explained above. The prepositional construction give it to him,—to whom shall I give it? is unnecessary. The evidence of this is the same as in the construction of the adjective like.
[§ 563]. The partitive construction.—Certain transitive verbs, the action whereof is extended not to the whole, but only to a part of their object, are followed by the preposition of and an objective case. To eat of the fruit of the tree=to eat a part (or some) of the fruit of the tree: to drink of the water of the well=to drink a part (or some) of the water of the well. It is not necessary, here, to suppose the ellipsis of the words part (or some). The construction is a construction that has grown out of the partitive power of the genitive case; for which case the preposition of, followed by the objective, serves as an equivalent.
[§ 564]. It has been already stated that forms like I believe
it to be him, and forms like I believe it to be he, had not been investigated. Of these, the former is, logically, correct.
Here, the word, to be, is, in respect to its power, a noun.
As such, it is in the accusative case after the verb believe.
With this accusative infinitive, it agrees, as being part of the same complex idea. And him does the same.
In English we have two methods of expressing one idea; the method in question, and the method by means of the conjunction, that.
1. I believe it to be him.
2. I believe that it is he.
In the first example, it is the object; and it-to-be-him forms one complex term.
In the second, he agrees with it; and it is the subject of a separate, though connected, proposition.
Of these two forms the Latin language adopts but one, viz., the former,—credo eum esse, not credo quod illud est ille.
[§ 565]. The expression ob differentiam.—The classical languages, although having but one of the two previous forms, are enabled to effect a variation in the application of it, which, although perhaps illogical, is convenient. When the speaker means himself, the noun that follows, esse, or εἶναι, is nominative,—φημὶ εἶναι δεσπότης=I say that I am the master: ait fuisse celerrimus=he says that he himself was the swiftest—but, φημὶ εἶναι δεσπότην=I say that he (some one else) is the master; and ait fuisse celerrimum=he says that he (some one else) is the swiftest. This, though not adopted in English, is capable of being adopted,—He believes it to be he (i.e., the speaker) who invented the machine; but, he believes it to be him (that is, another person) who invented it.
[§ 566]. When the substantive infinitive, to be, is preceded by a passive participle, combined with the verb substantive, the construction is nominative,—it is believed to be he who spoke, not it is believed to be him.—Here there are two propositions:
1. It is believed.—
2. Who spoke.
Now, here, it is the subject, and, as such, nominative. But it is also the equivalent to to be he, which must be nominative as well. To be he is believed=esse-ille creditur,—or, changing the mode of proof,—
1. It is the subject and nominative.
2. Believed is part of the predicate; and, consequently, nominative also.
3. To be he is a subordinate part of the predicate, in apposition with believed—est creditum, nempe entitas ejus. Or, to be he is believed=esse-ille est creditum.
As a general expression for the syntax of copulas and appositional constructions, the current rule, that copulas and appositional verbs must be followed by the same case by which they are preceded, stands good.