Penal Responsibility
As between principals and their accomplices and accessories, Ifugao law recognizes only gradations in likelihood of punishment. The penalty is the same for all of them; but very frequently the offense is considered as having been expiated by the punishment of those whose responsibility for it is greatest, and the rest go free.
77. The nungolat, or principal.—The nungolat (he who was strong) is the conceiver, planner, and director of an offense. He may or may not take an active part in its commission. Whether or not he does so, he is considered to be responsible for it in the highest degree. He is, of all who take part in the offense, the most likely to be punished.
The following example, continued through several succeeding sections, shows the various degrees of criminal responsibility, and the corresponding degrees of likelihood of punishment:
A decides to avenge the death of a kinsman. He consequently calls a number of his kinsmen and proposes a war expedition to take the head of Z, an enemy concerned in the death of the murdered kinsman, in another village. They agree. A calls the family priests to his house to perform the necessary religious preliminaries to setting out on a head-hunting expedition. The ceremonies are performed, and the omen of the bile sac promises well. But, just before starting, some accident happens to A, which the priests attribute to the sorcery of the enemy. A consequently does not accompany the expedition. He is, notwithstanding, the nungolat, and is more likely to be the object of vengeance than any other, should the crime be accomplished.
78. The tombok, or “thrower.”—In offenses in which a spear is thrown, he who throws the effective spear is called the tombok. His responsibility for the crime is second to that of the nungolat, as is also his likelihood of being punished.
79. Iba’n di nungolat, the “companions of the one who was strong.”—Those who assist in the commission of a crime by reinforcing, accompanying, assisting, backing, giving aid and comfort to the committer thereof, or furnishing anything needful to the consummation of the crime incur the next lesser degree of criminal responsibility and of likelihood of being punished to those of the conceiver and committer of the crime.
80. The montudol, “shower,” or informer.—One who gives a person in the act of committing a crime information necessary to the successful carrying out of his intent, is guilty in the same degree as are persons of the preceding paragraph.
Thus, continuing the illustration started above, suppose that B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I go to take the head of A’s enemy and theirs. They meet O, a co-villager of Z, the man whose head they want to take, and ask him regarding Z’s whereabouts. The fact could not be otherwise than patent to O, that a head-hunting party was addressing him. He answers truthfully that Z is in his sweet potato field, and that the party may reach the field by such and such by-path without their being seen by Z’s kin or co-villagers. The party follows O’s directions. B spears Z.
B is the tombok; C, D, E, F, G, H, and I are the “companions of the one who was strong,” and O is the montudol.
81. Servants who commit crimes at the bidding of their masters.—Retainers incur a lesser degree of criminal responsibility than does the master. They will be punished if the master cannot be punished. Sometimes both are punished.
82. Likelihood of punishment.—
(Continuation of illustration given above.) Z’s kinsmen of course decide to avenge his death. It is a general rule that all debts must be paid with liberal interest, the interest being at least equal to the debt. The debt of life is no exception to this rule. The kinsmen, whom we will call Q, R, S, T, and U, decide that, at least, they will kill A, the nungolat, and B, the tombok, and that if opportunity offers they will kill one or two of the others. They go to the vicinity of the village of A and B and lie in wait for them. They may do this a number of times. Finally we will suppose that they kill A. Their thirst for blood is somewhat appeased, and they may not pursue their first intention. But it would be the part of wisdom for B to be extremely cautious. Z’s kinsmen are likely to make an expedition or two to take his head.
On the other hand, suppose that A dies a natural death or falls in some other feud. The full likelihood of punishment now falls on B.
Suppose that B, H, and O walk past the place of ambush of the avengers. The latter will try to make sure of B, but will also try to kill the other two.
Suppose that B, like A, meets death in some other way than at the hands of Z’s avengers. C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and O are now equally likely to be punished.
In case several unsuccessful expeditions are made to secure the head of A and B, the avengers are likely to take a head or heads from some of the others rather than continually to place themselves in jeopardy by their expeditions into an enemy region. Especially is this true if the enemy’s village be distant. If the villages be near, it is probable that C, D, E, F, G, H, I, or O might walk past the ambush of the avengers at first with impunity, since the avengers are desirous of taking the heads of the principals, and do not want to put the principals on their guard by slaying those whose guilt is less.
83. Drunkenness and insanity in relation to criminal responsibility.—Except in the case of murder, drunkenness mitigates the severity of punishment, provided there be no evidence to show that the culprit became intoxicated with the intent to commit the crime, and provided he sincerely repents on becoming sober. Even insanity is not an alleviating circumstance in the case of murder; but it is one in all other crimes.
84. The relation of intent to criminal responsibility.—Gulad or intent, is probably the greatest single factor in determining penal responsibility. Thus:
A deed committed without intent, and without carelessness, is excused. One has not, usually, even to make restitution for the injury done. Thus, in the case of a bolo flying out of a man’s hand, and putting out the eye of another, no damages were assessed. An enormous number of men, every year, are injured in the free-for-all scrambles over sacrificed carabaos. Many of these injuries result in stiff joints; some of them in deaths. In no case, not even in the case of death, is a payment demanded. Suppose that in the chase a number of hunters have surrounded a wild boar. The boar charges one of them. This man leaps backward, and, at the same time, draws back his spear to throw it at the boar. In so doing, he stabs a companion behind him with the shod end of the spear handle. This is not an uncommon accident. The others of the party are witnesses that the killing was purely accidental (naloktat). No fine is assessed; but the killer, to show that he is sorry, usually assists in the funeral feast. Of course, if there were no witnesses, and if there were a possible motive to complicate matters, the ending of the case might not be so happy.
Suppose that a number of men are throwing at a target with their spears. A child runs in the way, and is killed. One-half the usual fine for manslaughter is assessed on the ground that the thrower was careless in that he did not make sure before he threw the spear that such an accident could not occur. In this case there was an absence of intent; but carelessness was present.
A man kills a neighbor at night, acting under the impression that he is killing an enemy seeking his life. He is subjected to a much heavier fine than if he had killed him through carelessness, since there is present both the intent to kill, although not criminal, and carelessness in that he did not make sure at whom he was casting his spear.[1]