II. Mesopotamia
The war in Mesopotamia was quite a different one to any of the others, and perhaps resembled the operations of Lord Wolseley on the Nile in the early eighties more than any other in which England has been engaged. In fact, it was a river war and, until the siege of Kut-el-Amarah began, early in December, 1915, it had been a successful one.
A very brief sketch of the campaign, which ended in the surrounding of General Townsend’s force in Kut, is perhaps necessary in order properly to understand what followed: Sir John Nixon commanded an Anglo-Indian army in the land of Mesopotamia, which was, of course, a Turkish province. His headquarters were at the port of Basrah on the River Tigris, about sixty miles from the real mouth of the river. In the spring of 1915 the forces were much scattered: one brigade being at Ahwaz, eighty miles away on the right (to the eastward), and another brigade was at Qurnah (or Kurna), forty miles further up the river than Basrah. The enemy, which had been driven from Basrah because the English wanted the place, had collected mostly about Nasiriyah, one hundred miles away to the westward. This was a most important place from the Turkish point of view. It is on the Euphrates river, and from it runs a watercourse into the Tigris. It was from there that any attempt the enemy might make to recover what he had lost must start. About one hundred miles, as the crow flies, above Basrah and on the same river, stands Amarah, a place which, in 1915, was in Turkish hands; from the garrison of this town, early in 1915, had been detached a party of six battalions and ten guns down-stream as far as Qurnah, and this force was, of course, in contact with our brigade there.
Early in May General Gorringe, with the 12th Indian Division and a cavalry brigade, operated about Arwaz and, crossing the Kharkeh river with some difficulty, drove all the enemy in the eastern regions of the province in upon the garrison of Amarah. Meanwhile General Townsend with the 6th Indian Division advanced up the Tigris supported by the Naval flotilla, and, pursuing the Turkish detachment before him, entered Amarah practically unopposed, because General Gorringe’s operations had prevented the enemy from reinforcing his garrison. Amarah was entered on the 4th June, 1915. Immediately after the taking of this place arrangements were made for the capture of Nasiriyah, which was after serious opposition effected by General Gorringe on the 25th July. The defeat of Nur-ed-Din and the occupation of Kut-el-Amarah became the next objective as soon as Nasiriyah was secured, and the transfer of troops towards Amarah was begun the following day.
Kut is another one hundred miles higher up the Tigris than Amarah, without counting the bends, and in the summer the river is the only approach to it.
The British force referred to, reached Sanna-i-Yat, about eight miles below the enemy’s Kut position, by the 15th September, and halted there for ten days, being reinforced during that period. General Townsend then advanced and, with the aid of the Naval forces on the stream, drove the Turk back, who by the 5th October was at Ctesiphon, covering Baghdad; but here the enemy received very important reinforcements and, moreover, his position was daily being strengthened. Townsend, too, was concentrating at Aziziyah, but he found he could not proceed till the 21st November, and on the next day his force attacked the enemy and won the battle of Ctesiphon, though his heavy losses in killed and wounded rendered it impossible for him to renew his progress to Baghdad. As a matter of fact, the British Army was neither strong enough in numbers nor equipment for the task on which it had been sent.
General Townsend at last found it absolutely necessary to withdraw, and this was done very gradually and with much fighting; on the morning of the 3rd December his force reached Kut-el-Amarah where it was decided his retirement should end. The force, considerably reduced in numbers, was now regularly besieged by the Turks, and a resolute attempt to relieve him by an army under Lt.-General Aylmer was organized and arranged.
This relieving force got under way in December. It consisted of the 7th Lahore Division from France, 3rd Meerut Division and the 35th Indian Brigade, lately brought to Mesopotamia; this brigade included the 5th Battalion of the Buffs. The job was immense, because of the difficulties of transport. The only possible way of carrying the impedimenta of an army and of feeding and supplying it was by means of the River Tigris, and this stream was a most unsatisfactory one in every way: it winds about like a cork-screw, and is provided with endless shifting shallows; when the rains come it is a raging torrent; and after that the whole country, which is quite flat, is covered with impassable marshes, which connect with the river by treacherous channels. All this, of course, meant that the rations were bad and more or less precarious. In fact, at this period of the war, the feeding of the troops in Mesopotamia could not be compared with the system obtaining in France. The sick, too, suffered extremely from the difficulties of transport as well as a reprehensible paucity of medical officers and medical equipment. In fact, the conditions of soldiering on the Western Front and in this cradle of the human race were as different as they well could be. In France nothing that could alleviate the sufferings of the sick and wounded was left undone, whereas under the Indian Government the contrary was the case, and it was only after many lives had been needlessly sacrificed that adequate arrangements were made.
Townsend’s cavalry had left him on the 6th December, and retired down the Tigris till it reached Ali-el-Gharbi, at which spot it was reinforced by infantry and guns from Basrah.
The siege of Kut was full of incident and the defence was a very fine one, starvation being the only enemy that could not be defied, but it is only with the attempted relief of the place that the Buffs were concerned.
General Aylmer’s leading troops, under Major-General Younghusband, who had moved up from Basrah by river steamers with open barges lashed on either side, started from the Ali-el-Gharbi on the 4th January, 1916, and moved up the river, using both banks and marching on Sheikh Saad. The Buffs were on the left bank and furthest from the stream. All surplus stores were carried by water. The length of the first day’s march was about eight miles, the weather being very wet and the nights cold.
The second day took the force another journey up the course of the Tigris in the same formation. There was a considerable amount of sniping when night fell. Indeed, it was obvious from this and other signs that there was a strong force in front.
On the next day (6th January) the march was resumed and the outposts of the enemy were reached. The firing commenced about noon and lasted till 4.30 p.m., but our casualties were inconsiderable; 2nd Lieut. Holyman and three men being wounded. There was very heavy sniping that night.
The next day was fought the action of Sheikh Saad. Our force began to advance and came under fire almost at once, and the artillery opened at 8 o’clock. The firing increased hourly in intensity as the day wore on, from rifles and shrapnel and later on from machine guns, too, and casualties began to grow to an unpleasant extent. The adjutant, Lieut. H. S. Marchant, was killed, and Lt.-Colonel J. Munn-Mace, Major E. Clarke and many others were wounded. The advance was over open country and the available cover was so meagre as to be almost non-existent. There was a mirage, too, which interfered considerably with observation, but by the middle of the afternoon a much thinned-out firing line of Buffs, Black Watch and Seaforth Highlanders had got within about four hundred yards of the position. There were not enough men to keep up the pressure, however, and as there was every appearance of a counter-attack being contemplated, these British troops prepared a line about two hundred yards behind the place they had advanced to, and digging themselves in for the night prepared to resist any offensive on the part of the enemy. Beyond very heavy firing, which rendered the bringing in of the wounded a matter of great difficulty, however, nothing of that nature occurred, though the situation was anything but a pleasant one, for the firing was kept up all night, the weather was bitterly cold and showery, and the food consisted of a few biscuits with some bully beef for breakfast.
Saturday the 8th January was a day of rifle fire. The Turks attempted an advance, but were repulsed and all our men could do was to strengthen and improve their defences, which work was carried out at dusk. On the following morning the enemy had disappeared and nothing was found to be in front but a few snipers. The reason of this proved to be that, though our advance was checked, as has been seen, on the left bank of the river, our troops on the other side had captured the trenches in front of them. So, after burying the dead and clearing up the battlefield, Aylmer’s force marched another six miles or so over what had been the Turkish position, which was found to be a very elaborate one, and camped at Sheikh Saad.
The part taken by the Buffs in this fight earned the very warmest praise from those in authority. The casualty list was heavy, 3 officers and 38 men were killed outright and 14 officers and 196 other ranks were wounded, some of whom succumbed to their injuries.
The list of officer casualties was as follows:—
Killed: Lieuts. H. S. Marchant and G. T. Baker, and 2nd Lieut. E. Rothwell.
Wounded: Lt.-Colonel J. Munn-Mace, Major E. Clarke; Captains B. Buss (afterwards died of wounds), F. O. Marchant, T. H. O. Collings; Lieuts. A. E. L. Hardcastle, G. Jessel, the Hon. G. J. Goschen (died of wounds), W. H. Winch (died of wounds), F. S. Fleuret, S. W. Weldon, L. E. Holyman, A. Goode (attached) and T. Bridgens (attached).
On the 11th January in the evening came sudden orders to get on the move again, and at 7 o’clock the force marched off in a north-easterly direction, but after proceeding three miles halted again and dug in. This procedure was repeated on the 12th, but the march (in the same direction) was this time about eight miles, and every preparation was made for an attack at dawn. The enemy had, however, gone when morning arrived, and our people moved after him and marched steadily from 7 o’clock in the morning till 2 p.m., when the foe was located and promptly attacked. His position was known as the Wadi, which is a stream running into the Tigris river on its left bank. The 35th Brigade, in which the Buffs were serving, being on the right flank of the relieving force, carried out a flanking movement and only really came into action about 4 p.m. Then it advanced under fire and closed with the bayonet, but the Turk thought it unwise to measure himself at close quarters with the men of Kent, though he is a brave and hardy fighter, so he made off and another battle was lost and won.
The Buffs’ own principal loss was the new commanding officer of the battalion, Major J. S. Fraser, who was killed. Captain J. Body assumed command.
The weather was now very bad indeed, the rains were terrible and the wind very high. This state of things interfered sadly with military operations, and delay was the only thing that really disheartened the men. British comrades were being besieged in Kut, only some twenty-five miles away, and discomforts and inferior feeding could be easily borne if only progress could be made.
It is necessary to understand something of the nature of the country and of the Turkish lines of defence between Kut and the relieving forces and to remember that the only practical avenue of approach was by the river, because sustained operations in the desert which bordered the stream were impossible without adequate land transport, which did not exist. Within a mile or two of the stream on both sides were extensive and impassable marshes, and the enemy had constructed several lines of entrenchments, one behind the other, and each stretching across the water from the marshes on the left bank to those on the right. The first of these, and nearest to Aylmer’s forces, were the lines of Umm-el-Hanna. Then came those of Falahiyeh and then Sanna-i-Yat. Behind all these, only about seven miles east of Kut itself, was the long entrenchment of Es Sinn. The main line of this, as it did not rest on marshes on the right side of the river, was thrown back at an angle till it rested on the Shatt-el-Hai, the watercourse which joined the Tigris at Kut to the great River Euphrates. At the salient angle of this long line of works stood the Dujailah Redoubt.
On the 21st January Aylmer attacked the Umm-el-Hanna lines, but alas! the attack proved a failure and the English army had to entrench itself and await reinforcements, it being that day fairly conclusively proved that our people were not in sufficient force for the work undertaken. The Buffs had, amongst others, Captain A. G. A. Adam and Lieut. J. Thorp Waite killed and Lieut. Goodland wounded. The weather of the 21st was terribly wet: by evening the trenches were full of water; it became difficult to carry away the wounded, and many of the stretcher-bearers fell with their burdens.
About this time several pairs of battalions, who had been depleted of men, were coupled up into one. This was of more or less frequent occurrence. Thus two companies of the Hampshires, whose other half battalion was in Kut, were sent to the Buffs, and together, until the following June, the Buffs and these two companies formed the “composite Territorial battalion,” better known as the “Huffs,” which was commanded by Major F. N. Thorne, of the 1st Royal Sussex Regiment.
Notwithstanding everybody’s anxiety to get on, February proved a comparatively idle month. As has been stated, Aylmer had an insufficient force for his task. Reinforcements, however, were coming up and every effort to reorganize for a fresh attempt was being made. Soldiers, like sailors, will never leave a stone unturned to rescue comrades in distress, and a relief column may always be depended on to strive to the very end. The last day of the month brought a draft from the 3/5th Battalion of 6 officers and 302 men, and sadly was the draft needed. Very few indeed of the 627 men who left Basrah were now able to perform a day’s duty.
On the 7th March a very resolute attempt to relieve the beleaguered garrison commenced. It being impossible to force the several lines in front, it was determined to try and turn them. This meant that our people must leave the river and their water supply and march out across the desert. The only possible chance of success was rapidity and a decisive victory. The desert column could not be fed, watered, relieved of its sick or reinforced until its work was ended and touch again obtained with the Tigris in rear of the formidable Turkish lines. A night march on the Dujailah Redoubt, in three columns, over the desert, started on the evening of the 7th March and marched in pitch darkness and in strict silence all night. At dawn the redoubt was reached and Kut was in sight. Intense eagerness and excitement reigned in every breast, but the result was the most bitter disappointment it is hoped that will ever fall to the lot of gallant rescuers. The attack was too late and failed to surprise, and the enthusiastic columns had to fall back again upon their old camp at Hanna. During the march the brigade in which the Buffs were acted as escort to the second-line transport, but moved up into the fight at Dujailah, which lasted all day. The enemy’s guns followed up the British retreat and our men were under their fire during the greater part of the 9th. At 11.30 p.m. on that date a dispirited and terribly fatigued column reached the old camping ground again. They had suffered severely from want of water.
It was sad to have to remain inactive so near to Kut, but it was essential that more troops should arrive. These came at last in the shape of the 13th Division from Gallipoli, which had been evacuated early in January. General Aylmer, V.C., was replaced by General Sir G. P. Gorringe, and on the 5th April this commander attacked, frontally and with the utmost vigour, the Hanna trenches, before which the relief force had been held up so long. The attack took place early in the morning and was chiefly entrusted to the newly arrived division, which gloriously carried the obstacle in a couple of hours, though it consisted of no less than five lines of trenches. It was soon noticed by our aircraft that the Falahiyeh and Sanna-i-Yat lines were being strongly reinforced. Absence of cover militated greatly against a successful further advance, but this was made as soon as night fell, and the Falahiyeh fortifications were soon also in our possession on both banks of the river.
Hopes rose again after this victory that Kut would, after all, be saved, and every man was prepared for any necessary effort, but unhappily the floods now rose with great rapidity. The river became a roaring torrent and the marshes more formidable than ever, not only in impassability but, what was worse, in extent as well. Nevertheless, attempts were made to pass the lines still intervening between Gorringe’s men and their goal, but it was not to be. The last attempt was made on the 23rd April: on the evening of the 21st the Buffs, with the remainder of the brigade, crossed the river from the right to the left bank, marched three or four miles up stream and took up a position in reserve preparatory to an attack. Here the night was passed in the open air in artillery formation, and a move up into the reserve trenches was made the following morning. The attack was more or less successful at first, but the Turks were reinforced and drove those of our men who had penetrated their defences out again. Nothing but a frontal attack could possibly be attempted owing to the presence of and utter impassability of the marshes. The Buffs were sent back into the trenches from whence they had emerged so full of anticipation, and on the 29th April the garrison of Kut surrendered to the enemy.
During the end of April the Buffs had had to fight another enemy besides the Turk. There were a few cases of cholera reported on the 27th. On the 28th there were four deaths and for a few days things looked serious, but a bad epidemic was avoided.
TURKISH LINES NEAR KUT
The following is the list of casualties suffered by the 5th Battalion during these operations:—
Officers killed, 8: Major J. S. Fraser; Captain A. G. A. Adam; Lieuts. G. T. Baker, Hon. G. J. Goschen, H. S. Marchant, E. Rothwell, J. T. Waite and W. H. Winch.
Twelve were wounded: Colonel J. Munn-Mace; Major E. Clarke; Captains B. Buss (afterwards died of wounds), T. H. O. Collings, F. O. Marchant and D. S. Wilkinson; Lieuts. F. S. Fleuret, A. E. L. Hardcastle, L. E. Holyman, G. Jessel, J. H. J. Peters and S. W. Weldon.
Eighty-four other ranks were killed up to the 29th April, and 259 wounded.