IV. Battle of Armentieres: Action at Radinghem
Before reaching the above line the battalion got orders to take the village of Radinghem.
Just beyond this village is a fairly high ridge or plateau on which stands the Chateau de Flandres, and there is a wood on the edge of the plateau screening the house from the village, the distance between this wood and the south edge of the village being about three hundred yards.
Brevet Colonel Julian Hasler was in command of the forward or firing line which advanced through Radinghem, seized the ridge and, pushing on, took the Chateau where severe hand-to-hand fighting occurred. But soon considerable German reinforcements coming up, the Buffs had to abandon the Chateau itself, though they still clung to the edge of the wood.
During the attack Company Sergeant-Major Brady, with nineteen men of C Company, on surmounting a piece of rising ground, suddenly found himself about two hundred yards from a German battalion in close order. Each Buff had three hundred rounds of ammunition, and one of the most beautiful displays of rapid firing ever made was the result: that particular German battalion was very quickly “put out of action,” as they say on field days. The successful attack on the Chateau de Flandres was immensely helped by Major Bayley’s company of the York and Lancaster Regiment, which had worked its way round to take the enemy in flank; so that when these men approached, the enemy had hastily to withdraw. Without a doubt the Buffs owe very much to this gallant company.
At 6.10 p.m. the situation was looking serious, but after a German counter-attack had been repulsed things became better. Then orders came to hand over Radinghem to some French cavalry and to withdraw. When the Frenchmen arrived, however, they were found to be only 130 strong, so the Buffs and York and Lancaster consolidated themselves on the south edge of the village and settled in for the night. The artillery, a mixed brigade under Lt.-Colonel Humphrey, had most nobly supported the infantry during the day. Later on, when the regiment had more experience, they found that the devotion to duty shown by the Gunners at Radinghem was quite a normal state of things with that arm, and was so looked for as a matter of course that notice was hardly taken of their excellent work, but in this, almost their first battle of the war, praise of the Gunners was in every man’s mouth.
On the 19th touch was obtained with the 18th Brigade at the railway crossing east of Bas Champs. At 3 p.m. the 16th Brigade was ordered to withdraw to Bois Grenier and to leave one battalion only at Radinghem. The consequence of this was of course that, the York and Lancaster being withdrawn, the Buffs were left alone to occupy the lines which last night had been constructed for both regiments.
The morning of the 20th opened with very heavy artillery fire from the enemy’s guns of large calibre, and then the German infantry pressed very heavily. About 2 p.m. Colonel Hasler was badly wounded,[3] and command of the front line devolved on Major McDouall. At 3 p.m. the artillery reported that the Germans were advancing along the two roads from Le Maisnil leading to Radinghem. This meant that the Buffs would probably be surrounded, as touch with the 18th Brigade and French cavalry had failed, and indeed it was ultimately found that these troops had been driven back. At 3.35 and again at 4 o’clock McDouall reported that the situation was very serious, but that he was holding on; that the machine guns were knocked out, the trench on his left hitherto held by C Company had been captured and that he was “in a tight corner.” He received orders to retire company by company, and replied that it was very difficult, but that “We will do the best we can.” At 4.50 came a message from the brigade to hold on at all costs and promising the support of two companies of the York and Lancaster. The Headquarter party of the battalion manned a barricade in the village and McDouall retired, the work being carried out in a most soldierly manner, and at 7 p.m. the promised help arrived, followed half an hour later by the brigadier himself, who ordered the front of the village to be held, unaware that both flanks were exposed. A staff officer of the division, however, shortly arrived who was acquainted with the situation, and he directed the retirement of the Buffs, which was carried out without trouble, as the enemy was not enterprising and appeared to have had enough of the battalion. At 1 a.m. on the 21st the rear guard cleared the village, and that morning Grand Flamengrie Farm was reached again and billets resumed.
In this action the Buffs lost Lieuts. J. D. Phillips, R. McDougall, M. Noott and R. S. Glyn killed, and Colonel J. Hasler and Lieuts. G. F. Hamilton, C. C. Stanfield and Orwan wounded. Of the rank and file 17 were reported killed and 62 missing, but these were undoubtedly all or nearly all killed; 57 were wounded. The regiment earned great praise for the stand it made at Radinghem, and, though it will be impossible in this history accurately to chronicle each honour and reward as conferred, it is interesting to note that on the 28th November No. 8922 Sgt. J. McNeir was awarded the D.C.M. for the gallant manner in which he brought up his platoon to the support of B Company at Chateau de Flandres, near Radinghem, on the 20th October, 1914, and that:—
“On the 20th October, 1914, at Chateau de Flandres, near Radinghem, Sergeant Forwood continued to serve his machine guns, after the officer in charge had been killed, until all the team and both the guns had been knocked out by heavy artillery, himself being wounded in five places. He crawled in and reported the situation.” Sergeant Forwood was awarded the D.C.M., and the incident is described by a General Officer, who later on commanded the 6th Division, as being typical of the fierce fighting at this time.
On the 23rd October a heavy attack developed at dawn against the Shropshire and York and Lancaster battalions and part of the line, which consisted of isolated trenches only, was rendered untenable by machine guns which the shape of the ground enabled the enemy to bring up. This attack was a very bold one and Germans were actually bayoneted in the trenches, and two hundred dead were counted opposite one of the Shropshire defences.
At one time there was a gap just east of Bridoux, caused by some of the trenches being lost and others still held, and matters were in rather a confused state, so, to clear up the situation, Lieut. G. R. Thornhill’s platoon of the Buffs, under the direction and guidance of Major Clemson of the York and Lancaster Regiment, was pushed forward from the Touquet-La Boutillerie road by some dongas running south. There appeared to be no enemy in the gap, and on approaching one of the trenches Thornhill and his men rushed forward to secure it, when he and several of his followers were shot down by a concealed machine gun. Indeed, only ten returned, bringing with them seven wounded men, but they were obliged to leave Thornhill, who was actually in the trench, and several others. Pte. Pearce made a manly effort at rescue and managed to drag Pte. Bull in, but could not reach his officer. Both A and C Companies employed the bayonet on this day, counter-attacking in front of the Shropshire and the Leicestershire trenches.
It is not so very long ago that many thoughtful army officers were of opinion that the days of the bayonet were over for ever; but then, of course, no one at all dreamed in the summer of 1914 that soldiers would again fight in iron helmets or throw grenades, and there have been many similar surprises during this war.
There seems to be no doubt that from the 23rd to the 25th of October the situation of the 16th Brigade was very critical, and indeed Br.-General Ingouville-Williams twice reported that this was the case. The reason was that the line held was not continuous and it was impossible to make it so, on account of the great number of Germans who were attacking. It was therefore resolved to construct a proper line of trenches 100 yards or so south of the Touquet-La Boutillerie road and to withdraw into it; but as, during the whole of the 23rd, the Leicestershire right flank was being enveloped, new dispositions were made by Brigadiers Williams and Congreve in consultation; they resolved that the Leicestershire should hold their trenches east of the railway and then bend back along it—a most prominent salient and with a poor field of fire, but the best that could be done till the new trenches were ready for occupation.
On the 24th October loud cheering was heard in this direction, and it was feared that the Leicestershire had been rushed, and a company of the Buffs and another of the York and Lancaster were immediately deployed to take the supposedly successful enemy in flank. Verbal reports came in during the morning to Brigade H.Q. at La Touquet that the Leicestershire battalion had been forced to retire, that some posts had been surrounded and that no officers were left. This account, however, fortunately proved to have been exaggerated. The enemy had, in fact, made a small gap in the line, occupying the railway, but the good old battalion from Leicestershire had quickly closed it and, though it had suffered severely, it still held its own and was moreover in touch with the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry.
On the 25th the withdrawal of the whole brigade to the newly made trenches which had been carefully prepared was carried out without a hitch, but in most unpleasantly wet weather.
The student, interested in the tactical movements of military forces, rarely thinks of weather and other little details, but to the poor suffering soldier weather, punctual or fairly punctual delivery of rations (not forgetting the rum), baths, clean clothes, nature of shelter by day and night, and even the phases of the moon seem almost of more importance than the chance of a few casualties.
C.S.M. Stone and Sgt. Stock had been highly complimented during these last few days, as was Corpl. Marsh for his good reconnoitring work; but this occurred to the N.C.O.’s and men of the Buffs so frequently from 1914 to 1918 that it is impossible to refer to all acts of devotion and gallantry. It may well be noted, however, that on the 25th October C Company was resolutely attacked, the enemy getting within seventy yards of their trench, and that Captain E. B. Chichester showed all the gallantry of his English ancestry, cheering on his men and showing a noble example till he fell mortally wounded. D Company gallantly repulsed German attacks at 8 and at 9 o’clock and then retired to a prepared position in rear. The Buffs’ casualties this day were Captain Chichester and Lieut. Stock killed, Lieuts. R. W. Homan and Child wounded, five other ranks killed, twenty wounded and two missing.
About this time the discovery seems to have been made that officers could be supplied not only from civilians in England, but from highly trained, very gallant and thoroughly reliable non-commissioned officers, who were daily adding to their war experience; so Company Sergeant-Majors (C.S.M.) Nesbit and Stone, Sgts. Corrall, Stock and Orwin, and a little later on Company Quarter-Master Sergeant (C.Q.M.S.) Sayer, C.S.M. Kesby, C.S.M. Price, and Sgts. King, Hallan and Harris were promoted to be 2nd Lieutenants. Most of them, alas, were sent out of the regiment, which was a great blow, but of course the needs of the Army as a whole must always be the first consideration.
RADINGHEM
On the 5th November the death took place of Major-General R. G. Kekewich,[4] C.B., Colonel of the Buffs; General the Right Honourable Sir Arthur Paget,[5] P.C., G.C.B., K.C.V.O., was appointed to succeed him.
On the 15th November Colonel H. C. de la M. Hill, the commanding officer, was invalided home and Major McDouall temporarily took over the battalion. This was the first of a long series of changes in the command, which was the common fate of all units.
After the very strenuous attack by the Germans had died away the 1st Battalion had a longish spell of comparative quiet. Casualties, which in one of our frequent minor wars would have made a stir, were of regular occurrence and almost taken for granted; the records show almost every day something like two killed and five wounded, and drafts to replace these good fellows were fairly often arriving from England. Later on the relief of units actually in the trenches by others in rear occurred at short intervals, but it may be noted here that on the 24th November the Buffs, when relieved by the Shropshire Light Infantry, had been no less than four weeks and six days in the front line, east of Bois Grenier.
During the winter the wet weather, followed by frosts, caused the sides of the trenches to fall in, and the low-lying nature of the country made it impossible to drain them properly; so it was decided, as a temporary measure, to abandon the ditches themselves and build and man breastworks in lieu. These were generally placed just in rear of the old works so that the latter could be reoccupied when the weather improved.
Of course, the long, dull and dreary trench warfare was not entirely without incident. A poem by Captain C. W. Blackall[6] describes in graphic verse how one of the ration carriers being a little late in slipping into the safety of the trench was bowled over by the enemy and was at first supposed to be dead, but he managed after a while to crawl in somehow and in spite of his agony he brought in his sack of bacon with him. That is the sort of spirit which, when it animates everyone in an army, renders that force absolutely unconquerable. It has often been the same. On the Indian frontier once a Buff soldier was apparently killed. Someone bent over him to take any possible last message. The man was in agony and shot in the stomach, but he could just speak. “Where’s my bloody rifle?” was all he said.
On St. George’s Day, 1915, the enemy had the audacity to stick out a flag at their sap head and on it was inscribed the words “Gott strafe England.” 2nd Lieut. Corrall, Sergt. Vigors and Pte. Russell disapproved of this, as showing an improperly defiant attitude, so they crept out and triumphantly brought it in with them.
The Army Commander, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, inspected the battalion in the spring and was much struck with the smart turn-out. Such is custom and the result of training and education. The Buffs must be smartly turned-out, and conditions and circumstances have nothing to do with the matter.
It was on the 3rd May that the 1st Battalion and the rest of the 16th Brigade first heard of the German gas attacks, which occurred north-east of Ypres and to which reference will be made in the next chapter. Precautionary measures were taken, but the second battle of Ypres did not greatly affect the troops so far south of the town as was the 6th Division, but about 1,500 shells fell into Armentieres on the 6th May. On the last day of this month a move was made to the neighbourhood of Bailleul and Poperinghe—the village of Wittenhoek, four miles south of the latter town, being the Buffs’ billet.
On the 2nd June it so happened that the 2nd Battalion, whose adventures are now to be related, were in Poperinghe, and so, in the nature of things, a meeting, which will be referred to later, had to be arranged.
It must be remembered in reading the foregoing pages, and indeed in studying the next chapter also, that the enemy was, during the last quarter of 1914 and early in the next year, making a well-organized and very determined attempt to gain Calais and the coast of the English Channel, and that enormous masses of men were devoted to this effort, as well as artillery vastly superior in weight of metal to that which our side could then by any possibility bring to bear. The English lines of communication ran across the Channel, and it is a maxim of war that if such lines are lost the army that relies on them must either win an overwhelming victory or surrender. If Calais had been won by the Germans the connection between England and her armies would have been to a great extent severed, for how could reinforcements, munitions and necessaries daily cross the Channel under heavy and continuous fire, and repeated and constant attacks from submarine bases?
At Radinghem and at Ypres then, our regiment was helping to defend England from a dreadful and unprecedented disaster, and Men of Kent must further consider that to a certain extent, at any rate, the Buffs were, more than any other regiment, defending their own homeland, for if hostile batteries of modern long-range guns could have been planted on Cape Gris Nez, not only would Dover harbour and dockyard have been destroyed, but, knowing the Germans as we do now, we may be pretty certain that Hythe, Folkestone, Sandgate and perhaps Deal would soon have been in as ruinous a condition as were, a little later, Rheims, Arras and Ypres.
Leaving the 1st Battalion for a while doing its duty in the neighbourhood of Poperinghe, we will now turn our attention to the story of the 2nd Battalion from India.