Machine-Gun Tactics

by R. V. K. Applin

ESCORT TO ARTILLERY

There is one important duty which machine guns are able to perform better than any other arm, and that is escorting artillery, but more especially horse artillery. When cavalry are detailed for this purpose they not only deprive squadrons of much-needed men, but can only provide three rifles in action to every four men of the escort, owing to the necessity of providing horse-holders. In addition to this drawback, the horses provide a costly fire-trap for the shells of the enemy’s guns which may go wide of the battery. For these reasons, where it is possible to spare them, a section of machine guns should be allotted to each battery of artillery when an escort is necessary.

They should march in the rear of the battery when on a road, and on the outer flank when in open country and away from cavalry. The sole object of the machine guns is to afford protection to the battery from cavalry, and to prevent rifle fire from being brought to bear on them from effective range; therefore the section commander must devote his whole attention to this object, and he is not justified in opening fire on any target that does not directly threaten the battery—this especially applies to that stage of the mounted combat immediately before the collision, when the guns are firing on the opposing squadrons.

The section commander will be under the immediate orders of the battery commander, and should be acquainted with his plans and intentions. He should remain with him until the position for action has been selected, when he will immediately seek the best position from which to cover the guns, taking particular care not to mask or limit their radius of fire nor hinder their line of advance or retreat. This will necessitate a careful but rapid survey of the ground in the vicinity of the position, in which good ground scouts, who have been previously trained in this work, will materially assist. The most suitable positions will usually be found well to the front and on the inner flank of the battery from 200 to 600 yards’ distance. It may be occasionally possible to place a machine gun on each flank from which a cross fire can be brought to bear on ground in front of the guns; but such a position on either side of the battery, unless the ground is particularly favourable, has the disadvantage of rendering fire control difficult, and may hamper the fire or movement of the battery. The principal considerations which should govern the choice of a position are as follows:

(1) Good field of fire to protect the battery from attack.

(2) Position clear of the fire and movement of the battery.

(3) Immunity from artillery firing on the battery.

(4) Concealment.

(5) Cover from fire.

There should be no dead ground in front or on the flanks of the battery, and with two machine guns this condition can generally be satisfied. In cases where one flank remains exposed and cannot be protected by the fire of the machine guns, or where a portion of the front or one flank cannot be seen, scouts must be placed well out in this direction, where they can see anything approaching and signal timely warning of it, and a position must be selected beforehand to which to move a machine gun should the warning be given. It has already been pointed out in a previous chapter, and may be repeated here, that machine guns have nothing to fear from cavalry under any circumstances, and when in a selected position with ranges accurately known, as they would be in this case, a single gun properly handled could easily stop a squadron. When selecting the place for the led horses, it must be remembered that fire from the enemy’s guns is likely to search the reverse slopes of the position immediately in rear of the battery.

The machine guns must not be re-horsed until after the battery has limbered up and moved off, as they are then most vulnerable. They should endeavour to come into action before the battery unlimbers—though this will seldom be possible with horse artillery.

CHAPTER V
EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD WITH INFANTRY

The employment of machine guns with infantry seems at first sight to be obvious, for they fire the same ammunition and have the same range and kinetic effect. Nevertheless the first machine gun was used by the French in 1870 as artillery, and its name “mitrailleuse” indicates “grape shot” rather than rifle bullets. This initial error in its tactical employment, together with its crude mechanism, artillery carriage, and short range (about 500 yards), enabled the artillery to silence it early in the battle, so that it rarely proved of any use.

On the few occasions when it was concealed from the artillery and used at short range against the infantry, its effect was as astonishing as it was decisive. At Gravelotte several batteries of mitrailleuses concealed near St. Hubert’s Farm reserved their fire until the attacking infantry was on the glacis within close range. The result was decisive, and the German attack was repulsed with terrific loss. Again at Mars la Tour, the German official account describes the repulse of the 38th Prussian Brigade by mitrailleuse batteries placed on the crest of the hill, as causing them such losses as to amount almost to annihilation. The brigade lost more than half its numbers and two-thirds of its officers.

When it is remembered that this mitrailleuse was not automatic, but had to be operated by hand, that it had 25 barrels and a maximum effective range of only 500 yards, and that it cheerfully engaged in the artillery duel at ranges between 2,000 and 4,000 yards, the only wonder is that, having accomplished so much, the reasons for its failure were not immediately apparent, and that it has taken nearly forty years to convince the world that tactics are as necessary for the effective employment of machine guns as for infantry. The general principles for their tactical employment have already been dealt with in Chapter II., but they are so excellently condensed in Sect. 187 of the German Regulations, that at the risk of repetition they may be quoted here.

“Machine guns enable commanders to develop at fixed points the maximum volume of infantry fire on the smallest possible front. Machine guns can be employed over any country that is practical for infantry, and when they are unlimbered they must be able to surmount considerable obstacles. In action they offer no greater target than riflemen fighting under like conditions, and they can, in proportion to their fire value, support far greater losses than infantry. They can utilise all cover that infantry are able to use. Cover which is barely sufficient for a section of infantry (60 men) can protect an entire machine-gun detachment (six guns).”

In order to see in more detail how machine guns should be employed with infantry and the limitations of their tactics, it will be necessary to follow the sequence of the infantry combat in attack and defence, and to assume such situations as seem likely to arise.