MOUNTAIN WARFARE
“The principle of always having bodies of men in rear or on the flanks, covering by their fire the advance or retirement of the troops nearest the enemy, is specially important in hill fighting. On nearly every ridge and spur positions will be found where this can be done, and advantage can also often be taken of parallel features, from which covering and cross fire may be used with effect.”[58]
It will seldom be possible to make much use of machine guns with the advanced guards, as mountaineers usually oppose the advance by bands of skirmishers who fire from the cover of rocks and scattered sangars, and while affording a bad target to the machine gun, can quickly put it out of action by concentrating their fire upon it. They are also unsuitable for piqueting the heights, on account of the difficulty of getting them into position and of rapidly withdrawing them again. They are, however, very useful to strengthen small fortified posts on the lines of communications, and for the defence of camps by night, being trained by day and the sights prepared as suggested in Chapter VII., [page 150]. Callwell says: “It is a good plan, if night attacks are at all probable, to train guns and machine guns by daylight upon points where the enemy may be expected to mass, or from which assault is to be anticipated. This was done at the defence of Chakdara in 1897 with excellent results.”
Machine guns are invaluable to the rear guard of a force retiring, which is an exceedingly difficult undertaking in mountain warfare, because hillmen invariably await this opportunity to swoop down and make a vigorous attack. The very nature of the operations necessitates frequent retirements. Callwell says: “Columns have to visit outlying valleys for punitive purposes, and must then rejoin the main body; and even when penetrating into the heart of a hostile mountain district, the rear of the army, as it passes successively the homes of different tribes and clans, draws these down upon it, and, as a result of the general direction of its march, retires before them.”
Field Service Regulations, 1909, speaking of rear guards in mountain warfare, says: “Mountain artillery should usually form part of a rear guard, and machine guns may be usefully employed. The withdrawal of the artillery is usually an encouragement to the enemy to press on, and on such occasions machine guns will often find scope for action....” “If the rear-guard commander considers it impossible to reach camp before nightfall, it will generally be advisable for him to halt and bivouac for the night in the most favourable position for defence.” Here, again, machine guns will be most useful in defending the bivouac after dark if trained by daylight to sweep approaches, while the morale effect of its accurate fire in the dark will be considerable. There are many instances from our wars on the North-West Frontier where machine guns might have been used profitably in covering the retreat; but to be successfully employed in such cases, they must be far more mobile and better trained for rapid-fire practice than they have been in the past. Lieut.-Colonel Haughton’s retreat from the Iseri Kandeo Pass is typical of such operations. “A brigade had been sent on detached duty into the Warais Valley, and after completing its work there was rejoining the rest of the army in Maidan. In doing so the brigade had to cross the Iseri Kandeo Pass over the hills which separate the two valleys. As the force quitted its bivouacs the Ghurkas were left as rear guard, while the 15th Sikhs were told off to hold the Kotal, which was about half-way. The main body and baggage moved off early, and the latter reached the maidan almost unnoticed. The Ghurkas, however, were pressed from the commencement of the retirement right up to the top of the Kotal; then they marched on, leaving the 15th Sikhs to cover the retirement. As the Sikhs began to draw in their piquets from the heights above the pass, the Afridis, as was their wont, grew bolder and bolder, and, taking advantage of the cover of a wood hard by, they crept down close to the rear guard. One company as it withdrew was suddenly charged by a crowd of swordsmen.... But those who participated in this rush paid dearly for their temerity, the Sikh company meeting them with steady musketry and being most opportunely reinforced by another company. The carrying off of the wounded was, however, becoming a matter of serious difficulty, so reinforcements were asked for. These arrived in the shape of two companies of Dorsets and of several companies of the 36th Sikhs under Lieut.-Colonel Haughton, who assumed command, and who withdrew his force down the hill without much loss.”[59] It is easy to imagine how machine guns might have been used here, and how their presence might even have rendered the reinforcements unnecessary; but unless they are capable of coming into action and opening fire in thirty seconds, and of packing up and moving off again after ceasing fire in the same time, the rear guard in mountain warfare is no place for them and they had best march with the baggage.
During the expedition to Tibet some trouble arose with the machine guns owing to the extreme cold, which not only froze the water in the barrel-casing of the Maxims, but froze the lubricating oil in the lock and recoiling parts and thus rendered the gun useless. When very low temperatures are encountered in high latitudes, alcohol or spirit should be added to the water to prevent it freezing; and as potable spirit is liable to “evaporate,” a little paraffin oil should be added. Glycerine may be substituted for lubricating oil in temperatures where even Russian petroleum will freeze.