"SEA-COAST DEFENCES
"In considering the state of the public revenues, the subject involves the question whether we shall extinguish the surplus by reducing the revenue; or, whether we shall apply the surplus to payments on the public debt; or, whether we shall seize the occasion to provide for our sea-coast defences, which have been too long neglected. The Secretary is of the opinion that the latter is a paramount necessity, which ought to precede the reduction of the revenue; and ought, also, to precede an excessive rapidity in the payment of the public debt.
"The property exposed to destruction in the nine seaports—Portland, Portsmouth, Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, New Orleans, and San Francisco—cannot be less in value than five thousand millions of dollars. To this must be added a vast amount of property dependent for its use on three seaports. Nor does this statement afford a true measure of the damage which might be carried to the property and business of the country by a failure to protect these seaports from hostile naval attacks.
"They are the centres, not only of foreign commerce, but of most of the internal trade and exchanges of domestic productions. To this state of things the machinery of transportation of the whole country has become adapted.
"The interruptions of the currents of traffic by the occupation of one of our principal seaports by a foreign enemy, or the destruction of them by bombardment, or by the holding over them the menace of destruction for the purpose of exacting contribution or ransom, would inflict upon the property and business of the country an injury which can neither be foreseen nor measured.
"The elaborate and costly fortifications, which were constructed with the greatest engineering skill, are now practically useless. They are not capable of resisting the attacks of modern artillery.
"A still greater defect exists in our coast defences. The range of the best modern artillery has become so extended that our present fortifications, designed to protect the harbor of New York, where two-thirds of the import trade and more than one-half of the export trade of the whole United States is carried on, are too near to the great populations of New York city, Jersey City, and Brooklyn to be of any value as a protection.
"To provide effectual defences would be the work of years. It would take much time to construct permanent fortifications. A small provision of the best modern guns would take several years. Neither of these works can be extemporized in presence of emergent danger. A million of soldiers with the best equipments on the heights surrounding the harbor of New York, in our present state of preparation, or, rather, in our total want of preparation, would be powerless to resist a small squadron of war-steamers.
"This state of things is discreditable to our foresight and to our prudence.
"The best guarantee against aggression—the best assurance that our diplomacy will be successful and pacific, and that our rights and honor will be respected by other nations, is in their knowledge that we are in a situation to vindicate our reputation and interests. While we may afford to be deficient in the means of defence, we cannot afford to be defenceless. The notoriety of the fact that we have neglected the ordinary precautions of defence invites want of consideration in our diplomacy, injustice, arrogance, and insult at the hands of foreign nations.
"It is now more than sixty years since we announced to the world that we should resist any attempts, from whatever quarter they might come, to make any new colonizations on any part of the American continent—that while we should respect the status quo, we should protect the people of the different nations inhabiting this continent from every attempt to subject them to the dominion of any European power, or to interfere with their undisturbed exercise of the rights of self-government.
"This announcement was formally made by President Monroe, after consultation with Mr. Madison and Mr. Jefferson. It was formulated by John Quincy Adams. Our government has firmly adhered to the Monroe Doctrine, and even so late as 1865 it warned Napoleon III. out of Mexico.
"It is impossible to foresee, in the recent scramble of the European powers for the acquisition of colonies, how soon an occasion may arise for our putting in practice the Monroe Doctrine. It is clear that there ought to be some relation between our assertion of this doctrine, and our preparation to maintain it.
"It is not intended to recommend any attempt to rival the great European powers in the creation of a powerful navy. The changes which have rapidly occurred by the diminution of the relative resisting power of the defensive armor of ironclads, and by the increased efficiency of modern artillery—which, on the whole, has gained in the competition—suggest that we should not, at present, enter largely into the creation of armored vessels.
"In the questions that beset this subject until they shall have reached a solution, we can content ourselves with adding but sparingly to our navy. But what we can add should be the very best that experience and science can indicate. This prudential view is reinforced by the consideration that the annual charge of maintaining a war-vessel bears an important proportion to the original cost of construction.
"In constructing permanent fortifications, and in providing an ample supply of the best modern artillery, the annual cost of maintenance is inconsiderable. Nearly the whole expenditure is in the original outlay for construction.
"If we do not make this expenditure necessary to provide for our sea-coast defences when we have a surplus, and have no need to levy taxes, we certainly will not make those expenditures when we have no longer a surplus in the Treasury.
"To leave our vast interests defenceless, in order to reduce the cost of whiskey to its consumers, would be a solecism.
"The present time is peculiarly favorable for providing for this great national necessity too long neglected. Not only does the surplus in the Treasury supply ample means to enable us to meet this great public want, without laying new burdens upon the people, but the work can now be done at a much lower cost than has ever before been possible. The defensive works would consist almost entirely of steel and iron. Those materials can now be had at an unprecedentedly low price. A vast supply of machinery, and of labor, called into existence by a great vicissitude in the steel and iron industries, offers itself to our service. We should have the satisfaction of knowing that while we were availing ourselves of these supplies, which would ordinarily be unattainable, we were setting in motion important industries, and giving employment to labor in a period of depression. With encouragement by the guarantee of work, or, perhaps, by the government itself furnishing the plant, the inventive genius of our people would be applied to the creation of new means and improved machinery, and establishments would spring into existence capable of supplying all of the national wants, and rendering us completely independent of all other countries in respect to the means of national defence."