CHAPTER XVIII CLEVELAND'S SECOND TERM 1892 to 1896

I have already, in other parts of these recollections, referred to the National Convention of 1892, and the reasons which induced me to support President Harrison for renomination. I attended as one of the delegates, and took a more or less active part in the work of the convention. Harrison was chosen on the first ballot. No other candidate had any chance. Mr. Blaine and Mr. McKinley on that ballot received one hundred and eighty-two votes each, but neither was really considered for the nomination.

Grover Cleveland, of course, was the principal candidate before the Democratic Convention, and had no serious opposition aside from the bitter personal enmity evinced toward him by David B. Hill, of New York, who had succeeded him as Governor of that State, and had hoped to succeed him as President. Senator Hill has only recently passed away. He was one of the most astute and ablest politicians in the history of the Democratic party. President Cleveland determined, for some reason or other, to drive him out of public life, and he succeeded in doing so during his second administration as President.

The campaign of 1892, just as the previous Presidential campaign had been, was entirely fought out on the tariff issue; and the question in general was the McKinley Law and its results. The Democrats were able to show that there had been increase in cost in many articles regarded as necessaries, while the Republicans pointed to a great era of national prosperity. The Republicans contended also that wages had advanced and prices declined under the McKinley Law; but I have always doubted whether we were able to sustain that contention. For instance, the department stores and retail merchants generally marked up prices, and wholly without reason, on articles on which there had been no increase in the tariff; and when asked why, they would reply, "It is because of the McKinley tariff."

For these economic reasons, added to the labor disturbances, Mr. Cleveland was again elected President of the United States, and carried with him for the first time both the Senate and the House. The Democrats now had complete control of all branches of the Government, and were in a position, if united, to enact any legislation they might desire. The result of the election was a complete surprise to every one. Why the voters should have turned against the Republican administration, it is hard to say. Mr. Harrison's personality had much to do with it.

The times were never more prosperous. In his message to the Congress which convened after his defeat, President Harrison appositely said: "There never has been a time in our history when work was so abundant, or when wages were so high, whether measured in the currency in which they are paid, or by their power to supply the necessaries and comforts of life." And yet, with this admitted condition prevailing, the Democratic party was returned to power.

I felt very badly over President Harrison's defeat, as I had done everything I could to secure, first, his renomination and then his re-election. After the election I wrote President Harrison as follows:

"U. S. Senate Chamber,
"Washington, D. C., Nov. 11, 1890.

"Dear Mr. President:—

"I have delayed writing you since the election for the reason that the result so surprised me I scarcely knew what to make of it. We lost Illinois by the overwhelming Democratic vote in Chicago. I feared that city all the time, but was assured by the committees that it would not be very much against us. I said all the time that we would take care of the country and carry the State if the Cook County vote could be kept below ten thousand Democratic, and was assured by all hands there that it would be. We did carry the country about as heretofore. As things have gone bad nearly everywhere, I am not feeling so chagrined as I would if Illinois had been the pivotal State. I specially desire to say that the cause of the defeat does not lie at your door personally. Any man in the country standing upon the doctrine of high protection would have been defeated. The people sat down upon the McKinley Tariff Bill two years ago, and they have never gotten up. They were thoroughly imbued with the feeling that the party did not do right in revising the tariff up instead of down. They beat us for it in '90 and now again.

"Hoping to see you in ten days, I am, with great respect,

"Truly yours,
"S. M. Cullom."

Curtis, in his work on the Republican party, in commenting on the result of this election, said:

"It will be seen that to the Solid South were added, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, West Virginia, and Wisconsin; while Mr. Cleveland obtained one electoral vote in Ohio, and five in Michigan. The result was certainly disastrous, and left no doubt that the people at large for the time being had rebuked the Republican party for what they wrongly supposed to be against their best interests. And yet, though a large majority of the people had voted for Mr. Cleveland, they were probably sorry for it within twenty-four hours after the election. There was no such rejoicing as took place in 1885. In fact, as soon as it was determined without doubt that the next Congress would be Democratic in both branches, and would enable Mr. Cleveland and his party to carry out their threats to repeal the McKinley Law and enact in its stead a Free Trade measure, apprehension and alarm took possession of the industrial and financial interests of the country, and could the election have been held over again within ten days, it may be estimated that a million or more votes would have been changed from the Cleveland column to that of Harrison. The people, as it were, awoke from a dream; they saw at once how they had been deceived by the methods of the Democratic campaign managers, and how an incident which had no bearing whatever upon the issue of the campaign had influenced their vote in a time of temporary anger and resentment."

This perfectly sums up the situation, as I now recollect it, on the election of President Cleveland; it was the beginning of the most protracted era of hard times that this country has ever known.

Mr. Cleveland was inaugurated the second time on March 4, 1893, and, as Mr. Curtis says, there was very little enthusiasm. The ceremonies were quiet and unenlivened.

Of course, it goes without saying, that I was not glad to see the Democratic party returned to power; but I confess I was a little pleased to meet President Cleveland in the White House again. His manner, his treatment of those with whom he came in contact, was so different from that of his predecessor, that it was a real pleasure, rather than a burden, to call at the executive offices.

Mr. Cleveland promptly proceeded to remove Republicans from Presidential offices and appoint Democrats. This even went to the extent of the removal of postmasters, large and small, against whom almost any sort of charge might be trumped up.

Adlai E. Stevenson was a past master in this respect. He was First Assistant Postmaster-General under Cleveland's first Administration and removed Republican postmasters whose terms had not expired, without cause or reason. He was elected Vice-President when Mr. Cleveland again came into office. He was a great favorite among the Democrats, because he believed in appointing Democrats to every office within the gift of the Executive.

I remember, after Stevenson was elected, Senator Harris, of Tennessee, remarking to me: "Now we have got Cleveland and Stevenson elected, if Cleveland would drop out and Stevenson was President, we would get along finely." He meant that Stevenson would never permit a single Republican to remain in office, if he could help it.

Mr. Stevenson made a popular presiding-officer of the Senate. He has been a strong Democrat all his life, and it has repeatedly been charged against him, although I believe he denies it, that he was a Southern sympathizer during the Civil War. He served in Congress two terms, having been elected from the Bloomington district, and was quite an influential member. He was defeated as a candidate for Vice-President with Mr. Bryan in 1900, and was also defeated as a candidate of the Democratic party for Governor of Illinois, in 1908.

As a candidate for Governor he made a splendid showing in 1908, as he was defeated by 23,164 votes, while President Taft carried Illinois by 179,122.

President Cleveland's Cabinet contained some very able men. He appointed Judge Walter Q. Gresham as Secretary of State. Why he should have appointed Gresham, I do not know. It would seem to me that there were men of as much ability in his own party whom he might have selected, but for some reason or other he did appoint him.

Judge Gresham was then serving as United States Circuit Judge, at Chicago. He had always been a Republican, and in the convention which nominated Harrison he received on one ballot one hundred and twenty-three votes as the candidate of the Republican party for President of the United States. He probably supported Mr. Cleveland, although of this I am not sure. He was a bitter enemy of President Harrison,—so much so, indeed, that he could scarcely be polite to any one whom he thought favored Harrison. He was holding court in Springfield, during the Harrison Administration, when I met him, and, not appreciating his feeling, I casually commended President Harrison for some particular thing which I approved. Gresham did not like it, and he almost told me in so many words that he did not think much of me or any one else who thought well of Harrison. Whereupon we separated somewhat coolly, I giving him to understand that I would insist upon my views and my right to commend a man who I thought was following a proper course. I do not believe he ever avowed himself a Democrat, and in the State Department he always declined to make any recommendations for appointments, on the ground that he was not a Democrat, and that those appointments must be left to the President himself. I had more or less intercourse with him as Secretary of State, and always found him polite and agreeable. He was regarded as an able Secretary, and served in that office until his death.

Richard Olney succeeded him as Secretary of State. He had been the Attorney-General in the cabinet. He was to me a much more satisfactory Secretary than Judge Gresham, and fully as able as a lawyer.

John G. Carlisle was appointed Secretary of the Treasury. He had been seven times elected to Congress and three times Speaker. He resigned his seat in the House, having been elected as a member of the Senate from Kentucky, and remained in the Senate until he resigned to accept the position of Secretary of the Treasury under Cleveland.

Mr. Carlisle was in entire harmony with the President on the tariff and also on the monetary questions—and, indeed, I remark here that Mr. Carlisle had very much to do toward the defeat of Mr. Bryan in 1896. Although a life-long Democrat himself, he believed that Mr. Bryan's theories on the monetary question would ruin the country, and he stood with Mr. Cleveland in opposing his election. Had Cleveland, Carlisle, and other patriotic Gold Democrats stood with their party, Mr. Bryan would probably have been elected and the history of this country would have been written differently.

After Mr. Cleveland's election, our industrial conditions became so depressed—and it was alleged by many that the cause for this was the Sherman Coinage Act of 1890—that a special session of Congress was called to meet August 7, 1893. The President said in his message to this Congress:

"The existence of an alarming and extraordinary business situation, involving the welfare and prosperity of all our people, has constrained me to call in extra session the people's representatives in Congress, to the end that through a wise and patriotic exercise fo the legislative duty with which they are solely charged, present evils may be mitigated and danger threatening the future may be averted. . . . With plenteous crops, with abundant promise of remunerative production and manufacture, with unusual invitation to safe investment, and with satisfactory returns to business enterprise, suddenly financial fear and distrust have sprung up on every side. . . . Values supposed to be fixed are fast becoming conjectural, and loss and failure have involved every branch of business. I believe these things are principally chargeable to Congressional legislation touching the purchase and coinage of silver by the general Government."

And Mr. Cleveland earnestly recommended the prompt repeal of the
Sherman Coinage Act of 1890.

The extra session continued until October 30, when the Sherman Act was finally repealed.

But the repeal of the Sherman Act did not at all remedy industrial conditions. It was not the Sherman Act that was at fault, but the well-grounded fear on the part of our manufacturers of the passage of a free trade measure. The panic commenced, it is true, under the McKinley Bill, but it was the direct result of what the business interests felt sure was to come; and that was the passage of a Democratic Tariff act.

The year 1893 closed with the prices of many products at the lowest ever known, with many workers seeking in vain for work, and with charity laboring to keep back suffering and starvation in all our cities. And yet, in view of the condition, Mr. Cleveland sent to Congress at the beginning of the annual session a free trade message, advocating the repeal of the McKinley Act and the passage of a Democratic free trade, or Tariff for Revenue, measure. From the tone of this message, however, he seems to have changed somewhat from his message of 1887; yet it was strong enough to startle the business interests, and make more widespread financial panic.

Speaker Crisp at once proceeded to the formation of the committees of the House, and particularly the Committee on Ways and Means.

I was naturally anxious concerning our industries in Illinois, and I wanted one of our strongest Illinois Representatives placed on that committee. I happened to enjoy particularly friendly relations with Mr. Crisp, he having been a House conferee on the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and I felt quite free to call upon him. After looking over the Illinois delegation, I came to the conclusion that the Hon. A. J. Hopkins, my late colleague in the Senate, and who was then serving in the House, was the very best man he could select for that place. I urged Mr. Crisp to appoint him, saying that he was capable of doing more and better work on the committee than any other man in the delegation. Crisp was very nice about it, and whether he did it on my recommendation or not I do not know; but he appointed Hopkins. Senator Hopkins was, during his service on that committee, regarded as one of its leading members, and had a prominent part in framing the Dingley tariff. He served in the House until elected to the Senate, where he remained for six years. Senator Hopkins is an able man, and was constantly growing in influence and power in the Senate. He was an agreeable colleague, and I regretted very much indeed that he was not re- elected.

It did not take long for the Democratic majority of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House to frame and report the Wilson Bill, repealing the McKinley Bill, and recommending in its stead the enactment of a Tariff for Revenue, which was fairly in harmony with Democratic Free Trade principles, and in harmony with the President's message. The bill was passed without long delay, Mr. Reed leading the ineffectual opposition to its passage in the House, with a speech of great eloquence, in which he depicted conditions that would surely arise after the passage of such a measure.

But this bill still had to run the gantlet of the Senate, where many Democratic Senators did not sympathize to the full extent with the Cleveland-Carlisle Free Trade theory. Senators Gorman, Hill, Murphy, Jones, Brice, and Smith of New Jersey, led the opposition, uniting with the Republicans in securing some seven hundred amendments, all in the interest, more or less, of Protection.

The truth is, we were all—Democrats as well as Republicans—trying to get in amendments in the interest of protecting the industries of our respective States. I myself secured the adoption of many such amendments. After I had exhausted every resource, I went to Senator Brice one day and asked him if he would not offer some little amendment for me, as I felt pretty sure that if Brice offered it it would be adopted, and I knew if I did it myself it stood a good chance of being defeated. Brice, by the way, was a very bluff, frank man; he replied to me, half jocularly, "Now, you know when your party is in power you will never do anything for a Democrat, and I won't offer this amendment for you. You go and get your colleague, Senator Palmer, to offer it for you." I left him and went to General Palmer; he presented the amendment, and it was adopted.

The bill passed the Senate; and after going to conference, when it seemed likely the Conference Committee would not agree, the Democratic leaders of the House, fearing the bill would fail entirely, decided to surrender to the Senate and accept the Senate bill with all its amendments. President Cleveland denounced this temporizing, coining the famous expression, "party perfidy and party dishonor" in the Wilson letter, evidently referring to Mr. Gorman and other leaders of the Senate.

There has been endless controversy and discussion over the attitude of Senator Gorman on the Wilson Bill. I myself have always believed that Senator Gorman felt that the industries of the country could not prosper under a Democratic Free Trade Tariff, and that he was willing to afford them a certain amount of protection. Especially was he criticised on account of the sugar schedule. Senator Tillman in his memorial address in the Senate, on the occasion of the delivery of eulogies on Senator Gorman, said in reference to this:

"In the conversations I had with the Democratic leaders, it was clearly brought out that the sugar refineries were ready to contribute to the Democratic campaign fund if it could be understood that the industry would be fostered and not destroyed by the Democratic Tariff policy, and I received the impression, which became indelibly fixed on my mind then and remains fixed to this day, that President Cleveland understood the situation and was willing to acquiesce in it if we won at the polls. I did not talk with Mr. Cleveland in person on this subject, though I called at his hotel to pay my respects, and I am thoroughly satisfied that the charge of party perfidy and party dishonor was an act of the grossest wrong and cruelty to Senator Gorman. If Mr. Cleveland, as I was told, knew of these negotiations and was the beneficiary of such a contribution, it is inconceivable how he could lend his great name and influence toward destroying Senator Gorman's influence and popularity, in the way he did."

Senator Gorman himself was very justly indignant and displayed much feeling when he addressed the Senate on July 23, 1894, replying to Mr. Cleveland's letter.

He used, in part, the following language:

"As I have said, sir, this is a most extraordinary proceeding for a Democrat, elected to the highest place in the Government, and fellow Democrats in another high place, where they have the right to speak and legislate generally, to join with the commune in traducing the Senate of the United States, to blacken the character of Senators who are as honorable as they are, who are as patriotic as they ever can be, who have done as much to serve their party as men who are now the beneficiaries of your labor and mine, to taunt and jeer us before the country as the advocates of trust and as guilty of dishonor and perfidy."

It was a Democratic controversy, and I am not in a position to say whether Mr. Cleveland or Mr. Gorman was right; whether it was a bargain in advance of the election to secure campaign funds; whether the sugar schedule was framed to secure the support of the Louisiana Senators; but I do know that Mr. Cleveland's attacks on Mr. Gorman turned the State of Maryland over to the Republicans and relegated Mr. Gorman to private life.

The Wilson Bill became a law without the approval of the President, Mr. Cleveland taking the position that he would not permit himself to be separated from his party to such an extent as might be implied by a veto of the tariff legislation which, though disappointing to him, he said was still chargeable to Democratic efforts.

There was one provision of the Wilson Bill which, I have been convinced since, was a very wise measure, and which will yet be enacted into law; and that is the income tax provision. That bill provided for a tax of two per cent on incomes above four thousand dollars. A separate vote was taken on this section and I voted against it. It was Republican policy then to oppose an income-tax, and the view I took then was, that if we started out taxing incomes the end would be that we would derive, from the source, sufficient amount of revenue to run the Government and that it would gradually break down the protective policy. It was declared unconstitutional by a vote of five to four of the Supreme Court. A previous income- tax had been declared constitutional during the Civil War, and I am very strongly of the opinion that if the case is again presented to the Court the decision will be in harmony with the first decision, overruling the decision of 1895. An income-tax is the fairest of all taxes. It is resorted to by every other nation. It falls most heavily on those who can best afford it. The sentiment in the Republican party has changed, and I believe that at no far distant day Congress will pass an income-tax as well as an inheritance-tax law.

The passage of the Wilson Bill increased, rather than diminished, the hard times commencing with the panic of 1893. The Democratic party, or the free silver element of it, claimed that the panacea was the free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen to one. The silver question was argued week after week in both branches of Congress, and was never finally settled until the election of McKinley and the establishment by law of the Gold Standard. In recent years we hear very little about free silver; but the Democratic party split on that issue, Mr. Cleveland heading the faction in favor of sound money.

In those closing days of the Cleveland Administration, it was very seldom that a Democratic Senator was seen at the White House. The President became completely estranged from the members of his party in both House and Senate, but it seemed to bother him little. He went ahead doing his duty as he saw it, utterly disregarding the wishes of the members of his party in Congress.

I saw him many times during this period, and I remember on one occasion I had seen a notice in one of the papers indicating that the President was about to appoint my old friend Mr. Charles Ridgely, of Springfield, Illinois, as Comptroller of the Currency. I had the highest regard for Mr. Ridgely, and I called at the White House to congratulate the President on the selection. He seemed to be out of humor, and was more than usually abrupt. He declared that he knew nothing about it, that he did not know Ridgely, and never had had any intention of appointing him. I repeated that I had seen the announcement in a newspaper, adding that it looked to me as though the report were authentic, and that I only wanted to congratulate him. But the President merely reiterated, somewhat curtly, that he knew nothing about it. I became a little annoyed, finally losing my temper.

"I don't care a damn whether you appoint him or not," I exclaimed;
"Ridgely's a Democrat, anyhow."

Thereupon his attitude quickly changed, and he inquired about Ridgely, listening with interest to what I had to say. He then talked with me on the silver question and other matters, detaining me while he kept his back to the crowd waiting to see him. I almost had to break away in order to give others a chance.

Among the other embarrassments and difficulties of the Cleveland Administration were the famous Chicago riots of 1893. The trouble grew out of a railroad strike; much damage was done and a great deal of property was destroyed, with consequent loss of life. The city itself seemed to be threatened, the business and manufacturing interests appealed to the Governor first, and then to the President, to send troops to Chicago to protect property. When the Governor failed to act, the President ordered Federal troops to Chicago. The action was regarded as very wise, and it endeared him to the business people of that city. Governor Altgeld protested, and that was one of the reasons why he became Mr. Cleveland's most bitter enemy.

I think I should say a few words in reference to Governor Altgeld. He has been called an anarchist and a socialist. In my judgment, he was neither. Of his honesty, his integrity, his sincerity of purpose, his determination to give the State a good administration, I never had the slightest doubt. The mainspring of the trouble, I believe, was an inability to select good men for public office. He was not a good judge of men; he surrounded himself with a coterie that betrayed his trust and used the State offices for personal gain. I have always sympathized with Governor Altgeld. Had he been eligible I believe he would have been the nominee of his party for the Presidency; but he was born abroad.

One can scarcely imagine industrial conditions in a worse state than they were at the close of the Cleveland Administration. The election of a Republican Congress in 1894 had helped some, but the revenues were not sufficient to meet the ordinary running expenses of the Government; bonds had to be issued, labor was out of employment, the mills and factories were closed, and business was at a standstill.

This was the condition of affairs when the Republican National
Convention assembled in 1896.