ARTICLE SIGNED "CANDIDUS."
[Boston Gazette, September 23, 1771.]
Messieurs EDES & GILL,
The consequence of the determination of the house of Representatives not to rescind the resolution of the former house, of which I gave you a particular account in my last, was an immediate prorogation of the general assembly, and the next day a dissolution, agreeable to the orders of a minister of state! - Governor Bernard in a subsequent letter to lord Hillsborough, pressed his lordship for further orders respecting the calling a new assembly; and acquainted him that "when the usual time should come, it would be quite necessary that the governor should be able to vouch positive orders for his not calling the assembly, if he was not to do it," and he adds that, "with regard to calling the new assembly in May, it would require much consideration." By the Charter of this province, which is a Compact between the Crown and the People, it is ordained that a General Assembly shall be called on every last Wednesday in May yearly: Did gov. Bernard then think that his lordship, to whom in one instance at least, he had surrendered the power of the governor of the province, could by another order rescind that effectual Right of the Charter? It would in truth require much consideration with one, even of his lordship's peculiar turn of mind, before he would assume an authority to put an end to the constitution of the province: He had gone far enough already. - The Charter further ordains, that the assembly shall be held "at all such other times as the governor shall think fit." Not as lord Hillsborough shall think fit, for he is not the governor. Could the governor think that the people were so stupid as to be satisfied with his vouching - orders for neglecting that which it was his indispensable duty to do as governor of the province; and by neglecting which, either with or without his lordship's orders, there would be an end to the supreme legislative power; the establishing of which, as Mr. Locke says, is the first and fundamental positive law of the commonwealth. The general assembly is constituted by the charter, the legislative of the province; having full power and authority to make all such orders, laws, statutes, &c. not repugnant to the laws of England, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the province. - "The first framers of the government, not being able by any foresight to prefix so just periods of return and duration to the assemblies of the legislative, in all times to come, that might exactly answer all the emergencies of the commonwealth, the best method that could be found, was to trust this to the prudence of one, who was always to be present, and whose business it should be to watch over the commonwealth." Hence the charter provides, that the governor who is to reside in the province, and who, being always present, must be acquainted with the state and exigences of the public affairs, shall have full power and authority to adjourn or dissolve the assembly, and call a new one from time to time as he shall judge necessary: But our governors have of late given up this power of judging - to a minister of state; residing at a thousand leagues distance, and therefore utterly unable to determine, if it was lawful for him to do it, at what time the necessities of the state might require the immediate exertion of legislative power. This ministerial manoeuvre, to speak in modern language, which threatens the destruction of the constitution, will, it is hoped, be the subject of national enquiry, when the present confusion in Britain and America shall, as it must soon, be brought to a happy issue. "The legislative is sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community has fixed it." In this province it is fixed by the community, in the hands of the Governor, Council and House of Representatives: In their hands therefore, it ought to rest sacred and unalterable; to be sure as long as the express conditions of the compact are fulfilled. - Lord Stafford, and many lords and great men before him, suffered death for attempting to overthrow the constitution of the state. - Their crime was called, and I supposed justly called, Treason: It surely could not have been treason therefore, to have disturbed and resisted them in their mad attempts, even though they might have produced the orders of a king - What punishment awaits those who have manifestly attempted to overthrow the constitution of the American colonies, the time which we hope for, and is hastening on, will determine. If the very being of the legislative of this province is for the future to depend upon the mere will and pleasure of an arbitrary minister - if he may take it upon him to dictate such measures as he pleases, and to dissolve them, or which is the same thing, order an obsequious governor to do it, upon their non-compliance with his will and pleasure, surely we have little to boast of in such an assembly. The charter may be taken away in tarts as well as in the whole: And it seems by some later ministerial mandates and measures, as if there was a design to deprive us of our Charter-Rights by degrees. An attempt upon the whole by one stroke would perhaps be thought too bold an undertaking. His lordship could not indeed have chosen a more effectual step to deprive us of the whole benefit of a free constitution, than by attempting to controul the debates and determinations of the House of Representatives, which ought forever to be free, and suspending the legislative power of the province, for their refusing to obey any mandate, especially when it is not only contrary to their judgments and consciences, but, as it appeared to them, absurd. It is a pitiful constitution indeed, which so far from being fixed and permanent as it should be - sacred and unalterable in the hands of those where the community has placed it, depends entirely upon the breath of a minister, or of any man: But it is to be feared from this as well as other more recent instances, that there is a design to rase the foundations of the constitutions of these colonies, and place them upon this precarious and sandy foundation. - I have seen a letter from the agent of this province to the government here, dated so long ago as March the 7th, 1750; wherein he says, "I am afraid there is at bottom in the minds of some, a fixed design of getting a parliamentary sanction of some kind or other, if possible, to the King's instructions on this occasion;" which was the redressing the inconveniencies proceeding from the paper bills. And in another letter of the 12th of April following, he writes, "Since my last, I have found too great reason to confirm my apprehensions, that some persons of consequence here, are determined, if possible, to put the future use of the credit of the several governments of New England, wholly under the power of an instruction; and what tendency that may have to introduce the King's instructions into the government of the other colonies, in other instances, I need not observe This design seems to be conducted with great art." The fears of that watchful agent, there is reason to apprehend, from the perfect good understanding that now exists between the ruling men in the American department, on both sides the atlantic, may very soon be far from appearing groundless. Instructions have of late been so frequent, and in every instance so punctiliously obeyed, that there is reason to fear, unless greater attention is had to them, they soon will be established as rules of administration, not only to governors as servants of the crown, but to legislatures. The enforcing them seems to be conducted with equal art on this side of the water at present, to that with which the original design of introducing them was conducted on the other side, when that agent wrote. They may soon therefore be regarded as fixed laws in the colonies, even without the sanction or intervention of parliament Principiis obsta, is a maxim worth regarding in politics as well as morals, and it is more especially to be observed, when those who are the most assiduous in their endeavours to alter the civil Constitution, are not less so in persuading us to go to sleep and dream that we are in a state of perfect security. - What benefit is it to us to have a governor residing in the province, invested with certain powers of judging -, and acting according to his own judgment, for the good of the people, if he submit to be made a man of wire, & for the sake of preserving the emolument of a governor, with the name only, is turned this way or that, as the minister directs, without any judgment of his own? And of what use can a legislative be to us, without the free exercise of the powers of legislation? Liable to be thrown out of existence for not acting in conformity to the will of another? Can there be any material difference between such a legislative and none at all? The original constitution of this province, the charter, required the convening of a new general assembly in May: The public exigencies might have required it sooner: But governor Bernard was determined in neither of these cases to convene an assembly, if he could but vouch the positive orders of the minister, who had no right or legal authority at all to interpose in the matter. "The using of force upon the people without authority, and contrary to the trust reposed in him that does so, is a state of war with the people;" This is the judgment of one of the greatest men that ever wrote. "If the executive power, being possessed of the power of the commonwealth, shall make use of that force to hinder the meeting and acting of the legislative, when the original constitution or the public exigencies shall require it, the people have a right to reinstate their legislative in the exercise of their power: For having erected a legislative, with an intent they should exercise the power of making laws, either at certain set times or when there is need of it, if they are hindered by any force from what is so necessary to the society, and wherein the safety and preservation of the people consists, they have a right to remove it by force." From this instance of the dissolution of the assembly of this province, as well as that of the suspension of the legislative of New York, for refusing to execute an act of parliament, requiring them to give and grant away their own and their constituents money for the support of a standing army, posterity will form a judgment of the temper of the British administration at that time: Whether a different disposition has since prevailed, will appear from the measures they have taken in general; and particularly from the answers to the addresses, petitions and remonstrances which we have lately seen. One would have thought that the American legislative assemblies had become too harmless bodies to have been the object of ministerial rage, since the passing of acts of parliament for the sole purpose of raising revenues at the expence of the colonists, without their consent, and for appropriating those revenues as they should think proper. The most essential Rights of American legislation, are those of raising and applying their own monies for the support of their own government, and for their own defence: By the late revenue acts, these rights are in effect superseded; the parliament having already granted, such sums as they please, out of the purses of the colonists, for the same purposes. Thus the shadow of legislation only remains to them: Their importance is at an end. They may indeed, as the Pennsylvania farmer observes, whose works I wish every American would read over again, "They may perhaps be allowed to make laws for yoking of hogs or pounding of stray cattle: Their influence will hardly be permitted to extend so high as the keeping roads in repair; as that business may more properly be executed by those who receive the public cash." Their substantial rights and powers, lord Hillsborough himself should know, are as really annihilated by these acts, as they would be, if they were deprived of all existence. "Upon what occasion, says that elegant writer, will the crown ever call our assemblies together, when, the charges of the administration of justice, the support of civil government, and the expences of protecting, defending and securing us, are provided for" by the parliament? "Some few of them may meet of their own accord, by virtue of their several charters: But what will they have to do when they are met? To what shadows will they be reduced? The men, whose deliberations heretofore, had an influence on every matter relating to the liberty and happiness of themselves and their constituents, and whose authority in domestic affairs at least, might well be compared to that of Roman senators, will find their determinations to be of no more consequence than that of constables." - And this will not be the utmost extent of our misery and infamy