FOOTNOTES:
[1] Cf. infra, p. 95.
PART I
THE CAUSES OF JEWISH EMIGRATION
CHAPTER II[ToC]
Eastern Europe: Economic, Social and Political Conditions
I. RUSSIA
The difficulty of the average American to understand the character of Russian life, some traits of which have been so vividly brought home to him in recent years, may be attributed to a general idea that a country rubbing elbows as it were with Western civilization for several centuries must perforce itself possess the characteristics of modern civilization. A closer survey of the economic, social and political conditions prevailing in Russia to-day, however, reveals many points of difference from those of the countries of Western Europe, and presents a remarkable contrast with those prevailing in the United States. Russia and the United States, indeed, stand, in Leroy-Beaulieu's phrase, at the two poles of modern civilization. So far apart are they in the character of their economic, social and political structures, in the degree in which they utilize the forms and institutions of modern life, and, in the difference in the mental make-up of their peoples, that there exist few, if any, points of real contact.
Up to the middle of the 19th century, Russia was, in nearly all respects, a medieval state. She was a society, which, in the words of Kovalevsky, "preserved still of feudalism, not its political spirit but its economic structure, serfdom, monopoly and the privileges of the nobility, its immunities in the matter of taxes, its exclusive right to landed property, and its seignorial rights."[2] Her modern era dates from the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, when she became, at least in form, a European state. But, though the Russia of our day has witnessed great transformations in the direction of modernization, she still retains many of the conditions and much of the spirit of her medieval past.
A rapid review of the economic, social and political conditions of Russia will serve to make clearer this situation, which has an important bearing upon the exceptional position, legal, economic, social, of the Jews in the Empire, and upon the fateful events of their history for a third of a century.
The most striking fact in the economic life of present-day Russia is that it is overwhelmingly agricultural. More than three-fourths of her population are engaged in some form of agricultural labor. The vast majority are peasants living in villages. Towns are relatively few and sparsely populated. Agricultural products constitute 85 per cent of the annual exports. What a contrast does this agricultural state, this "peasant empire", present to the industrially and commercially developed countries of Western Europe and the United States!
The Russian peasant still practices a primitive system of agriculture. His method of extensive cultivation, the three-field system in vogue, his primitive implements, his domestic economy of half a century ago, with its home production for home consumption, which is still maintained in many parts of Russia to this day—all these present conditions not far removed from those of the middle ages of Western Europe.[3]
The existence to our day of this almost primitive economy finds its explanation in the fact that serfdom existed in Russia, in all its unmitigated cruelty, until comparatively recent times. Its abolition through the Emancipation Act of Alexander II—antedating our own Emancipation Proclamation by a few years—struck off the chains that bound twenty millions of peasants to the soil. The emancipation, however, was not complete. The land the peasants received was insufficient for their needs. Other conditions co-operated in the course of time with this primary one, to create a situation of chronic starvation for the great mass of the Russian peasants. Forced by the government to pay heavy taxes, in addition to redemption dues for the land, which they paid until recently, and receiving little help from either government or the nobility for the improvement of their position, they are virtually exploited almost as completely as before the emancipation.
Thus, though freed in person, the peasants are to a great extent bound by economic ties to their former masters, the nobles. These two social-economic classes maintain towards each other practically the same relative position held by them before the emancipation. The manor still controls the hut.
The former servile relations have persisted psychologically as well. The Russian peasant is still largely a serf in his mentality, in his feeling of dependence, in his inertia and lack of individual enterprise, and, above all, in the smallness of his demands upon life.[4] This fact permeates, as it serves to explain, many aspects of contemporary Russian life.
The industrial and commercial stage of Russian economy began with the emancipation, which set free a great supply of labor. The changes that have taken place have nevertheless not obliterated many of the landmarks of the feudal, pre-reformation period. The economic activities of the last half-century present a curious juxtaposition of old and new, medieval and modern. Cottage and village industries but little removed from the natural economy of the earlier period exist by the side of great factories and industrial establishments employing thousands of workmen. Fairs and markets still play a large part in supplying the needs of the peasants, rapidly as they are being supplanted by the commercial activities of the towns. The industrial laborers, recruited mainly from the country, retain largely their peasant interests, relations and characteristics. The payment of wages in kind, which is still in vogue in many parts, and the right of inflicting corporal punishment retained by the employers, give evidence of the strong impress of the servile conditions of the past.
Vast changes have nevertheless taken place since the emancipation. Capitalism has made rapid, if uneven, progress. Under the fostering care of the government, industry and commerce have made immense strides. The factory system has taken firm root and has been developing a specialized class of industrial laborers. Great industrial centers have sprung up; towns have grown rapidly. The middle class, hitherto insignificant, has increased in number, wealth and influence. Among the peasants as well, freedom has given birth to the spirit of individualism. The differentiation of the peasantry into wealthier peasants and landless agricultural laborers, the great mass of the peasantry occupying the middle ground, and the gradual dissolution of the two great forces of Russian agricultural life—the patriarchal family and the village community—have been the most important results.
Russia is clearly in a state of transition from the agricultural or medieval to the industrial and commercial or modern economic life. This transformation of the economic structure is being effected under great difficulties and the strong opposition of the ruling classes, whose privileges are threatened by the new order of things.
The Russian social and political order reflects the medieval background which formed the setting for her entrance upon the modern stage. The class distinctions, naturally obtaining, are hardened into rigidity by the law, which divides Russian society into a hierarchy of five classes or orders—the nobles, the clergy, the merchants, the townsmen and the peasants—each with separate legal status, rights and obligations.
The individual is thus not an independent unit, as in the legal codes of Western Europe or the United States. Accompanying the legal stratification there is an exceedingly strong, almost caste-like, sense of difference between the members of the different groups.
This emphasis on the person is characteristic of the medieval social order. In Russia it finds additional expression in the control of individual movement by means of the passport, without which document a Russian may be said to have no legal existence.
Even more striking is the position of the Russian Church, as well as the religio-national conception which dominates the Russian mind and according to which orthodoxy and nationality are regarded as one. The Russian Orthodox is the only true Russian; all others are foreigners. In the alliance of church and state—which in Russia reaches a degree of strength not attained in any other European state—in the complete control exercised by the Church over the lives of the faithful and the clergy, in secular as in religious matters, in its intolerant attitude towards other creeds and its unceasing attempts to suppress them—it presents characteristics strongly reminiscent of the position of the medieval church in Western Europe.
The one great political fact of Russia has been the autocracy. The degree of control which the autocratic Czars exercised unopposed over their subjects marks an important difference between the political development of Russia and that of the countries of Western Europe. At an early period the Czars had transformed the nobility into a body of state officials, thus at a blow depriving them of any real powers, apart from the will of the Crown, and making them serve the interests of the state. In this way the nobles, or the landed aristocracy, became the main source from which the members of the bureaucracy were recruited. The lack of a middle class of any real size and influence, which could play a part in the demand for political rights, explains in a measure the strength of the autocratic powers.[5] The autocracy in turn has been largely dependent upon its servant, the bureaucracy. To such an extent has the Russian government been the expression of the will and interests of this all-powerful body as to justify Leroy-Beaulieu's designation of Russia as the "Bureaucratic State".
Thus the autocracy, the nobility-bureaucracy and the church have been the dominating forces in the economic, social and political life of Russia.
In the light of this analysis, the political struggles that have been so conspicuous a feature of Russian life during the last half of the 19th century become an accompaniment as well as an expression of the progressive development of Russia towards modern economic, social and political institutions.
Russian liberalism,—largely revolutionary because of the denial of even elementary rights, such as the freedom of person, of speech, of the press and of meeting,—rights which were secured to Englishmen through the Magna Charta—has had the serious task not only of securing these rights but at the same time of creating in Russia the conditions of modern civilization. For the twenty years in which its spirit ruled, during the reign of Alexander II, the reforms begun under its influence amounted to a veritable revolution. The economic, social, political and juridical reforms of this epoch generated new forces and began the modernization of Russia. These reforms encountered the formidable opposition of the nobility and the church and finally of the autocracy, when the latter felt that its position was gradually being undermined, especially by the demand for a constitution. With the assassination of Alexander II, the liberal era was brought to a close, and a reaction was ushered in which has lasted to our day.
The classes that came into power with Alexander III and Pobedonostseff were, from their economic interests, social outlook and political ideals, essentially medieval and may properly be termed the feudal party. Guided by its economic interests—which had been seriously threatened by the emancipation—and swayed by the Slavophilistic philosophy,[6] this party sought to nullify as far as possible the reforms of the epoch of emancipation and to carry through a many-sided program for putting the order of things backward to the medieval, pre-reform days. Autocracy, Greek Orthodoxy and Russian Nationalism—the famous Slavophilistic trinity—were glorified, the first two as peculiarly national institutions, the policy of russification and the repression of non-orthodox faiths by force were proclaimed as vital to the social health of Russia, the blind ignorance and illiteracy of the peasants were extolled as a virtue and the control over them by the nobility was strengthened in many ways. Freedom of every form was condemned as an aping of the "rotten" civilization of the West with its decaying institutions, and as false to the true Russian national, historical development.
During this period of reaction, however, the liberal movement was kept alive, largely as revolutionary propaganda. The earlier movement had been directed by the educated classes, the "Intelligenzia" of Russia. Lately, with the growth of the middle class and a population of industrial workers in the towns and the factories, and a wealthier class of peasants, the cry for reform has become more insistent, and only recently partly successful in results.
Summarizing his impressions of Russian life and institutions obtained while serving as Ambassador to Russia, Andrew D. White remarked: "During two centuries Russia has been coming slowly out of the middle ages—indeed, out of perhaps the most cruel phases of medieval life."[7] One of the phases of this process has been the bitter struggle between the feudal and the modern forces that has occupied Russia for the last third of a century.
II. ROUMANIA
In Roumania,[8] in spite of a liberal constitution modeled upon the Belgian, granting all rights enjoyed by citizens of a free state, the underlying economic, social and, in a measure, political conditions point to a state of things little removed from the medieval forms of life. The main social-economic classes are the large landed proprietors, composed chiefly of the old nobility or boyars, and the peasants, who were formerly serfs. In the hands of the former are concentrated the greater part of the land. Five thousand large landed proprietors together owned nearly half of the cultivable land. Nearly a million of peasants, on the other hand, comprising with their dependents a great majority of the population, together owned a little over two-fifths of the cultivable land.[9]
This situation is an inheritance from the servile system which existed in Roumania until 1864, when it was legally abolished. The freedom granted to the peasants was, however, more formal than real. The land given them being insufficient for their needs, and pasture land especially having been denied them, they were as a rule compelled to lease land or pasture right from their former masters at ruinous rates, often paying by labor on their former masters' estates. Thus the essential feudal services were in the main continued, especially as the lease and labor contracts, generally drawn up in the interests of the landed proprietor, were often usurious and extremely oppressive.[10] In twenty years there was little change from the previous condition of serfdom, so that a law was necessary, in 1882, to permit the peasants to work at least two days during the week on their own land.
Since this period there has been practically little change in this essentially feudal relation of the peasantry to the landed proprietors. As the owners of the great estates are a ruling power in the political life of the country, the greater part of peasants being disqualified from voting through property and educational requirements, the former have been enabled to keep the peasantry in this condition of semi-servitude. The result is a state of ignorance, misery and degradation on the part of the peasantry that is difficult to parallel in another European country. That the peasants are not entirely passive under their wrongs is shown in the repeated uprisings against their masters and in the two great social revolutions of 1888 and 1907, both of which were put down by military force.
Roumania's advent into industry and commerce may be dated from the eighties of the last century, and was initiated by the industrial law of 1887, which sought to create a national industry by means of subsidies, land grants and other favors to undertakers of large industrial enterprises. Since then the growth has been sufficiently rapid to place Roumania as the industrial and commercial leader of the Balkan States. Relatively, however, it is still very backward. Only 14 per cent of the population is urban. The industrial laborers are estimated at no more than 40,000. There are only a few cities. Only the largest—Bucarest—has above 100,000 inhabitants, three other cities have between fifty and seventy-five thousand inhabitants. The chief industrial establishments, such as saw mills, flour mills and distilleries, are concerned mainly in the working up of the raw materials produced in the country. Nevertheless, industrial progress has made for the growth of a small but influential middle class, which divides the control of affairs with the large landed proprietors. Its influence can be traced in the electoral law, which gives the urban classes, constituting the backbone of the liberal party, a majority in the Chamber of Deputies.
III. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
Though relatively far advanced along the road of modern civilization, Austria-Hungary, through its prevailing mode of economic and social life, and through its large Slavic populations, belongs rather to Eastern than to Western Europe. Historically, it began its modern career about the same time as Russia, when it abolished, in 1867, the feudal services and dues, survivals of the previous servile institutions. Nevertheless, in its large agricultural population, in the primitive system of cultivation generally in vogue, in the scattered character of the peasant holdings, in the strong contrast between the great landed estates or Latifundia, held chiefly by the nobility, and the small, even minute, estates of the majority of the peasant proprietors, and in the natural economy prevailing in many parts of the Dual Monarchy and constituting the main foundation upon which the life of the peasants rests—in all these characteristics, is reflected the almost medieval economy which existed in the empire before 1848 and which is not yet entirely outgrown.
Industrially and commercially, Austria, far more than Hungary, has indeed made really remarkable progress. Yet in this respect the greatest contrast exists between the various Austrian provinces. Certain of these—Galicia and Bukowina, for instance—are not only the most backward in these pursuits, but their agricultural population is even relatively increasing. Even in the industrially advanced provinces, such as Lower Austria and Bohemia, the transitional nature of the industrial life is evident in the unspecialized character of a larger portion of the town laborers, many of whom are peasants temporarily employed in factories and mines.
The Austrian organization of industry and commerce is a modernized version of the guilds and crafts of medieval Western Europe. How these medieval economic forms with their underlying psychologic forces still live and dominate Austria, especially its Slavic nationalities, is shown by the revival in 1859 of the Austrian guilds, the direct descendants of the medieval Innungen. These were, in 1883, developed in the form of Zwangsgenossenschaften or compulsory trade-guilds, which, in their regulations concerning the Befähigungsnachweis or certificate of capacity, the three orders of master, journeyman and apprentice, the principle of compulsory entrance into the local guild, the workman's passport or Arbeitsbuch, unite the methods of regulating and restricting industry and trade characteristic of the Middle Ages, with modern methods of combination, arbitration, and assistance of members. By the side of these compulsory guilds are to be found the Gewerkschaften, or the modern voluntary trade-unions.
The transition to modern economic and social conditions is, nevertheless, well advanced. This is seen in a decrease of the agricultural classes and an increase of the industrial and commercial classes in the thirty years from 1869 to 1900. Another sign is the fairly strong differentiation of the economic-social classes, in both the agricultural and the industrial groups, which has advanced quite rapidly. The middle class, while neither as large nor as influential as in the countries of Western Europe, has played an important rôle towards hastening this transition.
Politically, the Dual Monarchy occupies a middle ground between absolutist Russia and constitutional England. The court, the nobility and the Roman Church with its strong aristocratic leanings, represent the dominant power in Austria. The economic and social changes of the transitional period have been accompanied by politico-economic struggles which have played a vital part and have cut through and across the racial, national and religious conflicts of this much-distracted conglomeration of peoples. Amid the confusion of parties, with their complexity of programs, may be distinguished the German-Austrian liberals, representatives of the middle class or industrialists, whose historic mission was to create a modern state in Austria, and who carried out, in large measure, their program of constitutionalism, economic freedom and the secular state. Against them were arrayed the powerful forces of the agrarian party or the landed aristocracy—the upholders of the feudal economic-social order of privilege and class distinction, the clericals—the upholders of the idea of the Christian State—and the representatives of the lower middle class, composed chiefly of petty artisans and traders, whose ideal was the medieval industrial organization, largely co-operative and regulated, as opposed to the individualistic and competitive system of the modern era, with its great concentration of wealth, capital and power in the hands of the middle class. That the present structure of Austria is so much of a compromise and crosspatch between modern and medieval economic, social and political forms, and contains so much that is essentially incongruous, is due largely to the successful struggle which the chief parties of the medieval order—the feudal-clericals—the party of the upper classes, and the Christian Socialists—the party of the lower classes—have waged against the growing constitutionalization, industrialization and secularization of Austria—in short, against the transformation of Austria into a modern state.
It is in Galicia that the conditions obtaining in Russia are largely duplicated. Geographically, racially and socially, Galicia is a part of Russia. Galicia is a preponderatingly agricultural land and possesses the densest agricultural population in Europe. Modern industry is relatively little developed, its place being held to a great extent by the domestic system of industry. The contrast between the large and small estates is sharper here than perhaps in any other section of Europe. The Polish nobility, in whose hands the large estates are mostly found, are the ruling social and political, as well as economic, power in Galicia. The autonomous Galician Diet is practically the instrument of their interests. A middle class has been gradually rising and contesting their supremacy. The peasantry is one of the most illiterate, degraded, and oppressed in all Europe.
IV. SUMMARY
This brief review of the economic and social conditions in Russia, Roumania and Austria-Hungary has shown that, broadly speaking, these countries present points of similarity in their situation and their recent movement. In all of these countries, economic and social conditions closely resembling those that obtained in the countries of Western Europe several centuries ago were found until comparatively recent times. The abolition of serfdom in Russia and in Roumania, and of feudal dues in Austria-Hungary, paved the way for the entrance of these states into modern European civilization. The succeeding period has been marked by a rapid transition from the old domestic economy to a modern exchange economy, through the growth of industry and commerce. The medieval conditions of the earlier period have nevertheless not been entirely obliterated. They exist, in Russia, in the privileges and powers of the nobility, in the inferior status and oppressed condition of the peasantry, in the strong class distinctions, in the restraints upon economic activity and upon movement. Though in smaller measure, the same conditions are found in Austria-Hungary, especially in Galicia. In Roumania, so far as the peasantry is concerned, the pre-emancipation conditions remain practically, if not legally, in force. Owing to the increase of population, the minute subdivision of the estates of the peasants, the backwardness of their agricultural methods, and their over-taxation, the position of the peasants has been rendered precarious. Revolutionary uprisings directed chiefly against the landed proprietors have been a recurring expression of their discontent.
An important consequence has been the rapid evolution of the industrial and commercial, or the middle class. The growth of the middle class has been accompanied by a struggle in each of these countries between the privileged classes of the feudal state and the middle class, including in the latter the educated classes and the industrial workers of the towns.
It is in this middle class that the Jews are chiefly to be found. Owing to this fact, as well as through the action of historical conditions, the Jews occupy an exceptional position in the economic activities and the social life of each of the countries of Eastern Europe. A survey of their economic and social position in each country will serve to clarify the last thirty years of their history in Eastern Europe and to give some of the causes underlying their vast movement from these countries to Western Europe and particularly to the United States.