The Taking of Life
97. General considerations.—It is extremely difficult to unravel the law, if there be a law, with respect to murder, executions, and war. The Ifugao has no tribunals to sentence, and no government to execute. He makes no declarations of war. Doubtless no two nations or tribes of the world ever engaged in a warfare in which each did not consider the other the aggressor, or at least, the offender. The same is true with respect to feuds between families, which were almost as numerous as the families themselves. In spite of the years of American occupation during which comparative peace has prevailed, these feuds still exist. We must substitute, however, for patriotism, fraternal and filial love; the sense of duty to the unavenged dead, love of vengeance, and intense hatred engendered and justified by a well learned catalogue of wrongs and assassinations inflicted on the family by the enemy family. Once started, a blood feud was well nigh eternal (unless ended by a fusion of the families by means of marriage), for the reason that what was a righteous execution to one family was a murder (usually treacherous) to the other.
Outside of manslaughter, to be treated of later, it may be stated as a general tenet of Ifugao practice that the taking of a life must be paid by a life. Considering, too, that a member of an Ifugao family rarely if ever effected or accomplished any except the most ordinary and elemental acts without previous consultation with his family, and that nearly all killings were effected pursuant to a decision of a family council, it was not without a fair show of reason that Ifugao law held that a murder might be punished almost as well by the execution of some member of the murderer’s family as by the execution of the murderer himself. For, if not principals in the commission of the crime, other members of the family were at least accomplices or accessories. Indeed Ifugao law held the whole family guilty, looking upon the crime, quite correctly, as an offense for which the whole family was responsible.
War, murder, and the death penalty exacted in execution of justice, in the Ifugao’s society are so near each other as to be almost synonymous terms. We have already seen that a capital execution for crime is nearly always looked upon by the kin of the executed as being a murder; it is retaliated by them, by what to them is a justifiable execution; but by what, to the killers, is considered as a murder to be punished by another execution, and so on ad infinitum.
The Ifugao has one general law, which with a few notable exceptions he applies to killings, be they killings in war, murders, or executions, which public opinion would pronounce justifiable and legal. That law is: A life must be paid by a life. Let us pass now to a consideration of various classes of the takings of human life.
98. Executions justifiable by Ifugao law.—Public opinion or custom, or both, justify the taking of a life in punishment for the following crimes: sorcery; murder; persistent and wilful refusal to pay a debt when there is the ability to pay; adultery discovered in flagrante; theft by one of a foreign district; refusal to pay a fine assessed for crime or for injury suffered. But even though custom and public opinion justify the administration of the extreme penalty in these cases, the kin of the murdered man do not, in most cases, consider the killing justified. There are innumerable circumstances that complicate a given case. Was the sorcery proven or only suspected? Was it a murder that the man committed; or was he justified in the killing? Would not the debtor have come to his right mind had his creditor waited a little longer; and did the creditor approach him in the right way with reference to the debt? Did not the woman make advances in the adultery case that no self-respecting male could turn down? Was not the indemnity assessed too large or otherwise improper; or did the injured party wait long enough for the payment? These and a thousand other questions may arise with respect to the various cases.
If the death penalty be inflicted by persons of a foreign district, it is sure to be looked upon as a murder.
At feasts and gatherings about the “bowl that cheers” and especially in drunken brawls, an unavenged killing, no matter what the circumstances, is likely to be brought up as a reflection upon the bravery or manhood of the living kin, and so urge them to the avenging of what was really a justified execution.
Murder, sorcery, and a refusal to pay the fine for adultery justify the infliction of the death penalty even on a kinsman if he is not too close a relative. An execution of one kinsman by another is not so likely to be avenged as is justifiable execution by one outside the family. This is in accordance with the principle of Ifugao law: The family must at all hazards be preserved.
99. Feuds.—A feud is a series of takings of human life as vengeance, in which the heads may or may not be taken. There are some hundreds of ways in which feuds may start. As a rule they begin with a taking of life that is not justified in the eyes of the kin of him whose life was taken. They may begin from a retaliation for a kidnapping or even from an accidental killing. Feuds exist between neighboring districts, or districts not far distant between which to a certain extent ties of blood and marriage exist. It is exceedingly rare—if it ever occurs—that entire villages or districts are involved. The feud is an affair between families only. It consists of a series of vengeances and “returning of vengeances.” Feuds may even start within the district: but as a rule, they are short lived, being stopped by the counsel of the influential. Feuds between districts are well nigh interminable usually, but may come to an end by means of intermarriage or when one or two of the leaders of each family are afflicted by certain diseases[3] thought to be inflicted by certain deities that desire the peace ceremony. As has been hitherto stated, each killing in a feud is considered by the killers to be an entirely justifiable execution in punishment of crime. The deities of war and justice are called to witness that the debt is not yet paid. Contemporaneously, the kin of the slain are calling on the same deities to witness that their family is sorely afflicted; that no debt was owed the others; that no chickens or pigs, or rice had been borrowed; that no theft or other crime had been committed, and so on; yet, that innocent, they are being slaughtered.
100. War.—Before the American occupation, districts that were far distant might be said to be continually at war with each other. The war was carried on as a series of head-takings. There was no formal declaration of war. As a rule there were no large expeditions to the enemy country, and heads were taken from ambush, on the outskirts of an enemy village or along much traveled paths. Women’s heads were taken in these exploits; but not as a rule, in feuds. To avenge lives taken in war, while no doubt the life of the actual head-taker was preferable, the life of any person of the enemy village might be taken; just as in feuds, the life of any member of the enemy family might be taken.
101. Head-taking.—Heads were not taken in the case of executions for injury. In feuds within a district, heads were not taken. In feuds between families of different districts, heads might or might not be taken. Usually they were taken if there were no ties of kinship between the districts. It should be emphasized, however, that there was no definite boundary between districts, and consequently, no well-defined line beyond which heads might be taken. Families from the southern part of a district would take heads in territory from which those in the northern part of the district would not take them. Heads were always taken in the case of those killed in war, if circumstances permitted.
102. Hibul or homicide.—The Ifugao law clearly recognizes several grades of homicide.
(a) The taking of life when there is an entire absence of both intent and carelessness. As for example, in the case already cited (see [sec. 54]). when a party of hunters have a wild boar at bay. The boar, as there stated, charges the most advanced of the hunters, and in retreating backwards, the latter jabs one of his companions with the shod point of his spear handle. There is no penalty for such a taking of life.
(b) The taking of life when there is clearly an absence of intent, but a degree of carelessness. For example, a number of men are throwing spears at a mark. A child runs in the way, and is killed. The penalty is a fine varying from one third to two thirds the amount of the full fine for homicide according to the decree of carelessness.
(c) Intentional taking of the life of another, under the impression that he is an enemy when in reality he is a co-villager or a companion. In case the killer can make the family of the slain understand the circumstances, only a fine is assessed. This fine is called labod. (See [sec. 106].) If the killer be unrelated to the slain, the full amount of the labod is demanded: if related, the amount is usually lessened.
Example: Pumauwat of Raay was irrigating his fields at night. Some of his companions told him that there were some head-hunters from an enemy village near. In the darkness. Pumauwat encountered another man. Likyayu, the betrothed of his daughter. He asked him who was there. On account of the noise of water falling from the rice fields, Likyayu did not hear the inquiry, and said nothing. Pumauwat speared him. Likyayu cried out. Pumauwat recognized his voice, and carried him home. He furnished animals for sacrifice to secure Likyayu’s recovery. Likyayu recovered. Had he died, Pumauwat would have been called on for the full amount of the fine: but had Likyayu been firmly engaged to Pumauwat’s daughter, that is, had the bango ceremony been performed the full amount of the labod fine would not have been demanded, since the relationship would have been an extenuating circumstance.
(d) The taking of life by persons in a brawl or by an intoxicated or insane person. In case the slain died before his slayer could agree to provide animals for sacrifice, the latter would probably be killed by the kin of the slain if he were of a foreign district. He might be killed if a non-related co-villager. He would be fined the labod if a kinsman. He would probably go scot free if a brother or uncle.
Example: A of Longa became insanely drunk at a feast at the house of his brother Gimbungan. He attempted to embrace the comely daughter of Gimbungan, his niece. Gimbungan tried to quiet him, and in so doing aroused his ire. He drew back his spear menacingly, and in so doing pierced the girl—who was at his back—with the shod point at the end. She died. A was properly penitent when he sobered, and furnished animals for sacrifice. The fine labod was not, however, demanded of him. This was about thirty five or forty years ago. Considerable feeling exists between the two branches of the family to this day, owing to this occurrence.
The burden rests upon the slayer in the above cases to show that the killing was accidental or that he was so drunk as to have utterly lost his reason. The absence of a motive is a great help to him in this. If he has ever had a serious altercation with the slain, in the absence of controverting evidence, the presumption is likely to be that the killing was intentional, and that he has been “feigning friendship in order to kill by ugâ (treachery).”
103. Attempts to murder.—An attempt on the part of an enemy of another district on the life of a person is punishable by death. An attempt by one of the same district may or may not be punished by death; in most cases peace would be arranged by mutual friends and kinsmen. In such a case, he who made the attempt would be required to furnish animals for a peace feast.
104. Wounding.—Wounds inflicted accidentally and without intent or carelessness are not punished. In case the element of intent or carelessness be present, he who inflicts the wounds must furnish animals for sacrifice, pay the wounded man and his kin a fine, and stand the expense of a feast to make peace. The following is a typical list, for the kadangyang (wealthy)class, of the expenses of animals for sacrifice and fine:
(a) First feast for the recovery of the wounded man, sacrifices to the war deities: 3 pigs at 15 pesos; 10 chickens at 1 peso; total 55 pesos.
(b) Second feast for recovery, the pinochla, or feast to cure wounds and infections: 1 pig at 10 pesos; 2 chickens at 1 peso; 8 spear heads as fees of priests at 25c; total 14 pesos.
In case the wounded man lives, the following fine is paid him and his kin:
(c) Fine of two bakid (two tens) amounting to 72 pesos; fee of the monkalan, 10 pesos; total 82 pesos.
(d) Peace making ceremony: 1 pig at 15 pesos; other appurtenances of feast, 2 pesos; total 17 pesos.
105. Special liability of the givers of certain feasts.—The givers of uyauwe or hagabi feasts (glorified general welfare feasts to which great numbers of people come) are responsible for wounds or deaths that occur at these feasts. When a man decides to initiate himself and his wife into the ranks of the kadangyang by giving one of these feasts, he appoints one of the old priests of his family to perform the tikman ceremonies. These ceremonies are sacrifices to the various classes of deities whose special function is the “tying up” of men’s stomachs and passions. Prayers are addressed to these deities that a little food satisfy the guest that attends the feast, to the end that the giver be not eaten out of house and home; that a little rice wine suffice to intoxicate the people; that the passions of men be tied up to the end that no quarrels or frays occur; that no rice-wine jars or gongs be broken; that no accidents occur—in short, that the whole feast pass off smoothly. The duties of the manikam (the priest who performs these ceremonies) are rather arduous. To say nothing of the ceremonies he conducts, he must fast for a number of days and must observe a number of taboos. He receives rather a large fee for these services. And, indeed, their importance, in the eyes of the Ifugaos, and the legal responsibility he incurs, certainly justify a large fee.
The manikam priests are jointly responsible with the giver of the feast for accidents or violence that may occur. This liability of the giver of the feast for wounds or loss of life is based on the supposition that if he had not given the feast the wound would not have occurred; and possibly that he gave the feast with the motive of bringing about such an occurrence. The liability of the manikam is based on the supposition that there must have been a remissness on his part in his religious duties, else the accident or loss would never have occurred. The following is an actual instance that would indicate that this provision of the law is an incipient employer’s liability provision.
Malingan of Pindungan, many years ago, gathered together his kin and friends, performed the preliminary feasts, and went to Payauan to make a hagabi (lounging bench, the insignium of the kadangyang class). They made a very large hagabi that weighed nearly a ton. In helping to carry it across the river two men were carried downstream by the current and drowned. Demand was made on Malingan and the manikam of the feast for the labod fine (see [sec. 106]). It was paid, and that is the reason Malingan’s descendants are not wealthier today, for formerly Malingan was one of the wealthiest men of the district.
It should be stated that brawls and accidents are much more common in feasts of this character given in parts of Ifugao other than the Kiangan-Nagakaran-Maggok area. This is due to the fact that in the area named above only relatives and persons invited by relatives attend, while in other regions the event is not so exclusive. There is the further consideration that in this area, on the night before the general drink-fest begins, an old man makes a speech in which he tries to put the crowd assembled in a good humor, and in which he warns each and every one to seize and hold any person who begins to disgrace hospitality by unseemly brawling.
106. The labod, fine assessed for homicide.—This fine is paid to the family of the slain. For the kadangyang, or wealthy class, the full fine consists of ten portions or divisions, totaling 975 pesos in the case tabulated below. These divisions may be briefly described as follows:
The Labod Fine
The rank of the slain has something to do with the amount of the labod. The amounts given above are those that would be collected in the case of the killing of a Kiangan man of the kadangyang class. If the slain were a middle class or poor man the amounts would not be so great.[4] If the slayer were a middle class, or poor man, the amounts above might be lessened somewhat, but not very much. If the slayer be unable to pay, he is saddled with the rest as a debt. If he cannot pay the debt during his lifetime, his children must pay it.
107. Accidental killing of animals.—The accidental killing of an animal is not a crime. Sometimes even the value of the animal is not demanded or accepted if tendered.
If a dog runs out threatening to bite a passer-by, and the latter kills it, he is required to pay the value of the dog. If a dog bites a passer-by, the latter may kill the dog and need not pay a fine. If the dog bites him, and he does not kill it, he may demand a payment from the owner. It was a provision of primitive Roman law that “If an injury were done by a slave, the person injured had the right to exact vengeance against the slave personally, thus injuring the master’s property; and the master or owner was consequently allowed to prevent this vengeance by making compensation for the injury done.”[5]
Should a pig, at that period of the year when rice is stacked below the granary to dry out, enter through the fence and eat of the rice, it may be killed by the owner of the granary; but he must give the owner another pig in place of it. Such a killing is not considered malicious, for the pig was spoiling the “miraculous increase” of the year’s harvest.
A pig that enters a rice field and eats of the unharvested rice is usually returned to the owner with the request that he tie the pig up. Should it again enter the field, the damage it does must be paid for. Should the owner refuse to pay this indemnity, and should the pig again enter the field, the owner of the field would be likely to kill the animal. The owner of the pig might consider such a killing malicious and improper. Public opinion would sustain the owner of the field.
108. Malicious killing of animals.—This is a serious crime. Its seriousness is due partly to the fact that domestic animals are to a great extent considered members of the household and as such loved and protected, and further to the fact that the intentional and malicious killing of such a member of a household would have a tendency to bring a like fate on the human members thereof, owing to the mystic power and force of analogy.
A labod fine is demanded for the malicious killing of a pig. The fine, in case a wealthy family is concerned, is as follows:
Labod Fine for Malicious Killing of a Pig
| 1. | The corpse of the dead pig is surrounded by living pigs, one on each side, i.e., four pigs are exacted in return. |
| 2. | Dangale (see [sec. 106]): 1 carabao. This animal is simply handed over, not killed for a funeral as is the case when a human being is concerned. |
| 3. | Gagaom (see [sec. 106]): 6 death blankets; 1 bayaó (fancy blanket); 1 tin-unwe (ceremonial clout); 4 clouts. |
| 4. | Habalag (see [sec. 106]): precisely as in the case of a homicide. |
| 5. | Liwa, fee of the monkalun, or go-between: 1 death blanket. |