THE FEDERAL ATTACK.
Col. T. L. Snead states that on the night of the 9th he sat up all night at Gen. Price’s headquarters, which were on the side of the creek, at the foot of the sloping, rocky, black-jack hills on whose summit the main battle was fought. About daybreak Gen. Price got up in great impatience and sent for McCulloch, who soon afterward arrived, accompanied by Col. James McIntosh (of the 2d Arkansas Mounted Riflemen), his assistant adjutant-general. “Gen. Price and I were just sitting down to breakfast,” says Col. Snead, “and they sat down with us.”
As the officers were eating, a messenger came running up from the front, where Gen. Rains’ division was posted, a mile or more away, and said that the Yankees were advancing, full 20,000 strong, and were on Rains’ line already, peppering his camp with musketry. “O, pshaw,” said McCulloch, laughingly, “that’s another of Rains’ scares,” alluding to the Dug Springs affair. “Tell Gen. Rains I will come to the front myself directly,” he added. The three officers went on eating, and in a minute or two another messenger came up and reported that the Federals were not more than a mile away, and had come suddenly upon Rains’ men as they lay on their arms and had driven them back. McCulloch again said, “O, nonsense! That’s not true;” but just then Rains’ men could be seen falling back in confusion. Gen. Price rose up and said to Col. Snead, “Have my horse saddled, and order the troops under arms at once.” He had hardly spoken when Totten’s battery unlimbered and sent its first shot, and about the same instant Sigel’s guns opened.
Dispositions for battle were quickly made. Price was ordered to move at once towards Rains with the rest of the Missourians. Pearce was ordered to form on Price’s left. Very soon Totten’s battery was in plain sight on the top of the hills in front and pounding away, while Sigel’s guns in the rear plainly gave notice that the Federals were on all sides.
The surprise was perfect. Most of the Southern troops were asleep. The few pickets that were out had mostly been called in to prepare for the early march, and this enabled Lyon to get close to the line,—upon the skirmishers, in fact,—before being discovered. The troops hurried out as fast and as best they could. The majority of Price’s Missourians had their horses with them. Nearly every secessionist, upon enlisting, wanted to ride and did ride. The idea of walking was distasteful in more ways than one,—it was laborious, to begin with, and it was considered somewhat plebeian and disgraceful. And the horsemen, so many of them, proved a serious disadvantage to the Southern cause. They stripped the country in many parts of this State and west of the Mississippi, not only of provisions but of forage and provender, cumbered the roads, and often in battle did more harm than good. At Wilson’s Creek the horses became frightened and unmanageable, and at one time they and some of their riders came near stampeding the entire Southern army. Hundreds of them tried to escape from the field by the Fayetteville road, but found it held by Sigel and his Germans.