An account of the battle of Wilson's Creek, or Oak Hills, fought between the Union troops, commanded by Gen. N. Lyon and the Southern, or Confederate troops, under command of Gens. McCulloch and Price, on Saturday, August 10, 1861, in Greene county, Missouri

by R. I. Holcombe; Thomas W. Adams

CONFEDERATE MILITARY MOVEMENTS PRECEDING THE BATTLE.

From their camp at Moody’s Spring, where they had arrived Monday night, Generals Price and McCulloch moved forward to the point on Wilson’s creek, heretofore described, and went again into camp on the 6th. Scouting parties were at once sent out, especially to discover the Federal position, but with little success, while foraging parties scoured the country in every direction, and were equally inefficient in obtaining information. The combined forces were at once put in position to advance on Springfield, and only awaited the decision of Gen. McCulloch to begin to move. The latter was irresolute and undecided for some days. From the information he possessed as to the strength and character of Lyon’s forces and his knowledge of his own, he was fearful of the result of an engagement at that time. He had but little confidence in Price’s Missourians, who were somewhat undisciplined and inexperienced, it is true, and at one time he characterized them as “splendid roasting-ear foragers, but poor soldiers.”

It is an undoubted fact that at one time Gen. McCulloch had decided to retreat into Arkansas. Gen. Price, however, was anxious for an immediate advance and attack. He knew that Lyon’s force was inferior even to his own, and that the entire Southern army had but little to risk in offering battle. He knew furthermore, that Lyon ought to be reinforced, and that the chances were that he could and would be, and of course it was desirable that the enemy be attacked before this reinforcement should be effected. The most serious feature considered by McCulloch, that the Missourians were illy disciplined, imperfectly organized, and poorly armed, Price thought would be overcome by their superiority in numbers and their pluck in fighting on Missouri soil against a detested enemy—“the Yankee Dutch.”

There remains to be shown a good reason why McCulloch did not follow up Lyon and attack him on the 6th; it is true that he gained a victory by waiting, but that victory could have been won four days earlier and made more complete, more decisive and more lasting in its results. And yet McCulloch, on the 8th, seriously meditated a retreat—knowing his enemy’s strength as well as his own, and understanding, or supposed to understand, the situation perfectly.

In his report to the Confederate Secretary of War (see Rebellion Records, Series I., Vol. III., p. 745), Gen. McCulloch says: “* * * I asked of the Missourians, owing to their knowledge of the country, some reliable information of the strength and position of the enemy. This they repeatedly promised, but totally failed to furnish, though to urge them to it I then and at subsequent periods declared I would order the whole army back to Cassville, rather than bring on an engagement with an unknown enemy. It had no effect, as we remained four days within ten miles of Springfield, and never learned whether the streets were barricaded, or if any kind of works of defense had been erected by the enemy.”

Col. Snead says that McCulloch made every effort to discover the condition of Springfield; that he (McCulloch) would frequently sling his rifle over his shoulder, mount his horse and reconnoiter in person; but all to no purpose. Incredible as it may seem, it could not even be ascertained whether or not the Federals had thrown up breastworks, which it might be supposed could be learned from inspection a mile away.

Gen. N. B. Pearce says the first information concerning Gen. Lyon’s condition was furnished by two ladies, who, “on a pass to go out of Lyon’s lines, came around by Pond Springs, and came to Gen. Price’s headquarters and gave the desired information.” No corroboration of this story has been obtained, but it is given on the high authority of such a gallant officer and high-minded gentleman as Gen. Pearce, now of Whitesboro, Texas.

At last, Gen. Price lost all patience, and at sunrise on the morning of the 9th, sent Col. Snead over to McCulloch, to say to him that if he did not give orders for an immediate advance he (Price) would resume command of the Missouri State Guard and advance alone, be the consequences what they might. This led to a conference of the general officers at Price’s headquarters that afternoon, which conference resulted in orders for an advance on Springfield that very night, the movement to begin at nine o’clock.