Is a Ship Canal Practicable? / Notes, Historical and Statistical, Upon the Projected Routes for an Interoceanic Ship Canal Between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, in Which is Included a Short Account of the Character and Influence of the Canal of Suez, and the Probable Effects Upon the Commerce of the World of the Two Canals, Regarded Either as Rivals, or as Parts of One System of Interoceanic Navigation

by S. T. Abert

CHAPTER II.

Influence of Commerce—Distances Reduced by the Suez Canal—Tables showing the Gain of the United States and European Ports—Navigation by way of Red Sea and Good Hope—Napoleon III on Advantages of the American Route—Darien and Suez Canals as parts of one system of Navigation—Lieut. Maury on Darien Canal; its influence on the Resources of the Basin of the Mississippi—Table of Distances by Cape and Canal—Saving to the Commerce of the World—Table showing how far the great Maritime States are interested in the American Canal—Advantages of Suez and Darien Canals.

Statistics have been accumulated to show to what extent commerce will be benefited by the [Suez Canal]. The question of choice of route is not dependent on distance alone. The winds and currents are natural advantages or dangers which the navigator skillfully avoids or employs. Steam, while it enables a vessel to contend with wind and current, is yet obliged to obey their dictates. The distance of coaling stations, the large space occupied by fuel to the exclusion of freight, renders steam desirable rather as an auxiliary than as the sole means of propulsion.

The [Suez Canal] has reduced the distances from European ports to India about one-half. England derives an equal advantage, yet she has justly regarded with apprehension the diversion of trade from the old route. Anticipating the day when she would be compelled to acquiesce in the opening of the new highway, she has shrewdly secured the military command of the new course of trade which threatens her monopoly.

For the United States, the distances to the East are reduced to from 2000 to 4000 miles. But on account of winds and currents for homeward-bound ships, the old route by way of Cape Horn is still preferable.

The following table, computed by M. de Lesseps, exhibits the distances from European and American ports to Bombay:

Tables showing the Gain of U. S. and European Ports.

PORTS	BY CAPE HORN.	BY SUEZ CANAL.	SAVING EFFECTED BY CANAL.
	MILES.	MILES.	MILES.
Constantinople	14,760	4,350	10,410
Malta	14,130	4,990	9,140
Trieste	14,420	5,660	8,760
Marseilles	13,675	5,745	7,930
Cadiz	12,584	5,384	7,200
Lisbon	12,960	6,050	6,910
Bordeaux	13,670	6,770	6,900
Havre	14,030	6,830	7,200
London	14,400	7,500	6,900
Liverpool	14,280	7,380	6,900
Amsterdam	14,400	7,500	6,900
St. Petersburg	15,850	8,950	6,900
New York	15,000	9,100	5,900
New Orleans	15,600	9,000	6,600

The subjoined table contains distances from London, New York, and Port Royal to certain Eastern ports, compared with distances to the same ports from New York via the Pacific Railroad and Darien:

ORIENTAL PORTS	LONDON, VIA SUEZ.	NEW YORK, VIA SUEZ.	PORT ROYAL, VIA SUEZ.	NEW YORK, VIA PAC. R. R.	NEW YORK, VIA DARIEN.
	MILES.	MILES.	MILES.	MILES.	MILES.
Melbourne	11,280	13,200	13,700	10,300	10,400
Shanghai	11,504	12,500	13,000	8,850	11,100
Hong Kong	10,469	11,700	11,100	9,300	10,850
Manila	9,639	11,600	12,200	9,600	11,500
Singapore	8,239	10,300	10,800	10,600	12,800[4]
Batavia		10,500	11,000	11,000	12,550
Penang	7,859	9,950	10,430	11,000	12,800
Calcutta	7,964	9,700	12,200	12,150	14,350
Ceylon	7,946	8,750	9,250	12,200	14,300
Yeddo					10,200
Bombay		9,000
Yokohama		11,504

According to the first table, distances from the European and American ports therein named are shortened one-half. According to the second table, the distances to Oriental ports, from the great European and American entrepôts, are greater by the Darien route; but by reason of winds and currents, the voyage by the way of Suez is from four to five days longer.

In the Red Sea the prevailing winds are from the north, which retard the steamers and compel the sailing ships to beat up to Suez. “From Suez to Ceylon,” according to the London Times, “the winds are unfavorable. From Point de Galle to Swan River, terrible hurricanes sweep the Indian Ocean. Along the coast of New South Wales, violent winds prevail from the westward, causing a prodigious sea to arise, which nearly precludes navigation in that direction.”

The route by way of Good Hope is beset by gales from the south-west and north-west, rendering the return passage a matter of great uncertainty; but by Darien or Panama route, going or returning, regular voyages and smooth seas may be counted on with precision.

For steam, but more especially for sailing vessels, the American route, lying in the zone of the trade-winds, possesses special advantages. Outgoing and returning ships may trim their sails to favorable winds; and the experienced navigator may have the aid of confluent currents, and enter the monsoons at greater advantage.

Napoleon III, when a prisoner in Ham, thoroughly examined the advantages of the American route. “In regard to the United States of America,” he observes, “all the distances would be shortened 1400 miles and fifteen days”——“Europe would gain forty-seven days in a voyage to the coast of South America, while the United States would gain sixty-two days. To China and Sidney, Europe would gain twenty-nine days, and the United States twenty-four days.”

But it is not as rivals that the two routes should be compared, but as parts of the same system by which maritime nations are brought into commercial union. The benefit which each route will confer upon commerce is doubled by considering the effects of both together. The one opens the gates to the East, the other to the West. While one route is favorable to outward ships, the other affords equal advantages to the homeward bound, so that in many cases the most desirable route would lead to a circumnavigation of the globe.

To appreciate the importance of such a system of navigation, and exhibit some of the advantages of the American route, it may be well to compare it with the old route, by the way of the Cape, which will still remain the principal highway to the East.

“The Englishman,” says Lieut. Maury, “meets the American in all the markets of the world with the advantage of ten days or upward. Cut through the Isthmus, and instead of some ten days’ sail or more, the scale would be turned, and we shall have the advantage of some twenty days’ sail, thus making a difference of thirty or forty days under canvas.” The distance between New York, China, India, and Australia, and the west coast of South America exceeds that by way of Cape Horn from 8,000 to 14,000 miles.

To the States lying in the great basin of the Mississippi, and to all the cities situated on its navigable waters, the gain is much greater. These parts of the continent, now secluded by their position from direct trade with the west coast of South America and the Indies, will be brought into closer commercial relations with these ports of the world. With but one transshipment, the silk, teas, spices, and fabrics of India, China, Japan, and the Pacific Islands may be landed on the banks of the Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio.

The following tables, taken from the Report of Lieut. Maury to the Committee on Naval Affairs, will show the sailing distance from New York and Liverpool to the principal ports beyond and around Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope. The distances to South and North Pacific ports are greatly reduced by the Darien or Panama route.

	FROM LIVERPOOL.	FROM NEW YORK.
	MILES.	MILES.
To Calcutta, via Cape of Good Hope	16,000	17,500
Calcutta, via Cape Horn	21,500	23,000
Canton, via Cape Horn	20,000	21,500
Canton, via Cape of Good Hope	18,000	19,500
Valparaiso, via Cape Horn	11,400	12,900
Callao, via Cape Horn	12,000	13,500
Guayaquil, via Cape Horn	12,800	14,300
Panama, via Cape Horn	14,500	16,000
San Blas, via Cape Horn	16,300	17,800
Mazatlan, via Cape Horn	16,500	18,000
San Diego, via Cape Horn	17,000	18,500
San Francisco, via Cape Horn	17,500	19,000

The following table shows the saving of time from New York by the new route, via the Isthmus of Panama, as compared with the old routes, via Cape Horn and Cape of Good Hope, to the places therein named, estimating the distance which a common trading ship will sail per day to be one hundred and ten miles, and calculating for the voyage out and home:

FROM N. Y. TO	DISTANCE VIA CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.	LENGTH OF PASSAGE OUT AND HOME.	DISTANCE VIA; CAPE HORN.	LENGTH OF PASSAGE OUT AND HOME.	DISTANCE VIA THE ISTHMUS OF PANAMA.	LENGTH OF PASSAGE OUT AND HOME.	SAVING IN DISTANCE OVER THE ROUTE BY CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.	TIME SAVED BY ISTHMUS OVER TIME BY CAPE HOPE, OUT AND HOME.	SAVING IN DISTANCE OVER THE ROUTE BY CAPE HORN.	TIME SAVED BY ISTHMUS OVER TIME BY CAPE HOPE, OUT AND HOME.
	MILES.	DAYS.	MILES.	DAYS.	MILES.	DAYS.	MILES.	DAYS.	MILES.	DAYS.
Calcutta	17,500	318	23,000	418	13,400	244	4,100	74	9,600	174
Canton	19,500	354	21,500	390	10,600	192	8,900	162	10,900	198
Shanghai	20,000	362	22,000	400	10,400	188	9,600	174	11,600	212
Valparaiso			12,900	234	4,800	86			8,100	148
Callao			13,500	244	3,500	62			10,000	182
Guayaquil			14,300	260	2,800	50			11,500	210
Panama			16,000	290	2,000	36			14,000	254
San Blas			17,800	322	3,800	68			14,000	254
Mazatlan			18,000	326	4,000	72			14,000	254
San Diego			18,500	336	4,500	82			14,000	254
San Francisco			19,000	344	5,000	90			14,000	254
Wellington, N. Z.	13,740		11,100		8,480		5,260		2,620
Melbourne, Australia	13,230		12,720		9,890		3,340		2,830

The following condensed statement, from tables carefully prepared by an advocate of intermarine canals, exhibits some of the commercial advantages depending upon the completion of the route:

Table showing the saving to the trade of the world, in insurance on vessels and cargoes, interest on cargoes, saving of wear and tear of ships, and saving of wages, provisions, etc., by using the Isthmus Canal:

United States	$35,995,930
England	9,950,348
France	2,183,930
Other countries	1,400,000
Total yearly saving	$49,530,208

Exports of Great Britain increased one hundred and seven per cent. in ten years; exports of France increased one hundred and thirty per cent. in ten years; exports of the United States increased ninety-three per cent. in ten years. If the trade increases one hundred per cent. in the next ten years, the saving to the world will then be ninety-nine millions sixty thousand four hundred and sixteen dollars ($99,060,416) per annum.

Taking this statement as a basis, and representing the gross pecuniary interest of the United States in the proposed canal as unity, the saving to Great Britain will be one-fourth, to France one-eighteenth, and to all other countries one-thirty-fifth.

This preponderance of interest on the part of the United States may be taken to imply a proportionate share in the cost. Such would be a correct conclusion if our Government retained control of the route. Surrendering the latter claim, she relinquishes with it her proportionate liability, and is entitled to be received as one of the contracting parties upon terms of equality. The respective shares of the parties is, however, a proper subject for diplomatic arrangement. But while the greatest saving accrues to the United States, the absolute value of our oriental exports and imports is about equal to that of Great Britain, and about double that of France and other countries.

Neutralization of the Isthmus is only, in appearance, a suspension of the policy understood as the Monroe Doctrine. It can be made an international recognition of that policy. Such objections, even if well founded, sink into insignificance in comparison with the benefits which must accrue to mankind at large. The United States has not shown herself so incapable of adopting a policy in accordance with her high destiny, as to justify a suspicion that she will ever by her acts sanction the selfish theory that “nations may combine to oppress and plunder, but rarely for any useful or benevolent purpose.” The progress of events has already made her an arbiter in the destiny of nations, and she can no longer, by an insular and anti-social policy, separate herself from the interests of the great family of nations. Mutual and liberal concessions in the generous spirit of our civilization, looking to the extension of commerce, industry, arts, science, and religion throughout the world, can alone lead to that harmonious coöperation without which an interoceanic ship canal must remain forever problematical.

The above tables supply material for other important conclusions. Eighteen vessels, sailing from as many different ports in East India, China, Japan, Australia, and South America, would save the average distance of 8,791 miles, equivalent to a voyage by sail of about eighty days, or to between thirty-six and forty days by steam.

Supposing the average tonnage of ships to be one thousand tons, then three thousand and ninety-four steamships would be requisite to carry the freight which would now seek the Isthmus annually. The saving of time to trade and to each man would be about three and four-tenths years to every generation of thirty-three years. The amount of tonnage above mentioned would give employment to 86,632 seamen, giving to them, by the new route, a saving of time in one generation amounting to the aggregate of 294,548 years. The benefits being diffused among all engaged or interested, directly or indirectly, the accession to the time, wealth, and industry of so large a number of men is not only a great economic and commercial advantage, but may be regarded as participating in the nature of those beneficent, moral movements which characterize the age.

The annual saving to the trade of the world is shown to be $49,530,208.00. The annual increase of the trade of Great Britain, France, and the United States is together more than one hundred per cent. The saving to the maritime powers in one year at the end of a decade will be $99,060,416.00. Assuming the trade of the three powers to increase in the same ratio, the total amount saved at the end of ten years will be equal to the aggregate of the amounts saved each year, and foots up as follows:

Amount	saved	at end of	first year	$54,483,228.80
“	“	“	second year	59,436,249.60
“	“	“	third year	64,389,270.40
“	“	“	fourth year	69,342,291.20
“	“	“	fifth year	74,295,312.00
“	“	“	sixth year	79,248,332.80
“	“	“	seventh year	84,201,353.60
“	“	“	eighth year	89,154,374.40
“	“	“	ninth year	94,107,395.20
“	“	“	tenth year	99,060,416.10
Entire amount saved in ten years				$767,718,224.10

This result is verified by an estimate based upon the tonnage which will be actually engaged in this trade:

Maintenance of ship and crew of 1000 tons	$500	per month.
Interest of 1½ per cent. on tonnage worth $17,000	255	“
Insurance at 1 per cent. on value of ship worth $18,000	180	“
Saving per month	$935
Add reduction of insurance upon ship and cargo at 1 per cent.	350
Total saving per month	$1285

The annual saving for each ship will be $15,420, giving as the aggregate saved upon the tonnage which would pass the Isthmus the sum of $47,709,480, and the saving of one year at the end of a decade as $95,418,960, a sum sufficiently near the first to establish its correctness.

The following tables were compiled by Mr. F. W. Kelley, of New York, and were intended to exhibit the effect upon the trade of the world by the completion of the canal through the Isthmus:

Table showing the trade of the U. S. that would pass through the Isthmus Canal, if now finished. Taken from the official returns for 1857.

COUNTRIES TRADED WITH.	EXPORTS AND IMPORTS.	TONNAGE.
Russian North American Possessions	$  126,537	$  5,735
Dutch East Indies	904,550	16,589
British Australia and New Zealand	4,728,083	52,105
British East Indies	11,744,151	177,121
French East Indies	98,432	3,665
Half of Mexico	9,601,063	34,673
Half of New Granada	5,375,354	131,708
Central America	425,081	36,599
Chile	6,645,634	63,749
Peru	716,679	193,131
Ecuador	48,979	1,979
Sandwich Islands	1,151,849	33,876
China	12,752,062	123,578
Other ports in Asia and Pacific	80,143	4,549
Whale Fisheries	10,796,090	116,730
California to East United States	35,000,000	861,698
Value of cargoes	$100,294,687	$ 1,857,485
Value of ships, at $50 per ton	92,874,250
Total value of ships and cargoes	$193,168,937	$92,874,250

“Whale ships and coasting vessels have been estimated generally throughout this appendix at forty dollars ($40) per ton. The United States and European commerce around the Capes is conducted in first-class ships, which often cost eighty dollars ($80) per ton. Fifty dollars ($50) have therefore been taken as the fair average value in the construction of this table, which does not include coasting trade.”

Table showing the trade of England that would pass through the Isthmus Canal, if now finished. Taken from the official returns for 1856.

COUNTRIES TRADED WITH.				EXPORTS AND IMPORTS.	TONNAGE.
Half of Mexico				$ 2,775,137	$ 11,833
Half of Central America				1,244,817	5,615
Half of New Granada				2,437,605	10,188
Chile				15,486,110	118,311
Peru				20,473,520	244,319
Ecuador				360,015	1,820
China		Outward; only 40 days saved by the canal		7,077,390	68,530
Java				3,821,410	16,003
Singapore				4,364,070	16,500
Australia and New Zealand				78,246,095	522,426
Sandwich Islands				520,560	1,950
California				2,378,105	11,800
Value of trade				$139,184,834	$ 1,029,295
Value of ships, at $50 per ton				51,464,750
Total value of trade and ships				$190,649,584	$51,464,750

Table showing the trade of France that would pass through the Isthmus Canal, if now finished. Taken from the official returns for 1857.

COUNTRIES TRADED WITH.				EXPORTS AND IMPORTS.	TONNAGE.
Chile				$ 10,000,000	$  25,688
Peru				13,160,000	35,096
Half of Mexico				2,790,000	10,004
Half of New Grenada				1,090,000	2,389
Ecuador				440,000	1,651
Bolivia				100,000	1,000
California				2,073,859	8,997
China		Outward only		2,180,000	2,028
Dutch East Indies				4,440,000	20,400
Sandwich Islands				2,000,000	4,119
Philippine Islands				1,000,000	1,463
Australia				19,800,000	50,000
Value of cargoes				$59,073,859	$ 162,735
Value of ships at $50 per ton				8,136,750
Toal value				$67,210,609	$8,136,750

The value of the tonnage which would take the Darien route is, according to the above table, $152,475,750, and the total value of exports and imports passing the same way is:

England	$193,168,939
United States	190,649,584
France	67,210,609
Total value of trade passing the Isthmus	$451,029,132

But the aggregate amount of British imports and exports from and to India and China is $378,587,122, giving the value of the trade which would pass through the Suez and Darien Canals $636,447,315, yearly.

The rapidly growing trade between Levantine ports and India would take the Suez route, but between the European ports and the Pacific coast of North and South America, and between the east and west coasts of these two continents, the American route would be exclusively employed.

In selecting a route to oriental ports it is evident, from the facts of physical geography, as stated by Lieut. Maury, Napoleon III, and the writer in the London Times, that the navigator seeking to make a rapid voyage would adopt the American route both going and returning, except, perhaps, between Levantine and Indian ports. Between French, English, Levantine, and Indian ports, the outward voyage by way of Darien, or Panama, and homeward by way of Suez would, in many cases, be favorable to the quickest trip.

The [Suez Canal] was built by French talent, French energy, French machinery, and French money. England and the Mediterranean States participate in the benefit. But the larger share of the profit belongs to France, by reason of her ports and industrial resources; and so far as France and the Levant enter into a direct trade with India, so far, it has been supposed, will the value of trade between Great Britain and India be impaired.

We have spoken of the piercement of the American Isthmus as an international work. It should rather be the work of American energy, American talent, and American money. It is part of the American continent. No foreign nation can have the same military control of it that Great Britain now has of the [Suez Canal]. The benefit of its construction, although shared by the maritime powers, will be most important to the Americas, and by reason of resources, organization, and position, especially to the United States. It deserves consideration as an American project.

---