CHAPTER III. BATON ROUGE.
On the 26th of July, the troops landed at Baton Rouge. In the five weeks that had elapsed since their departure their effective strength had been diminished, by privations, by severe labor, and by the effects of a deadly climate, from 3,200 to about 800. For more than three months, ever since their re-embarkation at Ship Island on the 10th of April, they had undergone hardships such as have seldom fallen to the lot of soldiers, in a campaign whose existence is scarcely known and whose name has been wellnigh forgotten; but their time for rest and recreation had not yet come.
No sooner did Van Dorn see the allied fleets of Davis and Farragut turning their backs on one another and steaming one to the north and the other to the south, than he determined to take the initiative. His preparations had been already made in anticipation of this event. He now ordered Breckinridge to hasten with his division to the attack of Baton Rouge, and even as the fleet got under way, the train bearing Breckinridge's troops was also in motion.
Breckinridge received his orders on the 26th, and arrived at Camp Moore by the railway on the 28th. At Jackson he had been told that he would receive rations sufficient for ten days, but he could get no more than half the quantity. Van Dorn had estimated the Union force to be met at Baton Rouge as about 5,000, and had calculated that Breckinridge would find himself strong enough to dislodge the Union army and drive it away. In fact, Van Dorn estimated Breckinridge's division, including 1,000 men under Brigadier-General Ruggles that were to meet him at Camp Moore, at 6,000 men. The Arkansas was to join in the attack, and she was justly considered a full offset to any naval force the Union commander would be likely to have stationed at Baton Rouge. Breckinridge left Vicksburg with less than 4,000. On the 30th of July he reports his total effective force, including Ruggles, at 3,600. The same day he marched on Baton Rouge, and on the 4th of August encamped at the crossing of the Comite, distant about ten miles from his objective. His morning report of that day shows but 3,000 effectives, according to the methods by which effective strength was commonly counted by the Confederates.
The distance from Camp Moore to Baton Rouge is about sixty miles, and the march had been thus retarded to await the co-operation of the Arkansas. This Breckinridge was finally assured he might expect at daylight on the morning of the 5th of August. The Arkansas had in fact left Vicksburg on the 3d.
Van Dorn's object obviously was by crushing Williams to regain control of the Mississippi from Vicksburg to Baton Rouge, to break the blockade of Red River and to open the way for the recapture of New Orleans. Williams was expecting the attack and awaited the result with calmness.
At Baton Rouge the Mississippi washes for the last time the base of the high and steep bluffs that for so many hundreds of miles have followed the coasts of the great river and formed the contour of its left bank, overlooking its swift yellow waters and the vast lowlands of the western shore. The bluff is lower at Baton Rouge than it is above and slopes more gently to the water's edge; and here the highland draws back from the river and gradually fades away in a southeasterly direction toward the Gulf, while the surface of the country becomes more open and less broken. The stiff post-tertiary clays that compose the soil of these bluffs were in many places covered with a rich growth of timber, great magnolias and beautiful live oaks replacing the rank cottonwood and tangled willows of the lowlands, as well as the giant cypresses of the impenetrable swamps, with their mournful hangings of Spanish moss, and the wild grape binding them fast in a deadly embrace.
Six roads led out of the town in various directions. Of these the most northerly was the road from Bayou Sara. Passing behind the town its course continued toward the south along the river. Between these outstretched arms ran the road to Clinton, the Greenwell Springs road, by which the Confederates had come, the Perkins road, and the Clay Cut road.
In numbers the opposing forces were nearly equal. The Confederates went into action with about 2,600, without counting the partisan rangers and militia, numbering 400 or 500 more. Williams had about 2,500 fighting men. He had eighteen guns, the Confederates eleven. On both sides the men were enfeebled by malaria and exposure; yet the Confederates had left their sick behind, while the Union force included convalescents that came out of the hospital to take part in the battle. "There were not 1,200," said Weitzel after the battle, "who could have marched five miles. None of our men had been in battle; very few had been under fire." Among the Confederates were many of the veterans of Shiloh and more of the triumphant defenders of Vicksburg. The advantages of position was slight on either side. On the one hand Williams was forced to post his left with regard to the expected attack of the Arkansas, so that in the centre his line fell behind the camps. To offset this his right rested securely on the gunboats. As it turned out the Arkansas was not encountered, and the gunboats told off to meet her were therefore able to render material assistance on the left by their oblique fire across Williams' front.
Breckinridge commanded four picked brigades, three selected from his own division and one of Martin L. Smith's Vicksburg brigades, the whole organized in two divisions, under Brigadier-Generals Charles Clark and Daniel Ruggles. Clark had the brigades of Brigadier-General Bernard H. Helm and Colonel Thomas B. Smith, of the 20th Tennessee, with the Hudson battery and Cobb's battery. Ruggles had the brigades of Colonel A. P. Thompson, of the 3d Kentucky, and Colonel Henry W. Allen, of the 4th Louisiana, with Semmes's battery. From right to left the order of attack ran, Helm, Smith, Thompson, Allen. Clark moved on the right of the Greenwell Springs road, and Ruggles on the left. Scott's cavalry was posted on the extreme left, four guns of Semmes's battery occupied the centre of Ruggles's division, while in Clark's centre were the four guns of the Hudson battery and one of Cobb's; the other two having been disabled in a panic during the night march before the battle. On the extreme right the Clinton road was picketed and held by a detachment of infantry and rangers and the remaining section of Semmes's battery.
To meet the expected attack, Williams had posted his troops in rear of the arsenal and of the town, occupying an irregular line, generally parallel to the Bayou Sara road, and extending from the Bayou Grosse, on the left, to and beyond the intersection of the Perkins and Clay Cut roads, on the right. On the extreme left, behind the Bayou Grosse, was the 4th Wisconsin, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Bean. Next, but on the left bank of the bayou, stood the 9th Connecticut. Next, and on the left of the Greenwell Springs road, the 14th Maine. On the right of that road was posted the 21st Indiana, under Lieutenant-Colonel Keith, with three guns attached to the regiment, under Lieutenant J. H. Brown. Across the Perkins and Clay Cut roads the 6th Michigan was formed, under command of Captain Charles E. Clarke, while in the rear of the interval between the 6th Michigan and the 21st Indiana stood the 7th Vermont. The extreme right and rear were covered by the 30th Massachusetts in column, supporting Nims's battery, under Lieutenant Trull. On the centre and left were planted the guns of Everett's battery, under Carruth, and of Manning's 4th Massachusetts battery.
The left flank was supported by the Essex, Commander William D.
Porter; the Cayuga, Lieutenant Harrison; and the Sumter,
Lieutenant Erben; the right flank by the Kineo, Lieutenant-Commander
Ransom, and Katahdin, Lieutenant Roe.
These dispositions were planned expressly to meet the expected attack by the ram Arkansas, and in that view the arrangement was probably the best that the formation of the ground permitted. But the fighting line was very far advanced; the camps still farther; the reserve on the right was posted quite a mile and a half behind the capitol, and, as at Shiloh, no portion of the line was fortified or protected in any way, though the field was an open plain and the converging roads gave to the attacking party a wide choice of position.
About daylight Breckinridge moved to the attack in a summer fog so dense that those engaged could at first distinguish neither friend nor enemy. The blow fell first, and heavily, upon the centre and right, held by the 14th Maine, 21st Indiana, and 6th Michigan. As our troops were pressed back by the vigor of the first onset, the exposed camps of the 14th Maine, 7th Vermont, and 21st Indiana fell into the hands of the Confederates. The 9th Connecticut, with Manning's battery, moved to the support of the 14th Maine and 21st Indiana, on the right of the former, and the 4th Wisconsin formed on the left of the 14th. Further to the right, the 30th Massachusetts advanced to the support of the 21st Indiana and 6th Michigan, covering the interval between the two battalions to replace the 7th Vermont. In the first fighting in the darkness and the fog this regiment had been roughly handled; its colonel fell, a momentary confusion followed, and the regiment drifted back into a convenient position, where it was soon reformed, under Captain Porter. Nims brought his guns into battery on the right of the 6th Michigan.
The battle was short, but the fighting was severe; both sides suffered heavily, and each fell into some disorder. At different moments both wings of the Confederate force were broken, and fell back in something not very unlike panic. The colors of the 4th Louisiana were captured by the 6th Michigan. As the fog lifted, under the influence of the increasing heat, it became clear to both sides that the attack had failed. The force of the fierce Confederate outset was quite spent. The Union lines, however thinned and shattered, remained in possession of the prize. "It was now ten o'clock," says Breckinridge. "We had listened in vain for the guns of the Arkansas: I saw around me not more than 1,000 exhausted men." The battle was over. Indeed it had been over for some hours; these words probably indicate the period when the Confederate commander gave up his last hope.
The Arkansas, disabled within sight of the goal by an accident to her machinery, was run ashore and destroyed by her commander to save her from capture. The Confederate losses were about 84 killed, 313 wounded, and 56 missing; total, 453. Clark was severely wounded and made prisoner. Allen was killed, and two other brigade commanders wounded. Helm, Hunt, and Thompson had been previously disabled by an accident during the night panic.
The Union losses were 84 killed, 266 wounded, and 33 missing; total, 383. The heaviest loss fell upon the 21st Indiana, which suffered 126 casualties, and upon the 14th Maine, which reported 118. Of the killed, 36, or nearly one half, belonged to the 14th Maine, while more than two thirds of the killed and nearly two thirds of the total belonged to that regiment and the 21st Indiana. The 4th Wisconsin, being posted quite to the left of the point of attack, was not engaged.
Colonel G. T. Roberts, of the 7th Vermont, fell early in the action, and near its close Williams was instantly killed while urging his men to the attack. In him his little brigade lost the only commander present of experience in war; the country, a brave and accomplished soldier. If he was, as must be confessed, arbitrary, at times unreasonable, and often harsh, in his treatment of his untrained volunteers, yet many who then thought his discipline too severe to be endured, lived to know, and by their conduct vindicate, the value of his training.
The Confederates appear to have suffered to some extent during the last attack, until the lines drew too near together, from the fire of the Essex and her consorts. Ransom also speaks of having shelled the enemy with great effect during the afternoon from the Kineo and Katahdin, accurately directed by signals from the capitol; but no other account even mentions any firing at that period of the day; the effect cannot, therefore, have been severe, and it seems probable that the troops against whom it was directed may have been some outlying party.
Cahill's seniority entitled him to the command after Williams fell, yet during the remainder of the battle Dudley seems to have commanded the troops actually engaged. Shortly after the close of the action Cahill assumed the command and sent word to Butler of the state of affairs.
The Confederates were still to be seen upon the field of battle. Their force was naturally enough over-estimated. Another attack was expected during the afternoon, and reinforcements were urgently called for. Butler had none to give without putting New Orleans itself in peril. However, during the evening he determined to release from arrest a number of officers who had been deprived of their swords by Williams at various times, and for various causes, mainly growing out of the confused and as yet rather unsettled policy of the government in reference to the treatment of the negroes, and to send all these officers to Baton Rouge. Among them were Colonel Paine of the 4th Wisconsin and Colonel Clark of the 6th Michigan. Since the 11th of June Paine had been in arrest; an arrest of a character peculiar and perhaps unprecedented in the history of armies. Whenever danger was to be faced, or unusual duty to be performed, he might wear his sword and command his men, but the moment the duty or the danger was at an end he must go back into arrest. Paine, who was an extremely conscientious officer, as well as a man of high character and firmness of purpose, had from the first taken strong ground against the use of any portion of his force in aid of the claims of the master to the service of the slave. Williams, strict in his idea of obedience due his superiors, not less than in his notions of obedience due to him by his own inferiors in rank, stood upon his construction of the law and the orders of the War Department, as they then existed; hence in the natural course of events inevitably arose more than one irreconcilable difference of opinion. Paine was now ordered to go at once to Baton Rouge and take command. He was told by Butler to burn the town and the capitol. The library, the paintings, the statuary, and the relics were to be spared, as well as the charitable institutions of the town. The books, the paintings, and the statue of Washington, he was to send to New Orleans; he was then to evacuate Baton Rouge and retire with his whole force to New Orleans.
At midnight on the 6th of August Paine arrived at Baton Rouge. There he found every thing quiet, with the troops in camp on an interior and shorter line, but expecting another attack. There was in fact an alarm before morning came, but nothing happened. On the 7th Paine took command and set about putting the town in complete condition for an effective defence. With his accustomed care and energy he soon rectified the lines and entrenched them with twenty-four guns in position, and, in co-operation with the navy, concerted every measure for an effective defence, even against large numbers.
Breckinridge, however, after continuing to menace Baton Rouge for some days, had, by Van Dorn's orders, retired to Port Hudson, and was now engaged in fortifying that position. Ruggles was sent there on the 12th of August. The next day Breckinridge received orders from Van Dorn, then at Jackson, to follow with his whole force. "Port Hudson," Van Dorn said, "must be held if possible." "Port Hudson," remarks Breckinridge, in his report of the battle of Baton Rouge, "is one of the strongest points on the Mississippi, which Baton Rouge is not, and batteries there will command the river more completely than at Vicksburg."
Meanwhile Butler had changed his mind with regard to the evacuation of Baton Rouge, and had directed Paine to hold the place for the present. With an accuracy unusual at this period, Butler estimated Breckinridge's entire force at 5,000 men and fourteen guns. On the 13th the defences were complete, the entrenchments forming two sides of a triangle of which the river was the base and the cemetery mound the apex. The troops stood to arms at three o'clock every morning; one fourth of the force was constantly under arms, day and night, at its station. At two points on each face of the entrenchment flags were planted by day and lights by night, to indicate to the gunboats their line of fire.
On the 16th of August Butler renewed his orders to burn and evacuate Baton Rouge. Its retention up to this time he had avowedly regarded as having political rather than military importance. Now he wrote to Paine: "I am constrained to come to the conclusion that it is necessary to evacuate Baton Rouge. . . . Begin the movement quietly and rapidly; get every thing off except your men, and then see to it that the town is destroyed. After mature deliberation I deem this a military necessity of the highest order."
Against these orders Paine made an earnest appeal, based upon considerations partly humane, partly military. He was so far successful that Butler was induced to countermand the order to burn. The movement was not to be delayed on account of the statue of Washington. However, the statue had been already packed. It is now in the Patent Office at the national capital. All the books and paintings were brought off, "except," to quote from Paine's diary, "the portrait of James Buchanan, which we left hanging in the State House for his friends." Finally, on the 20th, Paine evacuated Baton Rouge, and on the following day reached the lines of Carrollton, known as Camp Parapet, and turned over his command to Phelps.