III. “O” Trench
The brigade front at this time was intersected at right angles by the Ypres-Comines Canal, which divided it into what were known as the Right and Left Sections of Defence. Immediately north of the canal the Left Section of Defence was entrusted to the Buffs and 3rd Royal Fusiliers, these battalions relieving each other as ordered; and the south or the Right Section of Defence to the 2nd East Surrey and the 3rd Middlesex. Each section had its own battalion headquarters. A small part of the southern section was also held by one company of the Buffs (Captain Worthington). The other battalions of the brigade were in somewhat similar conditions to the Buffs, and were daily and rapidly being reduced in fighting strength and efficiency, chiefly through frost-bite and sickness. So serious had things become owing to this reduction in fighting strength that, by the 13th February, it was decided to relieve the brigade, and to withdraw it to recoup and refit as soon as other troops were available to replace it in the line.
It had already been decided by the higher command that a part of the line then being held by the 3rd Middlesex and the 2nd East Surrey, south of the canal, was to be shortened by the construction of new trenches a little in rear of trenches “O” and “P.” This work had already been started, and was, on the night of the 14th February, being continued by the 3rd Middlesex, which temporarily withdrew the garrisons from “O” and “P” trenches for the purpose of digging, leaving those trenches in charge of small covering parties only.
The Germans, who up till then had been showing very little local activity, unexpectedly raided and captured “O” trench and prevented its reoccupation by the Middlesex; without delay they reversed the parapet, wired the front on our side and took all necessary steps for resisting any attempts at recapture.
During the night 14th/15th February the Buffs were relieved by the 3rd Royal Fusiliers from their unenviable position in the trenches as recorded above, and were withdrawn a short distance to Chateau Rosenthal (Bedford House), on the Ypres-St. Eloi road, to rest. By the time the reliefs had been completed and the battalion had settled down to rest the night was far spent.
Shortly before dawn alarming rumours reached Battalion H.Q. that the enemy had broken through the Middlesex and were advancing on Ypres. Colonel Geddes reported accordingly to Brigade H.Q., and the battalion was at once turned out in readiness for any eventuality. Soon after daybreak orders were received to move out and hold the canal bank south-east of Langhof. Although fairly heavily shelled en route, the battalion crossed the canal without loss and assembled on the north side, under cover of the canal embankment. Here it was subsequently joined by the brigadier and some of the brigade staff and remained awaiting developments throughout the rest of the morning.
About 2.30 p.m. the 2nd East Surrey, assisted by as many of the Middlesex as it had been possible to collect, were ordered to recapture “O” trench. No arrangements had apparently been made for artillery support, and moreover this attack had to be made over ground deep in mud, devoid of any cover and without any previous reconnaissance or guides. From the Buffs’ rendezvous nothing could be seen of what was taking place on the far side of the embankment, where the attack had been launched. About 4.30 p.m. the Buffs (less one company which remained with the brigadier in reserve) were ordered to reinforce the East Surrey, who, owing to extremely heavy losses, were reported to be held up and unable to make further progress. As the leading company of the Buffs broke cover it came under artillery fire which caused many casualties, including its commander, Major F. S. Reeves, wounded, and Lieut. R. M. Heywood, killed. Neither the whereabouts of the East Surreys nor the direction of the objective were known, and by this time darkness was fast approaching. However, the three companies continued the advance in the dusk and by good fortune came up with some of the East Surreys, who, having reached a point some five hundred yards from the objective, were unable to advance any further. The Buffs passed through them and continued to advance until they reached a point about three hundred yards from the objective, which by this time, however, was completely hidden in the darkness which had by now intervened. At this point a subaltern of the East Surrey Regiment, who had lost his platoon, was met, and he volunteered to act as guide. The leading company again pushed on, but, owing to the difficulty of keeping touch and maintaining direction in the dark, a part of the battalion found itself held up by wire and suffering heavy losses from fire from more than one direction. At this juncture Colonel Geddes wisely determined to withdraw the battalion, which was only done with the greatest difficulty.
Whilst the above operations were in progress, half a battalion of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, sent from the 84th Brigade, had arrived in the dark at the rendezvous on the canal bank, where the brigadier and the reserve company of the Buffs (Major R. E. Power) were waiting. As nothing was known of the military situation, nor of the whereabouts of the Buffs nor of the East Surrey Regiment, from whom no reports had been received since dark, the brigadier ordered the reserve company of the Buffs to go out and find the rest of the battalion. He himself started with them. After going a short distance they came across a building full of wounded which was found to be the Battalion H.Q. of the Right Section of Defence, then occupied by the headquarters of the 3rd Middlesex Regiment. Here a guide was procured, and the company proceeded in the direction in which the remainder of the battalion and the 2nd East Surrey had gone. Before it had gone far, however, it luckily met Colonel Geddes returning. The battalion (less half Major Power’s company, detached to occupy a front-line trench) reached the canal about 10.30 p.m., and was sent back at 1 a.m. to Chateau Rosenthal to get a meal and rest.
During the morning of the 15th February, 1915, a conference was held at Brigade H.Q., and it was decided to renew the attack on the lost trench “O” on that night. The brigadier at first decided to carry out this operation with the Buffs and East Surrey Regiment only, but these two battalions had together only about three hundred men available, owing to the casualties of the previous day and the losses sustained during the recent tour in the trenches. Two companies of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers (84th Brigade) were, therefore, added to this small force, which was placed under command of Colonel Geddes. In the written orders issued to units it was stated that “O” trench was to be retaken at all costs and held until reliefs arrived. The G.O.C. 28th Division stated that the 85th Brigade, which, owing to the severe losses from fire and sickness already incurred, was to have been at once withdrawn from the line and sent back to recoup and refit, would not be relieved until the lost trench “O” had been recaptured.
At 7 p.m. the Buffs (less half D Company)[8] and 2nd East Surrey Regiment (less one and a half companies) assembled at the place ordered, that is, on the road junction on the Ypres-St. Eloi road, 620 yards south of the canal. From this point the column, led by the Buffs, marched via the road leading east towards Oosthoek, as far as the Battalion H.Q. of the Right Sections of Defence, where the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers (less two companies) joined and followed in reserve. Leaving here at 7.40 p.m. and moving in file, closed up, the column was skilfully guided some two thousand yards across country by Lieut. J. A. H. Wood, 2nd East Surrey, to the position of deployment (the north-east end of a spinney about 150 yards north of “O” trench), which was reached without opposition or casualties at about 8.40 p.m. On reaching the position of deployment the Buffs, under Major L. I. B. Hulke, having previously fixed bayonets, silently deployed into line to the left, in single rank, without extending, and lay down in the deep mud. The East Surreys, acting in a similar manner, formed a second line twenty yards in rear with the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers some fifty yards behind them. Selected scouts of the Buffs were sent out to reconnoitre and cut the enemy’s wire and to report on the intervening ground, which was quite unknown to all those about to take part in this attack. Such complete silence had been maintained during the advance and deployment that the presence of the column was unknown to the enemy until a prearranged artillery bombardment of his trenches commenced at 8.55 p.m. The shells all appeared to take effect against the main German position, and consequently well beyond the immediate objective. They unfortunately had the undesired effect of putting the defenders on the qui vive, for they at once manned the trench “O,” sent up flares, which revealed the position of the attacking force, and opened on it a withering fire from rifles, machine guns and trench mortars.
The time ordered for the assault was 9 p.m., and the right of the Buffs was detailed to direct. Immediately the enemy opened fire it was apparent from the shells which, following one another in quick succession, burst immediately behind and close to the Buffs, that the enemy had the exact range. Realizing this, Major Hulke at once gave the order to advance. Just in front of the Buffs the ground sloped somewhat steeply downwards towards the objective for about fifty yards. Nothing could have been finer than the dash and the steady determination with which the whole line, like one man, arose and went forward down this slope. The configuration of the ground, and the unhesitating manner in which the order to advance was carried out, undoubtedly saved the battalion from serious losses at this stage, as the more quickly the advance down the slope was made the higher above the men’s heads rained the storm of shells and bullets on to, and beyond, the position which the battalion had just vacated.
From the bottom of the slope the advance had to be made across heavy ground, ankle deep in mud and devoid of cover, for a distance of about 120 yards, the last part of which was up a steep incline. Except for the enemy’s flares it was pitch dark. Against the heavy frontal fire from the trench, and enfilade machine-gun fire from the left flank, the battalion forged ahead with magnificent determination, and in spite of serious casualties, most of which were sustained when the level ground at the foot of the first slope was reached, fought its way through the wire and finally assaulted and gained a footing in the trench. The enemy, who had kept up a heavy fire until the Buffs were within ten yards of the trench, disappeared in the dark, apparently down a communication trench and also towards the western end of “O” trench.
Major C. L. Porter was wounded and many other ranks killed and wounded during the attack, but ten officers and about sixty other ranks succeeded in entering the trench. Major Hulke immediately reorganized and distributed these along the trench, starting from the extreme left, and arranged for the protection of the right flank by the construction of a sandbag traverse, which was built, under fire from rifle and bombs, under Captain Morgan’s supervision, assisted by Lieut. Laing. A considerable number had already been wounded; parties had to be employed in repairing and strengthening the parapet, whilst others had to be told off to assist those detailed to man the parapet, in clearing the jammed rifles and supplying them with cleaned ammunition. When all these deductions from the sixty odd other ranks who had succeeded in gaining a footing in the trench had been made, it was found that only sufficient men remained to hold about fifty out of a probable two hundred yards of trench. Whilst the above arrangements were in progress the enemy started sniping and throwing bombs, apparently from a communication trench and from the western end of “O” trench, which was still in their hands. Bombs at that time were weapons of warfare of which the 28th Division had had no previous experience whatever, and owing to the darkness, the non-provision of maps and lack of previous information about, or knowledge of, the trench, it was very difficult to locate the places from which the enemy were throwing them and sniping. However, Captain F. W. Tomlinson, Captain L. Fort and 2nd Lieut. E. F. D. Strettell discovered the whereabouts of a party of the enemy’s bombers and rushed it; demolished the sandbag wall, from under cover of which bombs were being thrown, and cleared the enemy out of the trench. Captain Tomlinson seized the bayonet of one of the enemy, who turned tail. Captain L. Fort, who a few days previously had shown the greatest courage and resource whilst in charge of an officers’ reconnoitring patrol, was killed, and 2nd Lieut. E. F. D. Strettell was severely wounded in this gallant enterprise, which undoubtedly saved many lives and further casualties in the battalion, as the enemy afterwards ceased bombing and apparently withdrew.
Owing to the mud, with which everybody and everything was smothered, a large number of the rifles became jammed and unserviceable. After holding on for three hours, as the promised support had not arrived the position of the Buffs was by now (midnight) somewhat critical. Major Hulke therefore sent 2nd Lieut. J. A. Wood (2nd East Surrey), accompanied by No. 9522 Pte. W. J. White, to report the situation to Colonel Geddes, and eventually the former returned, guiding a company of the 2nd Suffolk Regiment. He reported that both the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers and 2nd East Surrey had lost their way in the dark, and that the former had been now ordered to follow the 2nd Suffolk Regiment. They did not, however, arrive at “O” trench before the Buffs were relieved.
As soon as the company of the Suffolks had taken over the portion of the trench the Buffs were holding, they had to work their surplus men along the trench beyond the sandbag traverse which the battalion had built, and extend them further to the right. In trying to do this they met with considerable opposition from parties of the enemy, who were in the western part of the trench. As the officer in command of this company appeared to meet with some difficulty in overcoming this opposition, Major Hulke offered to remain with his handful of men until it got sufficiently light to see what the real situation was. This offer, however, was refused, and, in accordance with the orders issued, Major Hulke therefore withdrew the Buffs, leaving in charge of the Suffolks any wounded who were unable to be removed without stretchers—of which there were none available. Great difficulty was experienced in carrying out the withdrawal over the fire-swept morass which had to be crossed, lit up, as it was, by almost incessant star-shell and flares. By crawling through the mud between the flares, a few yards at a time, and by lying down as flat as possible whilst any light remained, was the only way of proceeding, but many lives, including Sgt. Rosam, were lost during the first part of the withdrawal: although the distance was not more than 150 yards, it took half an hour to reach the original place of deployment.
After a few hours’ rest in the cavalry barracks in Ypres the battalion marched into scattered billets in and around Reninghelst. On the same afternoon the services of 2nd Lieut. C. W. Laing were asked for to act as guide to another brigade detailed on that night to recapture “O” trench, which the enemy had again taken possession of very shortly after the Buffs had been relieved. In spite of his arduous experiences of the previous night’s fighting and want of rest, 2nd Lieut. C. W. Laing undertook this hazardous enterprise, and carried it out successfully.