CHAPTER VIII.

The rise of Christ’s first temptation.—Of Satan’s suiting his temptations to the conditions of men.—Of tempting men upon the plea of necessity.—The reasons and cheats of that plea.—His pretences of friendship in tempting, with the danger thereof.

Having thus considered these temptations as they lie before us in their general prospect, I shall now speak of this first special temptation in particular, in which—(1.) The rise, or occasion; (2.) The temptation itself; (3.) The argument by which Satan would enforce it, are to be distinctly noted.

1. First, As to the rise of it, it is questioned by some why Satan begins with this first. The cause they assign, in part at least, is from his first success against Eve, in a temptation about eating, as if this were the chief and most hopeful arrow in his quiver. But we need not go so far, when the evangelist is so punctual in setting it down, in the latter end of the former verse, ‘he was an hungered.’ This the devil took notice of, and from hence took the rise of his temptation, that by ‘turning stones to bread,’ for the satisfaction of his present hunger, he might be induced to make way for the secret stratagems which he had prepared against him on this occasion. Here I note,

Obs. 6. That where Satan hath a design against any, he doth take the advantage of their condition, and suits his temptation accordingly. Thus, if men be in poverty, or in the enjoyments of plenty, in sickness or health, if in afflictions, under wrongs, in discontents, or carried to advancements and honours, or whatever else may be considerable relating to them, he observes it, and orders his designs so as to take in all the advantages that they will afford. That it is his concern and interest so to do, we may imagine, upon these grounds:—

(1.) First, Our consent must be gained. This he cannot properly and truly force, but must entice and deceive us to a compliance with him.

(2.) Secondly, If our condition speak for him, and lie fair for the furtherance of any device of his, our consent is upon the matter half gained. It is much, if so powerful an advocate, as is our present state, do not influence us to an inclination.

(3.) Thirdly, This doth his work easily and effectually. He more generally prevails by this course, and with less labour.

Applic. This policy of Satan should advantage us by suggesting fit memorials to us in our expectations of temptation. Though we know not all Satan’s thoughts, yet may we know where and how he will usually make an onset. Our condition will tell us what to look for. The distressed and afflicted may expect a temptation suited to their condition, as of murmuring, repining, revenge, distrust, use of indirect means, despairings, &c. They that have peace and plenty may be sure they shall be tempted suitably, to pride, boasting, covetousness, oppression, contempt of others, security, or whatever may be fit to be ingrafted on that stock. The like may be said of any other different condition. How fairly are we forewarned, by an observation made upon Satan’s proceeding upon these advantages, where to expect him, and how to provide against him.

Let us proceed to a further inquiry, How the devil managed this advantage of Christ’s hunger. He plainly urgeth him with a necessity of providing supplies for himself, spreading before him his desire to eat, and the impossibility of help, in a barren and desolate wilderness: as if he had said, ‘The want of the body is to be provided for; nature and religion consents to this; the wilderness affords no help, ordinary means fail; there is therefore a necessity that some extraordinary course be taken, therefore turn stones to bread; this is not unsuitable to the condition and power of him who is the Son of God.’ At this rate he pleads.

Obs. 7. Observe then, That Satan usually endeavours to run his temptations upon the plea of necessity, and from thence to infer a duty.

When he cannot pretend a fair and direct way to irregular practices, he would break a door and force a way by necessity.

Under this notion of necessity, the devil marshals all those pretences that seem to be of more than ordinary force, in their usual prevalencies. Thus he teacheth men to think they are necessitated, if they be carried by a strong inclination of their own, or if there be an urgency and provocation from others, or if they be in straits and dangers; and sometime he goes so high as to teach men that a necessity is included in the very fabric of their natural principles, by which they presumptuously excuse themselves in being sinful, because by nature they are so, and cannot be changed without special grace. Scarce shall we meet any man with seasonable reproof for his iniquity, but he will plead such kind of necessities for himself,—I could not help it; I was strongly carried; or, I was compelled; I must do so, or else I could not escape such a danger, &c.

The reasons of this policy are these:—

(1.) First, He knows that necessity hath a compulsive force, even to things of otherwise greatest abhorrencies. A treasury of instances is to be had in famines and besieged places, where it is usual to eat unclean things, not only creatures that are vile, but even dung and entrails; nay, so tyrannical is necessity, that it makes inroads into, and conquests upon nature itself, causing ‘the tender and delicate woman, which would not adventure the sole of her foot upon the ground for delicateness and tenderness, to have an evil eye towards the husband of her bosom, towards her son, and towards her daughter,’ Deut. xxviii. 56. A like force doth it exercise upon the minds and consciences of men. It makes them rise up against their light, it engageth men to lay violent hands upon their own convictions, to stifle and extinguish them. How many mournful examples have we of this kind! How many have apostatized from truth, being terrified by the urging necessities of danger, contrary to the highest convictions of conscience!

(2.) Secondly, Necessity can do much to the darkening of the understanding, and change of the judgment, by the strong influence it hath upon the affections. Men are apt to form their apprehensions according to the dictates of necessity. What they see to be hazardous, they are inclinable to judge to be evil. Men in straits not only violate their reason, but sometime by insensible steps, unknown to themselves, slide into a contrary judgment of things, directly cross to what they have believed and professed. Which persuasion they owe not to any further accession of light, or new discovery of argument; for ofttimes the same arguments which, in the absence of trouble, they have contemned as weak, by the appearance of danger, put on another face and seem strong; but to the prevalency of their fears. And thus many in all ages have altered their judgments and thoughts, not because they knew more, but because they feared more.

The like necessities do men form to themselves from exorbitant and greedy hopes and expectations of a better condition, compared to that wherein they at present are; and the like influence it hath in the alteration of their judgments. Let the bishop of Spalato be an example of this, who loathed the Romish religion first, and in England, whither he came for refuge, writ against it; but saw a necessity, from the disappointment of expectation, to change his mind, returned to Rome again, and persuaded himself that that was true which he had formerly pronounced false; and so writ against the church of England, as before he had done against the church of Rome. To him we may add Ecebolius,[385] of whom Socrates reports, that, according to the various appearings of hazards, he changed his religion several times. Under Constantine, he was a Christian; under Julian, a pagan; and under Jovinian, a Christian again.

(3.) Thirdly, Necessity offer’s an excuse, if not a justification, of the greatest miscarriages.[386] Lot offered to expose his daughters to the raging lust of the Sodomites for the preservation of his angel-strangers, which surely he would in no wise have done, but that he thought the present necessity might have excused him. Esau profanely sells his birthright, but excuseth the matter so, ‘Behold, I am at the point to die; and what profit shall this birthright do to me?’ Gen. xxv. 32. Aaron produceth a necessity, from the violent resolves of the people, in justification of himself in the matter of the golden calf, ‘Thou knewest that this people are set on mischief,’ [Exod. xxxii. 22.]

(4.) Fourthly, Necessity is a universal plea, and fitted to the conditions of all men in all callings, and under all extravagancies. The tradesman, in his unlawful gains or overreachings, pleads a necessity for it from the hardness of the buyer in other things; the poor man pleads a necessity for stealing, and the rich pleads the same necessity for revenge, and thus it serves all with a pretext.

These considerations, discovering this course so hopeful as to this design of the devil, he will be sure to put us to this pinch where he can. But, besides this, we may observe three cheats in this plea of necessity:—

[1.] First, Sometimes he puts men upon feigning a necessity where there is none. Saul sacrificed upon a needless supposal that, Samuel not coming at the time appointed, there was a necessity for him to do it. He spared also the cattle upon the like pretence, that it was a necessary provision for sacrifice. And thus would the devil have persuaded Christ, that there was an absolute necessity to turn stones to bread, when in truth there was no such need.

[2.] Secondly, Sometimes he puts men upon a necessity of their own sinful procurement. Herod sware to gratify the daughter of Herodias, and this is presently pleaded as a necessity for the cutting off John Baptist’s head. Saul forbade the tasting of meat, and sealed the penalty by an oath and curse, and this is by and by made a necessity for the taking away of Jonathan’s life,—who had tasted honey not knowing his father’s curse,—had not the people rescued him, [1 Sam. xiv. 24, seq.]

[3.] Thirdly, Sometime he stretcheth a necessity further than it ought. He knows that God hath such a regard to real necessities, that upon that ground he will dispense with his Sabbath and the present performance of duty. These instances he lays before men, and endeavours to persuade them, that in like manner God will, upon a necessity, dispense with sins, as well as with the present opportunity of service. What a covering, in all ages, men have made of necessity for their highest outrages and extravagancies, and with what confidence they have managed such pleas, would be endless to relate.

Applic. This must warn us not to suffer ourselves to be imposed upon by the highest pretences of necessity. Whatever it may dispense with, as in some cases it will suspend a present service, and warrant the performance of a duty, besides the common rule and way wherein it ought ordinarily to be managed, it must never be pleaded to give warranty to anything in its own nature sinful. Necessity will not justify lying, stealing, covetousness, adulteries, &c., Ferenda magis omnis necessitas quam perpetranda aliqua iniquitas.—Aug[ustine.]

Besides, we must be wary in judging what is a necessity. Men are apt to plead a necessity where there is none; and if we give way to a facile admittance of excuses of this kind, we shall presently multiply necessities, and have them to serve us at every turn. Some would warrant sin by necessity, others would turn off duty and rule by pretending a necessity where none is; both are to be avoided as snares of Satan.

Once more, before we dismiss this rise of the temptation of Christ in hand, let us observe that, in persuading him to turn stones to bread, he seems to express a great deal of care and tenderness to Christ, with an invidious reflection upon the love and providence of God: as if he should say, ‘I see thou art hungry, and this wilderness affords nothing to eat, and God hath not taken care to spread a table for thee; I therefore, pitying thy condition, as a friend, advise thee to turn stones to bread.’

Obs. 8. Note, That Satan manageth his most cruel designs under the highest pretences of friendship. He did so with Eve, ‘The Lord knoweth that ye shall be as gods,’ [Gen. iii. 5;] as if he had a greater regard to them than God himself. He tempted Christ in the mouth of Peter to ‘spare himself,’ under the show of great kindness, [Mat. xvi. 22;] and no less are his common pretences to all men. This is a deep policy, for by this means the mischief intended is the better concealed, and the less care and provision made against it; and besides, the affections and desires are stirred up to a hasty embracement of the motion, and an eager swallowing of the bait.

So great a subtlety is in this manner of dealing, that those who affect the name of great politicians in the world have learned from Satan to shew greatest respects and a most friendly countenance to those whom they most hate and intend to ruin. Thus our Richard the Third of England constantly dealt with those for whose blood he lay in wait; and the precepts of Machiavel are fitted to this, that it is wisdom ‘to hug those whom we desire to destroy.’ Ehud’s present made way for his dagger, [Judges iii. 22.] Joab’s sword could not so well have despatched its errand upon Abner, if he had not ushered it in with a kiss, [2 Sam. xx. 9.]

Applic. This should make us most suspect those temptations that offer us most kindness and advantage, and such as are most gratifying to our humours and desires. For can it be imagined in good earnest that Satan intends us a real good? Can the gifts of enemies pass for courtesies and favours with any,[387] but such as are bewitched into a blockish madness? Satan is more to be feared when he flatters than when he rageth; and though such offers may be looked upon by some as more benign, and less odious temptations, as some kind of familiar spirits are more kindly treated by some, under the notion of white devils, yet may we say of them, as Cornelius Agrippa speaks of some unlawful arts and ways of Thurgia,[388] Eò sunt pernitiosiora, qùo imperitis diviniora, They have the greatest danger that pretend the highest friendship. Thus much for the rise of the temptation.