CHAPTER XXV THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL
Probably the most important work before the Committee on Foreign Relations since the treaty of peace with Spain, were the several treaties concerning the construction of the Isthmian Canal.
In 1850, the United States entered into what is known as the Clayton- Bulwer Treaty with Great Britain, the purpose of which was to facilitate the construction of a canal; but instead of operating to this end, it stood for fifty years or more as an effectual barrier against the construction by the United States of any canal across the Isthmus of Panama. Succeeding Administrations had endeavored to secure the consent of Great Britain to its abrogation, but it was not until Secretary Hay's time that Great Britain finally agreed to annul it and substitute in its place a new treaty. Secretary Hay had been Ambassador to Great Britain, and he enjoyed the confidence of the then existing British Ministry to a greater degree than almost any minister or ambassador we have ever sent to Great Britain. After entering the State Department, Mr. Hay at once directed his attention to the making of a new treaty with Great Britain and this resulted in the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. This convention was considered by the committee, but was not found satisfactory, and certain amendments were added to it. These amendments Great Britain would not accept, and the treaty died.
Secretary Hay was very much disappointed, but he at once set to work to negotiate such a treaty as would go through the Senate without amendment and such a one as Great Britain would consent to. He wrote to a number of Senators, members of the committee, I suppose, asking for suggestions as to just what the Senate would agree to. I was not at that time chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, but I was very deeply interested in the subject and had given it considerable study and thought. Secretary Hay wrote me, and I replied at length, giving my views both as to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and what I thought should be inserted in the new treaty.
Mr. Hay promptly renewed negotiations, which resulted in what is known as the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. After a good deal of effort this agreement was ratified without amendment. This act signalized the beginning of my service as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.
The principal contention arose over the subject of fortifications, a question that is still a mooted one. It occurs to me that the proper reasoning is this—and I believe I took the same position when the treaty was under consideration:
The first and second Hay-Pauncefote treaties must be construed together; the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty contained a prohibition against fortification; the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty neither prohibited nor in terms agreed to fortifications, but was silent on the subject; therefore, the legal construction would be that Great Britain had receded from the position that the canal should not be fortified. In any event, we will go ahead and fortify the canal, and do with it whatever we please, regardless of any of the nations of the world.
That obstacle having been finally removed, the question which next arose was: What route should be selected? The selection of the route was not a subject over which the Foreign Relations Committee had jurisdiction; but after the Panama route was decided on, it became necessary to negotiate with Colombia, the owner of that route, for the right of way for the canal. Secretary Hay promptly proceeded with the negotiation, as it was his duty to do, under the Spooner Act, and on January 3, 1903, submitted the treaty to the Senate for its Constitutional action thereon. Senator Morgan and others led the fight against it; but a vote was taken, and the treaty was ordered favorably reported. On February 12, 1903, I called it up in the Senate and made quite an extended speech, explaining its provisions, and urging its ratification. The session was to close on March 4, and it finally became manifest that it would be hopeless to attempt to ratify it before that day, and the effort was abandoned. President Roosevelt called a special session of the Senate after the fourth of March, when there would be nothing for the Senate to consider except the Colombian treaty and other executive matters. According to the usual rule, the treaty was referred back to the committee, at the beginning of the special session, and the subject was again gone over in committee as if there had been no proceedings on it at all during the regular session. The proposed agreement was finally reported to the Senate, and ratified. There is no need for me to go over the story of its rejection by Colombia. The action of the Colombian Congress was a hold-up pure and simple, and the treaty was rejected in the hope that the United States would offer a greater amount for the right- of-way. Panama promptly seceded, which she had a perfect right to do. Many people have charged that the Roosevelt Administration actually incited the revolution. Whether this is true or not, I do not know. I contended at the time, and still believe, that it is not true. I hope it is not; but the correspondence did show that the State Department had pretty close knowledge of events which were occurring on the Isthmus, and had seen to it that there was a sufficient naval force in the vicinity "to protect American interests." It was a remarkable revolution—I think the most remarkable I have ever read of in history. It was practically bloodless. One or two shots were fired, a Chinaman was killed, and yet a new and independent republic entered the family of Nations.
We were able to make with Panama a much more satisfactory treaty than we had with Colombia. Senator Morgan this time was assisted by most of his Democratic colleagues; he denounced the treaty and made all sorts of charges against the Administration; but after numerous long sessions of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I was authorized to report it to the Senate with certain minor amendments, which, in my opening speech, I asked the Senate to reject, and to ratify the treaty without amendment. I did this at the earnest insistence of the State Department. And, in addition, I did not think that the amendments were of such importance as would justify resubmitting the treaty to Panama after that little country had once ratified it. The State Department was led to this action by the receipt of the following cable from Mr. Buchanan, the first Minister of the United States to Panama:
"Panama, January 22, 1904.
"Hay, Washington:
"I can not refrain from referring to my belief that no amendment to the treaty should be made. The delimitation of Panama and Colon involves several things which can only be satisfactorily adjusted on the ground by joint action. There are several other points in the treaty which will require a mutual working agreement, or regulation, including sanitation. While the treaty covers broadly all these things, my observation here is that the details of development of the authority conferred by the treaty in these regards can not be satisfactorily carried out by amendments, but should be done through a mutually agreed upon regulation or understanding reached here on the ground between the two countries. The executive power here can secure for the convention ample authority to do such things without their being referred to the convention hereafter. Would it not be possible and best to adopt this course with these amendments to the treaty; will bring up here much discussion of many articles which can all be avoided and our purpose gained by above course. Any time when any specific grants of land or power not implied in the treaty is desired, it appears to me the wise course to take will be to do this by a supplemental convention.
"(Signed) Buchanan."
Secretary Hay showed the most eager anxiety to have the treaty ratified as it stood, and he wrote me quite a lengthy letter on the subject, which I now feel at liberty to quote.
"Department of State, Washington. "January 20, 1904.
"Dear Senator Cullom:—
"I enclose a copy of a letter from the Panama Minister which he sent me last night. He, as well as Mr. Buchanan, who is on the ground, is greatly disturbed over the possible complications which may arise if amendments are added to the treaty in the Senate. Of course, I need not say nobody questions the right of the Senate to amend the treaty as may seem to them best. I am only speaking of the matter of opportuneness and expediency. We insisted on an immediate ratification of the treaty by the Panama Government, and they acceded to our wishes. If we now, after a very long delay, send the treaty back to them amended, you can at once imagine the state of things that it will find there. The moment of unanimity and enthusiasm, which only comes once in the life of a revolution, will have passed away and given way to the play of politics and factions. They will have a certain advantage which they have not had before in dealing with the matter. We shall have ratified the treaty with amendments, which gives them another chance to revise their perhaps hasty and enthusiastic action. They will consider themselves as entitled to make amendments as well as we, and it needs only a glance at the treaty to show what an infinite field of amendments there is from every point of view. The Junta in making their report to the present Constitutional Convention said that, although many of the provisions seemed harsh and hard, yet it was judged for the public good to accept it as it was. When they get the amended treaty in their hands again, they will compare it with the treaty we made with Colombia, and see how vastly more advantageous to us this treaty is than that one was, and there are never lacking in a body of men like the Constitutional Convention a plenty of members who like to distinguish themselves by defending the interests of their country through the advantageous amendment of a treaty. Meanwhile the country will be open to the intrigues of the Colombians, and even to the military attacks upon the frontier.
"All these considerations would, of course, have no weight whatever if the amendments were vital to our interests, but, as I said to you yesterday, it was the opinion of all of us who have studied the matter that every point made by the amendments was intended to be covered—I do not say how successfully—by the provisions of the treaty itself. This letter of Mr. Varilla's shows that the intentions of each Government were thoroughly understood by the other, exactly in the sense of the amendments now proposed. I earnestly hope that our friends in the Senate may see the strength of our present position if the treaty is ratified without amendment, and the certain complications that will arise if, after a long debate here, the treaty is put once more in the hands of the Panamans for reconsideration and amendment.
"If the object of the amendments, as some people say, is to get it ratified by the new permanent Government, nothing is easier. I have no doubt we can have a solemn resolution of that sort adopted by the Convention at any time.
"Very sincerely yours,
"John Hay.
"The Honorable S. M. Cullom,
"United States Senate."
After nearly a month and a half of debate in executive session, devoted to its consideration, the treaty was finally ratified without amendment.
Considerable discussion arose over the question of the recognition of Panama and the right of that country to make the treaty at all. I contended in the Senate, in open as well as executive session, that the new Republic of Panama had a perfect right to make the treaty with the United States because it was a complete, sovereign, and independent State. The recognition given the new Government was the highest recognition we could accord. It was not a recognition of belligerency, which is only a recognition that war exists; it was not a virtual recognition, which is a recognition only for commercial purposes; but it was what Pomeroy and Fillmore define to be a formal recognition—that is, an absolute recognition of independence and sovereignty. The recognition of the Republic was a complete and formal recognition of independence, because the President had received an envoy-extraordinary and minister- plenipotentiary from that State. The United States Senate was a party to that complete and formal recognition, because we confirmed the nomination of Mr. Buchanan as envoy-extraordinary and minister- plenipotentiary to that country.
This ended the long fight over the construction of the Panama Canal —at least, so far as it in any way involved the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Relations. With the ratification of the treaty, the subject was transferred to the Committee on Interoceanic canals, where, during every session, matters of more or less importance connected with the canal are considered.
I do not know whether or not it was wise to change from the Nicaraguan to the Panama route. Senator Hanna and Senator Spooner were responsible for the change; and time alone will demonstrate whether we acted wisely.