The Writings of Samuel Adams - Volume 2

by Samuel Adams

ARTICLE SIGNED "CANDIDUS."

[Boston Gazette, January 20, 1772.]

Messieurs EDES & GILL,

IN the Massachusetts-Gazette of the 9th instant, Chronus attempts to prove that "the Parliament's laying duties upon trade, for the express purpose of raising a revenue, is not repugnant to and subversive of our constitution." In defence of this proposition, he proceeds to consider the nation as commercial, and from thence to show the necessity of laws for the regulation of trade. - In the nation he includes Great-Britain and all the Colonies, and infers that these acts for the regulation of trade, "should extend to all the British dominions, to prevent one part of the national body from injuring another." And, says he, "If laws for the regulation of trade are necessary, who so proper to enact them, &c. as the British parliament, or to dispose of the fines & forfeitures arising from the breach of such acts?" And then he tells us, that as a number of preventive officers will hereupon become necessary, the parliament have thought proper to assign to his Majesty's revenue "the profits arising on the duties of importation for the payment of those officers ". This is Chronus's "method of reasoning ", to prove that because it is necessary that the parliament should enact laws for the regulation of trade, about which there has as yet been no dispute that I know of, and because it is proper that such preventive officers as shall be found needful to carry those laws into execution, should be paid out of the fines and forfeitures arising from the breach of them, Therefore, the parliament hath a right to make laws imposing duties or taxes, for the express purpose of raising a revenue in the colonies without their consent; and that this is not (as is alledg'd by our Patriots ") "repugnant to or subversive of our constitution ". Every one may easily see how Chronus evades the matter in dispute, and aims at amusing his readers according to his usual manner, by endeavouring, and that without a shadow of argument, to prove one point, instead of another which is quite distinct from it, and which he ought to prove, but cannot. He is indeed sensible that his artifice is seen through; that it will be urged that "he has evaded the chief difficulties," and that "the objection doth not lie against the regulation of trade, but against the imposing duties for the express purpose of raising a revenue." And he is full ready to remove this objection. But how? Why, by asking a question, which he often substitutes in the room of argument. Are we not, says he, "fellow-subjects with our brethren at home, and consequently bound to bear a part according to our ability, in supporting the honor & dignity of the crown?" It is allow'd that we are the subjects of the same prince with our brethren at home, and are in duty bound, as far as we are able, to support the honor and dignity of our Sovereign, while he affords us his protection. But does Chronus from thence infer an obligation on us to yield obedience to the acts of the British parliament imposing taxes upon us with the express intention of raising a revenue, to be appropriated for such purposes as that legislative thinks proper, without our consent? 0, says he, "there is good reason for this." What is the good reason? Why "if we will not consent to do anything ourselves ", "our money will be taken from us without our consent." This is conclusive argument indeed. And then he, as it were, imperceptibly glides into that which has ever appeared to be his favorite topick, however impertinent to the present point, viz, an independent support for the governor. He boldly affirms, what is a notorious untruth, that "we are unwilling to pay his Majesty's substitute in such a manner as should leave him that freedom and independency which is necessary to his station, and with which he is vested by the constitution:" And therefore the parliament hath a right to enable his Majesty to pay his substitute, out of a revenue extorted from us against our consent. If his premises were well grounded, his conclusion would not follow: And the question would still remain, to which Chronus has not attempted to give any rational answer, namely, By what authority doth the parliament these things, and who gave them this authority? Thus we still continue to dispute the authority of the parliament to lay duties and taxes upon us, with the express purpose of raising a revenue, as "repugnant to, and subversive of our constitution;" and for a reason which I dare say Chronus will never get over, namely, because as he himself allows," we are not represented in it." -

The English constitution, says Baron Montesquieu, has Liberty for its direct object: And the constitution of this province, as our own historian,1 informs us, is an epitome of the British constitution; and it undoubtedly has the same end for its object: Whatever laws therefore are made for our government, either in a manner, or for purposes subversive of Liberty, must be subversive of the end of the constitution, and consequently of the constitution itself. - No free people, as the Pennsylvania Farmer has observed, ever existed, or ever can exist without, to use a common but strong expression, keeping the purse-strings in their hands: But the parliament's laying taxes on the Colonies for the express purpose of raising a revenue, takes the purse strings out of their hands, and consequently it is "repugnant to, and subversive of (the end of) our constitution "-Liberty. Mr. Locke says, that the security of property is the end for which men enter into society; and I believe Chronus will not deny it: Whatever laws therefore are made in any society, tending to render property insecure, must be subversive of the end for which men prefer society to the state of nature; and consequently must be subversive of society itself:

But the parliament in which the Colonies have no voice, taking as much of their money as it pleases, and appropriating it to such purposes as it pleases, even against their consent, and as they think repugnant to their safety, renders all their property precarious, and therefore it is subversive of the end for which men enter into society and repugnant to every free constitution. - Mr. Hooker in his ecclesiastical polity, as quoted by Mr. Locke, affirms that "Laws they are not, which the public approbation hath not made so." This seems to be the language of nature and common sense; for if the public are bound to yield obedience to the laws, to which they cannot give their approbation, they are slaves to those who make such laws and enforce them: But the acts of parliament imposing duties, with the express purpose of raising a revenue in the colonies, have received every mark of the public disapprobation in every colony; and yet they are enforced in all, and in some with the utmost rigour. The British constitution having liberty for its object, is so framed, as that every man who is to be bound by any law about to be made, may be present by his representative in parliament, who may employ the whole force of his objections against it, if he cannot approve of it: If after fair debate, it is approv'd of by the majority of the whole representative body of the nation, the minority, by a rule essential in society, and without which it could not subsist, is bound to submit to it: But the colonies had no voice in parliament when the revenue acts were made; nay, though they had no representatives there, their petitions were rejected, because they were against duties to be laid on; and they have been called factious, for the objections they made, not only against their being taxed without their consent, which was a sufficient objection, but against the appropriation of the money when rais'd to purposes which as the Farmer has made to appear, will supersede the authority in our respective assemblies, which is most essential to liberty. Representation and Legislation, as well as taxation, are inseparable, according to the spirit of our constitution; and of all others that are free. Human foresight is incapable of providing against every accident. A small part of the nation may be "at sea, as Chronus tells us, when writs are issued out for the election of members of parliament"; and to admit that they, after their return "should be exempt from any acts of parliament, the members of which were chosen in their absence ", would be attended with greater evil to the community, the safety and welfare of which is the end of all legislation, than the misfortune of their voluntary absence, if it should prove one, could be to them. I say, if it should prove a misfortune to them; for those acts being made by the consent of representatives chosen by all the rest of the nation, it is presum'd they are calculated for the good of the whole, of which they, as a part, must necessarily partake: But the supposed case of these persons is far different from that of the colonists; who are, not by a voluntary choice of their own, but through necessity, not by mere accident, but by means of the local distance of their constant residence, excluded from being present by representation in the British legislature. Chronus allows that by means of their distance, "they are become incapable of exercising their original right of choosing representatives for the British parliament." If so, they cannot without subversion of the end of the British constitution, be bound to obedience, against their own consent, to such laws as are there made; especially such laws as tend to render precarious their property, the security of which is the end of men's entering into society. If they are thus bound, they are slaves and not free men: But slavery must certainly be "repugnant to the constitution" which has liberty for its direct object. If the supreme legislative of Great Britain, cannot consistently with the British constitution or the essential liberty of the colonies, make laws binding upon them, and Chronus for ought I can see, has not attempted to make it rationally appear that it can, it is dangerous for the colonies to admit any of its laws. For however upright some may think the present parliament to be, in intention, they may ruin us through mistake arising from an incurable ignorance of our circumstances; and though Chronus may be so singular as to judge the present revenue acts of parliament binding upon the colonies, to be salutary, the time may perhaps come, when even he may be convinced, that future ones may be oppressive and tyrannical, not only in their execution, but in the very intention of those that may make them.

Chronus says, that "he has all along taken it for granted, that the kingdom and the colonies are one dominion." If so he must allow the colonies to take it for granted that they have an equal share with the inhabitants of Britain in the rights belonging to this one dominion, and particularly in the cardinal right of being represented in the supreme legislature. But that right, he says, they are "incapable of exercising," by reason of their distance. We all agree in this, and it is not their fault? Why then should they not have the right of legislating for themselves, as well as that other part of this one dominion? Why truly, we have "a right of choosing an assembly, which with the concurrence of his Majesty's Governor, hath a power of enacting local statutes, establishing taxes, &c. - Yet still in subordination to the general laws of the empire, reserving the full right of supremacy & dominion, which are in themselves unalienable." If I understand his meaning in this dark expression, it is this, we have a right of choosing an assembly, but this assembly is controulable in all its acts, by another assembly which we have no right to choose, and which has this right of controul in itself unalienable. But the question still recurs, How came this right to be in the British parliament? Chronus says that "admitting that we are all one dominion, there is, and must be, a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrouled authority, in which must reside the power of making and establishing laws," "and all others must conform to it, and be govern'd by it". But if we are all one dominion; or if I understand him, the members of one state, tho' so remotely situated, the kingdom from the Colonies, as that we cannot all partake of the rights of the supreme Legislature, why may not this "irresistible, absolute, uncontrouled," and controuling "authority, in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of the government reside", be established in America, or in Ireland, as well as in Britain. Is there any thing in nature, or has Ireland or America consented that the part of this one dominion called Britain shall be thus distinguished? Or are we to infer her authority from her power? But it must be, and Chronus gives us no other reason for it than his bare affirmation, that "the King, Lords and Commons of Great-Britain form the supreme Legislature of the British dominions". And he adds, "to say that each of the Colonies had within itself a supreme independent Legislature, and that nevertheless the kingdom and the Colonies are all one dominion, is a solecism:" Let him then view the Kingdom and the Colonies in another light, and see whether there will be a solecism in considering them as more dominions than one, or separate states. It is certainly more concordant with the great law of nature and reason, which the most powerful nation may not violate and cannot alter, to suppose that the Colonies are separate independent and free, than to suppose that they must be one with Great-Britain and slaves. And slaves they must be, notwithstanding all which Chronus has said to the contrary, if Great Britain may make all laws whatsoever binding upon them, especially laws to take from them what portions of their property she pleases, without and against their consent.

I shall make further remarks upon Chronus, when I shall be at leisure.

CANDIDUS.

1 Mr. Hutchinson.