Rom. xii. 10.
—In honour preferring one another.
It is much to the honour of the inspired writers, because it shews them to be no enthusiasts, that, with all their zeal for the revealed doctrines of the Gospel, they never forget or overlook the common duties of humanity; those duties, which Reason itself, a prior Revelation, had made known to the wiser part of mankind.
Nay, which is more remarkable, they sometimes condescend to enforce what are called the lesser moralities[71]; that is, those inferiour duties, which, not being of absolute necessity to the support of human society, are frequently overlooked by other moralists, and yet, as contributing very much to the comfortable enjoyment of it, are of real moment, and deserve a suitable regard.
The text is an instance of this sort—in honour preferring one another—the NATURE, and GROUND, and right APPLICATION, of which duty, it is my present purpose to explain.
1. The general NATURE of this virtue consists in a disposition to express our good will to others by exteriour testimonies of respect; to consult the credit and honour of those we converse with, though at some expence of our own vanity and self-love. It implies a readiness to prevent them in the customary decencies of conversation; a facility to give way to their reasonable pretensions, and even to abate something of our own just rights. It requires us to suppress our petulant claims of superiority; to decline all frivolous contests and petty rivalries; to moderate our own demands of pre-eminence and priority; and, in a word, to please others, rather than ourselves.
It is an easy, social, conciliating virtue; a virtue made up of humility and benevolence; the former, inclining us not to think more highly of ourselves than we ought; and the latter, to give our Christian brother an innocent satisfaction when we can.
And our obligation to the practice of this virtue is FOUNDED,
II. On the clearest reasons, taken both from the nature of man, and the genius of our holy Religion.
And, FIRST, from the nature of man.
Among the various principles, some of them, in appearance, discordant and contradictory, which constitute our common nature, one of the first to take our attention is, “A conscious sense of dignity;” an opinion of self-consequence, which mixes itself with all our thoughts and deliberations; prompting us to entertain lofty sentiments of our own worth, and aspiring to something like superiority and dominion over other men. This principle, which appears very early, and is strongest in the more generous dispositions, is highly necessary to a being formed for virtuous action; and naturally leads to the exertion of such qualities as are proper to benefit society, as well as to gain that ascendency in it, to which we pretend. It is the spring, indeed, of every commendable emulation; puts in act all our better and nobler faculties; and gives nerves to that labor and industry, by which every worthy accomplishment is attained.
But now this principle (so natural and useful), when it is not checked by others, but is suffered to take the lead and predominate on all occasions, undisciplined and uncontrolled, easily grows into a very offensive and hurtful quality: offensive, because it is now exerted to the humiliation of every other, who is actuated by the same principle; and hurtful, because, in this undue degree, it counteracts the very purpose, the good of human society, for which it was designed.
This quality we know by the name of Pride. The other moderate degree of self-esteem, which is allowable and virtuous, seems not (I suppose, from its rare appearance under that form) to have acquired in our language a distinct name.
To Pride, then, the pernicious and too common issue of self-love, it became necessary, that some other principle should be opposed. And such a principle, as is proper to correct the malignity of pride, we find in that philanthropy, which, by an instinct of the same common nature, disposeth us to consult the happiness, and to conciliate to ourselves the good will and affection, of mankind. This benevolent movement of the mind is, further, quickened by the mutual interest all men have in the exercise of it. For Pride is disarmed by submission; and, by receding from our own pretensions, we take the most likely way to moderate those of other men. Thus, the generous affections are kept in play; reciprocal civilities are maintained; and, by the habit of each preferring other, which prudence would advise, if instinct did not inspire, the peace of society is preserved, its joy encreased, and even our vanity, so far as it is a just and natural affection, gratified and indulged.
The reason of the Apostolic precept is, then, laid deep in the constitution of human nature; which is so wonderfully formed, that its perfection requires the reconciliation of contrary qualities; and its happiness results from making benevolence itself subservient to self-love.
2. If, from the philosophic consideration of man, we turn to the genius of the Gospel, we shall there find this conclusion of natural reason strengthened and confirmed by evangelical motives.
Benevolence, which, in the Gospel, takes the name of Charity, hath a larger range in this new dispensation, than in that of nature. The doctrine, and still more the example, of Jesus, extends the duty of humility and self-denial; requires us to make ampler sacrifices of self-love, and to give higher demonstrations of good-will to others, than mere reason could well demand or enforce. He, that was so far from seeking his own, that he emptied himself of all his glory, and stooped from heaven to earth, for the sake of man, hath a right to expect, from his followers, a more than ordinary effort to conform to so divine a precedent, a peculiar attention to the mutual benefits and concerns of each other. It is but little that we keep within some decent bounds our aspiring tempers and inclinations: we are now to subject ourselves to our Christian brethren; to renounce even our innocent and lawful pretensions; and to forego every natural gratification, when the purposes of Christian Charity call us to this arduous task.
For the Gospel, it is to be observed, has taken us out of the loose and general relation of men, and has bound us together in the closer and more endearing tie of Brethren: it exalts the good-will, we were obliged to bear to the species, into the affection, which consanguinity inspires for the individuals of a private family. The Apostle, therefore, in the words preceding the text, bids us—be kindly affectioned one to another with BROTHERLY LOVE—not, with the love, that unites one man with another[72], which is the highest pretension of mere morality; but with the love, that knits together natural brethren[73], which is the proper boast and character of evangelical love. The words of the original have a peculiar energy[74]. They express that instinctive warmth of affection, which nature puts into our hearts for our nearest kindred, such as communicate with us by the participation of one common blood.
So that the same compliances, we should make with their inclinations, the same preference, we should give to their humour and interest above our own, should now be extended and exercised towards all Christians; and that principle of an ardent affection, by which we are led to make the most chearful condescensions to our natural brother, should work in us the same generous consideration of our spiritual brother, for whom Christ died.
Having explained the nature of this duty, and the grounds, both in reason and religion, on which it rests, it now remains,
III. To provide for the RIGHT APPLICATION of it in practice. And here, in truth, the whole difficulty lies.
It is evident enough, I suppose, from what has been said, That the moral and Christian duty of preferring one another in honour, respects only social peace and charity, and terminates in the good and edification of our Christian brother. Its use is, to soften the minds of men, and to draw them from that savage rusticity, which engenders many vices, and discredits the virtues themselves. But when men had experienced the benefit of this complying temper, and further saw the ends, not of charity only, but of SELF-INTEREST, that might be answered by it; they considered no longer its just purpose and application, but stretched it to that officious sedulity, and extreme servility of adulation, which we too often observe and lament in polished life.
Hence, that infinite attention and consideration, which is so rigidly exacted, and so duly paid, in the commerce of the world: hence, that prostitution of mind, which leaves a man no will, no sentiment, no principle, no character; all which disappear under the uniform exhibition of good-manners: hence, those insidious arts, those studied disguises, those obsequious flatteries, nay, those affected freedoms, in a word, those multiplied and nicely-varied forms of insinuation and address; the direct aim of which may be to acquire the fame of politeness and good-breeding; but the certain effect, to corrupt every virtue, to sooth every vanity, and to inflame every vice, of the human heart.
These fatal mischiefs introduce themselves under the pretence and semblance of that humanity, which the text encourages and enjoins. But the genuine virtue is easily distinguished from the counterfeit, and by the following plain signs.
1. True politeness is modest, unpretending, and generous. It appears as little as may be; and, when it does a courtesy, would willingly conceal it. It chuses silently to forego its own claims, not officiously to withdraw them. It engages a man to prefer his neighbour to himself, because he really esteems him; because he is tender of his reputation; because he thinks it more manly, more Christian, to descend a little himself, than to degrade another—It respects, in a word, the credit and estimation of his neighbour.
The mimic of this amiable virtue, FALSE POLITENESS, is, on the other hand, ambitious, servile, timorous. It affects popularity; is solicitous to please, and to be taken notice of. The man of this character does not offer, but obtrude, his civilities: because he would merit by this assiduity; because, in despair of winning regard by any worthier qualities, he would be sure to make the most of this; and, lastly, because of all things he would dread, by the omission of any punctilious observance, to give offence.—In a word, this sort of politeness respects, for its immediate object, the favour and consideration of our neighbour.
2. Again: the man, who governs himself by the spirit of the Apostle’s precept, expresses his preference of another in such a way as is worthy of himself: in all innocent compliances, in all honest civilities, in all decent and manly condescensions.
On the contrary, the man of the world, who rests in the letter of this command, is regardless of the means, by which he conducts himself. He respects neither his own dignity, nor that of human nature. Truth, reason, virtue, all are equally betrayed by this supple impostor. He assents to the errors, though the most pernicious; he applauds the follies, though the most ridiculous; he sooths the vices, though the most flagrant, of other men. He never contradicts, though in the softest form of insinuation; he never disapproves, though by a respectful silence; he never condemns, though it be only by a good example. In short, he is sollicitous for nothing, but by some studied devices to hide from others, and, if possible, to palliate to himself, the grossness of his illiberal adulation.
3. Lastly, we may be sure, that the ultimate ENDS, for which these different objects are pursued, and by so different means, must also lie wide of each other.
Accordingly, the truly polite man would, by all proper testimonies of respect, promote the credit and estimation of his neighbour, because he sees, that, by this generous consideration of each other, the peace of the world is in a good degree preserved; because he knows that these mutual attentions prevent animosities, soften the fierceness of men’s manners, and dispose them to all the offices of benevolence and charity; because, in a word, the interests of society are best served by this conduct; and because he understands it to be his duty, to love his neighbour.
The falsely polite, on the contrary, are anxious by all means whatever, to procure the favour and consideration of those they converse with, because they regard ultimately nothing more than their private interest; because they perceive, that their own selfish designs are best carried on by such practices: in a word, because they love themselves.
Thus we see, the genuine virtue consults the honour of others by worthy means, and for the noblest purpose; the counterfeit, sollicits their favour by dishonest compliances, and for the basest end.
By such evident marks are these two characters distinguished from each other! and so impossible it is, without a wilful perversion of our faculties, to mistake in the application of the Apostle’s precept!
It follows, you see, from what has been said, “that integrity of heart, as Solomon long since observed, is the best guide in morals[75].” We may impose upon others by a shew of civility; but the deception goes no farther. We cannot help knowing, in our own case, if we be ingenuous, when this virtue retains its nature, and when it degenerates into the vice that usurps its name. To conclude, an honest man runs no risk in being polite. Let us only respect ourselves; and we shall rarely do amiss, when, as the Apostle advises, in honour we prefer one another.