V. 7th Battalion
Without a doubt the most smashing blow that was dealt during the great German offensive fell upon the British 5th Army, in the very forefront of which stood the 7th Battalion of the Buffs. On the night of the 20th/21st March the 55th Brigade was at Liez holding, as its forward zone, from the village of Travecy, exclusive, up to a point about a mile north of Vendeuil, which sector was garrisoned by the 7th Buffs, eleven machine guns, four Stokes mortars, two six-inch trench mortars, one section of a field company of Royal Engineers, with two infantry platoons attached. Fort Vendeuil held as a garrison one platoon of the Buffs’ support company, the section of Royal Engineers, the two attached platoons and the two trench mortars. These attached platoons were a divisional idea and were No. 17 or extra platoons of the Buffs and the Queen’s. They were composed of men who were bad marchers and were usually employed with the Engineers as unskilled labourers. The Buffs’ headquarters were at a quarry called “Clarence Keep,” though it was only protected by a very light trench. It was close to the Vendeuil-Remigny road and about three-quarters of a mile from the fort. The two forward companies were: B to the northward, holding the main St. Quentin road, about half-way to Le Vert Chasseur, down to the railway station at Vendeuil, with headquarters in the middle of the village; A carrying on towards the south, holding part of Vendeuil, the quarry, which overlooked the river, and a post some nine hundred yards to the south-west of it, which was the company headquarters. C Company was immediately behind A and B, from near Vendeuil Fort to a post some fourteen hundred yards behind A’s headquarters. D Company was further west again and just in front of Poplar and Rouquenet Woods. Thus the battalion front was enormously extended, there being about four thousand yards between the right and the left platoons, and the nearest West Kent post (Le Vert Chasseur) being another twelve hundred yards away. The fighting strength of the Buffs was only 550, many of the men being recently taken over from the late 8th Battalion. The chief unit in the battle zone behind was the 7th Queen’s, and there was no brigade reserve because the 8th East Surrey happened to be in divisional reserve. The 4th Dismounted Brigade was attached to the 55th for the day.
At 4.45 a.m. on the 21st March the enemy’s artillery fire commenced, and almost immediately afterwards the order to man battle positions was sent out, but the Buffs were, of course, already in their places. The hostile shelling was intense and at first many of the shells were gas-laden. When day dawned it was found that the country was wrapped in so dense a fog that a man could not see twenty yards in front of him. It was a misty morning everywhere along our lines on this fateful 21st March, but perhaps in no part lay a thicker blanket of fog than in the valley of the Oise with its neighbouring canals. It was not long before the shelling began to cut, as was often the case, the telephone wires which connected the various distant posts, the first to go being that which connected “Clarence Keep” with B Company (Captain Chant), and soon afterwards Captain Fine, who commanded in Fort Vendeuil, failed to answer calls. Therefore in the morning the situation was very far from pleasant. Little isolated parties of Buffs were scattered about the countryside, blinded by fog, deprived of communication with their neighbours and with the suspicion, which amounted almost to a certainty, that silently closing in upon them were unknown numbers of the enemy intent on their destruction. The mist began to clear about noon, and it was only then that the defenders were able to gain some notion of the hostile movements which up till then had been screened. In the meantime the battalion signal sergeant, Browne, with three men[30] were working desperately to repair the line between “Clarence” and the Fort, and after four hours’ hard labour communication was re-established and Captain Fine reported “all correct.”
The first intimation of any hostile infantry on the sector held by the Buffs came from A Company (Captain Grant) reporting about 10 a.m. that thirty Germans were about Canal Post, near the quarry. After this headquarters lost communication with Captain Grant. At 11 o’clock C Company made out about two hundred of the enemy going north along the main St. Quentin road. At 11.45 A Company got communication with C and informed the latter first that there seemed to be much movement in their rear, and then that they were surrounded; after this the line “went.” D Company then observed a party of Germans between them and the Fort, and it was found that some, covered by the fog, had actually visited the company headquarters and broken the signalling lamp. The Buffs’ Headquarters now directed D Company to be ready to make a counter-attack, and at “Clarence Keep” itself the meagre defences were manned with spare runners, cooks, sanitary men, pioneers, police and servants, and these prepared to see the matter out. Then the chaplain and doctor arrived from Vendeuil, where they had been billeted, and told how B Company had been surrounded, but that Captain Chant had escaped into the fort. Strong bodies of Germans had come down the road from the north and surprised the defenders, though some had escaped in the fog and joined C Company; the enemy had got the two machine guns which on the left flank of the company had been stationed on the road and had surrounded the platoon that was there. There was no news of a party which had been at the railway station.
About this time a bugle sound, evidently German, was heard from the direction of Ronquenet Wood and a party, seen north of “Clarence Keep,” was fired on and dispersed. The second in command, too, trying to get back to report the state of the case to brigade headquarters, was wounded crossing the open ground near Ronquenet Farm, probably by the party that sounded the bugle. All this, of course, meant that the defences had been penetrated during the fog. The length of line held by the Buffs was roughly a couple of miles, and the posts or platoon garrisons had on an average about eight hundred yards between them, and so it came to pass that they were, one by one, isolated and surrounded. In fact, the Germans tried about 1.30 to assail the Fort itself from the south and south-west, but by this time the weather was clearer and, rifles and guns being turned upon them from several points and our artillery firing at very close range or “over the sights,” this attempt was abandoned; nevertheless they began to close on “Clarence Keep,” and later brought up a machine gun which began to fire into the backs of the men, the garrison being disposed now for an all-round defence. Several attacks on this headquarters post were beaten off by rifle fire, greatly due to the gallant behaviour of L.-Corpls. Berry and Harris.[31]
During the afternoon many hostile aeroplanes appeared on the scene. These, flying very low, were directing the shell fire by means of signal, one consequence being the shelling of our guns just east of “Clarence,” under cover of which shelling hostile infantry worked up very close and at last caused our gun detachment to surrender. In fact, the enemy had complete air command in this region. During the whole afternoon “Clarence Keep” kept up communication with D Company by flag, and headquarters had seen the Fort signalling to Liez, where the brigade staff was. The constant message was “counter-attack essential,” and this was because Captain Fine had been led to believe that the divisional reserve had arranged to carry one out, in the case of its being necessary in order to save the Fort. From 6 to 6.30 p.m. an intense hostile bombardment was directed on Captain Fine’s command, after which all was silent and it seemed as if the place had fallen, but it was afterwards ascertained that the little garrison had held out for another twenty-four hours. A Company was despaired of. The best that could be hoped was that the men were prisoners; but firing from their direction was heard up till midnight, and it was supposed that they were then still refusing to surrender. As a matter of fact, it was afterwards ascertained that Lieut. Kennett’s platoon fired on the German transport on the 22nd and held out till the evening of that day. B and C Companies had lost posts and garrisons and were now but fragments of the units they had been, but the enemy had not passed and what they had gained had been won in the morning, when they were so greatly aided by the fog.
C Company had been especially well handled by Captain Tupper and had defeated all hostile attempts during the day, and D Company, under Lieut. Morell, with 2nd Lieut. Halliday to aid him, had made a fine local counter-attack and driven the Germans back at a critical time. A project was entertained by the 55th Brigade, when reinforced by the 4th Dismounted Brigade, for relieving the pressure at Fort Vendeuil, but this was vetoed by the Divisional General, who issued very emphatic orders that touch was to be maintained with the brigade on the right about Quessy, and it was clear that the battle zone of this latter force was in the hands of the enemy. This order therefore meant a withdrawal and that those troops in the forward zone of the 55th Brigade which could not be extricated must just surrender or die. Before withdrawal orders reached the Buffs, they had been busy, under cover of night, reorganizing, serving out food and ammunition and digging in.
The first hint of retreat came at half an hour after midnight, when an officer of the Machine Gun Corps arrived at “Clarence” with orders to take away the two Vickers guns which were there and with the information that a general withdrawal had been ordered to a position west of the canal. This was confirmed shortly afterwards by patrols of the 7th Queen’s. These patrols had been sent up from the battle zone by the brigadier to deliver the orders to all the scattered parties of the Buffs and others which could be reached. Even now Colonel Ransome would not go back unless the order was confirmed, and his adjutant bicycled into Remigny to telephone for instructions. He, however, got a clear and distinct order that the Buffs were to retreat. So at 1.10 a.m. on the 22nd March the battalion headquarters retired by small parties to the brigade at Liez, after destroying all papers and leaving behind many useful and pleasant stores. C Company had already arrived here with fragments of B, and soon after D Company came in, and before daylight in the morning the battalion had concentrated about La Faisanderie, but it now consisted of only three companies. The 55th Brigade Headquarters moved from Liez to Rouez.
It was later ascertained that the 7th Battalion The Buffs was the only unit of the 3rd Corps that was, on the afternoon of the 21st March, still holding out in the forward zone, and that its doing so resulted in other units being enabled to reorganize behind the Crozat Canal. At 2 o’clock in the afternoon the Buffs withdrew into a wood a little to the south and started to dig in on very empty stomachs. It was not, however, till 3.30 a.m. on the 23rd March that the battalion occupied its new position, as it had been called away to the support of the Queen’s, and indeed very early on this date, too, C and D Companies had to be again placed at the disposal of the C.O. of that regiment, in order to fill a dangerous gap that existed between the left of the Queen’s and the right of the East Surrey.
VENDEUIL
Everybody prepared himself for a new day’s fighting, the 55th Brigade being now in support of the forward troops. At 6 o’clock a French regiment, which had been expected, duly arrived. This unit had been detailed to make a counter-attack on the town of Tergnier and was to be supported by the Queen’s, who fought that day under the command of Lt.-Colonel Bushell. This counter-attack was duly attempted, but the Frenchmen were very shortly back amongst the Buffs again. They seemed a fine, resolute lot, and they said they had gone up with only thirty-five rounds of ammunition per man and had expended it all. Moreover, they had lost their way in the mist. The story of this counter-attack is not the history of the Buffs, but it may be here mentioned that Lt.-Colonel Bushell of the Queen’s was the hero of the attempt. He appears to have led his own fellows and Frenchmen too with the greatest gallantry, and he was rewarded with a V.C.
From 8 o’clock in the morning there was confused fighting in the wood, where nothing beyond a range of fifty yards or so could be observed. Wounded men kept coming back to where Colonel Ransome’s little party was, and all brought with them the same tale of the enemy’s steady advance. Both Captain Morrell and 2nd Lieut. Halliday of the Buffs were badly wounded. Both were very gallant officers and a great loss at such a time. It appeared to Colonel Ransome, who commanded the Buffs, that it was not much use stopping in the wood: nothing could be seen, and it was thought that its northern edge was being passed by the enemy; so it was decided to take up two old lines of trenches and pits which existed in an orchard two hundred yards in rear, and the headquarters of both Buffs and Queen’s, with all sorts of fragments of companies and other small units, fell back to this place and there remained all day fighting a grim battle with the advancing foe. There were nine machine guns with the party, but only just enough personnel to work them. It was principally a machine-gun fight and for a long time our weapons did very well, but the enemy kept bringing up more and more, while our supply of ammunition began to fail as the afternoon drew on. Every effort was made to get up more from the rear, but the difficulties were too great to overcome, and the enemy gradually began to gain fire superiority. During the afternoon those companies of the Buffs which had gone forward by direction of the O.C. the Queen’s, as well as other advanced parties of British troops, had rallied on Ransome’s position, which proved an invaluable post for the purpose. The opinion of the brigadier of the 55th Brigade on this point is as follows: “In the light of subsequent knowledge it is clear that the stand made here by Lt.-Colonel Ransome’s force was of the greatest value not only to the rest of the brigade, but to the whole line in this vicinity.... This stand was due in the first place to the skill and foresight of Lt.-Colonel Ransome in establishing a line outside the wood on which the withdrawing troops, scattered and disorganized by the confused fighting in the wood, could be rallied and reorganized. In the latter part of the work Lt.-Colonel Ransome was assisted principally by Major Tortise and Captain Snell of the 7th Queen’s, and by Captain Black and Lieut. Howcroft of his own battalion. All these officers behaved with the utmost gallantry.”
About 6 o’clock a French battalion which had come up behind the English party during the afternoon essayed a frontal counter-attack. There was no artillery preparation. The attempt was beyond praise as regards the gallantry of the soldiers who made it, but the brave Frenchmen were met with a perfect storm of machine-gun bullets and they could not go on. After lying down for a few moments they got up and retired, and the retirement took the whole of the English first-line troops with it. This was by no means a misfortune. Anxiety had been felt already about the possibility of holding the position till nightfall, but it seemed to be suicidal to attempt to retire before the German machine guns by daylight. However, fortunately these ceased fire as the hostile infantry came forward to pursue, and so our retirement was far less costly than could have been expected. It was a very mixed lot of men that went back through Rouez Wood. Frenchmen and all sorts of English units mixed up in great confusion as regards their ranks. A fresh line was formed inside the wood and Captain Black actually led a small party forward to check the pursuit, which prevented any great pressure before darkness set in, and the fugitives were able to collect, reorganize and march back to Villiguier Aumont. During this final phase Sgt. Browne and Pte. Coleman, two signallers who had greatly distinguished themselves on the 21st by mending the line from “Clarence” to the Fort under quite extraordinary difficulties and heavy shell fire, were wounded.
The march to Villiguier was without incident, though it was thought by some that the party was surrounded. On arrival, the details belonging to the 55th Brigade were directed on to Bethancourt, where Br.-General Wood, commanding, already was, as was also the 8th East Surrey Regiment. About 10 a.m. on the 24th March the 55th Brigade was ordered to withdraw to a line approximately east of Caillouel; here it had the 53rd on its right flank and the 54th Brigade on the left. The Buffs, who were the supporting battalion of their brigade at first that night, withdrew later into divisional support, and at 7 a.m. on the 25th the whole division fell back to the line Grandru-Mondescourt-Appilly and later to a position covering Babœuf, these retrograde movements being carried out in good and soldier-like order by platoons in artillery formation. At 2 p.m. on this day the Buffs were sent back to a position west of Babœuf, to cover the canal bridge at Varesnes, and later to Varesnes itself, which was reached at 10 p.m. On the 26th March the whole of the 55th Brigade marched to Caisnes. The casualties suffered by the 7th Buffs between the 21st and 26th March amounted to:—Officers: killed, 1; wounded, 5; missing, 11. Other ranks: killed, 17; wounded, 108; missing, 410. When a force has to retire after fighting, it is generally quite unknown whether a man who fails to answer his name afterwards is dead or a prisoner of war. He is simply described as missing.
By the 28th March the brigade had got to Audignicourt and was in billets and caves there, but now the scene of its activities was changed. There was considerable enemy pressure on our defence works covering the important city of Amiens, and the whole of the 29th March was spent by the Buffs and their comrades in buses undergoing a weary journey to help to relieve the situation in that region. On the 30th the battalion debussed at St. Nicholas, east of Boves, and marched to Gentelles. In fact, the Buffs and Queen’s had to march direct from the buses into a support line east of this village. That night the 55th Brigade took over the front line south-east of Villers Bretonneux, but for the present the Buffs remained where they were, but on the 31st moved to a large farm close to the monument which is on the road which runs south from Villers Bretonneux. This farm was the battalion headquarters and was in full view from the German position at Marcelcave, but had never been shelled. After two days the Buffs relieved the Queen’s in front line and took the left of the brigade with D Company on right, B on the left and C, which was only two platoons strong, in reserve.
VENDEUIL TO VARESNES
At 3.45 a.m. on the 4th April a German prisoner was captured by the battalion, and this man stated that our enemy was going to attack at dawn and that, in fact, they were at that moment “standing to.” Notice, of course, was immediately sent round to everybody and thus an absolute surprise was avoided, though, of course, the force was always kept ready for contingencies of the sort. At dawn there was a thick mist and, communication being otherwise impossible, the Queen’s dropped a chain of connecting files between battalions and brigade headquarters. At 6 o’clock the hostile bombardment commenced. It was indiscriminate shelling followed by rifle and machine-gun fire, and at seven the attack developed on the Buffs’ front and that of the 35th Australian Battalion on their left. At or about 9 o’clock the Australian troops further away to the left fell back, which caused the 35th Australians and the Buffs to conform, the latter getting back to the bridge over the railway. One company of the Queen’s was at this juncture put under the Buffs’ orders, and an hour later a company also of the 2/6th London Regiment, which had been temporarily placed at the disposal of the 55th Brigade. The Australians withdrew somewhat further, making it necessary for the left of the Buffs to conform, though the right of the regiment remained in position. At four in the afternoon the enemy was seen advancing from the line Marcelcave-Aubercourt, and at the same time his artillery shelled our people heavily with gas, and the Germans got round our right flank, causing our whole line to withdraw, but the Buffs rallied about Villers Bretonneux railway station to cover there a battery of our artillery.
The casualties of the first week in April were:—Officers: killed, 1; wounded, 5. Other ranks: killed, 3; wounded, 34; missing, 13.
Early in the morning of the 5th the battalion got orders to move to Gentelles and later in the day to billets at Boves; it had remained out by the station all night, because those who bore the orders for the retirement failed to discover it. The 55th Brigade Headquarters moved next day to St. Fuscien, and the Buffs and East Surrey were attached to the 53rd and the Queen’s to the 54th Brigade; but the several battalions were by now so weak that a composite one had to be formed under the command of Lt.-Colonel Ransome, D.S.O., M.C., the Buffs finding two companies and the East Surrey and Royal Berkshire one company each. The English forward posts in this portion of the line were now about Gentelles and were manned by the troops in the neighbourhood till the 12th of April, when the 55th Brigade was withdrawn, moving by march to Dreuil les Molliens and Cavillon, about nine miles west of Amiens. The Buffs being close by at Le Mesge. Ten days’ intensive training was now undergone and then the brigade returned to St. Fuscien, only to move four days later north-east to Baizieux to be attached to the 2nd Australian Division. The area west of Albert was occupied by the 18th Division up till the 12th July, when it went into G.H.Q. reserve.
The story of the battalion from May Day till this date is lacking in the tremendous incidents which have been recorded above: the Buffs was soon again a battalion of four companies—such a loss as even a whole company was very quickly replaced in these days. A short history such as this necessarily occupies its available space with the exciting record of valorous days and strenuous combat and must reluctantly pass over with only slight allusion the hard, faithful and continuous work of the draft-finding units in England.
The battalion was a good deal at Lavieville and Baizieux about this time and, of course, were alternately in front line, support and reserve. When in the former a good deal of patrolling work was done: for instance, strong fighting patrols went out on the 3rd June; they got into their objective, but failed to get identification. On the 6th 2nd Lieut. Richardson with fifteen of C Company’s men had a small encounter with the enemy. On the 15th a raid was attempted, but, owing to the enemy’s resistance and the thickness of his wire, the objective was not reached, though some important information was gained. Protective patrols also were out nightly early in the month of June and much digging and wiring work was undertaken, because there were strong and persistent rumours of a hostile attack, and, as a matter of fact, on the 16th, three trench mortars, together with some rifle grenades, played frequently upon B and C Companies, and during the night a barrage was put down on the battalion, consisting of trench-mortar and high-explosive fire, which lasted over an hour. On the 30th June and following two or three days there was some fighting in the neighbourhood of the 55th Brigade, and indeed their comrades of the 54th were engaged, but the Buffs were at the time in divisional reserve and did not come into action. On the 12th July the whole division was relieved and on the 13th marched to Warloy and there embussed for G.H.Q. reserve at Briquemesnil until the 30th, the time being much occupied by strict training, as was usual when in G.H.Q. reserve.
On the 30th this spell of peace was over and the Buffs went into line again on the last day of the month, this time near and a little south of Warloy, the fighting lines being now at this part of the front somewhere about thirty miles westward of their position after the Somme battles of the last year. But by now the great American army was in France and reinforcements were pouring in. The tremendous German efforts to snatch victory between the collapse of Russia and their arrival had failed and our enemy was, so to speak, anxiously looking over his shoulder towards the dear homeland. By the 1st August he had already withdrawn from one or two dangerous points in France and Flanders, and there was a general feeling amongst our people that it was time he was on the move. However that may be, the 7th Battalion patrols on the 4th discovered that the Germans were still on its immediate front, and next day considerable movement was observed in the hostile lines.
Then, on the 6th August, a most unexpected event took place. For the last three days the brigade had been warned to expect and to look out for an enemy’s withdrawal, yet on this morning, before it was fairly light, the 27th German Division astride the Bray-Corbie road actually advanced to the attack at a time when we were relieving certain companies by others. Only a couple of hours or so earlier some of the Buffs had rushed an enemy’s post and found it empty. The authorities, being so certain that the German was going, attributed the movement noticed above as merely a blind on his part to cover an imminent retrograde movement. The battle that followed, though it commenced with a German attack on the 6th, lasted some days, and towards the finish the rôle of the two armies was reversed. It will therefore be convenient to relate what occurred in the following chapter, which will deal with the Grand Advance of the Allies.