CHAPTER XXIII.
ON THE AUXILIARY VERBS.
[§ 578]. The auxiliary verbs, in English, play a most important part in the syntax of the language. They may be classified upon a variety of principles. The following, however, are all that need here be applied.
A. Classification of auxiliaries according to their inflectional or non-inflectional powers.—Inflectional auxiliaries are those that may either replace or be replaced by an inflection. Thus—I am struck=the Latin ferior, and the Greek τύπτομαι. These auxiliaries are in the same relation to verbs that prepositions are to nouns. The inflectional auxiliaries are,—
1. Have; equivalent to an inflection in the way of tense—I have bitten=mo-mordi.
2. Shall; ditto. I shall call=voc-abo.
3. Will; ditto. I will call=voc-abo.
4. May; equivalent to an inflection in the way of mood. I am come that I may see=venio ut vid-eam.
5. Be; equivalent to an inflection in the way of voice. To be beaten=verberari, τύπτεσθαι.
6. Am, art, is, are; ditto. Also equivalent to an inflection in the way of tense. I am moving=move-o.
7. Was, were; ditto, ditto. I was beaten=ἐ-τύφθην. I was moving=move-bam.
Do, can, must, and let, are non-inflectional auxiliaries.
B. Classification of auxiliaries according to their non-auxiliary significations.—The power of the word have in the combination of I have a horse is clear enough. It means possession. The power of the same word in the combination I have been is not so clear; nevertheless it is a power which has grown out of the idea of possession. This shows that
the power of a verb as an auxiliary may be a modification of its original power; i. e., of the power it has in non-auxiliary constructions. Sometimes the difference is very little: the word let, in let us go, has its natural sense of permission unimpaired. Sometimes it is lost altogether. Can and may exist only as auxiliaries.
1. Auxiliary derived from the idea of possession—have.
2. Auxiliaries derived from the idea of existence—be, is, was.
3. Auxiliary derived from the idea of future destination, dependent upon circumstances external to the agent—shall. There are etymological reasons for believing that shall is no present tense, but a perfect.
4. Auxiliary derived from the idea of future destination, dependent upon the volition of the agent—will. Shall is simply predictive; will is predictive and promissive as well.
5. Auxiliary derived from the idea of power, dependent upon circumstances external to the agent—may.
6. Auxiliary derived from the idea of power, dependent upon circumstances internal to the agent—can. May is simply permissive; can is potential. In respect to the idea of power residing in the agent being the cause which determines a contingent action, can is in the same relation to may as will is to shall.
"May et can, cum eorum præteritis imperfectis, might et could, potentiam innuunt: cum hoc tamen discrimine: may et might vel de jure vel saltem de rei possibilitate dicuntur, at can et could de viribus agentis."—Wallis, p. 107.
7. Auxiliary derived from the idea of sufferance—let.
8. Auxiliary derived from the idea of necessity—must.
"Must necessitatem innuit. Debeo, oportet, necesse est urere, I must burn. Aliquando sed rarius in præterito dicitur must (quasi ex must'd seu must't contractum). Sic, si de præterito dicatur, he must (seu must't) be burnt, oportebat uri seu necesse habuit ut ureretur."—Wallis, 107.
9. Auxiliary derived from the idea of action—do.
C. Classification of auxiliary verbs in respect to their mode
of construction.—Auxiliary verbs combine with others in three ways.
1. With participles.—a) With the present, or active, participle—I am speaking: b) With the past, or passive, participle—I am beaten, I have beaten.
2. With infinitives.—a) With the objective infinitive—I can speak: b) With the gerundial infinitive—I have to speak.
3. With both infinitives and participles.—I shall have done, I mean to have done.
D. Auxiliary verbs may be classified according to their effect.—Thus—have makes the combination in which it appears equivalent to a tense; be to a passive form; may to a sign of mood, &c.
This sketch of the different lights under which auxiliary verbs may be viewed, has been written for the sake of illustrating, rather than exhausting, the subject.
[§ 579]. The following is an exhibition of some of the times in which an action may take place, as found in either the English or other languages, expressed by the use of either an inflection or a combination.
Time considered in one point only—
1. Present.—An action taking place at the time of speaking, and incomplete.—I am beating, I am being beaten. Not expressed, in English, by the simple present tense; since I beat means I am in the habit of beating.
2. Aorist.—An action that took place in past time, or previous to the time of speaking, and which has no connection with the time of speaking.—I struck, I was stricken. Expressed, in English, by the præterite, in Greek by the aorist. The term aorist, from the Greek ἀ-όριστος=undefined, is a convenient name for this sort of time.
3. Future.—An action that has neither taken place, nor is taking place at the time of speaking, but which is stated as one which will take place.—Expressed, in English, by the combination of will or shall with an infinitive mood. In Latin and Greek by an inflection. I shall (or will) speak, λέκ-σω, dica-m.
None of these expressions imply more than a single action; in other words, they have no relation to any second action occurring simultaneously with them, before them, or after them.—I am speaking now, I spoke yesterday, I shall speak to-morrow. Of course, the act of mentioning them is not considered as an action related to them in the sense here meant.
By considering past, present, or future actions not only by themselves, but as related to other past, present, or future actions, we get fresh varieties of expression. Thus, an act may have been going on, when some other act, itself an act of past time, interrupted it. Here the action agrees with a present action, in being incomplete; but it differs from it in having been rendered incomplete by an action that has past. This is exactly the case with the—
4. Imperfect.—I was reading when he entered. Here we have two acts; the act of reading and the act of entering. Both are past as regards the time of speaking, but both are present as regards each other. This is expressed, in English, by the past tense of the verb substantive and the present participle, I was speaking; and in Latin and Greek by the imperfect tense, dicebam, ἔτυπτον.
5. Perfect.—Action past, but connected with the present by its effects or consequences.—I have written, and here is the letter. Expressed in English by the auxiliary verb have, followed by the participle passive in the accusative case and neuter gender of the singular number. The Greek expresses this by the reduplicate perfect: τέ-τυφα=I have beaten.
6. Pluperfect.—Action past, but connected with a second action, subsequent to it, which is also past.—I had written when he came in.
7. Future present.—Action future as regards the time of speaking, present as regards some future time.—I shall be speaking about this time to-morrow.
8. Future præterite.—Action future as regards the time of speaking, past as regards some future time.—I shall have spoken by this time to-morrow.
These are the chief expressions which are simply determined by the relations of actions to each other, and to the time of speaking, either in the English or any other language. But over and above the simple idea of time, there may be others superadded: thus, the phrase, I do speak means, not only that I am in the habit of speaking, but that I also insist upon it being understood that I am so.
Again, an action that is mentioned as either taking place, or as having taken place at a given time, may take place again and again. Hence the idea of habit may arise out of the idea of either present time or aorist time.
α. In English, the present form expresses habit. See p. [455].
β. In Greek the aorist expresses habit.
Again, one tense, or one combination, may be used for another. I was speaking when he enters.
The results of these facts may now be noticed:
1. The emphatic present and præterite.—Expressed by do (or did), as stated above. A man says I do (or did) speak, read, &c., when, either directly or by implication, it is asserted or implied that he does not. As a question implies doubt, do is used in interrogations.
"Do et did indicant emphatice tempus præsens, et præteritum imperfectum. Uro, urebam; I burn, I burned: vel (emphatice) I do burn, I did burn."—Wallis, p. 106.
2. The predictive future.—I shall be there to-morrow. This means simply that the speaker will be present. It gives no clue to the circumstances that will determine his being so.
3. The promissive future.—I will be there to-morrow.—This means not only that the speaker will be present, but that he intends being so. For further observations on shall and will, see pp. [471]-474.
4. That the power of the present tense is, in English, not present, but habitual, has already been twice stated.
[§ 580]. The representative expression of past and future time.—An action may be past; yet, for the sake of bringing it more vividly before the hearers, we may make it present.
He walks (for walked) up to him, and knocks (for knocked) him down. This denotes a single action; and is by no means the natural habitual power of the English present. So, in respect to a future, I beat you if you don't leave off, for I will beat you. This use of the present tense is sometimes called the historic use of the present tense. I find it more convenient to call it the representative use; inasmuch as it is used more after the principles of painting than of history; the former of which, necessarily, represents things as present, the latter, more naturally, describes them as past.
The use of the representative present to express simple actions is unequivocally correct. To the expression, however, of complex actions it gives an illogical character,—As I was doing this he enters (for entered). Nevertheless, such a use of the present is a fact in language, and we must take it as it occurs.
[§ 581]. The present tense can be used instead of the future; and that on the principle of representation. Can a future be used for a present? No.
The present tense can be used instead of the aorist; and that on the principle of representation. Can a past tense, or combination, be used for a present?
In respect to the perfect tense there is no doubt. The answer is in the affirmative. For all purposes of syntax a perfect tense, or a combination equivalent to one, is a present tense. Contrast the expression, I come that I may see; with the expression, I came that I might see; i.e., the present construction with the aorist. Then, bring in the perfect construction, I have come. It differs with the aorist, and agrees with the present. I have come that I may see. The reason for this is clear. There is not only a present element in all perfects, but for the purposes of syntax, the present element predominates. Hence expressions like I shall go, need give us no trouble; even though shall be considered as a perfect tense. Suppose the root, sk-ll to mean to be destined (or fated). Provided we consider the effects of the action to be continued up to the time of speaking, we may say I have been destined to go, just as well as we can say I am destined to go.
The use of the aorist as a present (except so far as both the tenses agree in their power of expressing habitual actions) is a more difficult investigation. It bears upon such expressions as I ought to go, &c., and will be taken up in p. [475].
[§ 582]. Certain adverbs, i.e., those of time, require certain tenses. I am then, I was now, I was hereafter, &c., are contradictory expressions. They are not so much bad grammar as impossible nonsense. Nevertheless, we have in Latin such expressions as
"Ut sumus in ponto ter frigore constitit Ister."
Here the connection of the present and perfect ideas explains the apparent contradiction. The present state may be the result of a previous one; so that a preterite element may be involved in a present expression. Ut sumus=since I have been where I am.
It is hardly necessary to remark that such expressions as since I am here (where since=inasmuch as) do not come under this class.
[§ 583]. Two fresh varieties in the use of tenses and auxiliary verbs may be arrived at by considering the following ideas, which may be superadded to that of simple time.
1. Continuance in the case of future actions.—A future action may not only take place, but continue: thus, a man may, on a given day, not only be called by a particular name, but may keep that name. When Hesiod says that, notwithstanding certain changes which shall have taken place, good shall continue to be mixed with bad, he does not say, ἐσθλὰ μιχθήσεται κακοῖσιν, but,
Ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ τοῖσι μεμίξεται ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν.
Opera et Dies.
Again,—
Ἔπειθ' ὁ πολίτης ἐντεθεὶς ἐν καταλόγῳ
Οὐδεὶς κατὰ σπουδὰς μετεγγραφήσεται,
Ἀλλ' ὅσπερ ἦν τὸ πρῶτυν ἐγγεγράψεται.
Aristoph. Equites, 1366.
Here μετεγγραφήσεται means change from one class to another, ἠγγεγράψεται continuance in the same.—See Mathiæ, ii. § 498.
Upon the lines,—
Ὅθεν πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ὑστέρων κεκλήσεται
Δούρειος ἵππος.
Troades, 13, 14.
Seidler remarks that κληθήσεται, est nomen accipiet; κεκλήσεται, nomen geret.
Now it is quite true that this Greek tense, the so-called paulo-post-futurum, "bears the same relation to the other futures as, among the tenses of past time, the perfectum does to the aorist."—(Mathiæ.) And it is also true that it by no means answers to the English shall have been. Yet the logical elements of both are the same. In the English expression, the past power of the perfect predominates, in the Greek its present power.
2. Habit in the case of past actions.—I had dined when I rode out. This may apply to a particular dinner, followed by a particular ride. But it may also mean that when the speaker had dined, according to habit, he rode out, according to habit also. This gives us a variety of pluperfect; which is, in the French language, represented by separate combination—j'avais diné, j'eus diné.
[§ 584]. It is necessary to remember that the connection between the present and the past time, which is involved in the idea of a perfect tense (τέτυφα), or perfect combination (I have beaten), is of several sorts.
It may consist in the present proof of the past fact,—I have written, and here is the evidence.
It may consist in the present effects of the past fact,—I have written, and here is the answer.
Without either enumerating or classifying these different kinds of connexion, it is necessary to indicate two sorts of inference to which they may give origin.
1. The inference of continuance.—When a person says, I have learned my lesson, we presume that he can say it, i. e., that, he has a present knowledge of it. Upon this principle
κέκτημαι=I have earned=I possess. The past action is assumed to be continued in its effects.
2. The inference of contrast.—When a person says, I have been young, we presume that he is so no longer. The action is past, but it is continued up to the time of speaking by the contrast which it supplies. Upon this principle, fuit Ilium means Ilium is no more.
In speaking, this difference can be expressed by a difference of accent. I have learned my lesson, implies that I don't mean to learn it again. I have learned my lesson, implies that I can say it.
[§ 585]. The construction of the auxiliary, may, will be considered in the Chapter on Conjunctions; that of can, must, and let, offer nothing remarkable. The combination of the auxiliary, have, with the past participle requires notice. It is, here, advisable to make the following classifications.
1. The combination with the participle of a transitive verb.—I have ridden the horse; thou hast broken the sword; he has smitten the enemy.
2. The combination with the participle of an intransitive verb,—I have waited; thou hast hungered; he has slept.
3. The combination with the participle of the verb substantive,—I have been; thou hast been; he has been.
It is by examples of the first of these three divisions that the true construction is to be shown.
For an object of any sort to be in the possession of a person, it must previously have existed. If I possess a horse, that horse must have had a previous existence.
Hence, in all expressions like I have ridden a horse, there are two ideas, a past idea in the participle, and a present idea in the word denoting possession.
For an object of any sort, affected in a particular manner, to be in the possession of a person, it must previously have been affected in the manner required. If I possess a horse that has been ridden, the riding must have taken place before I mention the fact of the ridden horse being in my possession; inasmuch as I speak of it as a thing already done,—the participle, ridden, being in the past tense.
I have ridden a horse=I have a horse ridden=I have a horse as a ridden horse, or (changing the gender and dealing with the word horse as a thing)=I have a horse as a ridden thing.
In this case the syntax is of the usual sort. (1) Have=own=habeo=teneo; (2) horse is the accusative case=equum; (3) ridden is a past participle agreeing either with horse, or with a word in apposition with it understood.
Mark the words in italics. The word ridden does not agree with horse, since it is of the neuter gender. Neither if we said I have ridden the horses, would it agree with horses; since it is of the singular number.
The true construction is arrived at by supplying the word thing. I have a horse as a ridden thing=habeo equum equitatum (neuter). Here the construction is the same as triste lupus stabulis.
I have horses as a ridden thing=habeo equos equitatam (singular, neuter). Here the construction is—
"Triste ... maturis frugibus imbres,
Arboribus venti, nobis Amaryllides iræ."
or in Greek—
Δεινὸν γυναιξὶν αἱ δι' ὠδίνων γοναί.
The classical writers supply instances of this use of have. Compertum habeo, milites, verba viris virtutem non addere=I have discovered=I am in possession of the discovery. Quæ cum ita sint, satis de Cæsare hoc dictum habeo.
2. The combination of have with an intransitive verb is irreducible to the idea of possession: indeed, it is illogical. In I have waited, we cannot make the idea expressed by the word waited the object of the verb have or possess. The expression has become a part of language by means of the extension of a false analogy. It is an instance of an illegitimate imitation.
3. The combination of have with been is more illogical still, and is a stronger instance of the influence of an illegitimate imitation. In German and Italian, where even intransitive verbs are combined with the equivalents to the English have
(haben and avere), the verb substantive is not so combined; on the contrary, the combinations are
Italian; io sono stato=I am been.
German; ich bin gewesen=ditto.
which is logical.
[§ 586]. I am to speak.—Three facts explain this idiom.
1. The idea of direction towards an object conveyed by the dative case, and by combinations equivalent to it.
2. The extent to which the ideas of necessity, obligation, or intention are connected with the idea of something that has to be done, or something towards which some action has a tendency.
3. The fact that expressions like the one in question historically represent an original dative case, or its equivalent; since to speak grows out of the Anglo-Saxon form to sprecanne, which, although called a gerund, is really a dative case of the infinitive mood.
When Johnson (see Mr. Guest, Phil. Trans. No. 44) thought that, in the phrase he is to blame, the word blame was a noun, if he meant a noun in the way that culpa is a noun, his view was wrong. But if he meant a noun in the way that culpare, ad culpandum, are nouns, it was right.
[§ 587]. I am to blame.—This idiom is one degree more complex than the previous one; since I am to blame=I am to be blamed. As early, however, as the Anglo-Saxon period the gerunds were liable to be used in a passive sense: he is to lufigenne=not he is to love, but he is to be loved.
The principle of this confusion may be discovered by considering that an object to be blamed, is an object for some one to blame, an object to be loved is an object for some one to love.
[§ 588]. Shall and will.—The simply predictive future verb is shall. Nevertheless, it is only used in the first person. The second and third persons are expressed by the promissive verb will.
The promissive future verb is will. Nevertheless, it is only used in the first person. The second and third persons are expressed by the predictive verb shall.
"In primis personis shall simpliciter prædicentis est; will, quasi promittentis aut minantis.
"In secundis et tertiis personis, shall promittentis est aut minantis: will simpliciter prædicentis.
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nempe, hoc futurum prædico.
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nempe, hoc futurum spondeo, vel faxo ut sit."
Again—"would et should illud indicant quod erat vel esset futurum: cum hoc tantum discrimine: would voluntatem innuit, seu agentis propensionem: should simpliciter futuritionem."—Wallis, p. 107.
[§ 589]. Archdeacon Hare explains this by a usus ethicus. "In fact, this was one of the artifices to which the genius of the Greek language had recourse, to avoid speaking presumptuously of the future: for there is an awful, irrepressible, and almost instinctive consciousness of the uncertainty of the future, and of our own powerlessness over it, which, in all cultivated languages, has silently and imperceptibly modified the modes of expression with regard to it: and from a double kind of litotes, the one belonging to human nature generally, the other imposed by good-breeding on the individual, and urging him to veil the manifestations of his will, we are induced to frame all sorts of shifts for the sake of speaking with becoming modesty. Another method, as we know, frequently adopted by the Greeks was the use of the conditional moods: and as sentiments of this kind always imply some degree of intellectual refinement, and strengthen with its increase, this is called an Attic usage. The same name too has often been given to the above-mentioned middle forms of the future; not that in either case the practice was peculiar to the Attic dialect, but that it was more general where the feelings which produced it were
strong and more distinct. Here again our own language supplies us with an exact parallel: indeed this is the only way of accounting for the singular mixture of the two verbs shall and will, by which, as we have no auxiliary answering to the German werde, we express the future tense. Our future, or at least what answers to it, is, I shall, thou wilt, he will. When speaking in the first person, we speak submissively: when speaking to or of another, we speak courteously. In our older writers, for instance in our translation of the Bible, shall is applied to all three persons: we had not then reacht that stage of politeness which shrinks from the appearance even of speaking compulsorily of another. On the other hand the Scotch use will in the first person: that is, as a nation they have not acquired that particular shade of good-breeding which shrinks from thrusting itself[[61]] forward."
[§ 590]. Notice of the use of will and shall, by Professor De Morgan.—"The matter to be explained is the synonymous character of will in the first person with shall in the second and third; and of shall in the first person with will in the second and third: shall (1) and will (2, 3) are called predictive: shall (2, 3) and will (1) promissive. The suggestion now proposed will require four distinctive names.
"Archdeacon Hare's usus ethicus is taken from the brighter side of human nature:—'When speaking in the first person we speak submissively; when speaking to or of another, we speak courteously.' This explains I shall, thou wilt; but I cannot think it explains I will, thou shalt. It often happens
that you will, with a persuasive tone, is used courteously for something next to, if not quite, you shall. The present explanation is taken from the darker side; and it is to be feared that the à priori probabilities are in its favour.
"In introducing the common mode of stating the future tenses, grammar has proceeded as if she were more than a formal science. She has no more business to collect together I shall, thou wilt, he will, than to do the same with I rule, thou art ruled, he is ruled.
"It seems to be the natural disposition of man to think of his own volition in two of the following catagories, and of another man's in the other two:
Compelling, non-compelling; restrained, non-restrained.
"The ego, with reference to the non-ego, is apt, thinking of himself, to propound the alternative, 'Shall I compel, or shall I leave him to do as he likes?' so that, thinking of the other, the alternative is, 'shall he be restrained, or shall he be left to his own will?' Accordingly, the express introduction of his own will is likely to have reference to compulsion, in case of opposition: the express introduction of the will of another, is likely to mean no more than the gracious permission of the ego to let non-ego do as he likes. Correlatively, the suppression of reference to his own will, and the adoption of a simply predictive form on the part of the ego, is likely to be the mode with which, when the person is changed, he will associate the idea of another having his own way; while the suppression of reference to the will of the non-ego is likely to infer restraint produced by the predominant will of the ego.
"Occasionally, the will of the non-ego is referred to as under restraint in modern times. To I will not, the answer is sometimes you shall, meaning, in spite of the will—sometimes you will, meaning that the will will be changed by fear or sense of the inutility of resistance."[[62]]
[§ 591]. I am beaten.—This is a present combination, and it is present on the strength of the verb am, not on the strength of the participle beaten, which is præterite.
The following table exhibits the expedients on the part of the different languages of the Gothic stock, since the loss of the proper passive form of the Mœso-Gothic.
Deutsche Grammatik, iv. 19.
[§ 592]. Ought, would, &c., used as presents.—These words are not in the predicament of shall.
They are present in power, and past in form. So, perhaps, is shall.
But they are not, like shall, perfect forms; i. e., they have no natural present element in them.
They are aorist præterites. Nevertheless, they have a present sense.
So had their equivalents in Greek: ἐχρῆν=χρὴ, ἔδει=δεῖ, προσῆκεν=προσήκει.
In Latin, too, would was often not represented by either volo or volebam, but by velim.
I believe that the usus ethicus is at the bottom of this construction.
The assertion of duty or obligation is one of those assertions which men like to soften in the expression: should, ought.
So is the expression of power, as denoted by may or can—might, could.
Very often when we say you should (or ought to) do this, we leave to be added by implication—but you do not.
Very often when we say I could (or might) do this, we leave to be added by implication—but I do not exert my power.
Now, if what is left undone be the present element in this assertion, the duty to do it, or the power of doing it, constitutes a past element in it; since the power (or duty) is, in relation to the performance, a cause—insufficient, indeed, but still antecedent. This hypothesis is suggested rather than asserted.
[§ 593]. By substituting the words I am bound for I ought,
we may see the expedients to which this present use of the præterite forces us.
I am bound to do this now = I owe to do this now. However, we do not say owe, but ought.
Hence, when we wish to say I was bound to do this two years ago, we cannot say I ought (owed) to do this, &c., since ought is already used in a present sense.
We therefore say, instead, I ought to have done this two years ago; which has a similar, but by no means an identical meaning.
I was bound to pay two years ago, means two years ago I was under an obligation to make a payment, either then or at some future time.
I was bound to have paid, &c., means I was under an obligation to have made a payment.
If we use the word ought, this difference cannot be expressed.
Common people sometimes say, you had not ought to do so and so; and they have a reason for saying it.
The Latin language is more logical. It says not debet factum fuisse, but debuit fieri.