ARTICLE SIGNED “VALERIUS POPLICOLA."1
[Boston Gazette, October 28, 1771; the text is also in W. V. Wells,
Life of Samuel Adams, vol. 1., pp. 427-432.]
Messieurs EDES & GILL,
THE writer of the history of Massachusetts Bay tells us, that "our ancestors apprehended the acts of trade to be an invasion of the rights, liberties and properties of the subjects of his Majesty in the colony, they not being represented in parliament; and according to the usual sayings of the learned in the law, the laws of England were bounded within the four seas, and did not reach America. However, they made provision by an act of the colony, that they, i.e. the acts of trade should be strictly attended from time to time" -
The passing of this law of the colony, and thus making it an act of their own legislature, he says, "plainly shows the wrong sense they had of the relation they stood in to England " - And he further adds, that "tho' their posterity have as high notions of English Liberties as they had, yet they are sensible that they are Colonists, and therefore subject to the controul of the parent state." As I am not disposed to yield an implicit assent to any authority whatever, I should have been glad if this historian, since he thought proper to pronounce upon so important a matter, had shown us what was the political relation our ancestors stood in to England, and how far, if at all, their posterity are subject to the controul of the parent state. - If he had vouchsafed to have done this, when he published his history, he would have rendered the greatest service both to Great-Britain and America, and eased the minds of multitudes who have been unsatisfied in points of such interesting importance.
Mr. Locke, in his treatise on government discovers the weakness of this position, That every man is born a subject to his Prince, and therefore is under the perpetual tie of subjection and allegiance; and he shows that express consent alone, makes any one a member of any commonwealth. He holds that submission to the laws of any country, & living quietly & enjoying privileges & protection under them, does not make a man a member of that society, or a perpetual subject of that commonwealth, any more than it would make a man subject to another, in whose family he found it convenient to abide for some time, tho' while he continued under it, he were obliged to comply with the laws, and submit to the government he found there. Every man was born naturally free; nothing can make a man a subject of any commonwealth, but his actually entering into it by positive engagement, and express promise & compact.
If the sentiments of this great man are well grounded, our historian before he asserted so peremptorily that the ancestors of this country as colonists were subject to the controul of the parent state, should have first made it appear that by positive engagement, or express promise or contract, they had thus bound themselves.
Every man being born free, says another distinguished writer, the son of a citizen, arrived at the years of discretion, may examine whether it be convenient for him to join in the society for which he was destined by birth. If he finds that it will be no advantage for him to remain in it, he is at liberty to leave it, preserving as much as his new engagements will allow him, the love and gratitude he owes it.2 He further says, "There are cases in which a citizen has an absolute right to renounce his country, and abandon it for ever"; which is widely different from the sentiment of the historian, that "allegiance is not local, but perpetual and unalienable": And among other cases in which a citizen has this absolute right, he mentions that, when the sovereign, or the greater part of the nation will permit the exercise of only one religion in the state; which was the case when our ancestors forsook their native country.
They were denied the rights of conscience. They left, it however with the consent of the nation: It is allowed by this historian that they departed the kingdom with the leave of their prince. They removed at their own expence and not the nation's, into a country claimed and possessed by independent princes, whose right to the lordship and dominion thereof has been acknowledged by English kings; and they fairly purchased the lands of the rightful owners, and settled them at their own and not the nation's expence. It is incumbent then upon this historian to show, by what rule of equity or right, unless they expressly consented to it, they became subject to the controul of the parent state. - The obligation they had been under to submit to the government of the nation, by virtue of their enjoyment of lands which were under its jurisdiction, according to Mr. Locke, began and ended with the enjoyment. That was but a tacit consent to the government; and when by donation, sale or otherwise, they quitted the possession of those lands, they were at liberty, unless it can be made to appear they were otherwise bound by positive engagement or express contract, to incorporate into any other commonwealth, or begin a new one in vacuis locis, in any part of the world they could find free and unpossessed. - They entered into a compact, it is true, with the king of England, and upon certain conditions become his voluntary subjects, not his slaves. But did they enter into an express promise to be subject to the controul of the parent state? What is there to show that they were any way bound to obey the acts of the British parliament, but those very acts themselves? Is there any thing but the mere ipse dixit of an historian, who for ought any one can tell, design'd to make a sacrifice to the ruling powers of Great-Britain, to show that the parent state might exercise the least controul over them as Colonists, any more than the English parliament could exercise controul over the dominions which the Kings formerly held in France, or than it can now over the inhabitants of the moon, if there be any?
By the charter of this province, the legislative power is in the Governor, who is appointed by the King, the Council and House of Representatives. The legislative of any commonwealth must be the supreme power. But if any edict or instruction of any body else, in what form soever conceiv'd, or by what power soever backed, can have the force and obligation of a law in the province which has not its sanction from that legislative, it cannot be the supreme power. Its laws however salutary, are liable at any time to be abrogated at the pleasure of a superior power. No body can have a power to make laws over a free people, but by their own consent, and by authority receiv'd from them: It follows then, either that the people of this province have consented & given authority to the parent state to make laws over them, or that she has no such authority. No one I believe will pretend that the parent state receives any authority from the people of this province to make laws for them, or that they have ever consented she should. If the people of this province are a part of the body politick of Great Britain, they have as such a right to be consulted in the making of all acts of the British parliament of what nature soever. If they are a separate body politick, and are free, they have a right equal to that of the people of Great Britain to make laws for themselves, and are no more than they, subject to the controul of any legislature but their own. "The lawful power of making laws to command whole politick societies of men, belongs so properly unto the same intire societies, that for any prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth to exercise the same of himself, and not by express commission immediately and personally receiv'd from God, or else from authority deriv'd at the first from their consent, upon whose persons they impose laws, is no better than mere tyranny. Laws therefore they are not which publick approbation hath not made so.3 This was the reason given by our ancestors why they should not be bound by the acts of parliament, because not being represented in parliament, the publick approbation of the province had not made them laws. And this is the reason why their posterity do not hold themselves rightly oblig'd to submit to the revenue acts now in being, because they never consented to them. The former, under their circumstances, thought it prudent to adopt the acts of trade, by passing a law of their own, and thus formally consenting that they should be observ'd. But the latter I presume will never think it expedient to copy after their example.
The historian tells his readers that "They (the people of this province) humbly hope for all that tenderness and indulgence from a British parliament, which the Roman senate, while Rome remain'd free, shewed to Roman colonies" - Why the conduct of Rome towards her colonies should be recommended as an example to our parent state, rather than that of Greece, is difficult to conjecture, unless it was because as has been observed, the latter was more generous and a better mother to her colonies than the former. Be that as it may, the colonists have a right to expect from the parent state all possible tenderness; not only as they sprang from her, and are subjects of the same King, but as they have greatly contributed to her wealth & grandeur: And we are willing to render to her respect and certain expressions of honor and reverence as the Grecian colonies did to the city from whence they deriv'd their origin, as Grotius says, so long as the colonies were well treated. By our compact with our King, wherein is contain'd the rule of his government and the measure of our submission, we have all the liberties and immunities of Englishmen, to all intents, purposes and constructions whatever; and no King of Great-Britain, were he inclin'd, could have a right either with or without his parliament, to deprive us of those liberties - They are originally from God and nature, recognized in the Charter, and entail'd to us and our posterity: It is our duty therefore to contend for them whenever attempts are made to violate them.
He also says that "the people of Ireland were under the same mistake" with our ancestors; that is, in thinking themselves exempt from the controul of English acts of parliament. But nothing drops from his pen to shew that this was a mistake, excepting that "particular persons in Ireland did pennance for advancing and adhering to those principles." The same mighty force of reasoning is used to prove that this colony was mistaken, viz. "They suffer'd the loss of the charter." Such arguments may serve to evince the power of the parent state, but neither its wisdom nor justice appears from them. The sense of the nation however was very different after the revolution. The House of Commons voted the judgment against the Charter a Grievance; and a bill was brought in and passed that house for restoring the Charters, among which that of this province was expresly mentioned; notwithstanding the mistake abovemention'd was one great article of charge against it. But the parliament was proroug'd sooner than was expected, by reason of the King's going to Ireland.
Our historian tells his readers by way of consolation, that "it may serve as some excuse for our ancestors, but they were not alone in their mistaken apprehensions of the nature of their subjection"; and he appears to be mighty glad that "so sensible a gentleman as Mr. Molineux, the friend of Mr. Locke, engag'd in the cause". But we want no excuse for any supposed mistakes of our ancestors. Let us first see it prov'd that they were mistakes. 'Till then we must hold ourselves obliged to them for sentiments transmitted to us so worthy of their character, and so important to our security: And we shall esteem the arguments of so sensible, and it might justly be added, so learned a gentleman as Mr. Molineux, especially as they had the approbation of his friend Mr. Locke to be valid, while we see nothing to oppose them, but the unsupported opinion of Mr. Hutchinson.
VALERIUS POPLICOLA.
1 Attributed to Adams by Wells and by Bancroft, and also by the annotations of the Dorr file of the Gazette. 2 Mr. Vattel, law of nature and nations. 3 Hooker's Eccl. Poi.