Two Tracts on Civil Liberty, the War with America, and the Debts and Finances of the Kingdom / With a General Introduction and Supplement

by Richard Price

General Introduction.

The first of the following tracts was published in the beginning of the year 1776; and the second in the beginning of last year. They are now offered to the public in one volume, with corrections and additions. All the calculations, in the Appendix to the first tract, have been transferred to the second and fourth sections, in the third part of the second tract.

The section on Public Loans, in the second tract, has been revised with care; and a supplement to it, containing additional proposals and some necessary explanations, has been given at the end of the whole.—This is a subject to which I have applied (perhaps too unprofitably) much or my attention. I have now done with it; and the whole is referred to the candid examination of those who may be better informed, hoping for their indulgence should they find that, in any instance, I have been mistaken. I have not meant, in any thing I have said on this subject, to censure any persons. That accumulation of artificial debt which I have pointed out, and by which the dagger of the kingdom from its growing burdens has been so needlessly increased, has, I doubt not, been the effect of inattention in our ministers; and the scheme, by which the loan of last year has been procured, gives reason to hope that better plans of borrowing will be adopted for the future.

The principal design of the first part of the second tract was (as I have observed in the introduction to it) to remove the misapprehensions of my sentiments on Civil Liberty and Government into which some had fallen. It gives me concern to find that it has not answered that end in the degree I wished. I am still charged with maintaining opinions which tend to subvert all civil authority. I paid little regard to this charge, while it was confined to the advocates for the principles which have produced the present war; but as it seems lately to have been given the public from the authority of a writer of the first character,[1] it is impossible I should not be impressed by it; and I find myself under a necessity of taking farther notice of it.

There are two accounts, directly opposite to one another, which have been given of the origin of civil government. One of them is, that “civil government is an expedient contrived by human prudence for gaining security against oppression; and that, consequently, the power of civil governors is a delegation or trust from the people for accomplishing this end.”

The other account is, that “civil government is an ordinance of the Deity, by which the body of mankind are given up to the will of a few; and, consequently, that it is a trust from the Deity, in the exercise of which civil governors are accountable only to him.”

The question “which of these accounts we ought to receive,” is important in the highest degree. There is no question which more deeply affects the happiness and dignity of man as a citizen of this world.—If the former account is right, the people (that is, the body of independent agents) in every community are their own legislators. All civil authority is properly their authority. Civil governors are only public servants; and their power, being delegated, is by its nature limited.—On the contrary. If the latter account is right, the people have nothing to do with their own government. They are placed by their maker in the situation of cattle on an estate, which the owner has a right to dispose of as he pleases. Civil Governors are a body of masters; and their power is a commission from Heaven held by divine right, and unbounded in its extent.

I have espoused, with some zeal, the first of these accounts; and in the following tracts, endeavoured to explain and defend it. And this is all I have done to give countenance to the charge I have mentioned.—Even the masterly writer who, after a croud of writers infinitely his inferiors, seems to have taken up this accusation against me, often expresses himself as if he had adopted the same idea of government[2]. Such indeed is my opinion of his good sense, and such has been the zeal which he has discovered for the rights of mankind, that I think it scarcely possible his ideas and mine on this subject should be very different. His language, however, sometimes puzzles me; and, particularly, when he intimates that government is an institution of divine authority;[3] when he scouts all discussions of the nature of civil liberty, the foundation of civil rights, and the principles of free government; and when he asserts the competence of our legislature to revive the High-Commission Court and Star-Chamber, and its BOUNDLESS AUTHORITY not only over the people of Britain, but over distant communities who have no voice in it.

But whatever may be Mr. Burke’s sentiments on this subject, he cannot possibly think of the former account of government that “it is a speculation which destroys all authority.”—Both accounts establish an authority. The difference is, that one derives it from the people, and makes it a limited authority; and the other derives it from Heaven; and makes it unlimited.—I have repeatedly declared my admiration of such a constitution of government as our own would be, were the House of Commons a fair representation of the kingdom, and under no undue influence.—The sum of all I have meant to maintain is, “that LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, as opposed to OPPRESSION and TYRANNY, consists in the dominion of equal laws made with common consent, or of men over themselves; and not in the dominion of communities over communities, or of any men over other men.” Introduction to the second Tract, [p. 9].—How then can it be pretended, that I have aimed at destroying all authority? Does our own constitution destroy all authority? Is the authority of equal laws made with common consent no authority? Must there be no government in a state that governs itself? Or, must an institution, contrived by the united counsels of the members of a community, for restraining licentiousness and gaining security against injury and violence, encourage licentiousness, and give to every one a power to commit what outrages he pleases?

The Archbishop of York, (in a sermon preached before the society for propagating the gospel in foreign parts, Feb. 21, 1777,) has taken notice of some loose opinions, as he calls them, which have been lately current on civil liberty; some who mean delinquency having given accounts of it “by which every man’s humour is made to be the rule of his obedience, all the bad passions are let loose, and those dear interests abandoned to outrage for the protection of which we trust in law,” 4to edit. p. 15 and 16. It is not difficult to guess at one of the delinquents intended in these words. In opposition to the horrid sentiments of liberty which they describe, but which in reality no man in his senses ever entertained, the Archbishop defines it to be simply, the supremacy of law, or GOVERNMENT by LAW, without adding to law, as I had done, the words equal and made with common consent;[4] and without opposing a GOVERNMENT by LAW to a GOVERNMENT BY MEN, as others had done.—According to him, therefore, the supremacy of law must be liberty, whatever the law is, or whoever makes it.—In despotic countries government by law is the same with government by the will of one man, which Hooker has called the misery of all men; but, according to this definition, it is liberty.—In England formerly, the law consigned to the flames all who denyed certain established points of faith. Even now, it subjects to fines, imprisonment and banishment all teachers of religion who have not subscribed the doctrinal articles of the church of England; and the good Archbishop, not thinking the law in this case sufficiently rigorous, has proposed putting Protestant Dissenters under the same restraints with the Papists.[5] And should this be done, if done by law, it will be the establishment of liberty.

The truth is, that a government by law is or is not liberty, just as the laws are just or unjust; and as the body of the people do or do not participate in the power of making them. The learned Prelate seems to have thought otherwise, and therefore has given a definition of liberty, which might as well have been given of slavery.

At the conclusion of his sermon, the Archbishop adds words which he calls comfortable, addressed to those who had been patient in tribulation,[6] and intimating that they might rejoice in hope, “a ray of brightness then appearing after a prospect which had been long dark.” And in an account which follows the sermon, from one of the missionaries in the province of New-York, it is said, that “the rebellion would undoubtedly be crushed, and that THEN will be the time for taking steps for the increase of the church in America, by granting it an episcopate.” In conformity to the sentiments of this missionary, the Archbishop also expresses his hope, that the opportunity which such an event will give, for establishing episcopacy among the colonists, will not be lost; and advises, that measures should be thought of for that purpose, and for thereby rescuing the church from the persecution it has long suffered in America.

This is a subject so important, and it has been so much misrepresented, that I cannot help going out of my way to give a brief account of it.

It does not appear that the lay members themselves of the church in America have ever wished for Bishops. On the contrary, the assembly of Virginia (the first episcopal colony) some years ago returned thanks to two clergymen in that colony, who had protested against a resolution of the other clergy to petition for Bishops. The church here cannot have a right to impose Bishops on the church in another country; and therefore, while churchmen in America are averse to Bishops, it must be persecution to send Bishops among them. The Presbyterians, and other religious sects there, are willing, from a sense of the reasonableness of toleration, to admit Bishops whenever the body of episcopalian laity shall desire them, provided security is given that they shall be officers merely spiritual, possessed of no other powers than those which are necessary to the full exercise of that mode of religious worship. It is not Bishops, as spiritual officers, they have opposed; but Bishops on a state-establishment; Bishops with civil powers; Bishops at the head of ecclesiastical courts, maintained by taxing other sects, and possessed of a PRE-EMINENCE which would be incompatible with the equality which has long subsisted among all religious sects in America. In this last respect, the colonies have hitherto enjoyed a happiness which is unparalleled, but which the introduction of such Bishops as would be sent from hence would destroy. In Pensilvania (one of the happiest countries under heaven before we carried into it desolation and carnage) all sects of christians have been always perfectly on a level, the legislature taking no part with any one sect against others, but protecting all equally as far as they are peaceable. The state of the colonies north of Pensilvania is much the same; and, in the province of Massachusett’s-Bay in particular, civil authority interposes no farther in religion than by imposing a tax for supporting public worship, leaving to all the power of applying the tax to the support of that mode of public worship which they like best. This tax the episcopalians were, at one time, obliged to pay in common with others; but so far did the province carry its indulgence to them, that an act was passed on purpose to excuse them.—With this let the state of Protestant Dissenters in this country be compared. Not only are they obliged to pay tithes for the support of the established church, but their worship is not even tolerated, unless their ministers will subscribe the articles of the church. In consequence of having long scrupled this subscription, they have lost all legal right to protection, and are exposed to the cruellest penalties. Uneasy in such a situation, they not long ago applied twice to parliament for the repeal of the penal laws against them. Bills for that purpose were brought into the House of Commons, and passed that House. But, in the House of Lords, they were rejected in consequence of the opposition of the Bishops.—There are few I reverence so much as some on the sacred bench; but such conduct (and may I not add the alacrity with which most of them support the present measures?) must leave an indelible stain upon them, and will probably exclude them for ever from America.

On this occasion, I cannot help thinking with concern of the learned Prelate’s feelings. After a prospect long dark, he had discovered a ray of brightness shewing him America reduced, and the church triumphant: But lately, that ray of brightness has vanished, and defeat has taken place of victory and conquest.—And what do we now see?—What a different prospect, mortifying to the learned Prelate, presents itself?—A great people likely to be formed, in spite of all our efforts, into free communities, under governments which have[7] no religious tests and establishments!—A new æra in future annals, and a new opening in human affairs beginning, among the descendants of Englishmen, in a new world;—A rising empire, extended over an immense continent, without Bishops,—without Nobles,—and without Kings.

O the depth of the riches of the wisdom of God! How unsearchable are his judgments!

But to proceed to another subject.

In the second of the following tracts, [page 48], I have observed, that in former times it was the custom of parliament to pass bills for appointing commissioners to take, state, and examine the public accounts. I have lately had it in my power to inform myself more particularly on this subject; and I shall here beg leave to give a brief recital of some of the principal facts relating to it.

The first bill for the purpose I have mentioned was passed in the times of the commonwealth, and in the year 1653. It was called an “act for accounts, and for clearing of public debts, and discovering frauds and concealments.” Seven commissioners were named in it, and the necessary powers given them. In 1667, another act was passed for the same purpose; after which I find no account of any such acts till the beginning of the reign of King William. At this time complaints of mismanagement and embezzlements in the disposition of public money were become so prevalent, that the House of Commons thought it necessary to enter into measures for effectually preventing them, by obliging all revenue officers to make up their accounts, and bringing defaulters to justice.

With these views, six of the acts I have mentioned were passed between the years 1690 and 1701. Another was passed in the first of Queen Anne; and three more in her four last years. In King William’s reign they were always passed by the House of Commons without a division. In Queen Anne’s reign, not one passed without a division. In 1717, a motion for such an act was rejected without a division; and since 1717, only one motion[8] has been made for such a bill, and it was rejected by a majority of 136 to 66.

The preamble to these acts declares the reason of them to be, that “the kingdom may be satisfied and truly informed, whether all the monies granted by parliament have been faithfully issued and applied to the end for which they had been given; and that all loyal subjects may be thereby encouraged more chearfully to bear the burthens laid upon them.” The number of commissioners named in them was generally nine or seven, all members of the House of Commons. It was particularly ordered, that they should take an account of all the revenues brought into the receipt of the Exchequer, and all arrears thereof; of all monies in the hands of the receivers general of the land-tax, customs and excise; of all the public stores, provisions, &c. as well for land as sea service; of all ships of war, and the sums of money provided or paid for the use of the forces by sea and land, and the number of them respectively; and of any briberies or corruptions in any persons concerned in the receiving or disposing of the national treasure. And, for these purposes, they were impowered to call before them, and to examine upon oath the officers of the exchequer, the secretary at war, paymaster of the forces, commissioners of the navy and ordnance, and all persons whatever employed as commissioners, or otherwise, in or about the Treasury.

The reports, which the commissioners thus appointed delivered from time to time to parliament, contain accounts of a waste of public money, arising from the rapacity of contractors, and many scandalous abuses and frauds in every part of the public service, which must shock every person not grown callous to all the feelings of honesty and honour. In consequence of these reports, the House of Commons addressed the throne, and remonstrated; several great men were accused, and brought to shame; some were dismissed from their places, and ordered to be prosecuted; some expelled, and some committed to the Tower. Thus did our representatives in those times discharge their duty as guardians of the public property; and it is, in my opinion, only by such means that they are capable of doing this properly and effectually. It must, however, be acknowledged, that these commissions of enquiry did not produce all the good effects which might have been expected from them. The influence of the crown, and the interest in parliament of many great men entrusted with the disposition of public money, rendered the proper execution of them extremely difficult. This led some even of the Tories, at the time of the great change of ministry in 1710, to propose, that the receiving and issuing of the public money should be taken from the crown; and, in defence of this proposal, it was urged, that the issuing of public money, being in some of the most despotic countries left in the hands of the people, it was by no means a necessary part of the royal prerogative. This would indeed have provided a complete remedy; and it might have perpetuated the constitution. But, even in these times, it was a reformation too great and too impracticable to engage much attention.

Ever since those times the public accounts have been growing more complicated; and the temptations to profusion and embezzlement have been increasing with increasing luxury and dissipation. How astonishing then is it that every idea of such commissions should be now lost; and that, at a time when the nation is labouring under expences almost too heavy to be borne, the passing of accounts by the House of Commons is become little more than a matter of form; our representatives scarcely thinking it worth their while to attend on such occasions, and MILLIONS of the public treasure being sometimes given away, in a few hours, just as proposed by the Treasury, without debate or enquiry.

I must not forget to mention particularly on this subject, that the commissioners named in the acts I have described, were always declared incapable of holding any place or office of profit under the crown; and directed to take an account “of all pensions, salaries, and sums of money paid or payable to members of parliament out of the revenue or otherwise.”—Not long before this time, the House of Commons would not suffer even the Attorney-general[9] to sit and vote in the house because he was the king’s servant; and in 1678, a member, as Mr. Trenchard says, was committed to the Tower, for only saying in the house that the king might keep guards for his defence, if he could pay them.—Such once was the House of Commons.—So jealous of the power of the crown, and so chaste.—Since the reign of Queen Ann and the passing of the Septennial Act, a great change has taken place.[10] A change which is little less than the total ruin of the constitution, and which may end in a tyranny the most oppressive and insupportable. It is, therefore, the greatest evil, which could have happened to us; and the men, by whose abominable policy it has been accomplished, ought to be followed with the everlasting execrations of every friend to public virtue and liberty.

I now withdraw to the situation of an anxious spectator of public events; but before I do this, I must leave with the public, at this threatening period, the following sentiments.

Not long ago, the colonies might have been kept, without bloodshed or trouble, by repealing the acts which have made us the aggressors in the present war; but now it would be great folly to expect this.—At the same time I think it certain, that they may be rendered more useful to us by a pacification on liberal terms, which shall bind them to us as Friends, than by any victories or slaughters (were they possible) which can force them to submit to us as Subjects.—I think it also certain, that should the offer of such terms be delayed till they have formed an alliance with France, this country is UNDONE.—Such an alliance, we may hope, is not yet settled.—Our rulers, therefore, may possibly have still a moment for pausing and retreating; and every dictate of prudence and feeling of humanity requires them to be speedy and earnest in improving it.—But what am I saying? I know this must not be expected. Too full of ideas of our own dignity, too proud to retract; and too tenacious of dominion, we seem determined to persist: And the consequence must be, that the colonies will become the allies of France; that a general war will be kindled; and, perhaps, this once happy country be made, in just retribution, the seat of that desolation and misery which it has produced in other countries.

January 19, 1778.

Since the publication of the preceding Introduction, the event referred to at the end of it has been announced to the public. A memorial from the French court has been delivered to our court, declaring, that the former has concluded a treaty of commerce and friendship with the colonies as independent States; and acquainting us that, IN CONCERT WITH THEM, the King of France is determined and prepared to defend his commerce against any interruption we may give it.—A new turn, therefore, is now given to our affairs of a nature the most critical and alarming. Would to God there were any concessions by which we could extricate ourselves. But the opportunities for this have been shamefully lost, and cannot be now recovered.—With a judicial blindness in our councils which has hitherto carried us uniformly from bad to worse—With near half our strength torn from us, and our vaunted dignity in the dust—With our resources failing; our credit tottering; and a debt threatening to overwhelm us of more than a HUNDRED AND FIFTY MILLIONS—In these circumstances, we seem to be entering on a war with the united powers of France, Spain, and America.—This, should it happen, will complete the measure of our troubles, and soon bring on that catastrophe which there has been all along reason to expect and dread.

April 24, 1778.