Rom. xvi. 19.
I would have you wise unto that which is good, and simple concerning evil.
Our blessed Lord had given it in charge to his followers to be wise as serpents, and harmless as doves[119]. And the Apostle explains and enforces this command of his Master, when he enjoins us in the words of the text, To be wise unto that which is good, and simple concerning evil.
I confine myself, at present, to the former part of the text, and shall enquire into the properties or characters of Christian Wisdom.
This wisdom consists in the prosecution of what the Scriptures declare to be the true end of man, and by such means as they prescribe to us.
That end is the SALVATION of our souls; and the means, which lead to it, are FAITH and OBEDIENCE. Thus far there can be no mistake. The wise Christian is he who is intent on securing his eternal interest; and who, to that end, fortifies his mind with a firm belief of the doctrines, and conducts his life according to the precepts, of the Gospel.
I. But PERFECT WISDOM, which consists in a strict attention to these several particulars, and according to the true worth of each, is rarely the lot of human nature. And there are two ways, in which we are most apt to forfeit our pretensions to it. One is, when our minds, wholly taken up with the ultimate object of their hopes, neglect the means which are appointed to bring them to it: The OTHER, when we rest in the intervening means themselves, without a due regard to that final purpose, for the sake of which they were appointed.
1. The FORMER of these defects we may observe in those persons who, from a too warm and enthusiastic turn of thought, are for subliming all piety into the trances of mystic contemplation; as if morality and faith scarce deserved their notice; and the beatific vision were as well the object, as end of the Christian life. Here the fault lies in an impatience to come at the point we propose to ourselves, without observing the proper methods which are to put us in possession of it; and is much the same phrenzy as we should charge on those travellers, who, being on their way towards a distant country, stop short in the contemplation of all the wonders they have heard reported of it, without pursuing their journey, or indeed without taking one step towards it.
2. The OTHER defect of wisdom is seen in those less sanguine, and, in truth, lukewarm Christians, who do not, indeed, altogether neglect the subservient duties of their profession, but, as not enough considering the prize of their high calling, grow remiss in the exercise of them: in which they too much resemble those same travellers; who, when taking the ordinary means of arriving at their journey’s end, fall into an idle way of loitering on the road, and use not that dispatch and diligence in their stages, which an earnest consideration of the end, they have in view, should naturally inspire.
II. But this duty of Christian wisdom is further violated, when, with a full respect to our final hopes and expectations, and a general intention to pursue them by the means appointed in holy Scripture, we do not, however, observe the due bounds and measures of each; that is, when, of the two appointed means of salvation, a pure faith, and right practice, we chose to ourselves a favourite, and incline too much to one, at the expence of the other. For,
1. With regard to the distinct provinces of FAITH and MORALITY, we know there are those, who, provided they are but sound and orthodox in their opinions, that they give an entire assent to the several articles of their creed, and submit their faith to the entire direction of Scripture, or perhaps of the church with which they communicate, suppose the affair of moral practice of much less importance; and conclude their devotion for this acceptable sacrifice of a right faith will excuse their making somewhat too free with the article of obedience. Such persons there have been and still are in all churches; but we know what sect of Christians is most deeply infected with this error.
2. On the contrary, they who have shaken off this bondage of superstition, and have observed the mischiefs which arise in abundance from this exclusive attachment to creeds and confessions, are very apt to run into the other extreme; and, because they find morality to be of eternal obligation, make the less account of faith and right opinion. As the former excess is the peculiar disgrace of Popery, this other has frequently been objected to Protestantism. Both are manifest violations of Christian wisdom; which, besides that it commands an equal reverence for the two tables of the divine law, should further instruct us, that as faith without works is vain, so good works themselves, unassisted and unsanctified by faith, are either not so perfect, or not so acceptable from us Christians, as otherwise they might be. Not to observe, that as the articles of our holy faith may be founded on reasons, which we do not know; so the belief or rejection of them may have consequences, which we cannot foresee.
III. And with this preparation, let us now descend to still more particular reflexions on the duty which lies upon us to approve our wisdom in the public profession of that faith, and the manifestation of that practice. Christian wisdom requires an attentive regard to the main end we have in view, and to the methods by which we are instructed to obtain it. But still there is great room for discretion to shew itself in the management and pursuit of those methods. One manner of doing the good, we are appointed to do, will be preferable to another. And it is a great part of Christian prudence to be ready and expert in discovering and acting upon that preference. This indeed is a large field; nor is it possible to enumerate all the cases which fall within this province of true wisdom. But to prescribe to ourselves some plan, however defective, we may consider, that, if a constant regard be had to ourselves, to our own character and circumstances, our virtues will then be most GRACEFUL; if to the exigencies of the times and places in which we live, most SEASONABLE; and, lastly, if to the persons, conditions, and characters of other men, they will thus become most ATTRACTIVE and EFFICACIOUS.
1. It was a point the masters of ancient wisdom took a singular pleasure to inculcate, and we find an equal stress laid upon it by the sacred writers, that a strict decorum be observed in the exercise of our virtues; or, in other words, that the good we do be that which is fit and decent, considering our circumstances and characters. Thus we find one set of duties more especially recommended to the young, another to the aged; some to private persons, others to such as are in place and authority. Different professions in life have also different sets of offices belonging to them; or in such as are common to all, propriety demands, that they be evidenced in very different manners. The virtues we expect in the poor man, are humility, industry, and resignation. These too are virtues, from the obligation of which no rich man is exempted; but it would be strangely misbecoming, if he did not surpass the other in acts of charity and beneficence. And in respect of the same common virtue, suppose charity, what the one would very commendably discharge by little acts of service and assiduity towards his distressed neighbour, might require a very considerable expence of wealth or labour in the other. Nay, the several humours and dispositions of men will occasion a difference, if not in the matter of their duty, yet in the way in which it will become them to express it. An eminent moralist, indeed, carried this point of decorum very far when he would justify so bad an action, as suicide, and which he owns he should have condemned in any other, from the singular turn of Cato’s temper and virtue[120]. But thus much may be said with great truth: that an action, good in itself, may come with a better grace from one man than another. A lesson of good advice, for instance, might be requisite from the liveliest man to his friend; but it would have additional weight and propriety from one of a graver disposition: and certainly what the former could only hint with address, the latter might be allowed to enforce with much earnestness and authority.
In short, if we study ourselves, and reflect what our station, character, or nature is, we shall best discern what the virtues are, and in what manner to be expressed, which sit most properly and gracefully upon us. And to give a diligent attention to these is no mean part of moral wisdom. But,
2. We must look beyond ourselves; we must consider what the condition of the times, what the state of the places in which we live, may require of us. I do not mean that religion is a matter of policy; or that virtue is a mere local consideration. But when the question is, how we may do the most good by our religious or moral conduct, a prudent accommodation of ourselves to time and place will be very necessary[121]. The primitive Christians were not wise unto that which is good, when they provoked the cruelty of their enemies, and offered themselves without cause to the racks and fires of persecution. Nor would they be less blameable, who, in a careless, prophane age, when silence would be readily taken for assent: when, not to profess the faith would be construed to renounce it, should, from a too scrupulous fear of giving offence, forbear to make an open confession of their religion. The exigencies of times, we see, are very different. A wise man would have endeavoured to moderate the excessive zeal, which prevailed in the former of these periods: he would apply himself to raise and quicken it, were he to find himself in the circumstances described in the latter. Or, to explain myself by a case which may still more nearly affect us. There was a time, when the religion of our country consisted too much in a zeal for unintelligible articles and superstitious ceremonies; when Popery had enslaved both mind and body, had bent the one to an implicit acquiescence in the doctrines of the Church, and burthened the other with a constant unprofitable exercise of its worship. How then was the wisdom of a good man to express itself in these circumstances? In dispelling, it will surely be said, the gloom of superstition; in asserting the great privileges of natural reason, and in pressing the obligation and necessity of a good life, as of more worth than all ceremonial observances.
This was the service rendered by the best men of those days to true Religion; and we have reason to bless and revere their memories for it. But should the liberty into which we are called, degenerate into licentiousness; should it ever be common for men, in the fear of believing too much, not to believe what the Scriptures themselves plainly require of them; and from the apprehension of relapsing into their old superstitious practices, to give little or no regard to the duties of external worship: should this at any time be the case, those truly wise men, who laboured so profitably to check the other extreme, would certainly, in this different state of things, apply themselves with equal earnestness to correct this. Not that their former practice was not good in itself, but that, by a change in the disposition of the times, it was now become less seasonable.
3. We are, lastly, to have a regard to the conditions, characters, and persons of those with whom we converse; this attention being especially requisite to render our virtues attractive and efficacious.
The philosopher that took upon him to discourse on the science of war, did not enough consider his own character. If he chose to do this in an age which wanted no such instructions, his conduct was certainly unseasonable. But when he presumed to instruct the greatest general and commander in the world, he deserved the censure which has disgraced him with all posterity[122]. A decorum like this is required in our attempts to promote truth and virtue. To dictate in such matters to persons wiser than ourselves, or to persons, who by their stations and characters should, in all reason, be supposed wiser, is a manifest indiscretion, and can never be attended with any good consequences. Were we ever so able to instruct, or were they ever so much in want of instruction, prudence would suggest a very different conduct. It would recommend to us all the honest arts of insinuation and address; it would oblige us to watch the fittest seasons and opportunities; or, perhaps, to content ourselves with the silent admonition of a good example. Or, were there nothing in the rank and condition of those we would work upon, to restrain us to this caution, we might even be required to shew a condescension to their very prejudices and humours. The errors of men may sometimes be removed by arguing with them on their own mistaken principles; by allowing all that truth and reason will warrant to their opinions; by putting the fairest construction upon their designs; by hinting objections to their wrong tenets, instead of fiercely declaiming against them; above all, by testifying a sincere disposition to advance truth and goodness, without any indirect views to our own interest. Or, were all other considerations out of the case, we could never be excused from proceeding in the way of gentleness and civility, from treating them with due respect, and expressing the sincerest good-will to their persons. Be their moral or religious defects what they will, we should hardly be wise; that is, we should take very improper methods of reclaiming them from either, if we reproved with bitterness, advised with insolence, or condemned with passion. In all addresses to mistaken or bad men, where our purpose is to inform or amend them, the gentlest applications are surely the best, because these excite no passion to counteract their virtue.
And now, at length, should it be asked who is that WISE CHRISTIAN whom the text designs and recommends to our imitation, we are able to furnish, at least, the outline of his character.
“He is one who sets before him the great END and prize of his high calling; who, in his progress through the various stages of this life, keeps in constant view the immortal happiness which his religion holds out in prospect to him in another: who, in humble adoration of his God and Saviour, is content to wait the appointed season which is to crown his hopes and expectations; and, for the present, is sollicitous to work out his salvation with fear and reverence, by an earnest application of his time and pains to those subservient duties, which are to qualify him for the enjoyment of Heaven; who subjects all the towering conceits of his understanding, to the doctrines of the Gospel, and the impetuous sallies of his will, to the precepts of it; who makes no audacious separation of what the wisdom of God hath joined together; but, whilst he adores the mysteries of his holy FAITH, walks on in the plain and humble path of moral OBEDIENCE. He is one, who thinks it not enough to rest in the mere MATTER of his duty, but performs it in such a MANNER as will render it most exemplary and efficacious. He knows it to be a great precept of his religion, to see, that his good be not evil spoken of. He would not disgrace the best cause in the world by the neglect of those decencies, which, as he observes, have sometimes the strange power to recommend the worst. The good he intends, therefore, is attempted in such a way, as is most BECOMING of himself; most SEASONABLE in respect of the opportunities which are offered to him; and most agreeable and PERSUASIVE to other men. In short, HE is one who, taking Prudence for his guide, and Innocence for his companion, thinks himself secure in these attendants; and therefore neglects no decorum, which the best philosophy prescribes; no art, which the soundest policy suggests; and no address, which the politest manners recommend: and so, in the high emphatic sense of the words, approves himself a WISE MAN; wise unto that which is good, to all purposes in this world, as well as in a better.”