II. 1st Battalion
The 6th Division, in the middle of March, held the ground opposite the villages of Queant and Pronville. The country consists of alternate long spurs and narrow valleys of down-like country, stretching from the high land on the west of our forces down to the valley in which Cambrai stands, and our position was at right angles to or astride these spurs and re-entrants. There were trenches in a state of readiness, but the entire scheme of fortification had not been completed, chiefly owing to a month’s hard frost in January. Still, the front and reserve trenches were in good order, and there was an excellent Corps trench called the Vaulx-Morchies line, a little over a mile in rear of the reserve system. There were, however, hardly any support trenches and no dug-outs. The 16th Brigade was on the left of the division. The distance from the front or outpost zone to the battle line was about two thousand yards on the day of the battle, the York and Lancaster, on the right, and the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, on the left, were in front line, and it happened to be the turn of the Buffs to be in reserve, where the men were hard at work as usual.
At 2 a.m. on the 21st the latter got the order to take up their battle positions and to be in the Vaulx-Morchies work by 5.30 o’clock, so off the battalion marched, leaving no one behind at Favreuil except the company quartermaster-sergeants and spare drummers and bandsmen, who were detailed as extra runners and stretcher-bearers. While still on the march, at 5 a.m., the battle opened by a tremendous bombardment directed on the front system and Lagnicourt trench, and also on the village of Vaulx. The Buffs were, of course, in ignorance of what was occurring on their front, but they recognized from the continuous and tremendous roar that the bombardment was terribly severe, and themselves suffered casualties. Indeed, the operation of getting into place was attended with great difficulty, as it was dark and gas masks had to be worn on the march. By 5.45 all the forward wires were cut and there was no more telephonic communication. Gas shells were intermingled with the others, and as the Buffs approached the scene they found it more and more difficult to get into position, particularly as it was still dark. However, by 6 o’clock D Company had got to its place on the Noreuil-Morchies road, A Company to posts 21 to 24 in the Vaulx-Morchies lines, B Company to Macauley Avenue, while C, the reserve company, filled gaps between post 22 (battalion headquarters) and the Vaulx-Lagnicourt road. All kits, drums, documents and such-like possessions had been left behind in camp, and subsequent efforts to regain possession of these were almost entirely unavailing.
A most anxious and depressing morning followed the battalion’s arrival in position. Casualties were mounting up from distant shelling: Lieut. P. W. Newington and six men were killed by a shell which struck battalion headquarters, but no definite news was received till 10 o’clock. Then the enemy was seen slowly but steadily advancing under a creeping barrage: now they were moving up the Lagnicourt valley upon the village; then news came that they had broken through the right of the 71st Brigade and were approaching “Skipton Reserve”; again they were in the villages of Noreuil and Lagnicourt; and soon it became plain that the forward part of the battle zone was in the hands of the Germans. Moreover, it was equally certain that the troops of the 6th Division that had defended it had all been killed or captured, for none returned.
The Buffs, to avoid casualties, had moved into the Vraucourt Switch (as it was called), about post 7, and had been joined by D Company, who having got no call from the battalion it was out to support, and being quite exposed, withdrew when the position seemed hopeless. Two platoons of B Company were sent up, however, to the aid of the K.S.L.I., and these were absorbed into the general ruin of the forward troops. They were under the command of Lieut. T. L. V. Moody and 2nd Lieut. Wotton, and they never rejoined. A wounded man stated that he had seen Buffs in “Leeds Reserve,” and that a strong point there was still holding out. Colonel Smith, who commanded the K.S.L.I. and two platoons of the Buffs, showed the greatest gallantry and fought his battalion to the last: not one of his officers who were in the front line ever came back. Later on it was ascertained that Moody had been killed trying to lead a break-through instead of surrendering. With reference to this day’s work in the forward positions, Sir Douglas Haig writes: “The prolonged defence of these different localities, under conditions which left little hope of any relief, deserve to rank among the most heroic actions in the history of the British Army.”
At noon a message came from the brigadier that the enemy was in force east of Lagnicourt. In fact, he was advancing up both valleys and endeavouring to cut off those troops which were still holding the battle zone. The message directed the reserve company (C) to move to the Vaulx-Morchies line to garrison that part near the Bois de Vaulx. The move was successfully accomplished, and C Company’s place was taken by the York and Lancaster headquarters, which had withdrawn, by machine gunners, sappers and a mixed lot of men from various parts of the field. C Company patrolled to its right, but failed to find any friendly troops on its flank. There now came a lull, and it was not till later that the enemy’s advance recommenced. The orders from the brigadier were plain and simple: the flanks were to be watched and every foot of ground was to be disputed. From now onward the position, as far as the Buffs were concerned, became obscure, but the enemy, working up the valleys, was gradually outflanking position after position, causing the defenders to form defensive flanks whenever any line became threatened. Thus the reserve company of the K.S.L.I., leaving Lagnicourt trench, manned Macauley Avenue, and later in the day a message came from Lieut. Collison-Morley, of the Buffs, that the enemy was getting round his No. 24 post, and a defensive flank was formed there. However, the Germans got into the main trench at No. 24 post and for about five hundred yards to the north of it. It appeared later that the little garrison of No. 24 was safe, having withdrawn to a position in some shell holes across the valley, and having got touch of a battalion of Scots Fusiliers on their left. An attempt to eject the enemy from the Vaulx-Morchies line was made by Lieut. Spence, but he was wounded in the foot while reconnoitring. A counter-attack was, however, organized by 2nd Lieut. Rogers of the K.S.L.I., who, with thirty men belonging to the Brigade Grenade School, had come up as a reinforcement. Some progress down the trench was made, but it was found to be occupied for a long extent and so a block was established, for Rogers could get no further. Lieut. E. Foster Hall was holding the post on the extreme left and rendered distinguished service throughout.
Meanwhile there had been developments on our right. At 3.30 p.m. Captain Hamilton reported that the enemy was attacking him there and that he was not in touch with anybody on that flank; that he had a very mixed lot of men and no officers, and was short of ammunition. Now, this particular advance by the enemy failed, notwithstanding very great courage displayed by the German troops. It could be seen from most parts of the field, and so came under fire at all sorts of ranges. Also a counter-attack, by a strong collection of British, got into and occupied the trench into which a few of the enemy had penetrated. There were no further determined attacks, and at dusk the fury of the struggle died away. The Buffs during the day, being in reserve, had suffered far less than the rest of the brigade and had been called upon to resist no frontal attack, though towards noon and afterwards their flanks had always been in danger from the steady hostile advance up both the L’Hirondelle and the Lagnicourt valleys.
At dusk rations, water, ball ammunition and bombs were sent up. The remnants of the York and Lancasters and the K.S.L.I., reinforced from the transport, were reorganized into one unit and were withdrawn and held in reserve, and at 9 p.m. the brigade front was readjusted. The remains of the Border Regiment, which had reinforced the 16th Brigade soon after noon, and a company of the Leicesters held from the right boundary of the Bois de Vaulx to the Lagnicourt-Vaulx road, and the Buffs from there to No. 24 post. The night passed quietly and during it touch was regained with the 71st Brigade on the right, but with no friends on the other flank because of the gap in our line which was held by the enemy. A fresh line of defence some one thousand yards in rear of the Vaulx-Morchies line had been hastily constructed by the engineers and partially manned by men from the Corps Reinforcement Camp, and the 40th Division had been pushed forward on the left of the 16th Brigade, but there was a large gap between it and the Buffs, so that the left flank of the regiment was still unsupported.
The morning of the 22nd was heralded by steady and violent hostile shelling, but no news reached the Buffs till about nine o’clock. It was evident, however, that the enemy were upon both flanks in force and therefore that these were in danger of being turned at any moment.[29] Defensive flanks were therefore arranged down the communication trench and the lower Noreuil road. At 10 a.m. the enemy attacked on the immediate right of the Bois de Vaulx and broke through the front of the brigade on our right, so a defensive flank had to be made by swinging the right round to the road just outside the village of Vaulx to the eastward. A counter-attack made away off to the right gave some hope for a moment, but it was too far away to relieve the pressure on what was left of the 16th Brigade, and the enemy quickly reorganized and pushed forward resolutely and with great vigour to improve his advantage, causing the right of the new defensive flank to close in. At 2 p.m. a determined attack was made on the Vaulx line where it crossed the road to Lagnicourt, and a wedge was driven in between the Borderers and the Buffs. This caused the former regiment to withdraw, and now the Buffs were left with both their flanks exposed and resting on nothing. The old simple order was then given out again: “contest every foot of ground, conform as far as possible with the movement of other troops and only retire fighting.” Hand-to-hand fighting resulted, in which Captain Hamilton greatly distinguished himself as a leader.
During the afternoon the regiment formed fresh defensive flanks, one near the place where the Lagnicourt road leaves Vaulx, and the other facing west across the spur, because the posts hitherto held in the valley had been driven in. These movements, as well as others, were immensely assisted by a machine-gun battalion which showed great pluck and ingenuity in selecting positions. The Buffs held on till 4.15, when the enemy launched a very heavy attack on Vraucourt and the ridge immediately north-east of Vaulx from the L’Hirondelle valley, and this was attended by low-flying aeroplanes which were very audacious. It was in and around Vraucourt that the Buffs concluded their two days’ combat. A very lively battle ensued here; as the Germans advanced up the valley they were met with rapid fire and the fighting was ultimately at point-blank range. The men were heartened by knowing that they inflicted many casualties, but at last the Buffs, together with the rest of the brigade, were forced to commence a withdrawal. Other troops had all gone, and it became obvious to those on the spot that to remain longer merely meant to be surrounded by sheer numbers, so a general retirement to the new army line was ordered. This was successfully carried out, and the battalion was then reorganized and placed in support to the 41st Division, which was now holding the line. The enemy did not attempt any further advance at this time, though he directed a lively machine-gun fire on men of many units who were holding various shell holes which existed between the Vaulx-Morchies and the “Army” lines. At nightfall the 6th Division was withdrawn from the fighting area and, after marching to Favreuil, was embussed there for Achiet le Grand, where it arrived about 3 a.m. on the 23rd.
To sum up the Buffs’ experience during the two momentous days, the 21st and 22nd March, the fighting for them meant a process of being continually outflanked, for that reason forming defensive flanks, and of their straightening out the line again in conformity with the movements of other troops whenever such straightening out became a possibility. These manœuvres were twice carried out at most critical moments, and on each occasion the enemy suffered severely while the battalion experienced but little loss. Great credit is due to the officers and men who rendered this possible by their coolness and quick grasp of each situation as it arose. The net result perhaps was that the battalion delayed the enemy on this front for many hours and withdrew from the fight with less than two hundred casualties, a large percentage of which were lost with Moody’s party. It was the last unit to leave Vaulx, as it had been the last to leave the Morchies line, and it was never disorganized nor out of hand for a moment. “Steady, the Buffs” is an expression often heard in the army and even outside it; it has been used in reference to this old battalion through the ages.
LAGNICOURT AND NOREUIL
Casualty list:—Officers: killed, Lieuts. T. L. V. Moody and P. W. Newington; missing, 2nd Lieuts. Davison and Wotton; wounded, Lieuts. Buss and Spence and 2nd Lieut. Froome.
Other ranks: killed, 24; wounded, 112; wounded but remaining on duty, 2; died of wounds, 5; missing, 65, of whom 40 were with Moody; wounded and missing, 3; missing, believed killed, 1.
For his able handling of the battalion (in the absence of Lt.-Colonel Power, who had been called to Brigade H.Q.) on the 21st and 22nd March, Captain H. de R. Morgan was awarded the D.S.O.
The 23rd March was a fairly peaceful day, but in the morning the men had to get into position and the battalion to push forward patrols towards Courcelles because the enemy was vaguely reported to be within three miles of that place. Gun fire was heavy, but no enemy was discovered in the immediate vicinity. An attempt was made to recover kits, drums and band instruments from Favreuil, but the searchers were promptly turned back by the military police. Two sporting drummers, however, managed to slip through these guardians of law and order and they rescued the big drum and three side drums. On the 24th the 6th Division was transferred to the 2nd Army and at 2.30 p.m. the Buffs entrained for Doullens and next day for Rousbrugge in Belgium, where they arrived at six o’clock on the 26th and from whence they marched six kilometres to Crombeke, going into scattered billets near Watow (some five miles west of Poperinghe).
On the 28th of the month H.M. The King visited Steenvoorde, close by, and the commanding officer, Lt.-Colonel Power, Captain Hamilton and one N.C.O., who had done well in the recent fighting from each company, attended his parade there.
At the very end of the month the battalion moved into the trenches again at Zonnebeke. A second German offensive, which commenced south of Ypres on the 9th April, was referred to at the commencement of this chapter. The 1st Battalion of the Buffs was engaged in no severe fighting in connection with this phase of the war, though it naturally joined in the general gradual withdrawal which was rendered necessary. This withdrawal, as far as it concerned the battalion, commenced on the 15th April, when after a few days of the usual trench warfare, losing eight casualties, one of which was Lieut. S. W. Taylor killed, and receiving a couple of drafts amounting to 230 men, it moved to Westhoek and the neighbourhood, being, in fact, somewhat scattered about to man several posts which were occupied up till the 23rd. The posts were heavily shelled on the 17th, with the result that C.S.M. Field and eleven men were wounded. The situation at this time was that the second German offensive had developed south of Ypres and that Messines Ridge and Kemmel Hill had been taken from us, these two positions being of the greatest importance for the defence of Ypres. Consequently the troops all round this area were in a somewhat desperate position and, as Sir Douglas Haig expressed it, “with their backs to the wall.” The gradual withdrawal of our forces west of Ypres into or immediately around the ruins themselves resulted; and so it came about that on the 23rd April the Buffs moved by detachments into the ramparts of Ypres. On that day the place was heavily gassed and twenty-two of our men were caught in the fumes. On the 26th the K.S.L.I. withdrew from the front line, leaving the York and Lancasters on outpost duty. After this withdrawal the enemy advanced very quickly, but they stopped at the York and Lancaster picquets. There were daily casualties now; men died by twos and threes and some were wounded more or less severely, and there was a continuous toll of gas casualties. A big attack was expected on the 28th, but it did not materialize, for now French reserves were hurrying up to the threatened portion of our line, and the second great German effort to wrest a victory before the Americans were in strength had proved a failure.
The month of May was a remarkable one to the 1st Battalion for the terrible list of casualties from gas. This mode of warfare began, as we have seen, at Ypres, and now, after three years of warfare, it seemed almost as formidable a weapon as ever, notwithstanding the mask, respirators and so on which had been invented to cope with it. During this month alone the 1st Battalion counted 119 casualties from this cause, and the unit was all the month (and up till the 12th June) either in Ypres or its vicinity. There was, however, a bright side to life this merry month of May. There was a gracious and fairly liberal distribution of honours to gladden the hearts of both the recipients and their friends. These were nearly all awarded for the fighting at Vaulx, and it is somewhat curious to note how well the number of awards compares with those given to our 2nd Battalion in 1915 and in connection with their terrible struggle north and east of Ypres. This remark is not for an instant to be misconstrued into an opinion that the 1st Battalion medals were not most magnificently won; it is only by way of a sigh of regret for the brave 2nd Battalion’s bad luck. Military Medals were given to Sgt. Morgan, Corpls. Andrews and Thomas, Ptes. Croft, Highton, Johnson, Kear (attached T.M.B.), Knight, Rainsbury and Stevenson. A bar to his M.M. to L.-Corpl. Wilson; to C.S.M. Peters a D.C.M.; to Major Morgan the D.S.O.; to Lieut. Spence the M.C.; and to Sgt. MacWalter, who had the M.M. already, the D.C.M. Corpl. Brookman also got the M.M. on the 29th. In addition to the gas casualties twelve men were killed during May and twenty-three wounded, as this part of the line, never a quiet one, was the scene at this period of unusual activity.
At 12.45 a.m. on the 27th May the whole of the back area of the brigade was very heavily shelled with gas and high explosive for three hours while the forward area was untouched. A number of direct hits was obtained on brigade headquarters without damage, and the Buffs (in reserve) were obliged to wear their respirators for more than four hours. Meanwhile the enemy attacked the French on our right and penetrated their line to a depth of about seven hundred yards, but did not reach his objective. No attack took place on the 6th Divisional front, but the 71st Infantry Brigade was constrained to form a strong defensive flank. During the day the French partially re-established their position and artillery activity continued on both sides, particularly by the enemy on our back area. During the night the 71st Brigade relieved the French regiment on their right and, in order to supply the number of men required by its brigadier, the Buffs were placed under his tactical orders as his reserve battalion. After this the enemy became for some days comparatively inactive except for the shelling of back areas and the use of aircraft, and on the 8th the brigade retired temporarily to Corps Reserve, moving by train to St. Omer for a few days’ musketry near that city, and afterwards returning to Poperinghe. On the 26th the Buffs relieved a French battalion in the Dickebusch area, taking over a bad line almost unprovided with wire and with no communication trench, so that movement by daytime was impossible. Then casualties recommenced and in four days 2nd Lieut. Thompson (attached from the Queen’s) and three men died, 2nd Lieut. Collett and seventeen were wounded, and this kind of thing went on steadily all July, the battalion losing 2nd Lieut. P. V. Drake-Brockman killed, Captain W. A. C. Hedley, who died of wounds, and eight men killed, one of whom was buried by a shell. 2nd Lieut. Balding and fifty men were wounded, fourteen of whom were, however, able to remain at duty. During June the following were mentioned in despatches for good work during the German offensive: Lt.-Colonel Power, D.S.O.; Major Blackall; Captains E. H. Allen, Marshall, D.S.O., M.C., and Stone; Lieuts. Corney and Froome; Sgt. French; and Ptes. Dewhurst and Keyes.
Towards the end of July two companies of Americans, numbering 4 officers and 340 men, arrived and were distributed amongst our people to learn the hang of things and prepare themselves for the early advance which was now every day becoming more clearly a certainty.
On the 2nd August C Company and No. 7 platoon of B carried out a raid which was arranged and organized by Captain Moss, M.C., the battalion being then on the left sector of the brigade front. The 18th and the 100th Brigades on either flank co-operated with demonstrations and so on, and great help was given by the 6th Divisional Artillery. The object of the expedition was the capture of prisoners and consequent obtaining of identification, and this object was very successfully gained, but at a terrible loss. The story is briefly as follows: two platoons, commanded by Lieut. Hollis, M.C., had for their objective the Brasserie, and another, under Lieut. Harper, a certain cabaret; while No. 7 Platoon, under 2nd Lieut. Lister, was directed on the Brasserie Farm. The raiders left our trenches at 7.5 a.m., and at the same time our barrage opened; a trench mortar of ours engaged the objectives and did great service; the divisional artillery engaged the enemy’s positions and also put up a smoke screen on the right of the raiders, and all neighbouring troops rendered assistance. The affair was most successful and all objectives were gained. The main opposition came from the hostile machine guns. The enemy lost heavily, several prisoners were taken and the fact was established that it was the 153rd regiment of infantry in front of our force. After this success, however, came trouble. It was while returning that the centre and left parties came under the heaviest machine-gun fire and casualties became very numerous. Besides, as there were no communication trenches and our lines were much exposed, the raiders had to scatter into any available cover there was behind our trench. Owing to the hostile sniping, which became very active after the barrage had ceased, it was impossible to remove several badly wounded men, and a machine gun which had been captured could not be brought in. The casualties resulting from this minor affair were, in fact, far too high. Captain R. W. Jones, D.S.O. (R.A.M.C.), Lieut. C. F. G. Hollis and thirteen men were killed; twenty-seven were wounded, of whom two died, and five men were missing. The death of Captain Jones was a very sad blow to the Buffs. With his usual utter disregard for personal safety whenever there was fighting or his assistance needed, this officer had gone over with the raiding party and though himself hit in the arm continued to move about bandaging the wounded until he was again hit, this time fatally. Except for a period following a wound which he had received on the Somme, Captain Jones had, at his own wish, remained always with the battalion since the early days of the war, and no British unit loved or reverenced their Medical Officer more than the Buffs their dear old “Doc.” In Lieut. Hollis, too, another very good officer fell. He had distinguished himself at Cambrai and, poor fellow, was almost back in safety when he received the bullet that killed him.
On the 5th August the battalion was relieved at night and withdrew to the Malin House area, and next day H.M. The King visited the Corps, and two hundred of all ranks, from each unit of the 6th Division, under Lt.-Colonel R. E. Power, D.S.O., went to greet him.
On the 8th August the Buffs became reserve battalion, but did not change their position.