P. 64.
And hence, though the dead shall not arise with the same identity of
matter with which they died, yet being in the same form, they will not
know themselves from themselves, being the same to all uses, intents,
and purposes.... But then as God, in the resurrection, is not bound to
use the same matter, neither is he obliged to use a different matter.
The great objection to this part of Asgill's scheme, which has had, and still, I am told, has, many advocates among the chief dignitaries of our church, is—that it either takes death as the utter extinction of being,—or it supposes a continuance, or at least a renewal, of consciousness after death. The former involves all the irrational, and all the immoral, consequences of materialism. But if the latter be granted, the proportionality, adhesion, and symmetry, of the whole scheme are gone, and the infinite quantity,—that is, immortality under the curse of estrangement from God,—is rendered a mere supplement tacked on to the finite, and comparatively insignificant, if not doubtful, evil, namely, the dissolution of the organic body. See what a poor hand Asgill makes of it, p. 26:—
And therefore to signify the height of this resentment, God raises man
from the dead to demand further satisfaction of him.
Death is a commitment to the prison of the grave till the judgment of
the great day; and then the grand 'Habeas corpus' will issue 'to the
earth and to the sea', to give up their dead; to remove the bodies,
with the cause of their commitment: and as these causes shall appear,
they shall either be released, or else sentenced to the common goal of
hell, there to remain until satisfaction.