Two Wars: An Autobiography of General Samuel G. French / Mexican War; War between the States, a Diary; Reconstruction Period, His Experience; Incidents, Reminiscences, etc.

by Samuel Gibbs French

CHAPTER XVI.

THE BATTLE OF ALLATOONA.

From Lovejoy's to Lost Mountain—Big Shanty—Acworth—Destroying Railroad—In the Rear of Sherman—Situation of the Two Armies—Orders to Destroy the Etowah River Bridge—To Fill Up the Railroad Cut at Allatoona—Hood Not Aware that Allatoona Was Fortified and Garrisoned—March to Allatoona—Summons to Surrender—No Answer—Gen. Corse's Report Erroneous—The Fortifications—Strength of Forces—Equalization of Forces—Some Federal Dispatches—The Battle—Corse's Account—Col. Ludlow's Description—Desperate Fighting—The Main Line Captured—Enemy Driven into an Interior Fort—Dispatches from Gen. Armstrong Respecting Movements of the Enemy at Big Shanty—Withdraw to Avoid Being Surrounded by Converging Forces—Corse's Dispatch to Sherman—Provisions—Confederates Three Days and Nights without Rest or Sleep—Pass by the Enemy—Evangelist P. P. Bliss Writes the (Gospel) Hymn, "Hold the Fort"—Hood and His Erroneous Publications in His Book—His Admiration for Corse—My Admiration for the Confederates—The Soldier's Grave—The Lone Grave—Lieut. Gen. A. P. Stewart's Note in Regard to This Account of the Battle.

September 29. This morning Loring's, Walthall's, and my divisions moved on the Pumpkinton road and crossed the Chattahoochee river and encamped beyond Villa Rica. The following day we marched to near Brownsville Post Office.

Saturday, October 1. I remained in camp. At 10 A.M. all the division commanders were invited to Gen. Hood's headquarters, and the object of the move was discussed. I found in the room on my arrival Gens. Stewart, S. D. Lee, Loring, Walthall, Stevenson, and Clayton. As soon as I entered the room Hood said to me: "Gen. French, what do you think Gen. Sherman will do now?" I replied: "I suppose he will turn southwest and move on to Mobile; or he may go to Augusta to destroy our powder mills, and then make for Charleston or Savannah." "In that event do you believe he can sustain his troops on the march if our cavalry lay waste the country before him?" I answered: "He will find all he wants as he moves on." To this Hood replied: "Well, I have nothing to do with that, as the President has promised to attend to that matter." Every officer present disagreed with me save Gen. S. D. Lee. He thought all would have difficulty to subsist except the cavalry.

On the subject of destroying Sherman's communications my diary says:

I was in favor of an immediate move on the railroad above Kennesaw with the whole army, and expressed my regrets at the delay.

I received orders to move to-morrow. We were requested to inform the brigade commanders of the object of moving in the rear of Sherman's army, and they were to inform the regimental and company officers.

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN
FROM ETOWAH RIVER TO ATLANTA.

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2d. I left camp and marched to Moon's, and this brought us to the same ground we occupied on the 24th of May.

3d. When Sherman discovered that Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee and was marching to obtain possession of his line of communication, he immediately adopted measures to defeat Hood's plans and give him battle.

The general situation of the two armies to-day is: Sherman's main body of troops is at Atlanta, with garrisons at the Chattahoochee, Vining's, Marietta, Kennesaw, Big Shanty, Moon's, Acworth, Allatoona Creek, Allatoona fortifications garrisoned by just about one thousand men, Gen. Elliott, chief of cavalry, with his command at Kennesaw, Gen. J. E. Smith, with his division, at Cartersville, Gen. J. M. Corse at Rome with a division, and the garrisons at important places on up to Chattanooga, as disclosed by the movements of troops, dispatches sent directing their movements, and subsequent information.

Hood's army marched to Lost Mountain, where he remained with two corps, while Stewart's Corps went thence in the rear of the enemy's line of fortifications to Big Shanty. Gen. Featherston captured some forty prisoners at Big Shanty, and commenced destroying the railroad. Loring, sent to Acworth (near Allatoona), captured about two hundred prisoners, and Walthall took seventy prisoners at Moon Station. All night every one was hard at work destroying the railroad, and the next day by noon we had about eight miles of the track taken up and the rails twisted.

4th. At noon, when filling up the railroad cuts at Big Shanty, I received orders to fill up the deep cut of the railroad at Allatoona, and then, if possible, destroy the railroad bridge over the Etowah river. About this time some one living near by told us that the enemy had fortifications at Allatoona, well garrisoned and commissary stores there. Under these peculiar orders (which will be given in full hereafter in my report) I left Big Shanty with my division at 3 P.M. for Acworth and thence to Allatoona, while Loring and Walthall were ordered in the direction of New Hope Church. I was now entering the zone of active movements of the Federals, and away from all support, and all support from me, and the enemy converging on Allatoona from all directions. I reached Acworth about dark, and was detained there till 11 P.M., awaiting rations and getting some one for a guide. I saw camp fires of the enemy east of the railroad and north of Kennesaw, and night signals from Allatoona to Kennesaw. From two young ladies, who to-day had visited Allatoona, I obtained the name of the commander there, and the probable strength of the enemy in the several works. I also succeeded, through some of the citizens, in getting a boy for a guide. I moved from Acworth about 11 P.M., and on arriving at Allatoona Creek I left there the Fourth Mississippi Regiment and one piece of artillery, with instructions to burn the bridge and capture the garrison of one hundred men in the blockhouse. When at Acworth I sent fifteen men from a Capt. Taylor's company of cavalry, Pinson's Regiment, to strike the railroad near the Etowah river and tear up the track to prevent reënforcements from reaching Allatoona. I moved on then from the creek, and arrived before Allatoona about 3 A.M. All was darkness; nothing could be seen except occasional lights flitting about the place. I put the artillery, eleven guns, in position, or rather left them in what the guide said was a good place, and also left two regiments of Ector's Brigade under Col. Andrews as a support to them. With the guide directing, I moved the division to gain the flank and rear of the line of works. There were five detached works on the high ridge through which the Western and Atlantic railroad runs. No road leads to this ridge except the Cartersville road, that ascends the ridge by a winding ascent, and enters the works, passing within a few feet of the main redoubt, under its guns, and then runs on the crest of the ridge for two hundred and fifty yards to where it passes out through the fortifications. So the guide directed us through the dark woods and up the steep, rugged, rocky hills, and down into deep valleys until we were lost, and the guide acknowledged that he could not find the way. This determined me to stop and rest till daylight. The pickets had been driven in, and now and then shots were exchanged. Starting again at dawn, I reached the high ridge on which the redoubts were at 7:30 A.M. with the leading brigade. I halted Cockrell's and Ector's Brigades on the ridge, and sent Gen. Sears to gain the rear of the works. The artillery opened fire on the forts (one on either side of the railroad) about 7 A.M., and when we gained the ridge appeared to keep the enemy quiet.

These dispositions being made, about 8 A.M. I summoned the commander to surrender the place. I then supposed the garrison consisted of only about nine hundred men, as reported to me at Acworth. Maj. D. W. Sanders was instructed to allow about twenty minutes for the officer to whom he delivered the message to go and return with the reply. After waiting longer than the specified time, he returned without an answer. Believing Sears was now well around on the north side, and having waited to hear his attack so long, I put Cockrell's Brigade in motion, supported by Ector's Brigade (of four regiments), to make the attack, as it was now 10:20 A.M.

The three companies of the Ninety-Third Illinois that were in the two extreme west redoubts abandoned them without making much resistance, and fell back to a very strong line of defense protected by all the entanglements of modern warfare. Through the center of this work ran the Cartersville road. This part of the defensive work was occupied by the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, Seventh Illinois, and seven companies of the Ninety-Third Illinois, making, in officers and men, a total of just about nine hundred. Against this force, placed in carefully constructed works, I could send only the Missouri brigade and four regiments of the Texas brigade, in all one thousand three hundred and fifty. I had been informed by Gen. Armstrong that the enemy's cavalry was moving up east of the railroad. Then again I received from him a second dispatch informing me that the Federal infantry was passing through Big Shanty and moving up the railroad. This dispatch was dated 9 A.M. Knowing that this column could reach the junction of the Sandtown and Dallas roads before I could, I determined to withdraw, trusting to arrive there first.

F. M. COCKRELL.

But as all these matters are more fully referred to in my report, I will here quit, for the present, further extracts from my diary, and give the report.

In Volume 39, Series 1, page 814, will be found in the "War Records" the following report:

Headquarters French's Division, }
Tuscumbia, Ala., November 5, 1864.}

General: Sometime since I had the honor to submit to you a brief preliminary report of the battle of Allatoona. As the report of the brigade commanders are now in, I have the honor to forward one embracing some of the details of the battle.

About noon on the 4th of October, when at Big Shanty, the following order was handed me by Lieut. Gen. Stewart, it being a copy of one to him:

Headquarters Army of Tennessee, October 4, 1864, 7:30 A.M.

Lieut. Gen. A. P. Stewart, Commanding Corps.

General: Gen. Hood directs that later in the evening you move Stevenson back to Davis's Cross Roads, and that you bring two of your divisions back to Adams's and between Adams's and Davis's Cross Roads, placing them in such a way as to cover the position at Adams's now occupied by Stevenson, and that your third division (say French) shall move up the railroad and fill up the deep cut at Allatoona with logs, brush, rails, dirt, etc. To-morrow morning at daylight he desires Stevenson to be moved to Lieut. Gen. Lee's actual left, that two of your divisions at that time at Adams's shall draw back, with your left in the neighborhood of Davis's Cross Roads, and your right in the neighborhood of Lost Mountain, and the division that will have gone to Allatoona to march thence to New Hope Church and on the position occupied by your other troops—that is, that the division shall rejoin your command by making this march out from the railroad and via New Hope. Gen. Hood thinks that it is probable that the guard at the railroad bridge on Etowah is small, and when French goes to Allatoona, if he can get such information as would justify him, if possible move to that bridge and destroy it. Gen. Hood considers its destruction would be a great advantage to the army and the country. Should he be able to destroy the bridge, in coming out he could move, as has been heretofore indicated, via New Hope.

Yours respectfully,

A. P. Mason,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Soon after an order, of which the following is a copy, was sent me:

Headquarters Army of Tennessee, }
Office of the Chief of Staff, October 4, 1864, 11:30 A.M. }

Lieut. Gen. Stewart, Commanding.

General: Gen. Hood directs me to say that it is of the greatest importance to destroy the Etowah railroad bridge, if such a thing is possible. From the best information we have now he thinks the enemy cannot disturb us before to-morrow, and by that time your main body will be near the remainder of our army. He suggests that if it be considered practicable to destroy the bridge when the division goes there and the artillery is placed in position the commanding officer shall call for volunteers to go to the bridge with lightwood and other combustible material that can be obtained, and set fire to it.

Yours respectfully,

A. P. Mason,
Major and Assistant Adjutant General.

Gen. Stewart's Corps had struck the railroad at Big Shanty on the evening of the 3d, and all three of his divisions had worked all night destroying the railroad from near Kennesaw up to Acworth Station. As we had been informed at Big Shanty that the Allatoona pass or cut was fortified, and that the enemy had a garrison there of three regiments, and had accumulated a considerable amount of provisions, it was considered a matter of importance that the place should be captured, and after the orders were handed me, at my request, Gen. Stewart sent me (with Maj. Myrick) four additional pieces of artillery. It would appear, however, from these orders that the general in chief was not aware that the pass was fortified and garrisoned that I was sent to have filled up. Under these orders I left Big Shanty about 3:30 P.M., and marched to Acworth, a distance of six miles, arriving there before sunset. There I was detained, awaiting the arrival of rations and cooking them, until 11 P.M.

As I knew nothing of the roads, the enemy's works or position, it was important to procure a guide, and at last a young man, or rather boy, was found who knew the roads, and had seen the position of the fortifications at Allatoona, he being a member of a cavalry company. At Acworth Capt. Taylor, of Pinson's Regiment of cavalry, with twenty-five men, reported to me for duty. He was immediately directed to send fifteen men under a trusty officer to strike the railroad as near the Etowah railroad bridge as possible, and take up the rails and hide or destroy them, to prevent trains from reaching Allatoona with reënforcements, as well as to prevent any trains that might be there from escaping. From an eminence near Acworth the enemy could be seen communicating messages by their night signals from Allatoona with the station on Kennesaw; and to the east of us were the fires of a large encampment of the Federals and apparently opposite Moon's Station. Citizens residing here informed me that there was a blockhouse with a garrison of about one hundred men at the Allatoona bridge; that at Allatoona there were two small redoubts with outworks, defended with four pieces of artillery and garrisoned with three and a half regiments of infantry. About 11 P.M. the march was resumed. The night was very dark, and the roads bad. After crossing Allatoona creek, Col. Adaire, with his Fourth Regiment, Mississippi Volunteers, and one piece of artillery, was left near the blockhouse with instructions to surround it, capture the garrison, and destroy the bridge over the creek. Continuing the march, the division arrived before Allatoona about 3 A.M. Nothing could be seen but one or two twinkling lights on the opposite heights, and nothing was heard except the occasional interchange of shots between our advanced guards and the pickets of the garrison in the valley below. All was darkness. I had no knowledge of the place, and it was important to attack at the break of day. Taking the guide and lights, I placed the artillery in position on the hills south and east of the railroad, and the Thirty-Ninth North Carolina Regiment, under Col. Coleman, and the Thirty-Second Texas were left as a supporting force, both under command of Col. J. A. Andrews, commanding the latter regiment. This being done, I proceeded with the guide to gain the heights, or ridge, crowned by the works of the enemy. Without roads or paths the head of the line reached the railroad, crossed it, and began ascending and descending the high, steep, and densely timbered spurs of the mountains, and after about an hour's march it was found that we were directly in front of the works, and not on the main ridge. The guide made a second effort to gain the ridge, and failed, so dark was it in the woods. I therefore determined to rest where we were and await daylight. With the dawn the march was resumed, and finally, by 7:30 A.M., the head of the column was on the ridge about six hundred yards west of the main fortifications, and between those he occupied an abandoned redoubt on our left.

CAPTURE OF BLOCKHOUSE, ALLATOONA CREEK, OCTOBER 5, 1864.

Here the fortifications, for the first time, were seen, and instead of two redoubts there were disclosed to us three redoubts on the west of the railroad cut, and a star fort on the east with outer works and approaches defended to a great distance by abatis, and nearer the works by stockades and other obstructions. The railroad emerges from the Allatoona Mountain by crossing this ridge through a cut sixty-five feet deep. Dispositions for the assault were now made by sending Gen. Sears's Brigade to the north side or rear of the works, Gen. F. M. Cockrell's (Missouri) Brigade to rest with its center on the ridge, while Gen. W. H. Young, with the four Texas regiments, was found in the rear of Gen. Cockrell.

Maj. Myrick had opened on the works with his artillery, and was ordered to continue his fire until the attacking force should interfere, or until he heard the volleys of musketry.

Gen. Sears was to commence the assault on the rear, and when musketry was heard Gen. Cockrell was to move down the ridge, supported by Gen. Young, and carry the works by (as it were) a flank attack. So rugged and abrupt were the hills that the troops could not be gotten into position until about 9 A.M., when I sent a summons to surrender. The flag was met by a Federal staff officer, and he was allowed seventeen minutes to return an answer. The time expired without any answer being received, whereupon Maj. D. W. Sanders, impatient at the delay, broke off the interview and returned. No reply being sent me, the order was given for the assault by directing the advance of Cockrell's Brigade. Emerging from the woods and passing over a long distance of abatis formed of felled timber, and under a severe fire of musketry and artillery, nobly did it press forward, followed by the gallant Texans. The enemy's outer line and one redoubt soon fell. Resting to gather strength and survey the work before them, again they rushed forward in column, and in a murderous hand-to-hand conflict that left the ditches filled with the dead they became masters of the second redoubt.

The third and main redoubt, now filled by those driven from the captured works on the west side of the railroad, was further crowded by those that were coming out of the fort on the east side of the road, from the attack of Gen. Sears. They had to cross the deep cut, through which our artillery poured a steady and deadly fire. The Federal forces were now confined to one redoubt, and we occupied the ditch and almost entirely silenced their fire, and were preparing for the final attack.

Pending the progress of these events I had received a note from Gen. F. C. Armstrong, dated 7 A.M., asking me at what time I would move toward New Hope, and informing me also that the enemy had moved up east of the railroad above Kennesaw and encamped there last night. I had observed this movement when at Acworth, but at 12 M. I received another dispatch from him, written at 9 A.M., saying: "My scouts report the enemy's infantry advancing up the railroad. They are now entering Big Shanty. They have a cavalry force east of the railroad."

On the receipt of this second note from Gen. Armstrong I took my guide aside and particularly asked him if, after the capture of the place, I could move to New Hope Church by any other route than the one by the blockhouse at Allatoona creek and thence by the Sandtown road to the Acworth and Dallas road, and he said I could not. Here, then, was Gen. Sherman's whole army close behind me, and the advance of his infantry moving on Acworth, which changed the whole condition of affairs. Ammunition had to be carried from the wagons, a mile distant at the base of the hills, by men, and I was satisfied that it would take two hours to get it up and distribute it under fire before the final assault. I had learned from prisoners that before daylight the place had been reënforced by a brigade under Gen. Corse. I knew the enemy was at Big Shanty at 9 A.M. By noon he could reach Acworth and be within two miles of the road on which I was to reach New Hope Church. I knew Gen. Stewart had been ordered to near Lost Mountain. My men had marched all day on the 3d; worked all the night of the 3d destroying the railroad; that they had worked and marched all day on the 4th; marched to Allatoona on the night of the 4th; had fought up to the afternoon of the 5th; and could they pass the entire third day and night without rest or sleep if we remained to assault the remaining works? I did not doubt that the enemy would endeavor to get in my rear to intercept my return.

He was, in the morning, but three hours distant, and had been signaled to repeatedly during the battle. Under these circumstances I determined to withdraw, however depressing the idea of not capturing the place after so many had fallen, and when in all probability we could force a surrender before night. Yet, however desirous I was of remaining before the last work and forcing a capitulation, or of carrying this interior work by assault, I deemed it of more importance not to permit the enemy to cut my division off from the army. After deliberately surveying matters as they presented themselves to me, I sent to Gen. Sears to withdraw his men at once, moving by the route he went in, and directed Gen. Cockrell to commence withdrawing at 1:30 P.M.

Before the action commenced it was foreseen that it would be impossible to carry any wounded, on litters, to the road where the ambulances were placed, owing to the steepness of the hills, the ravines, and the dense woods. Accordingly the wounded were brought to the springs near the ridge. All who could be moved without the use of litters were taken to the ambulances. The others were left in charge of surgeons detailed to remain with them.

The troops re-formed on the original ground, west of the works, and marched to the south side near the artillery, and at 3:30 P.M. commenced the move toward New Hope. After the troops left I rode on down to Col. Andrews's position in front of the works and directed him to remain until 5 P.M., and then withdraw and move on in our rear.

Before I commenced to withdraw the infantry from the captured works (but after the guide said I would have to return by the way I came) I sent orders to Maj. Myrick to send two batteries and caissons to a point beyond the blockhouse on the Sandtown road, to act in concert with the troops left there. Having been informed by Col. Andrews that the blockhouse at the Allatoona bridge had not been captured, I directed Capt. Kolb, with his battery that had remained with Col. Andrews, to move on and report to Gen. Cockrell for the purpose of taking the blockhouse.

Shortly after 4 P.M., and when not a person could be seen in or around the forts, I left the command of Col. Andrews and overtook the division near the blockhouse. Col. Adaire had burned the railroad bridge over Allatoona creek (over two hundred feet long), and also the duplicate of the bridge, which had been already framed to replace the old structure. Under the increased artillery fire the garrison of the blockhouse surrendered.

We captured two hundred and five prisoners, one United States flag, and the colors of the Ninety-Third Regiment of Illinois, a number of horses, arms, etc., and killed and wounded seven hundred and fifty of the enemy, being, with the garrison of the blockhouse, over one thousand.

History will record the battle of Allatoona one of the most sanguinary of the war; and when it is remembered that the enemy fought from within their strong redoubts the desperate deeds of daring performed by our troops in overcoming so many of the foe will win a meed of praise for their heroic valor.

The artillery opened about 7 A.M., and, except when the flag of truce was sent in, continued until 2 P.M.

The attack, commencing about 10 A.M., continued unremittingly until 1:30 P.M., and the rattle of musketry did not cease entirely until 3 P.M., when it died away, and a silence like the pall of death rested over the scene, contrasting strangely with the previous din of battle.

I cannot do justice to the gallantry of the troops. No one faltered in his duty, and all withdrew from the place with the regret that Gen. Sherman's movements—closing up behind us—forbade our remaining longer to force a surrender of the last work.

After leaving out the three regiments that formed no part of the assaulting force, I had but little over two thousand men.

My entire loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 799, as follows: Cockrell's Brigade: Killed, 42; wounded, 182; missing, 22. Sears's Brigade: Killed, 37; wounded, 114; missing, 200. Ector's Brigade: Killed, 43; wounded, 147; missing, 11. Staff: Captured, 1. Total: Killed, 122; wounded, 443; missing, 233; captured, 1. Grand total, 799.

MAJ. D. W. SANDERS.

Among the killed from Sears's Brigade is Col. W. H. Clark, Forty-Sixth Mississippi. He fell in the advance, near the enemy's works, with the battle flag in his hands. He was an excellent and a gallant officer. Also, were killed Capt. B. Davidson and Lieuts. G. C. Edwards, J. R. Henry, and J. D. Davis. Col. W. S. Barry, Thirty-Fifth Mississippi, and Maj. Partin, Thirty-Sixth Mississippi, were wounded, together with Capts. R. G. Yates and A. J. Farmer and Lieuts. J. N. McCoy, G. H. Bannerman, J. M. Chadwick, J. Copewood, R. E. Jones, E. W. Brown, G. H. Moore, and Ensigns G. W. Cannon and A. Scarborough.

Texas will mourn for the death of some of her bravest and best men. Capt. Somerville, Thirty-Second Texas, was killed after vainly endeavoring to enter the last work, where his conspicuous gallantry had carried him and his little band. Capts. Gibson, Tenth Texas, Bates, Ninth Texas, Lieuts. Alexander, Twenty-Ninth North Carolina, and Dixon E. Wetzel, Ninth Texas, were killed while gallantly leading their men.

Brig. Gen. W. H. Young, commanding the Texas Brigade, was wounded. Most gallantly he bore his part in the action. Col. Camp, Fourteenth Texas, one of the best officers in the service, was seriously wounded. Also Majs. McReynolds, Ninth Texas, and Purdy, Fourteenth Texas. Of the captains wounded were Wright, Lyles, Russell, Vannoy, and Ridley, and Lieuts. Tunnell, Haynes, Gibbons, Agee, Morris, O'Brien, Irwin, Reeves, and Robertson.

In the Missouri Brigade were killed or mortally wounded Majs. W. F. Carter and O. A. Waddell, Capts. A. J. Byrne, A. C. Patton, John S. Holland, Lieuts. Thomas S. Shelly, Joel F. Yancey, G. R. Elliott. R. J. Lamb, G. T. Duvall, and W. H. Dunnica, and Ensign H. W. De Jarnette—men who had behaved well and nobly during the whole campaign.

Among the wounded are Maj. R. J. Williams, Capts. Thompson Alvord, G. McChristian, G. W. Covell, and A. F. Burns, Lieuts. Joseph Boyce, Silas H. F. Hornback, J. L. Mitchell, A. H. Todd, and H. Y. Anderson, and Ensign William A. Byrd.

I have named the killed and wounded officers in this report. The names of the private soldiers who fell or were wounded will also be filed with this as soon as they are received. It is due to the dead, it is just to the living, that they who have no hopes of being heralded by fame, and who have but little incentive except the love of country and the consciousness of a just cause to impel them to deeds of daring, and who have shed their blood for a just cause, should have this little tribute paid them by me, whose joy it was to be with them.

For the noble dead the army mourns, a nation mourns. For the living, honor and respect will await them wherever they shall be known, as faithful soldiers, who, for their dearest rights, have so often gone through the fires of battle and the baptism of blood. It would perhaps be an invidious distinction to name individual officers or men for marked or special services or distinguished gallantry where all behaved so well, for earth never yielded to the tread of nobler soldiers.

I am indebted to Gens. Cockrell, Sears, and Young for bravery, skill, and unflinching firmness.

To Col. Earp, on whom the command of the gallant Texans devolved, and to Col. Andrews, who commanded on the south side, and Maj. Myrick, commanding the artillery, I return thanks for services. Maj. D. W. Sanders, assistant adjutant general, Lieut. Wiley Abercrombie, aid, Capt. W. H. Cain, volunteer aid, Capt. Porter and Lieut. Mosby, engineers, were zealous in the performance of their duties, and E. T. Freeman, assistant inspector general, was conspicuous for his gallant conduct. I commend the last-named to the government for promotion.

Col. E. Gates, First and Third Missouri, Maj. E. H. Hampton, Twenty-Ninth North Carolina, and W. J. Sparks, Tenth Texas, and Lieut. Cahal, of Gen. Stewart's staff, are named for gallant services.

Lieut. M. W. Armstrong, Tenth Texas, seized the United States standard from the Federals, and after a struggle brought it and the bearer of it off in triumph.

In the inclosed reports of brigade commanders will be found the names of many officers and soldiers that I know are entitled to commendation and all marks of distinction that the government can award.

The cavalry officer who was sent to cut the railroad (early in the afternoon of the 4th) and failed to perform that duty is, in my opinion, much to blame. Had he taken up the rails (and there was nothing to prevent it), reënforcements could not have been thrown in the works, and the result would have been different. After events showed that a cavalry force and Corse's other brigade arrived just three hours after we left Allatoona, and reënforced the garrison in the fort.

Very respectfully submitted.

S. G. French,
Major General Commanding.

You have now my official report of the battle of Allatoona as it was written soon after the event, and I will say here that, had I known it would have been so incorrectly reported by Gen. Corse, it would have embraced much matter of detail elucidating what occurred. I shall now proceed to copy some part of Gen. Corse's report, after which its errors will be pointed out as substantiated by facts not then known, and some that were not regarded. So, with my report, unintentional errors have been made known, as shown by subsequent information.

Gen. Corse's Report.

... I directed Col. Rowett to hold the spur on which the Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh Illinois were formed, ... and taking two companies of the Ninety-Third Illinois down a spur parallel with the railroad and along the bank of the cut, so disposed them as to hold the north side as long as possible. Three companies of the Ninety-Third, which had been driven from the west end of the ridge, were distributed in the ditch south of the redoubt, with instructions to keep the town well covered by their fire, and to watch the depot where the rations were stored. The remaining battalion of the Ninety-Third, under Maj. Fisher, lay between the redoubt and Rowett's line, ready to reënforce wherever most needed.

I had barely issued the orders when the storm broke in all its fury on the Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh Illinois. Young's Brigade of Texans had gained the west end of the ridge, and moved with great impetuosity along its crest till they struck Rowett's command, when they received a severe check, but, undaunted, came again and again. Rowett, reënforced by the gallant Redfield, encouraged me to hope that we were safe here, when I observed Gen. Sears's Brigade moving from the north, its left extending across the railroad (opposite Tourtellotte). I rushed to the two companies of the Ninety-Third Illinois, which were on the brink of the crest running north from the redoubt, they having been reënforced by the retreating pickets, and urged them to hold on to the spur; but it was of no avail; the enemy's line of battle swept us back like so much chaff, and struck the Thirty-Ninth Iowa in flank, threatening to ingulf our little band without further ado. Fortunately for us, Col. Tourtellotte's fire caught Sears in flank, and broke him so badly as to enable me to get a staff officer over the cut with orders to bring the Fiftieth Illinois over to reënforce Rowett, who had lost very heavily. However, before the regiment sent for could arrive, Sears and Young both rallied, and made their assaults in front and on the flank with so much vigor and in such force as to break Rowett's line, and had not the Thirty-Ninth Iowa fought with the desperation it did, I never should have been able to get a man back inside the redoubt; as it was, their hand-to-hand conflict broke the enemy to that extent that he must stop and re-form before undertaking the assault on the fort. Under cover of the blows they gave the enemy the Seventh and Ninety-Third Illinois, and what remained of the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, fell back into the fort.

The fighting up to this time, about 11 A.M., was of the most extraordinary character. Attacked from the north, from the west, and from the south, these three regiments (the Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh and Ninety-Third Illinois) held Young's and a portion of Sears's and Cockrell's Brigades at bay for nearly two hours and a half. The gallant Col. Redfield, of the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, fell shot in four places, and the extraordinary valor of the men and officers of this regiment and the Seventh Illinois saved to us Allatoona.

So completely disorganized were the enemy that no regular assault could be made on the fort till I had the trenches all filled and the parapets lined with men. The Twelfth and Fiftieth Illinois, arriving from the east hill, enabled us to occupy every foot of trench, and keep up a line of fire that, as long as our ammunition lasted, would render our little fort impregnable. The broken pieces of the enemy enabled them to fill every hollow, and take every advantage of the rough ground surrounding the fort, filling every hole and trench, seeking shelter behind every stump and log that lay within musket range of the fort. We received their fire from the north, south, and west of the redoubt, completely enfilading our ditches and rendering it almost impracticable for a man to expose his person above the parapet. An effort was made to carry our works by assault; but the battery (Twelfth Missouri) was so ably manned, and so gallantly fought, as to render it impossible for a column to live within a hundred yards of the work. Officers labored constantly to stimulate the men to expose themselves above the parapet, and nobly set them the example.

The enemy kept a constant and intense fire, gradually closing around us, and rapidly filling our little fort with the dead and dying. About 1 P.M. I was wounded by a rifle ball that rendered me insensible for some thirty or forty minutes, but managed to rally on hearing some persons cry "Cease firing!" which conveyed to me the impression that they were trying to surrender the fort.

Again I urged my staff, the few officers unhurt, and the men around me to renewed exertions, assuring them that Sherman would soon be here with reënforcements. The gallant fellows struggled to keep their heads above the ditch and parapets in the face of the murderous fire of the enemy now concentrated upon us. The artillery was silent, and a brave fellow, whose name I regret having forgotten, volunteered to cross the railway cut, which was under fire of the enemy, and go to the fort on the east hill to procure ammunition. Having executed his mission successfully, he returned in a short time with an arm load of canister and case shot. About 2:30 P.M. the enemy were observed massing a force behind a small house and the ridge on which the house was located, distant northwest from the fort about one hundred and fifty yards. The dead and wounded were moved aside so as to enable us to move a piece of artillery to an embrasure commanding the house and ridge. A few shots from the gun threw the enemy's column into great confusion, which, being observed by our men, caused them to rush to the parapet and open such a fire that it was impossible for the enemy to rally. From this time until near 4 P.M. we had the advantage of the enemy, and maintained it with such success that they were driven from every position, and finally fled in great confusion, leaving their dead and wounded, and our little garrison in possession of the field. [See War Records.]

The above extracts from Gen. Corse's report are taken from an address made by Col. William Ludlow, United States army, to the Michigan Commandery, at Detroit, April 2, 1891, and I desire it to be borne in mind that he is a graduate of the Military Academy and was with Gen. Corse at Allatoona during the battle, for I shall have cause to refer to his address after a while.

There have been so many erroneous accounts given to the public of this battle, impugning of motives, guessing at the controlling objects that influence action, falsifying of numbers, glorifying dispatches, and complimentary orders, that won the admiration even of a Confederate lieutenant general, that I purpose, as well as I am able, to give an impartial account of it.

To do justice to the troops engaged on either side in the conflict, it will be necessary: 1. To have a knowledge of the ground or topography of the field of action. 2. The strength of the fortifications, and the time and labor bestowed on them. 3. The strength of the respective forces. 4. The ratio of inequality between men in strong fortifications and men attacking from without, immediately on arrival. 5. The inspiring inducement to the garrison not to surrender when relief is at hand; and the advantage to be gained, if successful, compared with the risk of remaining after ascertaining that the enemy was converging on the place from every point.

1. If an examination of this topographical map be made in connection with the photographic views of the railroad cut, the star fort, and the view from the sally port, it will give you an idea of the rough mountain spurs over which we had to pass.

2. These forts and redoubts were built by a distinguished engineer in the United States army, and, with their mutual defensive relation the one to the other, form a remarkably strong line of fortifications on every side. Sherman wrote to Gen. Blair, June 1, 1864, "Order the brigade left at Allatoona to be provided with tools, and to intrench both ends of the pass very strong," and frequently he speaks of Allatoona as a "natural fortress," etc.

Beginning at the east, we have a fort about fifty feet in diameter in the interior (marked "T" on the map), near three hundred yards east of the railroad, with a deep ditch around it. Walls twelve feet thick, and having embrasures for artillery, for which it was mainly designed. This fort was connected with a line of heavy intrenchments extending to the railroad cut, and along the cut to defend the star fort "C" by a flank fire, and also the redoubt "R." Again, there are intrenchments on the east side of the railroad near the depot that sweep with a flank fire the south front of the star fort "C," the Cartersville road, depot, etc. There was also protection given by inundating the country north by a dam across the creek.

Crossing the railroad to the west, on the summit of the ridge and on the verge of the deep cut, you will find the star fort "C" surrounded by a wide ditch six feet deep. The interior is seventy-five feet in diameter, and has eight embrasures for large guns. It dominates, from its elevation, all the surrounding country, and commands the approach in every direction, completely sweeping the ridge both east and west, protecting the redoubt "R" from any force attacking it. The Cartersville road passes under the muzzle of its guns, and then runs west on the ridge, through redoubt "R."

FORTIFICATIONS—ALLATOONA, GA.

[View larger image]

The two forts, "T" and "C," are interior isolated works for artillery, and the fire from each swept all the other works both inside and externally. Both were surrounded by ditches six feet deep, making their parapets about twelve feet high. Consequently they could not be taken by assault without scaling ladders, or otherwise, usual in sieges, unless by the sally port. In fact these two inside forts could be used as citadels, or a place of refuge when the long exterior lines of defense were captured. And this was the case with fort "C" in the battle of Allatoona. The whole formed a mountain fortress.

The Federals call the intrenchments at "R" "rifle pits," to which they bear about as much relation, in regard to strength, as a battleship does to a dispatch boat. Commencing about one hundred and twenty-five yards west of the fort "C," and on the south side of the Cartersville road, are two lines of intrenchments running nearly parallel with that road. These two, or double, lines of defense converge and meet below the crest of the ridge, then, turning north, cross the road (with angles for flanking fire) and continue north down the slope. From this north line an intrenchment runs due east toward the main fort. The parapet is revetted with timber, and the interior ditch is very wide. On the parapet are large chestnut head logs to protect the persons of the soldiers. In front were immense entanglements of abatis, stockades, stakes, etc., to check any assault on the works. So well was the work done that in 1890, when I was there, time had not defaced them, and the revetments and "head logs" are today as round as when placed there. I am the more particular about this redoubt because here happened, perhaps, the bloodiest tragedy in the history of the war.

3. The strength of the respective forces.

Col. Tourtellotte's command was composed of the Ninety-Third Illinois, officers and men, 294; the Eighteenth Wisconsin, guns, 150; Fourth Minnesota, guns, 450; the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, men, 16; giving an apparent total of 910. To this must yet be added the force for the six pieces of artillery, not less than 60. If we add the company officers not enumerated, it will be found that Tourtellotte had about 1,000 officers and men. The above numbers are official.

Corse's official statement is that he brought with him to Allatoona the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, 280 men; Seventh Illinois, 267 men; Fiftieth Illinois, 267 men; Fifty-Seventh Illinois, 61 men; Twelfth Illinois, 155 men; or 1,030 men. To this must be added (say) 107 regimental and company officers, making the force that he brought with him 1,137 officers and men. So with Tourtellotte's troops the aggregate is 2,137 instead of 1,944 as reported by him, which excluded himself and officers.

As regards the strength of my division at Allatoona, the War Records show that on September 20, at inspection, I had present for duty 331 officers and 2,945 men. Total, 3,276.

Cockrell's Brigade was composed of eight small regiments consolidated into four, Ector's Brigade of six regiments, and Sears's Brigade of six regiments, and two batteries, 8 guns.

To this force add one four-gun battery sent with me, and deduct one gun and one regiment left at Allatoona creek bridge, and my entire force present was 3,197.

And thus officially we have Federals, 2,132; Confederates, as above.

4. Equalization of forces.

The ratio of inequality between a force within ordinary intrenchments in line of battle and the attacking force without is well known.

Gen. Cox in his "Atlanta Campaign," page 129, says: "One man in the trench is equal to five in front." Gen. O. O. Howard, in reference to the battle of Kennesaw Mountain, says: "My experience is that a line of works thoroughly constructed, with the front well covered with abatis and other entanglements, well manned with infantry, whether with our own or that of the enemy, cannot be carried by direct assault." Gen. R. S. Granger informs Gen. G. H. Thomas that the fort at Athens, manned by 700 men, can hold out an enemy 10,000 strong. (War Records, V. 39, Part 3, page 519.) Vicksburg, Jackson, Cold Harbor, Kennesaw, Petersburg, Atlanta, Knoxville, and other lines repelled the assaults. Now Allatoona was, without doubt, thrice as strong as these, and the attacking force was only one and a half to one inside. Then, too, we should consider that the works on the hills were almost inaccessible.

Battery Wagner, a sand fort on a level plain on Morris Island, Charleston, S. C., was garrisoned by only 740 men, who successfully defended it fifty-eight days and nights against the assaults and continuous fire of 11,500 men, with forty-seven cannon, aided by ships—the Ironsides, eight monitors, and five gunboats. And Fort Sumter never was taken by assault. It was quietly abandoned February 18, 1865.

On Sunday, April 16, 1865, seven days after the surrender at Appomattox, a small redoubt or fort, of weak construction, garrisoned by an unorganized force hastily collected, at West Point, Ga., near Atlanta, consisting of 64 men under Gen. Tyler and Col. J. H. Fannan, held the fort all day against 3,750 men of Gen. J. M. Wilson's command, and surrendered only for want of ammunition and loss of men. Col. O. H. LaGrange, of Wisconsin, commanded the Federals. Ratio, 1 to 62.

5. The inspiring hopes given the garrison will be discovered in the following dispatches informing them aid was at hand, begging them to hold out until reënforcements arrived. In these dispatches bear in mind that Gen. Stanley was in temporary command of the Army of the Cumberland, and Gen. Elliott was the commander in chief of Sherman's cavalry. I give only a few of the many dispatches in the War Records.

No. 1. Volume 39, Part 3, Page 53.

SHERMAN TO COMMANDING OFFICER AT ALLATOONA.

October 3, 1864.

Hood might slip up to Acworth and Allatoona. I want the utmost vigilance there. If he goes to Allatoona, I want him only delayed long enough for me to reach his rear.... If he moves up to Allatoona, I will surely come in force.

No. 2. Volume 39, Page 65.

SHERMAN TO STANLEY.

In the Field, October 4, 1864.

I heard from Gen. Elliott to-night. He was on the Sandtown and Allatoona road.... I will be up to-day and move to Kennesaw.

No. 3. Volume 39, Page 66.

SHERMAN TO STANLEY.

October 4, 1864. Received 10 A.M.

Yes, move to Little Kennesaw and west of it. Tell Elliott in my name to interpose with his whole force between Dallas and Allatoona, and strike for any force in the direction of Acworth.

No. 4. Volume 39, Page 71.

SHERMAN TO ELLIOTT.

October 4, 1864, 11 P.M.

Don't risk the safety of your cavalry until I get up with my whole force, but make bold reconnoissances in connection with Gen. Stanley. My chief object is to prevent the enemy from making an attack on Allatoona to-morrow.

No. 5. Volume 39, Page 71.

SHERMAN TO COMMANDING OFFICERS AT ALLATOONA, KINGSTON, AND ROME.

October 4, 1864.

The enemy is moving on Allatoona, thence to Rome.

No. 6. Volume 39, Page 52.

SHERMAN TO GEN. VANDEVER.

October 3, 1864.

Sherman wants the force at Big Shanty cleaned out, and wants it done to-night if possible.

No. 7. Volume 39, Page 75.

CORSE TO GEN. J. E. SMITH.

Rome, October 4, 1864.

I will move my entire command to Cartersville and unite with Gen. Raum in attacking the enemy from Allatoona direct.

No. 8. Volume 39, Page 75.

CORSE TO RAUM.

Rome, October 4, 1864.

I am expecting a train every moment; as soon as I can get ready I will move 3,000 to 4,000 men.

No. 9. Volume 39, Page 77.

VANDEVER TO SHERMAN.

Near Kennesaw, October 4, 1864.

Elliott is between Big Shanty and Kennesaw on our left. I am skirmishing with the enemy now.

No. 10. Volume 39, Page 77.

VANDEVER TO SHERMAN.

Near Kennesaw, October 4, 1864.

Gen. Elliott has all his force near the west base of the mountain. Gens. Kilpatrick and Garrard are both with him, so couriers report.

No. 11. Volume 39, Page 78.

VANDEVER TO COMMANDING OFFICER AT ALLATOONA.

Kennesaw Mountain, October 4, 1864, 2 P.M.

Sherman is moving in force. Hold out.

No. 12. Volume 39, Page 78.

VANDEVER TO COMMANDING OFFICER AT ALLATOONA.

Near Kennesaw Mountain, October 4, 6:39 P.M.

Gen. Sherman says hold fast, we are coming.

No. 13. Volume 39, Page 88.

SIGNAL OFFICER AT ALLATOONA TO SIGNAL OFFICER AT KENNESAW.

Allatoona, October 5, 1864.

Gen. Corse is here with one brigade. Where is Sherman?

No. 14. Volume 39, Page 89.

SHERMAN TO STANLEY.

Kennesaw Mountain, October 5, 1864, 11:15 A.M.

No news by signal from Allatoona. Heavy firing, indicating an assault and repulse. Occasional shots now, but too smoky to see signals. Can see the field about Lost Mountain. No large force of Rebels there. Can see Kilpatrick's cavalry massed in a big field this side, but no skirmishing.

No. 15. Volume 39, Page 89.

SHERMAN TO STANLEY.

Kennesaw Mountain, October 5, 1864. Received 2:30 P.M.

Throw forward pickets on the Sandtown road. Take strong position and hold it.

No. 16. Volume 39, Page 90.

STANLEY TO SHERMAN.

Pine Top, October 5, 1864, 3:10 P.M.

I am on Pine Top.... I saw our cavalry about two miles in advance of Kemp's Mills.

No. 17. Volume 39, Page 90.

SHERMAN TO STANLEY.

In the Field, October 5, 1864.

I want to control the Sandtown road back to Allatoona.[29]

No. 18. Volume 39, Page 91.

SHERMAN TO ELLIOTT.

In the Field, October 5, 1864.

Dispatch Garrard to-night to Allatoona, making a circuit to the right, and to learn if possible the state of affairs there.... The day was so hazy that we could get but few messages. Corse is there with his division.

No. 19. Volume 39, Page 92.

SHERMAN TO ELLIOTT.

In the Field, October 5, 1864.

I have heard from Allatoona. All right. Corse is there, but wounded. You need not send Garrard's cavalry, but send a squadron.

No. 20. Volume 39, Page 92.

SHERMAN TO ELLIOTT.

In the Field, October 5, 1864.

I have been up on Kennesaw all day watching the attack. Since it ceased I have a signal, O. K. Corse wounded.... I want to establish communication with Allatoona.

No. 21. Volume 39, Page 96.

TOURTELLOTTE TO SHERMAN.

Allatoona, Ga., October 5, 1864.

Gen. Sherman: Corse is here.

No. 22. Volume 39. Page 96.

TO COMMANDING OFFICER, ALLATOONA.

Kennesaw Mountain, October 5, 1864.

Near you.

No. 23. Volume 39, Page 96.

SIGNAL DISPATCHES FROM AND TO KENNESAW MOUNTAIN.

At 8 A.M. I called Allatoona for two hours and a half. I asked for news, and at 10:30 A.M. received the following message: "We hold out. Gen. Corse here."

Adams, Signal Officer.

At 4 P.M. I again called Allatoona, and at 4:15 got the following: "We still hold out. Gen. Corse is wounded."

No. 24. Volume 39, Page 97.

Kennesaw Mountain, October 5, 1864.

Tell Allatoona to hold on. Gen. Sherman says he is working hard for you.

No. 25. Volume 39, Page 97.

GEN. G. B. RAUM TO GEN. J. E. SMITH.

Cartersville, Ga., October 5, 1864.

We have won a great victory at Allatoona to-day. I am just from there. Gen. Corse is slightly wounded in the cheek; Col. Tourtellotte slightly in the left thigh.

No. 26. Volume 39, Pages 111, 112.

LIEUT. W. H. SHERFY, CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER, KENNESAW, REPORTS.

October 4, 1864.

I called Allatoona and sent the messages received last night. I saw the enemy hard at work destroying the railroad on both sides of Big Shanty.... At 5 P.M. the enemy began to move off on the Acworth road, and at 6 P.M. our army moved into camp at the foot of Little Kennesaw Mountain.

October 5.

To-day the battle of Allatoona was fought. I could see the smoke of guns and shells. Gen. Sherman was with me all day sending and receiving messages.

Having now given you some knowledge of the ground, the strength of the fortifications, the numbers engaged on either side, the ratio of inequality between troops inside and those outside ordinary works, and the many inspiring hopes sent to the garrison to hold out, you can better comprehend.

The Battle.

The day dawned beautiful and bright, and as the sun rose higher and higher in the mellow autumnal sky, and lit up the forest-clad heights, it turned into a quiet Indian summer day of hazy, drowsy appearance inducive of rest. All nature seemed at variance with the active preparations being made for the impending conflict of arms.

Gen. Corse had placed in redoubt "R" the Seventh Illinois, the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, and the Ninety-Third Illinois. He had some companies in advance of "R," and the remainder in reserve in the rear of "R." These three regiments for the defense of this redoubt (called rifle pits) numbered nine hundred and four officers and men.

Tourtellotte, in fort "T" and the intrenchments, had for the defense east of the railroad the Fourth Minnesota, Eighteenth Wisconsin, and the Fiftieth and Twelfth Illinois Regiments. Soon, however, the Fiftieth and Twelfth Illinois were ordered over by Corse to the west side of the railroad.

I made the following disposition of my division of infantry present on the ridge. Sears's Brigade was ordered to the north side of the ridge and east of the railroad. Cockrell's Brigade and the four regiments of Ector's Brigade were on the ridge west of the enemy's works.

About 9 A.M. the artillery ceased firing, and, under a flag of truce, I sent a summons to the commander of the garrison to surrender, supposing the forces were small or to be the same as reported to me when I was in Acworth. The summons was carried by Maj. D. W. Sanders, Adjutant General. He waited about twenty minutes for a reply; receiving none, he returned. I had no idea that the garrison had been reënforced by the arrival of Gen. Corse with one of his brigades.

It was now near 10 A.M. when, impatient at the delay of Sears not getting in position, I ordered Cockrell to make the attack on the redoubt "R" with his brigade of nine hundred and fifty strong, supported by four regiments of Ector's Texas Brigade of about four hundred men. The ridge was so narrow that when deployed the wings were in the woods on the steep sides of a rocky ridge. As Cockrell neared the line he was subjected to the fire of the artillery from the two forts "T" and "C," and the musketry from "R," and the troops in the intrenchments on the east side of the railroad, near the deep cut, that swept his approach on every side. Arriving near the redoubt, the troops were stopped by the formidable abatis and other entanglements. There for an hour, under this searching fire, they worked to make a way through the abatis. When passages had been made they rushed to the assault, and, after a terrible hand-to-hand conflict, the redoubt was carried, and the survivors fled to fort "C," followed by our men, and in a few minutes every Union soldier west of the railroad, including the Fiftieth and Twelfth Illinois, sought refuge in fort "C" and the ditch surrounding it, crowding them beyond measure.

BATTLE OF ALLATOONA.
In this picture the timber is omitted in order to show the ridge on which the fortress was constructed. All the troops visible are supposed to be Confederates.

Thus did 1,350 Confederates carry the redoubt defended by 904 brave Union veterans, although subjected all this time to the fire of forts "T" and "C," and other flanking works. But I will let Gen. Corse tell the story himself, as found on pages 761-766, Volume 39, War Records, only I will correct the errors in names and figures in some instances:

I had hardly issued these incipient orders when the storm broke in all its fury on the Thirty-Ninth Iowa and Seventh Illinois. Young's [Cockrell's] Brigade of Texans, 1,900 strong, had gained the west end of the ridge, and moved with great impetuosity along its crest till they struck Rowett's command, where they received a severe check, but, undaunted, they came again and again. Rowett, reënforced by the Ninety-Third Illinois, and aided by the gallant Redfield, encouraged me to hope we were all safe here, when I observed a brigade of the enemy under command of Gen. Sears moving from the north, its left extending across the railroad. I rushed to the two companies of the Ninety-Third Illinois, which were on the brink of the cut running north from the redoubt [fort "C">[ and parallel with the railroad, they having been reënforced by the retreating pickets, and urged them to hold on to the spur, but it was of no avail. The enemy's line of battle swept us back like so much chaff, and struck the Thirty-Ninth Iowa in flank, threatening to ingulf our little band without further ado. Fortunately for us, Col. Tourtellotte's fire caught Sears in the flank and broke him so badly as to enable me to get a staff officer over the cut with orders to bring the Fiftieth Illinois over to reënforce Rowett, who had lost very heavily. However, before the regiment sent for could arrive, Sears and Young [Cockrell and Young] both rallied and made their assaults in front and on the flank with so much vigor and in such force as to break Rowett's line, and had not the Thirty-Ninth Iowa fought with the desperation it did I never would have been able to have brought a man back into the redoubt [fort "C">[. As it was, their hand-to-hand struggle and stubborn stand broke the enemy to that extent that he must stop to re-form before undertaking the assault on the fort. Under cover of the blow they gave the enemy the Seventh and Ninety-Third Illinois and what remained of the Thirty-Ninth Iowa fell back into the fort. The fighting up to this time—about 11 A.M.—was of a most extraordinary character. Attacked from the north, from the west, and from the south, these three regiments, Thirty-Ninth Iowa, Seventh Illinois, and Ninety-Third Illinois infantry, held Young's and a portion of Sears's and Cockrell's [should be Cockrell's and Young's] Brigades at bay for nearly two hours and a half. [We were delayed about an hour, and that by the entanglements that prevented us from reaching the parapet; besides, we were under fire from guns everywhere.] The gallant Col. Redfield, of the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, fell, shot in four places, and the extraordinary valor of the men and officers of this regiment and the Seventh Illinois saved to us Allatoona.

The capture of the redoubt by Cockrell and Young under the fire of six pieces of artillery, two in fort "C" and one in a battery in advance of the fort, three in fort "T," and musketry fire from every place, besides the 904 men in the redoubt, ends the first act of the tragedy.

It is proper here to give a description of this scene by quoting from an address made by Col. William Ludlow, Corps of Engineers, United States Army, who was with Gen. Corse during the battle, to the Michigan Commandery, Loyal Legion, at Detroit, April 2, 1891. In referring to the capture of redoubt "R," he said:

But the appalling center of the tragedy was the pit in which lay the heroes of the Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh Illinois. Such a sight probably was never presented to the eye of heaven. There is no language to describe it. With all the glad reaction of feeling after the prolonged strain of that mortal day, and the exultant surge of victory that swelled our hearts, it was difficult to stand on the verge of that open grave without a rush of tears to the eye and a spasm of pity clutching at the throat. The trench was crowded with the dead, blue and homespun. "Yank" and "Johnny," inextricably mingled in the last ditch. Our heroes, ordered to hold the place to the last, with supreme fidelity, had died at their posts. As the Rebel line ran over them they struck up with their bayonets as the foe struck down, and, rolling together in the embrace of death, we found them, in some cases, mutually transfixed. The theme cannot be dwelt upon.

I will now go on with Corse's report, and let him tell his story of the battle in his own way.

So completely disorganized were the enemy that no regular assault could be made on the fort until I had the trenches all filled and the parapets lined with men. The Twelfth Illinois and the Fiftieth Illinois, arriving from the east hill, enabled us to occupy every foot of trench, and keep up a line of fire that as long as our ammunition lasted would render our little fort impregnable. The broken forces of the enemy enabled them to fill every hollow and take every advantage of the rough ground surrounding the fort, filling every hole and trench, seeking shelter behind every stump and log that lay within musket range of the fort. We received fire from the north, south, and west face of the fort, completely enfilading our ditches, and rendering it almost impracticable for a man to expose his person above the parapet. An effort was made to carry our works by assault [This is an error. We had no scaling ladders, besides the ditch was solid full of Corse's men who found shelter there], but the battery, Twelfth Wisconsin, was so ably managed and so gallantly fought as to render it impossible for a column to live within one hundred yards of the works. Officers labored constantly to stimulate the men to exertion, and almost all that were killed or wounded in the fort met this fate while trying to get the men to expose themselves above the parapet, and nobly setting them the example.

The enemy kept up a constant and intense fire, gradually closing around us, and rapidly filling our little fort with the dead and the dying. About 1 P.M. I was wounded by a rifle ball, which rendered me insensible for some thirty or forty minutes, but managed to rally on hearing some persons cry, "Cease firing," which conveyed to me the impression that they were trying to surrender the fort. Again I urged my staff, the few officers left unhurt, and the men around me to renewed exertions, assuring them that Sherman would soon be here with reënforcements. The gallant fellows struggled hard to keep their heads above the ditch and parapet in the face of the murderous fire of the enemy now concentrated upon us.

Here we have the astonishing official statement that his men would not expose themselves enough to fire over the parapet or out of the ditch, and that most of the officers lost their lives in "nobly setting them the example;" and this is also established by Col. Ludlow in his address, where he says:

Rowett's order to "cease firing" had, of course, nothing to do with the cry of "surrender." It is true that there were men in the fort ready to surrender or to do anything else in order to get out of it alive. Happily these were few, and most of them lay prone, close under the parapet, playing dead, with the combatants and wounded standing and sitting upon them. If I mistake not, Corse himself, at least for a time, was holding down one of these living corpses, who preferred to endure all the pain and discomfort of his position rather than get up and face the deadly music that filled the air with leaden notes.... It was absolutely necessary to keep room for the fighting force along the parapet, so the wounded were drawn back, and in some cases shot over and over again. The dead were disposed of in the same way, except that as the ground became covered with them they were let lie as they fell, and were stood or sat upon by the fighters.... The slaughter had been frightful.

SIGNAL TREE, ALLATOONA, OCT. 5, 1864.

One of our guns was disabled from the jamming of a shot, and we were out of ammunition for the other two.... I recall distinctly the fact that a regimental flagstaff on the parapet, which had been several times shot away, fell again at a critical moment toward the end of the action. There was a mad yell from our friends outside, and a few cries of "surrender" among our own people, but a brave fellow leaped to the summit of the parapet, where it did not seem possible to live for a single second, grasped the flagstaff, waved it, drove the stump into the parapet, and dropped back again unhurt. His action restored confidence; a great Yankee cheer drowned the tumult, and no cry of "surrender" was afterwards heard.

Here now is presented the testimony of Corse himself, and of Col. Ludlow, that the men would not expose themselves, and that they cried "cease firing," and "surrender." I know, as do hundreds of others now living, that the fire of the fort was silenced, because our men were close up; and if any one inside the fort or in the ditch exposed his head, instantly it became the target for several Confederates. Confederates moved about with impunity, and I called the attention of my staff to Johnson (Cockrell's flag bearer) riding up to the north side of the fort, sitting quietly on his horse, and listening to what was going on in the fort. In a recent letter from him he writes to J. M. Brown, of Atlanta: "I remember riding up very close to the fort. The distance was short, as I was close enough to tell what the Federals were doing in there." After 12 M. the Confederates merely watched for any person exposing his head above the parapet, and so I am sure that the fire described was not so severe as related by Gen. Corse, but it was very fatal.

Gen. Corse goes on with his report, and writes that about 2:30 P.M. the enemy massed a force (behind a small house) which he threw into great confusion, and that "from this time on until 4 P.M. we had the advantage of the enemy, and maintained it with such success that they were driven from every position, and finally fled in great confusion, leaving their dead and wounded, and our little garrison in possession of the field."

It is hardly possible to crowd into a short paragraph more errors than are found in the four lines above, and most of them he well knew to be false. It is true, no doubt, that he was not aware of the information sent me that induced me to withdraw my troops. That dispatch was received at 12:15 P.M. The Cartersville road, running north, passes within a few yards of fort "C," and then continues some two hundred and fifty yards on through the captured works. It was open to my infantry, but was there not life enough in the two forts, "C" and "T," to shoot down some of the horses and mules passing by within short pistol shot if I attempted to move the artillery, baggage wagons, and ambulances and block the road if I decided to move north to avoid Sherman's troops marching from the south to the relief of Allatoona?

So I resolved to obtain possession of the Acworth and Dallas road before it was occupied in force by the Federals, trusting to their slow and cautious movements. To this end, I first ordered all the artillery except one battery to start at once to the Allatoona Creek bridge to join the Mississippi regiment left there, and hold that position. Next, Sears was directed to withdraw immediately from the north side in front of fort "T," and Cockrell to commence at 1:30 P.M.; and, owing to the rough hillsides, to come out in squads, or individually. Although Sears began the movement over an hour before Cockrell and Young did, the latter were all collected on the ridge first, and sat there under the shade of the trees, within sight and easy rifle range of fort "C," until about 3 P.M., waiting for Sears, who had to go around the pond made by the Yankees damming up Allatoona Creek. During all this time but few shots were fired by the enemy. One, however, was fired at us, and it killed a man who had appropriated a fine pair of cavalry boots from the stores, and he fell dead at my feet where we were sitting. In the meantime I went among the wounded men who could not walk over the rocky hills to our ambulances, and explained to them why they would have to be left, and that surgeons had been detailed to remain with them. They gave me thanks without complaint.

After I showed Gens. Cockrell and Young the dispatches I had received, and informed them of my intention not to remain and make an assault on fort "C," lest reënforcements for the garrison should arrive before we could leave the place, they demurred, and said their men were mad, and wanted to remain and capture the place. Col. Gates, of the Missouri Brigade, declared that he would capture fort "C" in twenty minutes after the arrival and distribution of our ammunition, by way of the sally port. He asserted that they were so crowded inside that but few men could fire.

I adhered to my decision to withdraw, because the men had already been three days and two nights without rest or sleep, and that they could not pass a third night without sleep, and risk having to fight reënforcements momentarily expected; and the subsequent arrival of troops from Cartersville at 8 P.M. proved the correctness of my judgment; also Martin's Brigade reached Allatoona next morning.

About 3 P.M. the last of Sears's men arrived on the ridge near the fort where we rested awaiting them, and we then left the ridge and moved to the Cartersville road, where the wagons were left. Cockrell was now ordered to proceed with the infantry force to the Allatoona Creek bridge, and join the Mississippi regiment and artillery already there on the Dallas road. I rode down to the battery still in position on Moore's Hill to give instructions, and remained there sometime, not a little astonished at the scene presented to my view. The declining sun, seen through the calm, hazy atmosphere, shone red, like the rising of the full-orbed moon, on the fortifications before us. All was silent now where the battle raged so long, and the mellow light gleamed so gently down on the wounded and the dead that I remarked to the officers and men around me: "Silence, like the pall of death, rests over Allatoona; it is as lifeless as a graveyard at midnight." I even went up an inclined tree and used my glasses in vain to discover a human being. And so Corse's statement that we "were driven from every position, and finally fled in great confusion," leaps over the bombastic and loses its force in ridiculous excess of inaccuracy.

Corse, in his report, says that he brought with him 165,000 rounds of ammunition, and Ludlow states that "it was all expended except two hundred and fifty rounds." All the artillery ammunition Corse had in fort "C" was expended, and he got a man to go after some from fort "T," and he returned safely with an armful. See his report.

I will pause here awhile, that you may make a survey of the field of battle at 1:30 P.M.

For over two hours there had been pent up in fort "C," inside and in the ditch outside, the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, the Seventh Illinois, the Fiftieth Illinois, the Ninety-Third Illinois, the Twelfth Illinois, two companies of the Fifty-Seventh Illinois, and their artillery, 1,453 in number, less the killed, badly wounded, and prisoners resulting from their defense of the redoubt "R."

The fort, built for artillery mainly, had but seventy-seven yards of parapet, which made it so dangerous for any one to expose his head above the parapet that their men would not fire voluntarily, "and most of their officers were killed or wounded in setting the men an example;" and they passed the word to "cease firing." They cried "surrender." Some "played dead," and the combatants stood on the "living corpses." Others sat down on them. Even Corse himself used one for a seat after he was wounded (Ludlow). They were out of water. Their ammunition was nearly all expended. Their firing had slackened to a musket shot at intervals. They let us withdraw without molestation, and we sat in the shade of the trees in full view of the fort, within musket range, from 1:30 P.M. until 3 P.M. awaiting Sears. They saw us all leave the ridge at the last named hour. At 4 P.M. Corse sent dispatch No. 23: "We still hold out." So they were in the fort then, and did not come out until the Confederates were all out of sight. The officers tried to keep up the spirits of their men by assuring them that "Sherman will soon come" (Corse's report). The hope of speedy relief prevented utter despondency, and they waited and waited, hoped and hoped for the fulfillment of the encouraging promises implied in the dispatches sent them by Sherman, as: "Hold fast, we are coming;" "Sherman moving in force, hold out;" "Sherman working hard for you;" "Near you." With his troops in this condition, and in the face of all these facts, Corse officially publishes to his commander and to the world, in a vainglorious manner, that the Confederates "were driven from every position, and finally fled in great confusion, leaving their dead and wounded, and our little garrison in possession of the field!!!" It is a beautiful description of an event that never happened.

It must have been pretty soon after we left Allatoona that Gen. Green B. Raum, commanding a division of cavalry that was hovering around between the Etowah bridge and the Allatoona, arrived and made a social call on Corse, and sympathized with him in his afflictions; but he must have left at an early hour, for he went to Cartersville that evening and sent a dispatch, which will be found, No. 25, dated October 5.

BATTLE OF ALLATOONA—CAPTURE OF REDOUBT "R."

Soon Sherman was informed that the Confederates had retreated, and had taken the road to Dallas. So he checked his troops that were marching on Allatoona. However, Corse's train, expected every hour during the battle, returned to Allatoona at 8 P.M. with the remainder of Rowett's Brigade. Some cavalry also arrived, and the next morning came Martin's Brigade. With him the condition of affairs was very much changed now.

During this time the weary Confederates, after capturing the blockhouse with a garrison of one hundred and ten men at Allatoona Creek bridge, marched on till midnight of the 5th, and the next morning were at New Hope Church, far away from Allatoona. Corse was now resting in the bosom of his friends, who no doubt congratulated him on his happy deliverance from the distress of the day previous; and as there were no Confederates near to distress him any more, he wrote Sherman, at 2 p.m. on the 6th, his (so-called) famous dispatch, which for cheek is unequaled:

I am short a cheek bone and an ear, but can whip all h-ll yet!!

Now the adverb "yet" in this case implies conditions unchanged. But, as they were then entirely changed, he was not justified in sending such a dispatch. It is a vainglorious, self-laudatory dispatch, no doubt sent to divert attention from the real condition in which his command had been placed; or it may be that the joy he felt the day after the battle, on being reënforced and rescued from the "slaughter pen" (in which he was pent up), by Sherman's movements to save him, caused him to write it; if so, it is not excusable. If, however, intoxicated at the mess table by the congratulations of friends and the usual accompaniments required for his condition, he was inspired to send that dispatch (as a postprandial speech is made), to mean nothing, then he may be forgiven.

But the unbought grace of life, the trained veracity, the chivalrous respect for foemen his equal in valor, whose daring he had witnessed, whose prowess he had felt, and from whose presence he so longed to be delivered, should have restrained him, at a much later date, from writing in his official report the fabricated story of how he "drove the Confederates from every position until finally they fled in great confusion," because he well knew this statement was not true.

In connection with Gen. Corse's visit with Joseph M. Brown to the battle ground at Allatoona, I have a letter from Mr. Brown giving me other information of what was said during his visit to Atlanta. As a guest of Senator Brown this conversation grew frank and friendly.

Atlanta, Ga., August 31, 1900.

Gen. S. G. French, Pensacola, Fla.

My Dear General: Answering your inquiry as to Mr. De Thulstrup's picture of the battle of Allatoona, I will state that in 1886 Gen. John M. Corse came to Georgia with the above well-known battle artist. I went with them to Allatoona, where we spent almost a day going over the various points of the ridge on both sides of the railroad, where there were fortifications.

Returning to Atlanta, these two gentlemen were my guests at my father's home. That night, after some social conversation, Gen. Corse and Mr. De Thulstrup went upstairs to their sleeping apartments. Within probably an hour afterwards I also went up to my sleeping room. The hall door leading from my room to Gen. Corse's being open, I was unintentionally made a hearer of conversation going on. Gen. Corse was quite animated in giving instructions to the artist as to how to draw the picture. I very distinctly heard him use the following expression: "Be sure you have the Rebels running." He repeated this in very positive tones.

Any one looking at the picture will see that the artist faithfully complied with the General's instructions.

Very truly yours.

Joseph M. Brown.

When J. M. Brown told Corse that French never received his reply to his summons to surrender, he answered: "This is the first information I have to that effect, that my answer never reached him." Then Corse told him he was in great haste in examining the lines and disposing of his troops. "When one of his staff officers hailed me with advice that he had a note from the enemy's commander, which he supposed was a summons to surrender, ... I took the note and read it; it made me mad, because, from what I could see of his forces, and what I knew of mine, I believed that I had about as big a force as he had, hence considered the summons a superfluous piece of bravado. I sat down on a log, and, pulling my notebook out of my pocket, wrote the reply across the face of one of its pages, which I tore out and handed to my staff officer with instructions to take it to the bearer of the summons.... I never knew whether my answer reached French or not."

There is something in this statement which must be regarded as very remarkable, for in the ordinary affairs of life, if even a servant be sent to deliver a letter, and does not find the person to whom he was to deliver it, would he throw it away and never mention it, or would he return with it and report that he did not find the man to whom he was to hand it? And does not common sense tell us that on such a momentous matter as this, involving the lives of hundreds of men, his staff officer would have reported that the flag of truce could not be found, and have returned the dispatch given him? And, furthermore, can any person of intelligence believe that Gen. Corse and the said staff officer did not speak about this pretentious answer to the summons at any time, which is published to the world in facsimile, of which Julius E. Brown, of Atlanta, has one copy. If he published the "facsimile" of the dispatch sent me, where did he get it? It seems to me the General "doth protest too much." And further he says: "Being in great pain from my wound, I took the train the night of the 5th for Rome." If this be true, how could he have issued his "famous" dispatch from Allatoona on the afternoon of the 6th, for it gives the place, date, and the hour?

I am inclined to the belief that he did not leave Allatoona until after the 6th, or on the second day after the fight.

I would not detract anything from the well-earned reputation of Gen. Corse—and more especially so, as he is not living—yet it is a duty incumbent on me, a duty I owe to my children, and particularly to the noble Confederate soldiers who were with me, to protect them against the statement of being "driven away" by the garrison. The demands of impartial history require of me—an actor therein, a living witness—to transcribe from my diary the facts as there recorded at the time, so that the world may know to what extent the many reported incidents of the battle have truth for their foundation as we now find them related in nursery tales to children, taught in schools, narrated in story, and sung in the gospel hymn of "Hold the Fort" wherever the cross is seen and Christianity prevails.

But in the current literature of the North derived from the exaggerated bulletins daily sent from the seat of war there is a wonderful admixture of truth and error, and I am trying to separate them so far as they are found in the ordinary versions of this battle, and emphatically to declare that the Confederate troops were not repulsed as stated in the light publications of the day, or as written in Corse's report.

If any further testimony be desired, I would refer you to the following letter from a publication made by Joseph M. Brown, son of the late Senator Joseph E. Brown, of Georgia.

Allatoona, Ga., November 10, 1890.

Mr. Joseph M. Brown.

Dear Sir: In reply to the inquiries contained in your letter of October 31, I will state that, with my brother, I was in Allatoona on the night of October 4, 1864, when the place was surrounded by Confederates under Gen. French.

Early the next morning, for safety, we went into the fort on the west side of the railroad, and were there during the battle that day. Gen. Corse commanded on the west side of the railroad, and was in the fort all the latter part of the fight. The Federals fought desperately, and after they lost fort "R"[30] across the Cartersville road they were very much disheartened. They could get no water without exposing themselves to a deadly fire; and it was very much needed, especially for the wounded.

During the latter part of the engagement I frequently heard it said they were nearly out of ammunition. They were on the point of giving up the fight several times. The command "Cease firing" was given by somebody and passed around the fort, but then some of the officers rallied the men a little.

If the attack had been kept up a little while longer, the fort would have certainly been taken; but to the surprise of the Federals, their enemy's fire slackened and the Confederates retired from the front of the fort. The Federals at this time were at a loss to understand this movement, when they themselves were nearly ready to surrender. They seemed momentarily to expect a renewal of the attack from some other quarter. They remained quietly in the fort for nearly or quite three-quarters of an hour after the Confederates retired. But when they found that the Confederates would not renew the fighting there was a great rally in the fort. Then there was some desultory firing at the Confederates on the south of the fort near the depot and station. The Federals did not sally out of the fort until the Confederates were gone entirely out of sight.

W. M. Denton.

As regards the arms captured by Corse, I will simple remark they were inferior muskets exchanged on the field for Springfield rifles, and Henry repeating rifles (16 shooters), one of which I turned over, by my Aid Yerger, to the United States Ordnance officer at the close of the war. Had Corse gone to the blockhouse at Allatoona creek, he would have captured there eighty-five muskets (thrown away) in the road, in exchange for those we captured there, which would have augmented his list of arms captured.