GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTT TO WM. H. SEWARD
"Washington, March 3, 1861.
"Dear Sir,—Hoping that in a day or two the new President will have happily passed through all personal dangers and find himself installed an honored successor of the great Washington, with you as the chief of his Cabinet, I beg leave to repeat in writing what I have before said to you orally, this supplement to my printed 'views' (dated in October last) on the highly disordered condition of our (so late) happy and glorious Union.
"To meet the extraordinary exigencies of the times, it seems to me that I am guilty of no arrogance in limiting the President's field of selection to one of the four plans of procedure subjoined:
"1. Throw off the old and assume a new designation—the Union party. Adopt the conciliatory measures proposed by Mr. Crittenden or the peace convention—and my life upon it, we shall have no new case of secession, but, on the contrary, an early return of many, if not of all, the States which have already broken off from the Union. Without some equally benign measure the remaining slave-holding States will probably join the Montgomery Confederacy in less than sixty days, when this city, being included in a foreign country, would require a permanent garrison of at least 35,000 troops to protect the government within it.
"I stop here to call your attention to the fact that Maryland did not join the Montgomery Confederacy, and yet with Maryland on our side to-night, it requires a garrison of 150,000 men to protect Washington.
"2. Collect the duties on foreign goods outside the ports of which this government has lost the command, or close such ports by act of Congress and blockade them.
"3. Conquer the seceded States by invading armies. No doubt this might be done in two or three years by a young and able general—a Wolfe, a Desaix, or a Hoche, with 300,000 disciplined men, estimating a third for garrisons, and the loss of a yet greater number by skirmishes, sieges, battles, and Southern fevers. The destruction of life and property on the other side would be frightful, however perfect the moral discipline of the invaders.
"The conquest completed at that enormous waste of human life to the North and Northwest, with at least $250,000,000 added thereto, and cui bono? Fifteen devastated provinces! not to be brought into harmony with their conquerors, but to be held for generations, by heavy garrisons, at an expense quadruple the net duties or taxes which it would be possible to extort from them, followed by a protector or an emperor.
"4. Say to the seceded States, Wayward sisters, depart in peace!
In haste, I remain,
"Very truly yours,
"Winfield Scott."
"Hon. Wm. H. Seward, &c., &c., &c."
J. L. O'SULLIVAN[33] TO TILDEN
"Lisbon, May 6, 1861.
"My dear Tilden,—The heart-breaking news has just reached us here, first of the attack and capture of Sumter, for which the signal was so madly and wickedly given by the administration (dominated, evidently, by the war portion of that party) in its despatch of reinforcements; and, secondly, of Lincoln's declaration of war by his proclamation for 75,000 volunteers for the recapture of all the Southern forts, that is, for the invasion of the South—an act followed, of course, by secession of Virginia, and soon to be followed, I have no doubt, by that of all or nearly all the border States. Also the telegraph tells of a Massachusetts regiment resisted in an (insane) attempt to force a passage through Baltimore. Gracious God, that we should have lived to see such things! You can better judge, than I could describe, my affliction. At first it drew from me convulsions of tears. I think it is a greater grief than that I passed through a little short of a year ago. What doom is sufficient for the mad authors of all this! By that I mean, for 9/10 of the crime, the ultra portion of the Republican party. The papers say that there is a common enthusiasm of all parties at the North for the support of the admn. I may stand alone, but I do not share this. I am extremely anxious to hear from you. Do write me your views. I chafe terribly under the impossibilities which alone prevent my hastening home. Not only have I not the means, but I cannot leave my debts here, when a short, prolonged stay will probably assure me the means of paying them. Then I shall come, to do my best in the fight at home for peaceful separation if reunion has become indeed impossible. What will New York do? I trust devoutly that if any troops march from our State southward they may consist only of Republicans. My hope now is that the North will at last realize the mad horror of the whole thing, and that a cloud of witnesses will arise to protest against its being carried further. Thus far the country has drifted along, both sides standing obstinate to the consistency of their opposite theories. But surely all should now agree to pause and hold back! But the Republican leaders, I fear, will now move heaven and hell to push and drag forward the North to sustain them in the position to which they have brought things. And I fear much from the fighting character of our people. I dread the next news. If Maryland goes with Virginia there will probably be dreadful fighting for the possession of Washington, unless the wise and patriotic like you can stop it.
"We are exemplifying the fable of the dispute between the head and tail of the snake for the right to lead. The Democratic party is the natural and the only possible government of our Democratic confederation. It alone has ever understood the idea of State rights. The tail has taken its turn of leadership, and you see to what a pass it has brought the country.
"Were it not for the immediate question of the fighting to grow out of the question of the possession of Washington, I should say it were best that the border States should now all go at once, so as to make the North feel the absurdity of further prosecution of war. But reunion is now, I fear, scarcely to be hoped for!
"My wife sends you her affectionate regards.
"Ever yours,
"J. L. O'Sullivan."
"The great question for me here of the success of our copper establishment is not yet decided. I had expected to find the works in operation. They will not be ready to begin short of a week or fortnight, and then there may be further delay from changes required in details of machinery. Everything is very encouraging. I have good prospects of a contract for rifles and artillery from this government—it is under consideration now. Could not do anything at present in France, though the plan was recognized as superior to their own or to anything known. But in the present state of Europe they could not introduce a change, their existing armament on their own plan being on so vast a scale. But I was encouraged for a later day.
"In regard to politics, I suppose the North will be too hot to hold me hereafter, if the papers are right in their account of the Northern feeling."