PRELIMINARIES OF THE FINAL STRUGGLE.
On Monday, August 5, the day of Lyon’s arrival at Springfield, as before stated, he left a force of 2,500 strong at a point about five miles from Springfield, on the Fayetteville road. This force (comprising fully one-third of Lyon’s army), under Major Sturgis, was ordered by Gen. Lyon to be ready to move at a moment’s notice, and at about 6 o’clock on the evening of the next day the men were in ranks, the artillery horses harnessed, and everything in readiness to march back and attack the advancing enemy.
Shortly afterward a stream of visitors, messengers, and communications poured in upon the general, some reporting the engagement of Capt. Stockton, of the 1st Kansas, and two companies of Home Guards with a party of Price’s cavalry, on the prairie west of town, in which two of the latter were wounded; some gave other information; some were the bearers of excellent advice(!); others came for orders; still others had no business.
Two companies were ordered to the relief of Capt. Stockton. Eight companies of the 1st Kansas infantry, a part of the second Kansas, and Major Osterhaus’ battalion of the 2d Missouri were ordered to a certain point in town to await the arrival of Gen. Lyon, who, it seems, was so entirely occupied with other matters that instead of starting at 10 o’clock, it was midnight when he left his headquarters, and without looking at his watch he proceeded to Camp Hunter, having already ordered Major Sturgis to drive in the enemy’s pickets, if within two miles of his own. A company of cavalry under Capt. Fred Steele[4] was dispatched on his errand (to find the pickets) at half-past 12, and Gen. Lyon, with the troops above mentioned, arrived at 3 o’clock in the morning. Here he consulted his watch, and, finding the time more than two hours later than he supposed, he at once called together his principal officers, communicated to them his embarrassing position, and taking their advice, withdrew the entire force to Springfield.
It had been Lyon’s intention, on retreating from Dug Springs to Springfield, to wheel suddenly about on reaching the latter place and march back upon Price and McCulloch (who, he considered, would be following him up), fall upon them when they least expected an attack, and defeat them if possible. On arriving at Springfield, appearances indicated the approach of a Confederate force from the west, and this caused him to wait a few hours. The night of the 6th, his information was to the effect that Price and McCulloch were only seven miles away from Sturgis’ camp, and he intended attacking them at daylight. On the return to town the general remarked to Major Schofield, of the 1st Missouri (Frank Blair’s regiment), that he had a premonition that a night attack would prove disastrous, and yet he had felt impelled to try it once, and perhaps should do so again, “for my only hope of success is in a surprise,” he added. Before the Federals reached Springfield it was daylight. An ambush was formed in the timber southwest of town in case of pursuit.
During Wednesday continued alarms were circulated in Springfield, and a real panic prevailed among many of the citizens, who packed up and left, or prepared to leave, for supposed places of safety. The troops wore under arms in every quarter, and several times it was reported that fighting had actually commenced. Toward night the panic in a degree subsided: but many of the people who remained did not retire or make any attempt to sleep. Phelps’ regiment of Home Guards, commanded by Col. Marcus Boyd, was on the qui vive the whole night.
A consultation of the principal Federal officers was held at Gen. Lyon’s headquarters, which lasted till midnight. The question of evacuating Springfield and abandoning Southwest Missouri to its fate was seriously discussed. Looking at the matter from a military point of view, there was no doubt of the propriety and even the necessity of such a step, and Gen. Lyon and the majority of his officers counseled such a movement. Some favored a retreat to Fort Scott, while others thought Rolla a point easier reached and promising better results.
Gen. Sweeney, however, was strongly opposed to retreating without a fight. With his naturally florid face flushed to livid red, and waving his one arm with excitement, he exclaimed vehemently against such a policy—pointing out the disastrous results which must ensue upon a retreat without a battle—how the “rebels” would boast over such an easy conquest, how they would terrorize, harass, and persecute the unprotected Unionists if given undisputed possession of the country, how the Unionists themselves would become discouraged, crushed, or estranged, and declared himself in favor of holding on to the last moment, and of giving battle to Price and McCulloch as soon as they should offer it.[5]
Gen. Lyon and some of the other officers became converts to Gen. Sweeney’s views, and it was decided to remain, save the reputation of the little army, hope against hope for reinforcements, and not evacuate Springfield and Greene county until compelled to. The next day when Sigel’s brigade quartermaster, Major Alexis Mudd, asked Gen. Lyon when the army would leave Springfield, the latter replied: “Not until we are whipped out.”