II. Battle of Kut, 1917
As has already been seen, however, the enemy had withdrawn the bulk of his troops from the main river’s right bank, though as a matter of fact he held a strong line of trenches across the Hai covering a bridge over that water just south of Kut and bending back to the Tigris at each end. His main line, however, was along the left bank of that river, his right flank, of course, being almost in the direction of Baghdad, while his left was thrown back along the Sanna i Yat lines, which he still held strongly. Seeing this, Maude determined to attack him up stream and so make him bolt back to his only road to his base or else cut him off from Baghdad altogether. One party of ours, under Lt.-General Cobbe, V.C., faced the Sanna i Yat lines on the left bank of the Tigris, and another, under Lt.-General Marshall, in which were serving the Buffs, were as much as eleven miles up stream of them and on the other side of the river. The first thing to do was to seize the Hai stream, and this was done by Marshall by surprise on the night of the 13th/14th December, 1916, while Cobbe demonstrated in front of the Sanna i Yat lines as if about to attack furiously. After getting possession of the Hai, which he crossed at Bessouia and Atab, Marshall extended towards the north and at the same time wheeled up the bulk of his command to attack the bridgehead. He broke through on the night of the 18th opposite Kut and reached the main river, thus securing command of the Tigris up stream of the Khadaira Bend. This was important because, after he advanced, his food and stores had to go up by land for some miles.
In connection with all this manœuvring the Buffs had on the 13th December struck their camp and marched out to reserve trenches, in support of the movement of that date, and had followed up and formed a backing to the troops in advance. At 7 a.m. on the 16th the battalion appeared to be going into a serious action and B Company was sent out to take a certain ridge in front, with C in support. Everything appeared to be working satisfactorily, but at 12.30 orders came for withdrawal to another position, where the men dug in as far as possible and connection was obtained with the 13th Division on the left of the Buffs. B Company had three men wounded in this advance and D had one during the retirement to the new position. On the 17th a concentration on Bessouia was ordered and carried out, and the next day a demonstration was made without much result, Captain Harrison receiving a shrapnel wound and the little expedition returning to Bessouia in the evening.
In connection with Maude’s plan of getting up stream of his enemy, Major-General Crocker with his command attempted on the 20th to throw a bridge over the Tigris at the Shumran Bend and the 35th Brigade marched up to that place to assist, the Buffs being in reserve; but somehow the enemy had got wind of this attempt, the enterprise proved a failure and the men returned to their old bivouac. The remainder of the old year and up to the 10th January was spent working west of the Hai and exercising in drill and musketry in the neighbourhood of Bessouia, the work being interrupted only on the 9th, when the cavalry attempted a raid supported by the Buffs; but the horsemen lost their way in a dense fog and the force returned to camp early, having effected nothing, on account of the weather.
During these early days of January, Cobbe’s party, which, in addition to demonstrating in front of the Sanna i Yat lines, had the task of manning the right bank of the Tigris up to the point where Marshall was working, got orders to clear the Khadaira Bend, which occasioned some heavy fighting by the 3rd Indian Division and necessitated a diversion on the Hai bridgehead by Marshall and his men; so on the 11th of the month the Buffs went into the trenches and had four men killed and as many wounded on the first day. The clearing of the bend by Cobbe proceeded satisfactorily after this and by the 18th all was ready for the final assault, which was arranged for the following day. When dawn broke, however, it was found that during the night the whole of the Turks who had occupied this portion of their defences had cleared out and crossed the Tigris.
The next job the British forces had to take in hand was to reduce the very extensive trench system that the enemy still held across the Hai stream in the immediate vicinity of Kut. This was a slow and somewhat tedious business, but by the 24th January, after steady and persistent pushing, our troops got to within four hundred yards of the enemy, and an assault was arranged for the following day. This slow approach consisted of a series of small advances at various points and subsequent consolidation of what was gained. Thus a new line was occupied by the Buffs on the 12th, and the next day, while this was made strong, 2nd Lieut. Hook made a reconnaissance to the front, which resulted in establishing an advanced post, which was occupied by a platoon under 2nd Lieut. Filmer. On the 15th two endeavours were made by 2nd Lieut. Angus to reach another point, but without success. Captain V. Arnold was killed on this date.
A still more important little action of the same nature took place on the 16th: a party of about sixty of all ranks went out from the trench in the morning and attempted the occupation of a point about 450 yards in advance of the line. This enterprise was successfully accomplished and, in the words of Sir Stanley Maude, “with great gallantry,” but with severe loss considering the number engaged, and it was hard that, after the sacrifice made, the party was by superior authority ordered back again after dark. Lieut. Jeffreys and four men were killed, and Lieut. MacFadyen, 2nd Lieut. Gibson and twenty-seven men wounded—more than fifty per cent of the two platoons becoming casualties.
On the 18th another advanced point was reached by 2nd Lieut. Tustin and his platoon, and this time the place was consolidated and a communication trench dug. Later in the day the battalion was relieved from the trenches, but it was back again in four days’ time, suffering the loss of three men killed on the 22nd and Captain Usher, 2nd Lieut. Western and nine men wounded on the 24th. On the next day an attack was made in conjunction with the 3rd Indian and 13th British Divisions, with a view to clearing up the corner of the east bank of the Hai. This operation, however, was not successful and the Buffs lost some casualties to no great purpose, one officer and eighty other ranks being wounded in the business. The next day, however, the 36th Brigade attacked with great success and the 35th was able to come into line: Lieut. Sergeant and four men of the Buffs being wounded. The first blow of a hammer will often not drive in a nail, but it prepares the way for a successful second or third blow. The next two or three days were spent in consolidating and improving the new line.
The 31st of the month brought a fresh attack, and the brigade was progressing with its work when orders came that it was to move no further till the 37th Brigade came up on its left. This move, however, never materialized and, in consequence, the advance came to a standstill. Two men were killed and eleven wounded on the 1st February, but 2nd Lieut. Tustin and a party of bombers established themselves in a forward position. A further attack was prepared and was to be executed on the 2nd, but the dense fog, rendering all work impossible, made postponement necessary on the part of the 35th Brigade. The Turk was making fairly resolute counter-attacks, but they were broken by our artillery or met resolutely by our advanced troops.
On the 3rd the Devons and Ghurkas carried the enemy’s first and second lines, and in the evening there were signs that he contemplated withdrawal. In fact, it seemed a little later as if this retreat had actually taken place, for everything was very quiet, so much so that things looked like a withdrawal, partial at any rate, from the other bank as well; and the Buffs, Ghurkas and Dogras all sent forward strong patrols, while the whole brigade stood ready to move forward at a moment’s notice. On the 4th February the whole of the left bank of Hai had passed into our hands and the enemy was found to have fallen back to the Liquorice Factory and a line east and west across the Dahra Bend. On this day the Buffs took up a line of picquets facing the enemy in the bend, being relieved at nightfall.
It was not Maude’s intention to let any of the enemy remain on the south side of the Tigris, in case such could resist his contemplated march on Baghdad by saving the communications with that city, and so enabling the Turkish army to keep the field. Obviously, therefore, the next task was to clear the Dahra Bend and drive its occupants across the main river. With this object in view, the King’s Own Regiment effected a lodgment in the centre of the enemy’s line on the 9th February, and the same day the Worcestershire, capturing some advanced posts, established a line 2,500 yards or so south of the river at the southern end of the Shumran Bend, and on the 10th our infantry, lying west of the Liquorice Factory, after being attacked all night by bombing parties, began early to assail the Turkish position. In this connection the Buffs moved from their line against that of the enemy with the 2/4th Ghurkas on their right. The move was successful because the Turks would not abide the issue but vacated their trenches, and, after occupying them, the Buffs pushed forward patrols and bombing parties who, on the 11th, in pouring rain, took up a line well forward, from whence a communication trench was started towards the north. Four men were killed during these two days, and 2nd Lieuts. Tustin and Sergeant and fourteen men were wounded. On the 12th there was severe fighting over the job of driving in the enemy’s picquets and covering troops, and the 102nd Grenadiers of the 35th Brigade greatly distinguished themselves by gallantly capturing a redoubt and holding it against all counter-attacks.
THE RECAPTURE OF KUT-EL-AMARA
On the right a company of the Buffs is seen advancing on the Turkish position, which rests on the right bank of the river, roughly indicated by the bursting shrapnel. Kut, with its tall minaret, is seen in the dark palm-grove across the river. Beyond are the Pushtikuh Hills and the snow-capped Persian mountains. The tall yellow column (centre) is spray from lyddite bursting in the river.
From a sketch made from the parapet in foreground by Herbert Alexander, A.R.W.S.
But the principal day of battle in the Dahra Bend was the 15th February, and it was the date of a complete and glorious success. Quite early the Loyal North Lancashires carried a strong point opposite our left; then the South Wales Borderers and Welch Fusiliers captured the enemy’s right centre, taking many prisoners; and later, about 1.30 p.m., the Buffs and the Dogras, of their brigade, took up the work. On the occasion of occupying the forward position referred to above, A Company of the Buffs had been detached a little distance from the rest of the battalion and on the morning of the 15th patrols, sent out from this company, reported that the enemy’s line in front was strongly held. Nevertheless when the hour came, the remaining three companies, with the good and faithful Dogras, rushed forward and nothing could stay their onslaught. It was most successful and together they reached the river line, isolating the Turkish extreme left and taking one thousand prisoners, of which six hundred, together with five machine guns, surrendered to the Buffs. Tactically this success was of the greatest importance, for the Dahra Bend was cleared and nothing was left but to cross and try conclusions on the left bank of the Tigris. Our casualties were twelve men killed and 2nd Lieut. Brooke and sixty-seven men wounded. As Sir Stanley Maude pointed out in his despatches: “To eject the enemy from his horse-shoe bend, bristling with trenches, and commanded from across the river on three sides by hostile batteries and machine guns, called for offensive qualities of a high standard on the part of the troops.” To take the army across the river it would be necessary to keep the Turk fully occupied at Sanna i Yat and all along the bank from there to Kut, while preparations were made to pass the great obstacle as far to the westward as possible; so orders were issued to Lt.-General Cobbe to attack the lines at Sanna i Yat on the 17th.
An abnormally heavy rain fell on the 16th which flooded everything. The river rose—the trenches in the picquet line along the river bank, which were the temporary home of the Buffs, were swamped—the country was half under water and it was impossible to clean up the battlefield. Our battalion being relieved from picquet on the 18th returned to camp at a place called Kala Haji Fahan and remained there till the 22nd, all this time being utilized by Marshall and his men in methodical preparations for the great crossing which was to be about the Shumran Bend whilst Cobbe, fifteen miles away, was assaulting the lines, in front of which he had been so long, and inducing the enemy to believe that there was the point of danger. On the 17th he gained some trenches, but had to withdraw, only to attack again on the 22nd, on which date the two first trenches were taken and made secure.
Meanwhile Marshall made several feints as if to cross the stream, particularly one opposite Kut, but the real point selected was the south end of the Shumran Bend and there three ferries were arranged, while the bridge was being made. The first ferry trip was a success, but subsequent journeys were pretty strongly opposed; nevertheless by 3 p.m. on the 22nd February three battalions were established across the river about a mile north of the site selected for the bridge, and at 4.30 the work was ready for use. The enemy had tried more than one counter-attack which failed, on account of the quickness and accuracy of our artillery. The Buffs crossed about 7 p.m. on the 23rd and bivouacked three hundred yards or so from the bank.
The enemy on the 24th made a very good fight to retain possession of, at any rate, some portion of the Shumran peninsula, in the northern corners of which exist quite a network of nullahs which, giving good cover and excellent concealment for machine guns, were utilized to their fullest extent. It took four or five hours to clear the peninsula and push back the Turk, but it was done. The Buffs were in support of the 67th Punjabis who were held up on the left. Together these battalions at last made some progress, but were stopped some three hundred yards in front of a nullah which was strongly held; the Gurkhas attacked on the Buffs’ right, but were also stopped, and an attempted flanking movement was of no avail. However, about 9 p.m. patrols which had gone out as soon as it was dark reported that the enemy had evacuated the place and the nullah was at once occupied. The Buffs’ casualties on this day were twelve men killed and Lieut. Howell and thirty-four wounded. Meanwhile cavalry, artillery and another division crossed the river, and Cobbe finished his task by capturing Sanna i Yat and clearing the bank of the main stream as far as Kut.