FOOTNOTES:
[1] Except in the two first battles of Gaza, April and May 1917, when our losses, in comparison with the numbers engaged, were as severe as in some of the hardest fought battles on the Western Front.
CONTENTS
| [CHAPTER I] | ||||
| PAGE | ||||
| Preliminary. Situation in the East in June 1917. Objectives ofthe Palestine Campaign. The country. The opposing armies | [1] | |||
| [CHAPTER II] | ||||
| Plan of the operations. Laying the foundations. Cavalryreconnaissances. Work of the engineers. Maps and water supply | [10] | |||
| [CHAPTER III] | ||||
| 1917 Oct. 27th to Nov. 1st | The first round. The attack on Beersheba. Chargeof the 4th A.L.H. Brigade. Capture of the town with2000 prisoners. Destruction of the wells. First attackon the Gaza defences. German buildings in Beersheba.Arab sheikhs and the Camel Transport Corps | [18] | ||
| [CHAPTER IV] | ||||
| Nov. 2nd to Nov. 7th | The decisive battle. Enemy counterstroke on theeast. Hard fighting of the cavalry and the 53rdDivision. Lack of water. Capture of Tel Khuweilfeh.And of Hareira and Sharia. Enemy's front broken.Cavalry through the gap. Fall of Gaza | [38] | ||
| [CHAPTER V] | ||||
| Nov. 8th and 9th | The pursuit. All three cavalry divisions employed.Strong enemy resistance. Charge of the Yeomanry atHuj. Water at last. Sufferings of the horses. Delaycaused by lack of water. Arak el Menshiye and BeitDuras | [50] | ||
| [CHAPTER VI] | ||||
| Nov. 10th to Nov. 12th | The Cavalry Corps in line from the railway to the sea.Difficulties of supply. Withdrawal of all but twoinfantry divisions. Great heat and lack of water causesa slackening of the pursuit. Anzac Division seizes theEsdud bridge. Stiffening of the enemy resistance.The action of Balin | [61] | ||
| [CHAPTER VII] | ||||
| Nov. 13th to Nov. 15th | Attack on the enemy line. Charge of the 6th MountedBrigade at El Mughar. Armoured cars enter JunctionStation. Capture of the station. Enemy forces cutin two. Right group driven northwards across theRiver Auja, and left group into the Judæan Hills.Occupation of Ramleh, Ludd, and Jaffa. The Sidun-AbuShusheh position. Second charge of the 6thMounted Brigade | [77] | ||
| [CHAPTER VIII] | ||||
| Nov. 16th and 17th | Necessity for reinforcements, and exhaustion of horsescauses a lull in the operations. A waterless record.The Australian cavalry horse. Junction Station. Reappearanceof the Corps Ammunition Column. The Predatory Gunner. TheA.P.M.'s Odyssey. A Turkish communiqué | [93] | ||
| [CHAPTER IX] | ||||
| Nov. 18th to Nov. 25th | The advance resumed. Amwas. The AustralianMounted Division withdrawn to rest. The YeomanryDivision enter the mountains. Rain. Unsuccessfulattacks on the Beitunia Ridge. Difficulties of thecountry. Our infantry seize Nebi Samwil. TheAnzac Mounted Division forces the crossing of theNahr el Auja in the plain. And is driven back | [101] | ||
| [CHAPTER X] | ||||
| Dec. 1st to Dec. 31st | Hard fighting and bad weather in the hills. Our communicationscut. The last of the Yeomanry Division.Winter conditions in the Philistine Plain. Rain andmud. Floods cause breakdowns in the supply services.A 'Merry Christmas.' Enemy spies in the mountains.Surrender of Jerusalem. Final crossing of the Auja.Results achieved by the Desert Mounted Corps duringthe operations | [112] | ||
| [CHAPTER XI] | ||||
| 1918 Jan. 1st to Feb. 28th | 'Rest and Refit.' The ruins of Gaza. Decision toextend the battle line to the Jordan. The country betweenJerusalem and the Dead Sea basin. Thefirst descent into the Jordan Valley. Occupation of Jericho.A naval battle 1300 feet below the level of the ocean.Second descent into the Valley. Our right flankestablished on the river Jordan. Operations of theArab forces | [123] | ||
| [CHAPTER XII] | ||||
| Mar. 1st to Apr. 2nd | The first trans-Jordan raid. Description of the trans-Jordancountry. Bridging the Jordan. Difficultiesof the cavalry. Rain and cold. Hedjaz Railway cutnorth and south of Amman. Unsuccessful attackson the town. Large enemy reinforcements arrive onthe scene. Floods sweep away the bridges over theJordan. Hard fighting at El Salt. Attack on Ammanabandoned. Withdrawal of the raiding force | [132] | ||
| [CHAPTER XIII] | ||||
| Apr. 3rd to May 4th | Results of the raid. Successes of the Arab Army.Reorganisation of the Cavalry Corps. The secondtrans-Jordan raid. Capture of El Salt. Failure offirst attack on Shunet Nimrin. Enemy reinforcementscross the Jordan at Jisr el Damieh. 4th A.L.H.Brigade hard pressed. Loss of the guns. Enemyclears the way to El Salt. The Beni Sakhr play usfalse. Precarious position of our cavalry in the hills.Failure of second attack on Shunet Nimrin. Hardfighting at El Salt. Ammunition running out. Theraiding force withdraws across the Jordan. Resultsof the raid | [153] | ||
| [CHAPTER XIV] | ||||
| May 5th to Aug. 31st | Decision to hold the Jordan Valley during the summer.The Valley line. Description of the country andclimate. Enemy attacks on Abu Tellul and El Henurepulsed. An example of 'Kultur.' Out of the Valleyof Desolation | [177] | ||
| [CHAPTER XV] | ||||
| Sept. 1st to Sept. 18th | Preparations for the great drive. Description of theTurkish line and the country behind it. The opposingforces. Precautions to ensure secrecy. Plan of theoperations. Lawrence's Arabs cut the enemy railwayat Deraa junction. At the starting post | [190] | ||
| [CHAPTER XVI] | ||||
| Sept. 19th to Sept. 21st | Opening the door. Cavalry through the gap and overthe Carmel Range. On the Plain of Armageddon. 13thCavalry Brigade captures the enemy G.H.Q. at Nazareth.Cavalry seize Afule, Jenin, and Beisan. Bighaul of prisoners at Jenin | [202] | ||
| [CHAPTER XVII] | ||||
| Sept. 19th to Sept. 22nd | Rolling up the enemy flank. Work of the 5th A.L.H.Brigade. Our infantry attack all along the line anddrive in the Turkish front. Our cavalry reoccupyNazareth. Sad fate of the 'Haifa Annexation Expedition.'Chaytor's force closes the Jisr el Damiehroad, and advances on Shunet Nimrin. Turkisharmies trapped | [217] | ||
| [CHAPTER XVIII] | ||||
| Sept. 23rd | Drawing the net. Action of Makhadet Abu Naj.Capture of Haifa. Action at Makhadet el Masudi.Turkish VIIth and VIIIth Armies completely destroyed.Adventures of Chaytor's Force. Surrender of theHedjaz Corps. British and Turks as 'Allies' | [229] | ||
| [CHAPTER XIX] | ||||
| Sept. 24th to Sept. 27th | Decision to advance on Damascus. The orders forthe advance. 4th A.L.H. Brigade captures Semakh.Treachery of the Germans. Capture of Tiberias. Therace for Damascus. 4th Cavalry Division strikes atthe flank of the retreating IVth Army. And joinshands with the Arab forces | [247] | ||
| [CHAPTER XX] | ||||
| Sept. 27th and Sept. 28th | The action at the Bridge of Jacob's Daughters. Amemory of Napoleon's campaign in Syria. Last crossingof the Jordan. Occupation of El Kuneitra. Someundisciplined 'Allies.' 4th Cavalry Division reachesEl Mezerib. Turks massacre women and children.The Arabs' vengeance | [258] | ||
| [CHAPTER XXI] | ||||
| Sept. 29th to Oct. 5th | The last lap of the race to Damascus. Orders of theCavalry Corps. A fight in the darkness. The actionof Kaukab. 5th A.L.H. Brigade closes the Beirûtroad. Our two columns meet at Damascus. End ofthe Turkish IVth Army. Capture of the city with12,000 prisoners. Terrible condition of the enemytroops. A record charge by Australian cavalry. Disordersin Damascus | [266] | ||
| [CHAPTER XXII] | ||||
| Oct. 5th to Oct. 31st | Decision to advance to Rayak and Beirût. Sicknessin the Corps. Occupation of Homs and Tripoli. 5thCavalry Division ordered to advance to Aleppo. Ahunt by the armoured cars. A piece of bluff.Fall of Aleppo. The last of the Turkish army. The Armistice.Captures of the Desert Mounted Corps | [282] | ||
| [CHAPTER XXIII] | ||||
| Police work. The Desert Mounted Corps administers a countrylarger than Scotland. Condition of the country after theArmistice. Pax Britannica. Co-operation of the Arabs. Workof the Armenian Reparations Committee. Character of theArmenians. A gamble in exchange. Sport and games. Endof the Desert Mounted Corps. Northern Syria handed over tothe French | [295] | |||
| [CHAPTER XXIV] | ||||
| Horse Artillery | [303] | |||
| [CHAPTER XXV] | ||||
| Horses | [311] | |||
| [CHAPTER XXVI] | ||||
| Transport and Ammunition Supply | [322] | |||
| [Appendix I:] | (a) [The Desert Mounted Corps] | [331] | ||
| (b) [Infantry] | [335] | |||
| [Appendix II:] | Note on the Arab Movement | [337] | ||
| [Appendix III:] | Terms of Turkish Armistice | [342] | ||
ILLUSTRATIONS
[Lieutenant-General Sir H.G. Chauvel, K.C.B., K.C.M.G].
[Water at Esani]
[Country near Beersheba]
[Beersheba]
[Beersheba First Train]
[Turkish Cavalry]
[Turkish Machine Guns]
[After the Charge at Huj]
[Marching over Philistine Plain]
[Von Falkenhayn]
[Austrian Howitzer]
[R.H.A. in Action in Mountains]
[Reading British Proclamation in Jerusalem]
[Mosque at Gaza]
[German Motor Boat]
[Grain from Moab]
[River Jordan]
[Shunet Nimrin]
[Motor Lorries 'Before']
[Motor Lorries 'After']
[German Aircraft]
[In the Hands of the Enemy]
[Nazareth]
[Tiberias]
[R.H.A. Fording River Jordan]
[Barada Gorge, Damascus]
[Feisal's Headquarters at Damascus]
[Tripoli]
[Aleppo]
[Arabs and Feisal's Soldiers]
[River Euphrates]
[Aintab]
[Inscription at Dog River]
LIST OF MAPS AND DIAGRAMS.
Folding out.
Full page.
Diagram [1]
" [2]
" [3]
" [4]
" [5]
" [6]
" [7]
THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
AN ACCOUNT OF THE CAVALRY OPERATIONS IN PALESTINE AND SYRIA, 1917-1918
THE COUNTRY AND THE OPPOSING FORCES
When General Allenby arrived in Egypt in June 1917, and assumed command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, British prestige in the East was at a very low ebb. The evacuation of Gallipoli in December 1915, followed by the fall of Kut el Amara four months later, and by our two unsuccessful attacks on Gaza in the spring of the following year, had invested the Turkish arms with a legend of invincibility which was spreading rapidly in all Moslem countries. For the first time in seven centuries, sang the journalistic bards of Stamboul, the followers of Islam had triumphed over the Infidel; Allah was leading the Faithful to victory; the Empire of the Moslems was at hand.
The fall of Baghdad in March 1917 somewhat dashed these high hopes, it is true. But the Germans, to whom the city was, at the moment, of no more importance than any other dirty Eastern village, had little difficulty in persuading the Turks that its loss was a mere incident in the world war, which would be more than made good in the final, and glorious, peace terms. Nevertheless, the Turks insisted on making an effort to recapture the place, and for this purpose a special, picked force, known as the Yilderim, or Lightning, Army Group, was in process of formation in northern Syria at this time. The command of this group had been entrusted to the redoubtable von Falkenhayn, who was at Aleppo, directing the training and organisation of the troops.
Comforted by highly coloured accounts of the efficiency and fighting value of this force, the Turks rapidly recovered from the effects of the loss of Baghdad. Bombastic articles, inspired by Potsdam, began to make their appearance in the Turkish press, chronicling the doings of the 'Lightning' armies. They were to recapture Baghdad, drive the British into the Persian Gulf, and then march to the 'relief' of India. Afterwards the presumptuous little force that had dared to oppose the Turks' advance into their own province of Egypt would be dealt with in a suitable manner; Egypt would be delivered; and the Suez Canal, 'the jugular vein of the British Empire,' would be severed.
Aided by such writings, and supported by German money, Pan-Islamic emissaries were busily engaged in every Moslem or partly Moslem country, stirring up the Faithful to sedition and revolt. India, Afghanistan, Persia, and Egypt were all in a state of suppressed excitement and unrest, and it is probable that one more British reverse in the East would have been sufficient to set all these countries in a blaze. The least imaginative can form some idea of the tremendous consequences that such an upheaval would have had upon the war in general. Yet the newspapers of that time show clearly that there was a considerable, and vociferous, body of public opinion, both in England and in France, that regarded the Syrian and Mesopotamian campaigns as useless and extravagant 'side-shows,' and clamoured insistently for the recall of the troops engaged in them.
Thus, both for the purpose of re-establishing our waning prestige in the East, and of silencing the mischievous agitation at home, it was imperative that a signal defeat should be inflicted on the Turks as soon as possible. The capture of Jerusalem, which city ranks only after Mecca and Stamboul among the holy places of Islam, would set a fitting seal upon such a defeat, and would be certain to create a profound impression upon Moslems the world over.
Jerusalem, therefore, became the political objective of the new British Commander-in-Chief. The strategical objective will be discussed later.
The situation in Palestine in the summer of 1917 was not, however, at first sight, very encouraging. Our two abortive attempts on Gaza had shown the German commanders the weak points in the Turkish defences, and they had set to work, with characteristic energy and thoroughness, to strengthen them. 'Gaza itself had been made into a strong, modern fortress, heavily entrenched and wired, and offering every facility for protracted defence. The remainder of the enemy's line consisted of a series of strong localities, viz.: the Sihan group of works, the Atawineh group, the Abu el Hareira-Abu el Teaha trench system (near Sharia), and, finally, the works covering Beersheba. These groups of works were generally from 1500 to 2000 yards apart, except that the distance from the Hareira group to Beersheba was about four and a half miles.... By the end of October these strong localities had been joined up so as to form a practically continuous line from the sea to a point south of Sharia. The defensive works round Beersheba remained a detached system, but had been improved and extended.'[2]
The Turkish forces were thus on a wide front, the distance from Gaza to Beersheba being about thirty miles, but a well-graded, metalled road, which they had made just behind their line, connecting these two places, afforded good lateral communication, and any threatened point of their front could be very quickly reinforced.
From July onwards continual reinforcements of men, guns, and stores had arrived on the enemy's front, and he had formed several large supply and ammunition depots at different places behind his lines. He had also laid two lines of railway from the so-called Junction Station on the Jerusalem-Jaffa line, one to Deir Sineid, just north of Gaza, and the other to Beersheba, and beyond it to the village of El Auja,[3] on the Turko-Egyptian frontier, some twenty-five miles south-west of Beersheba. It was evident that the Turks intended to hold on to the Gaza-Beersheba line at all costs, in order to cover the concentration and despatch of the Yilderim Force to Mesopotamia.
This Junction Station was to be the strategical objective of our operations. From the junction a railway ran northwards, through Tul Keram, Messudieh, Jenin and Afule, to Deraa on the Hedjaz Railway, whence the latter line continued to Damascus, Aleppo, and the Baghdad Railway. With the junction in our hands, any enemy force in the Judæan hills, protecting Jerusalem, would be cut off from all railway communication to the north, and would be compelled to rely for its supplies on the difficult mountain road between Messudieh and Jerusalem, or on the longer and still more difficult road from Amman station on the Hedjaz Railway, thirty miles east of the Jordan, via Jericho to Jerusalem.
Our own position extended from the sea at Gaza to a point on the Wadi Ghuzze near El Gamli, some fourteen miles south-west of Sharia and eighteen miles west of Beersheba. The opposing lines thus formed a rough 'V,' with its apex at Gaza, where the lines were, in some places, only a couple of hundred yards apart. From here they diverged to El Gamli, which was about nine miles from the nearest part of the Turkish positions. The intervening space was watched by our cavalry.
The right flank of our line being thus 'in the air' out in the desert, it was a comparatively easy matter for enemy spies, disguised as peaceful natives, to pass round it under cover of darkness, and approach our positions from the rear in daylight. Native hawkers, other than those with passes from the Intelligence Staff, were forbidden to approach our lines, but it was impossible to control all the natives in such a scattered area, and much can be seen, with the aid of a pair of field-glasses, from the top of a hill a mile away. There were also at least two very daring Germans, who several times penetrated our lines disguised as British officers. They were both exceedingly bold and resourceful men, and it is probable that they obtained a good deal of useful information, before they met the almost inevitable fate of spies.
Before the end of our time of preparation, however, methods were evolved to deal with this nuisance, and the enemy was kept in ignorance of our movements and intentions with that success which always attended the efforts of General Allenby in this direction. An enemy staff document, subsequently captured by us, and dated just prior to the commencement of the operations, stated that: 'An outflanking attack on Beersheba with about one infantry and one cavalry division is indicated, but the main attack, as before, must be expected on the Gaza front.' How far wrong was this appreciation of the situation will be apparent later on. The same document also stated that we had six infantry divisions in the Gaza sector, whereas at the time there were only three.
The Royal Air Force was an important factor in denying information to the enemy during the latter part of our time of preparation. One of the first things the Commander-in-Chief had done on his arrival at the front, was to re-equip the force completely. Hitherto the German Flying Corps had done what it liked in the air over our lines. For several months on end our troops had been bombed, almost with impunity, every day. Our own pilots, starved alike of aeroplanes and of materials for repairs, gingerly manœuvring their antiquated and rickety machines, fought gallantly but hopelessly against the fast Taubes and Fokkers of the German airmen, and day by day the pitiful list of casualties that might have been so easily avoided grew longer.
In four months all this had changed. Our pilots, equipped with new, up-to-date and fast machines, met the Germans on level terms, and quickly began to obtain supremacy in the air. By the end of October this supremacy was definitely established, and the few enemy pilots who crossed our lines at that time flew warily, ever on the look-out for one of our fighting machines.
The country occupied by the opposing armies varied considerably in character. The district near the coast consisted of a series of high dunes of loose, shifting sand, impassable for wheeled traffic. Farther east the ground became harder, but it was still sandy and heavy going for transport. Eastwards again, towards Beersheba, the country changed to a wilderness of bare, rocky hills, intersected by innumerable wadis (dry river beds). These wadis were, for the most part, enclosed between limestone cliffs, sometimes 100 feet or more in height, and impassable except where the few native tracks crossed them. The whole of this part of the country was waterless, except for three very deep wells at Khalasa and one at Asluj (all of which had been destroyed by the Turks), and some fairly good pools in the Wadi Ghuzze at Esani and Shellal. In Beersheba itself there were seven good wells.
Northwards of the enemy's positions, between the Judæan mountains and the sea, stretched the great plain of Philistia, a strip of rolling down-land fifteen to twenty miles wide, admirably suited for the employment of mounted troops.
The appointment of General Allenby, himself a cavalryman, to the command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, presaged the employment of cavalry on a much larger scale than had hitherto been attempted. From his first study of the problem before him, the new Commander-in-Chief realised the predominant part that cavalry would play in the operations, and devoted himself, with his customary energy, to organising a force suitable for the work in prospect.
For the advance across the Sinai Desert from the Suez Canal, a special force had been organised, under the command of Sir Philip Chetwode. This force, which was known as the Desert Column, consisted of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division (which then included the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigades and the New Zealand Mounted Brigade), the 5th Mounted Brigade (Yeomanry), and the 42nd and 52nd Infantry Divisions.
The 2nd Mounted (Yeomanry) Division, which had arrived in Egypt in April 1915, had been sent to Gallipoli dismounted. After the evacuation of the peninsula, part of this division had been remounted. The 5th Mounted Brigade had taken part in the advance across Sinai, and other units of the division had been employed in the campaign against the Senussi, and in the Fayoum and other parts of Egypt. Most of these scattered units had been collected prior to the first battle of Gaza, and organised into two divisions of four brigades each, including a new brigade of Australian Light Horse (the 4th) which had been formed, partly out of Light Horsemen who had returned from Gallipoli, and partly out of reinforcements from Australia. General Allen by now remounted the remainder of the Yeomanry in Egypt, and formed out of them two new brigades. The ten brigades thus available were organised as a corps of three divisions: the Australian and New Zealand (1st and 2nd A.L.H. Brigades and the New Zealand Brigade), generally known as the Anzac Mounted Division; the Australian Mounted Division (3rd and 4th A.L.H. and 5th Mounted Brigades); and the Yeomanry Division (6th, 8th, and 22nd Mounted Brigades). The corps reserve consisted of the 7th Mounted Brigade, and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, while the (Indian) Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade[4] formed part of the Army troops. Only the Yeomanry Division and the 7th Mounted and Imperial Service Cavalry Brigades were at this time armed with swords.
It was originally intended to call this force the 2nd Cavalry Corps, but General Chauvel, who was appointed to command it, asked that the name of the Desert Column might be perpetuated in that of the new force. It was accordingly named the Desert Mounted Corps.[5]
The infantry of the Expeditionary Force, largely augmented by troops in Egypt, was formed into two corps of three divisions each, the 20th under Sir Philip Chetwode, and the 21st commanded by Lieutenant-General Bulfin, with one other infantry division. The 20th Corps (10th, 53rd, and 74th Divisions, with the 60th Division attached) was in the eastern sector of our line, while the 21st Corps (53rd, 54th, and 75th Divisions) held the trenches opposite Gaza.[6]
The Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade was attached to the 21st Corps during the operations. This brigade had not yet seen any serious service, and its fighting qualities were rather an unknown factor. Later on in the campaign, however, all three regiments distinguished themselves greatly, and established a fine reputation for dash.
Our total forces numbered some 76,000 fighting men, of whom about 20,000 were mounted, with 550 guns. The enemy troops opposed to us consisted of nine Turkish divisions, organised in two armies, the VIIth and VIIIth, and one cavalry division, a total of about 49,000 fighting men, 3000 of whom were mounted, with 360 guns.[7] Our superiority in numbers, though considerable, thus fell short of the Napoleonic minimum for the attack of entrenched positions, but our large preponderance of cavalry promised great results, if we could succeed in driving the Turks out of their fortifications.