Footnotes
[1.]Cicero, Philip. II. § 43.[2.]Nov. Org. 1. 68. “Ut non alius fere sit aditus ad regnum hominus, quod fundatur in scientiis, quam ad regnum cœlorum, in quod, nisi sub persona infantis, intrare non datur.”[3.]Bishop Wilson's Evidences, p. 38.[4.]See Dr. Hopkins's Lowell Lectures, particularly Lect. 2. Bp. Wilson's Evidences of Christianity, Vol. i. pp. 45-61. Horne's Introduction, Vol. i. pp. 1-39. Mr. Horne having cited all the best English writers on this subject, it is sufficient to refer to his work alone.[5.]Hopkins's Lowell Lect., p. 48.[6.]It has been well remarked, that, if we regard man as in a state of innocence, we should naturally expect that God would hold communications with him; that if we regard him as guilty, and as having lost the knowledge and moral image of God, such a communication would be absolutely necessary, if man was to be restored.—Dr. Hopkins's Lowell Lect., p. 62.[7.]The argument here briefly sketched, is stated more at large, and with great clearness and force, in an essay entitled “The Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation,” pp. 13-107.[8.]See Professor Stuart's Critical History and Defence of the Old Testament Canon, where this is abundantly proved.[9.]Per Tindal, Ch. Just., in the case of the Bishop of Meath v. the Marquis of Winchester, 3 Bing. N. C. 183, 200, 201. “It is when documents are found in other than their proper places of deposit,” observed the Chief Justice, “that the investigation commences, whether it was reasonable and natural, under the circumstances of the particular case, to expect that they should have been in the place where they are actually found; for it is obvious, that, which there can be only one place of deposit strictly and absolutely proper, there may be many and various, that are reasonable and probable, though differing in degree, some being more so, some less; and in these cases the proposition to be determined is, whether the actual custody is so reasonably and probably accounted for, that it impresses the mind with the conviction that the instrument found in such custody must be genuine.” See the cases cited in 1 Greenleaf on Evidence § 142. See also 1 Stark. on Evidence, pp. 332-335, 381-386. Croughton v. Blake, 12 Mees. & Welsb. 205, 208. Doe v. Phillips, 10 Jurist, p. 34. It is this defect, namely, that they do not come from the proper or natural repository, which shows the fabulous character of many pretended revelations, from the Gospel of the Infancy to the Book of Mormon.[10.]1 Greenleaf on Evid. § 34, 142, 570.[11.]Morewood v. Wood, 14 East, 329, n. Per Lord Kenyon. Weeks v. Sparke, 1 M. & S. 686; the Berkeley Peerage Case, 4 Campb. 416. Per Mansfield, Ch. J. See 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 128.[12.]1 Starkie on Evidence, pp. 195, 230; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 483.[13.]The arguments for the genuineness and authenticity of the books of the Holy Scriptures are briefly, yet very fully stated, and almost all the writers of authority are referred to by Mr. Horne, in his Introduction to the Study of the Holy Scriptures, vol. i., passim. The same subject is discussed in a more popular manner in the Lectures of Bp. Wilson, and of Bp. Sumner of Chester, on the Evidences of Christianity; and, in America, the same question, as it relates to the Gospels, has been argued by Bp. M'Ilvaine, in his Lectures.[14.]See the case of the Slane Peerage, 5 Clark & Finelly's Rep., p. 24. See also the case of the Fitzwalter Peerage, 10 Clark & Finelly's Rep., p. 948.[15.]Matt. ix. 10; Mark ii. 14, 15; Luke v. 29.[16.]The authorities on this subject are collected in Horne's Introduction, vol. iv. pp. 234-238, part 2, chap. ii. sec. 2.[17.]See Horne's Introduction, vol. iv. p. 229-232.[18.]See Campbell on the Four Gospels, vol. iii. pp. 35, 36; Preface to St. Matthew's Gospel, § 22, 23.[19.]See Gibbon's Rome, vol. i. ch. vi. and vol. iii. ch. xvii. and authorities there cited. Cod. Theod. Lib. xi. tit. 1-28, with the notes of Gothofred. Gibbon treats particularly of the revenues of a later period than our Saviour's time; but the general course of proceeding, in the levy and collection of taxes, is not known to have been changed since the beginning of the empire.[20.]Acts xii. 12, 25; xiii. 5, 13; and xv. 36-41; 2 Tim. iv. 11; Phil. 24; Col. iv. 10; 1 Pet. v. 13.[21.]Horne's Introduction, vol. iv. pp. 252, 253.[22.]Mark vii. 2, 11; and ix. 43, and elsewhere.[23.]Mr. Norton has conclusively disposed of this objection, in his Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels, vol. i. Additional Notes, see. 2, pp. cxv-cxxxii.[24.]Compare Mark x. 46, and xiv. 69, and iv. 35, and i. 35, and ix. 28, with Matthew's narrative of the same events.[25.]See Horne's Introd. vol. iv. pp 252-259.[26.]Acts xvi. 10, 11.[27.]Col. iv. 14. Luke, the beloved physician.[28.]Luke v. 12; Matt. viii. 2; Mark i. 40.[29.]Luke vi. 6; Matt. xii. 10; Mark iii. 1.[30.]Luke viii. 55; Matt. ix. 25; Mark v. 42.[31.]Luke vi. 19.[32.]Luke xxii. 44, 45, 51.[33.]See Horne's Introd. vol. iv. pp. 260-272, where references may be found to earlier writers.[34.]See Lardner's Works, 8vo. vol. vi. pp. 138, 139; 4to. vol. iii. pp. 203, 204; and other authors, cited in Horne's Introd. vol. iv. p. 267.[35.]2 Phillips on Evidence, p. 95, (9th edition.)[36.]When Abbot, Archbishop of Canterbury, in shooting at deer with a cross-bow, in Bramsil park, accidentally killed the keeper, King James I. by a letter dated Oct. 3, 1621, requested the Lord Keeper, the Lord Chief Justice, and others, to inquire into the circumstances and consider the case and “the scandal that may have risen thereupon,” and to certify the King what it may amount to. Could there be any reasonable doubt of their report of the facts, thus ascertained? See Spelman's Posthumous Works, p. 121.[37.]The case of the ill-fated steamer President furnishes an example of this sort of inquiry. This vessel, it is well-known, sailed from New York for London in the month of March, 1841 having on board many passengers, some of whom were highly connected. The ship was soon overtaken by a storm, after which she was never heard of. A few months afterwards a solemn inquiry was instituted by three gentlemen of respectability, one of whom was a British admiral, another was agent for the underwriters at Lloyd's, and the other a government packet agent, concerning the time, circumstances and causes of that disaster; the result of which was communicated to the public, under their hands. This document received universal confidence, and no further inquiry was made.[38.]Mark i. 20.[39.]John xix. 26, 27.[40.]John xiii. 23.[41.]Matt. xxvii. 55, 56; Mark xv. 40, 41.[42.]John xviii. 15, 16.[43.]Luke viii. 51; Matt. xvii. 1, and xxvi. 37.[44.]This account is abridged from Horne's Introd. vol. iv. pp. 286-288.[45.]Horne's Introd. vol. iv. p. 289, and authors there cited.[46.]See, among others, John i. 38, 41, and ii. 6, 13, and iv. 9, and xi. 55.[47.]See Horne's Introd. vol. iv. pp. 297, 298.[48.]See Gambier's Guide to the Study of Moral Evidence, p. 121.[49.]1 Stark. Evid. pp. 514, 577; 1 Greenl. on Evid. §§ 1, 2; Wills on Circumstantial Evid., p. 2; Whately's Logic, b. iv. ch. iii. § 1.[50.]See 1 Stark. Evid. pp. 16, 480, 521.[51.]This subject has been treated by Dr. Chalmers, in his Evidences of the Christian Revelation, chapter iii. The following extract from his observations will not be unacceptable to the reader. “In other cases, when we compare the narratives of contemporary historians, it is not expected that all the circumstances alluded to by one will be taken notice of by the rest; and it often happens that an event or a custom is admitted upon the faith of a single historian; and the silence of all other writers is not suffered to attach suspicion or discredit to his testimony. It is an allowed principle, that a scrupulous resemblance betwixt two histories is very far from necessary to their being held consistent with one another. And what is more, it sometimes happens that, with contemporary historians, there may be an apparent contradiction, and the credit of both parties remain as entire and unsuspicious as before. Posterity is, in these cases, disposed to make the most liberal allowances. Instead of calling it a contradiction, they often call it a difficulty. They are sensible that, in many instances a seeming variety of statement has, upon a more extensive knowledge of ancient history, admitted of a perfect reconciliation. Instead, then, of referring the difficulty in question to the inaccuracy or bad faith of any of the parties, they, with more justness and more modesty, refer it to their own ignorance, and to that obscurity which necessarily hangs over the history of every remote age. These principles are suffered to have great influence in every secular investigation; but so soon as, instead of a secular, it becomes a sacred investigation, every ordinary principle is abandoned, and the suspicion annexed to the teachers of religion is carried to the dereliction of all that candour and liberality with which every other document of antiquity is judged of and appreciated. How does it happen that the authority of Josephus should be acquiesced in as a first principle, while every step, in the narrative of the evangelists, must have foreign testimony to confirm and support it? How comes it, that the silence of Josephus should be construed into an impeachment of the testimony of the evangelists, while it is never admitted, for a single moment, that the silence of the evangelists can impart the slightest blemish to the testimony of Josephus? How comes it, that the supposition of two Philips in one family should throw a damp of scepticism over the Gospel narrative, while the only circumstance which renders that supposition necessary is the single testimony of Josephus; in which very testimony it is necessarily implied that there are two Herods in that same family? How comes it, that the evangelists, with as much internal, and a vast deal more of external evidence in their favour, should be made to stand before Josephus, like so many prisoners at the bar of justice? In any other case, we are convinced that this would be looked upon as rough handling. But we are not sorry for it. It has given more triumph and confidence to the argument. And it is no small addition to our faith, that its first teachers have survived an examination, which, in point of rigour and severity, we believe to be quite unexampled in the annals of criticism.” See Chalmers's Evidences, pp. 72-74.[52.]See 1 Stark. Evid. pp. 480, 545.[53.]If the witnesses could be supposed to have been biassed, this would destroy their testimony to matters of fact; it would only detract from the weight of their judgment in matters of opinion. The rule of law on this subject has been thus stated by Dr. Lushington: “When you examine the testimony of witnesses nearly connected with the parties, and there is nothing very peculiar tending to destroy their credit, when they depose to mere facts, their testimony is to be believed; when they depose as to matter of opinion, it is to be received with suspicion.” Dillon v. Dillon, 3 Curteis's Eccl. Rep. pp. 96, 102.[54.]This subject has been so fully treated by Dr. Paley, in his view of the Evidences of Christianity, Part I., Prop. I., that is it unnecessary to pursue it farther in this place.[55.]1 Stark. Evid., pp. 483, 548.[56.]Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, c. v. b. 1. Part 3, p. 125. Whately's Rhetoric, Part 1. ch. 2. § 4. 1 Stark. Evid., p. 487.[57.]See the Quarterly Review, vol. xxviii. p. 465. These narrators were, the Duchess D'Angoulême herself, the two Messrs. De Bouillè, the Duc De Choiseul, his servant, James Brissac, Messrs. De Damas and Deslons, two of the officers commanding detachments on the road, Messrs. De Moustier and Valori, the garde du corps who accompanied the king, and finally M. de Fontanges, archbishop of Toulouse, who though not himself a party to the transaction, is supposed to have written from the information of the queen. An earlier instance of similar discrepancy is mentioned by Sully. After the battle of Aumale, in which Henry IV. was wounded, when the officers were around the king's bed, conversing upon the events of the day, there were not two who agreed in the recital of the most particular circumstances of the action. D'Aubigné, a contemporary writer, does not even mention the king's wound, though it was the only one he ever received in his life. See Memoirs of Sully, vol. i. p. 245. If we treated these narratives as sceptics would have us treat these of the sacred writers, what evidence should we have of any battle at Aumale, or of any flight to Varennes?[58.]Far greater discrepancies can be found in the different reports of the same case, given by the reporters of legal judgments than are shown among the evangelists; and yet we do not consider them as detracting from the credit of the reporters, to whom we still resort with confidence, as to good authority. Some of these discrepancies seem utterly irreconcilable. Thus, in a case, 45 Edw. III. 19, where the question was upon a gift of lands to J. de C. with Joan, the sister of the donor, and to their heirs, Fitzherbert (tit. Tail, 14) says it was adjudged fee simple, and not frankmarriage; Statham (tit. Tail) says it was adjudged a gift in frankmarriage; while Brook (tit. Frankmarriage) says it was not decided. (Vid. 10 Co. 118.) Others are irreconcilable, until the aid of a third reporter is invoked. Thus, in the case of Cooper v. Franklin, Croke says it was not decided, but adjourned; (Cro. Jac. 100); Godbolt says it was decided in a certain way, which he mentions; (Godb. 269); Moor also reports it as decided, but gives a different account of the question raised; (Moor, 848); while Bulstrode gives a still different report of the judgment of the court, which he says was delivered by Croke himself. But by his account it further appears, that the case was previously twice argued; and thus it at length results that the other reporters relate only what fell from the court on each of the previous occasions. Other similar examples may be found in 1 Dougl. 6, n. compared with 5 East, 475, n. in the case of Galbraith v. Neville; and in that of Stoughton v. Reynolds, reported by Fortescue, Strange, and in Cases temp. Hardwicke. (See 3 Barnw. & Ald. 247, 248.) Indeed, the books abound in such instances. Other discrepancies are found in the names of the same litigating parties, as differently given by reporters; such as, Putt v. Roster, (2 Mod. 318); Foot v. Rastall, (Skin. 49), and Putt v. Royston, (2 Show. 211); also, Hosdell v. Harris, (2 Keb. 462); Hodson v. Harwich, (Ib. 533), and Hodsden v. Harridge, (2 Saund. 64), and a multitude of others, which are universally admitted to mean the same cases, even when they are not precisely within the rule of idem sonans. These diversities, it is well known, have never detracted in the slightest degree from the estimation in which the reporters are all deservedly held, as authors of merit, enjoying, to this day, the confidence of the profession. Admitting now, for the sake of argument, (what is not conceded in fact,) that diversities equally great exist among the sacred writers; how can we consistently, and as lawyers, raise any serious objection against them on that account, or treat them in any manner different from that which we observe towards our own reporters?[59.]
Mr. Hume's argument is thus refuted by Lord Brougham. “Here are two answers, to which the doctrine proposed by Mr. Hume is exposed, and either appears sufficient to shake it.
“First—Our belief in the uniformity of the laws of nature rests not altogether upon our own experience. We believe no man ever was raised from the dead,—not merely because we ourselves never saw it, for indeed that would be a very limited ground of deduction; and our belief was fixed on the subject long before we had any considerable experience,—fixed chiefly by authority,—that is, by deference to other men's experience. We found our confident belief in this negative position partly, perhaps chiefly, upon the testimony of others; and at all events, our belief that in times before our own the same position held good, must of necessity be drawn from our trusting relations of other men—that is, it depends upon the evidence of testimony. If, then, the existence of the law of nature is proved, in great part at least, by such evidence, can we wholly reject the like evidence when it comes to prove an exception to the rule—a deviation from the law? The more numerous are the cases of the law being kept—the more rare those of its being broken—the more scrupulous certainly ought we to be in admitting the proofs of the breach. But that testimony is capable of making good the proof there seems no doubt. In truth, the degree of excellence and of strength to which testimony may arise seems almost indefinite. There is hardly any cogency which it is not capable by possible supposition of attaining. The endless multiplication of witnesses,—the unbounded variety of their habits of thinking, their prejudices, their interests,—afford the means of conceiving the force of their testimony, augmented ad infinitum, because these circumstances afford the means of diminishing indefinitely the chances of their being mistaken, all misled, or all combining to deceive us. Let any man try to calculate the chances of a thousand persons who come from different quarters, and never saw each other before, and who all vary in their habits, stations, opinions, interests,—being mistaken or combining to deceive us, when they give the same account of an event as having happened before their eyes,—these chances are many hundreds of thousands to one. And yet we can conceive them multiplied indefinitely; for one hundred thousand such witnesses may in all like manner bear the same testimony; and they may all tell us their story within twenty-four hours after the transaction, and in the next parish. And yet, according to Mr. Hume's argument, we are bound to disbelieve them all, because they speak to a thing contrary to our own experience, and to the accounts which other witnesses had formerly given us of the law of nature, and which our forefathers had handed down to us as derived from witnesses who lived in the old time before them. It is unnecessary to add that no testimony of the witnesses, whom we are supposing to concur in their relation, contradicts any testimony of our own senses. If it did, the argument would resemble Archbishop Tillotson's upon the Real Presence, and our disbelief would be at once warranted.
“Secondly—This leads us to the next objection to which Mr. Hume's argument is liable, and which we have in part anticipated while illustrating the first. He requires us to withhold our belief in circumstances which would force every man of common understanding to lend his assent, and to act upon the supposition of the story told being true. For, suppose either such numbers of various witnesses as we have spoken of; or, what is perhaps stronger, suppose a miracle reported to us, first by a number of relators, and then by three or four of the very soundest judges and most incorruptibly honest men we know,—men noted for their difficult belief of wonders, and, above all, steady unbelievers in miracles, without any bias in favour of religion, but rather accustomed to doubt, if not disbelieve,—most people would lend an easy belief to any miracles thus vouched. But let us add this circumstance, that a friend on his death-bed had been attended by us, and that we had told him a fact known only to ourselves,—something that we had secretly done the very moment before we told it to the dying man, and which to no other being we had ever revealed,—and that the credible witnesses we are supposing, informed us that the deceased appeared to them, conversed with them, remained with them a day or two, accompanying them, and to avouch the fact of his reappearance on this earth, communicated to them the secret of which we had made him the sole depository the moment before his death;—according to Mr. Hume, we are bound rather to believe, not only that those credible witnesses deceive us, or that those sound and unprejudiced men were themselves deceived, and fancied things without real existence, but further, that they all hit by chance upon the discovery of a real secret, known only to ourselves and the dead man. Mr. Hume's argument requires us to believe this as the lesser improbability of the two—as less unlikely than the rising of one from the dead; and yet every one must feel convinced, that were he placed in the situation we have been figuring, he would not only lend his belief to the relation, but if the relators accompanied it with a special warning from the deceased person to avoid a certain contemplated act, he would, acting upon the belief of their story, take the warning, and avoid doing the forbidden deed. Mr. Hume's argument makes no exception. This is its scope; and whether he chooses to push it thus far or no, all miracles are of necessity denied by it, without the least regard to the kind or the quantity of the proof on which they are rested; and the testimony which we have supposed, accompanied by the test or check we have supposed, would fall within the grasp of the argument just as much and as clearly as any other miracle avouched by more ordinary combinations of evidence.
“The use of Mr. Hume's argument is this, and it is an important and a valuable one. It teaches us to sift closely and rigorously the evidence for miraculous events. It bids us remember that the probabilities are always, and must always be incomparably greater against, than for, the truth of these relations, because it is always far more likely that the testimony should be mistaken or false, than that the general laws of nature should be suspended. Further than this the doctrine cannot in soundness of reason be carried. It does not go the length of proving that those general laws cannot, by the force of human testimony, be shown to have been, in a particular instance, and with a particular purpose, suspended.” See his Discourse of Natural Theology, Note 5, p. 210-214. (Ed. 1835.)
Laplace, in his Essai sur les Probabilités, maintains that, the more extraordinary the fact attested, the greater the probability of error or falsehood in the attestor. Simple good sense, he says, suggests this; and the calculation of probabilities confirms its suggestion. There are some things, he adds, so extraordinary, that nothing can balance their improbability. The position here laid down is, that the probability of error, or of the falsehood of testimony, becomes in proportion greater, as the fact which is attested is more extraordinary. And hence a fact extraordinary in the highest possible degree, becomes in the highest possible degree improbable; or so much so, that nothing can counterbalance its improbability.
This argument has been made much use of, to discredit the evidence of miracles, and the truth of that divine religion which is attested by them. But however sound it may be, in one sense, this application of it is fallacious. The fallacy lies in the meaning affixed to the term “extraordinary.” If Laplace means a fact extraordinary under its existing circumstances and relations, that is, a fact remaining extraordinary, notwithstanding all its circumstances, the position need not here to be controverted. But if the term means extraordinary in the abstract, it is far from being universally true, or affording a correct test of truth, or rule of evidence. Thus, it is extraordinary that a man should leap fifteen feet at a bound; but not extraordinary that a strong and active man should do it, under a sudden impulse to save his life. The former is improbable in the abstract; the latter is rendered probable by the circumstances. So, things extraordinary, and therefore improbable under one hypothesis, become the reverse under another. Thus, the occurrence of a violent storm at sea, and the utterance by Jesus of the the words, “Peace, be still,” succeeded instantly by a perfect calm, are facts which, taken separately from each other, are not in themselves extraordinary. The connexion between the command of Jesus and the ensuing calm, as cause and effect, would be extraordinary and improbable if he were a mere man; but it becomes perfectly natural and probable, when his divine power is considered. Each of those facts is in its nature so simple and obvious, that the most ignorant person is capable of observing it. There is nothing extraordinary in the facts themselves; and the extraordinary coincidence, in which the miracle consists, becomes both intelligible and probable upon the hypothesis of the Christian. (See the Christian Observer for Oct. 1838, p. 617.) The theory of Laplace may, with the same propriety, be applied to the creation of the world. That matter was created out of nothing is extremely improbable, in the abstract, that is, if there is no God; and therefore it is not to be believed. But if the existence of a Supreme Being is conceded, the fact is perfectly credible.
Laplace was so fascinated with his theory, that he thought the calculus of probabilities might be usefully employed in discovering the value of the different methods resorted to, in those sciences which are in a great measure conjectural, as medicine, agriculture, and political economy. And he proposed that there should be kept, in every branch of the administration, an exact register of the trials made of different measures, and of the results, whether good or bad, to which they have led. (See the Edinburgh Review, vol. xxiii. pp 335, 336.) Napoleon, who appointed him Minister of the Interior, has thus described him: “A geometrician of the first class, he did not reach mediocrity as a statesman. He never viewed any subject in its true light; he was always occupied with subtleties; his notions were all problematic; and he carried into the administration the spirit of the infinitely small.” See the Encyclopedia Britannica, art. Laplace, vol. xiii. p. 101. Memoires Ecrits à Ste. Helena, i. 3. The injurious effect of deductive reasoning, upon the minds of those who addict themselves to this method alone, to the exclusion of all other modes of arriving at the knowledge of truth in fact, is shown with great clearness and success, by Mr. Whewel in the ninth of the Bridgewater Treatises, book 3, ch. 6. The calculus of probabilities has been applied by some writers, to judicial evidence; but its very slight value as a test, is clearly shown in an able article on Presumptive Evidence, in the Law Magazine, vol. i. pp. 28-32 (New Series.)
The arguments on this subject are stated in a condensed form, by Mr. Horne, in his Introduction to the Study of the Holy Scriptures, vol. i. ch. 4, sec. 2; in which he refers, among others, to Doctor Gregory's Letters on the Evidences of the Christian Revelation; Dr. Campbell's Dissertation on Miracles; Vince's Sermons on the Credibility of Miracles; Bishop Marsh's Lectures, part 6, lect. 30; Dr. Adam's Treatise in reply to Mr. Hume; Bishop Gleig's Dissertation on Miracles, (in the third volume of his edition of Stackhouse's History of the Bible, p. 240, &c.); Dr. Key's Norissian Lectures, vol. i. See also Dr. Hopkins's Lowell Lectures, lect. I. and II. delivered in Boston in 1844, where this topic is treated with great perspicuity and cogency.
Among the more popular treatises on miracles, are Bogue's Essay on the Divine Authority of the New Testament, ch. 5; Bishop Wilson's Evidences of Christianity, vol. i. lect. 7; Bishop Sumner's Evidences, ch. 10; Gambier's Guide to the Study of Moral Evidence, ch. v.; Mr. Norton's Discourse on the latest form of Infidelity, and Dr. Dewey's Dudleian Lecture, delivered before Harvard University, in May, 1836.
Matt. i. 19.
husband. There was commonly an interval of ten or twelve months, between the making of the contract of marriage and the time of its celebration. Gen. xxiv. 55; Judg. xiv. 8. During this period, though there was no intercourse between the bride and bridegroom, not even so much as an interchange of conversation, yet they were considered and spoken of as husband and wife. If, at the end of this probationary period, the bridegroom was unwilling to solemnize his engagements by the marriage of the bride, he was bound to give her a bill of divorce, as if she had been his wife. And if she, during the same period, had illicit intercourse with another man, she was liable to punishment, as an adulteress. Jahn's Archæol. § 154.
The Genealogy of Jesus, as given by Luke, is here inverted for the sake of more convenient comparison with that given by Matthew.
The apparent discrepancies in these accounts are reconciled by Dr. Robinson, in the following manner:
“I. In the genealogy given by Matthew, considered by itself, some difficulties present themselves.
“1. There is some diversity among commentators in making out the three divisions, each of fourteen generations, v. 17. It is, however, obvious, that the first division begins with Abraham and ends with David. But does the second begin with David, or with Solomon? Assuredly with the former; because, just as the first begins apo Abraham, so the second also is said to begin apo David. The first extends heos David, and includes him; the second extends to an epoch and not to a person; and therefore the persons who are mentioned as coeval with this epoch are not reckoned before it. After the epoch the enumeration begins again with Jechoniah, and ends with Jesus. In this way the three divisions are made out thus:—
1. Abraham.
2. Isaac.
3. Jacob.
4. Judah.
5. Phares.
6. Esrom.
7. Aram.
8. Aminadab.
9. Naasson.
10. Salmon.
11. Boaz.
12. Obed.
13. Jesse.
14. David.
1. David.
2. Solomon.
3. Roboam.
4. Abiah.
5. Asa.
6. Josaphat.
7. Joram.
8. Uzziah (Ozias).
9. Jotham.
10. Ahaz.
11. Hezekiah.
12. Manasseh.
13. Amon.
14. Josiah.
1. Jechoniah.
2. Salathiel.
3. Zorobabel.
4. Abiud.
5. Eliakim.
6. Azor.
7. Sadoc.
8. Achim.
9. Eliud.
10. Eleazar.
11. Matthan.
12. Jacob.
13. Joseph.
14. Jesus.
“2. Another difficulty arises from the fact, that between Joram and Ozias, in v. 8, three names of Jewish kings are omitted, viz. Ahaziah, Joash, and Amaziah; see 2 K. 8, 25 and Chr. 22, 1. 2 K. 11, 2. 21 and 2 Chr. 22, 11. 2 K. 12, 21. 14, 1 and 2 Chr. 24, 27. Further, between Josiah and Jechoniah in v. 11, the name of Jehoiakim is also omitted; 2 K. 23, 34. 2 Chr. 36, 4. comp. 1 Chr. 3, 15, 16. If these four names are to be reckoned, then the second division, instead of fourteen generations, will contain eighteen, in contradiction to v. 17. To avoid this difficulty, Newcome and some others have regarded v. 17 as a mere gloss, ‘a marginal note taken into the text.’ This indeed is in itself possible; yet all the external testimony of manuscripts and versions is in favour of the genuineness of that verse. It is better therefore to regard these names as having been customarily omitted in the current genealogical tables, from which Matthew copied. Such omissions of particular generations did sometimes actually occur, ‘propteres quod malæ essent et impiæ,’ according to R. Sal. Jarchi; Lightfoot, Hor. Heb. in Matth. 1, 8. A striking example of an omission of this kind, apparently without any such reason, is found in Ezra 7, 1-5, compared with 1 Chr. 6, 3-15. This latter passage contains the lineal descent of the high-priests from Aaron to the captivity; while Ezra, in the place cited, in tracing back his own genealogy through the very same line of descent, omits at least six generations. A similar omission is necessarily implied in the genealogy of David, as given Ruth 4, 20-22. 1 Chr. 2, 10-12. Matth. 1, 5, 6. Salmon was contemporary with the capture of Jericho by Joshua, and married Rahab. But from that time until David, an interval of at least four hundred and fifty years (Acts 13, 20,) there intervened, according to the list, only four generations, averaging of course more than one hundred years to each. But the highest average in point of fact is three generations to a century; and if reckoned by the eldest sons they are usually shorter, or three generations for every seventy-five or eighty years. See Sir I. Newton's Chronol. p. 53. Lond. 1728.
“We may therefore rest in the necessary conclusion, that as our Lord's regular descent from David was always asserted, and was never denied even by the Jews; so Matthew, in tracing this admitted descent, appealed to genealogical tables, which were public and acknowledged in the family and tribe from which Christ sprang. He could not indeed do otherwise. How much stress was laid by the Jews upon lineage in general, and how much care and attention were bestowed upon such tables, is well known. See Lightfoot, Hor. Heb. in Matth. 1, 1. Comp. Phil. 3, 4, 5.
“II. Other questions of some difficulty present themselves, when we compare together the two genealogies.
“1. Both tables at first view purport to give the lineage of our Lord through Joseph. But Joseph cannot have been the son by natural descent of both Joseph and Heli (Eli), Matth. 1, 16. Luke 3, 23. Only one of the tables therefore can give his true lineage by generation. This is done apparently in that of Matthew; because, beginning at Abraham, it proceeds by natural descent, as we know from history, until after the exile; and then continues on in the same mode of expression until Joseph. Here the phrase is changed; and it is no longer Joseph who 'begat' Jesus, but Joseph ‘the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus who is called the Christ.’ See Augustine, de Consensu Evangel. II. 5.
“2. To whom then does the genealogy in Luke chiefly relate? If in any way to Joseph, as the language purports, then it must be because he in some way bore the legal relation of son to Heli, either by adoption or by marriage. If the former simply, it is difficult to comprehend why, along with his true personal lineage as traced by Matthew up through the royal line of Jewish kings to David, there should be given also another subordinate genealogy, not personally his own, and running back through a different and inferior line to the same great ancestor. If, on the other hand, as is most probable, this relation to Heli came by marriage with his daughter, so that Joseph was truly his son-in-law (comp. Ruth 1, 8. 11. 12); then it follows, that the genealogy in Luke is in fact that of Mary the mother of Jesus. This being so, we can perceive a sufficient reason why this genealogy should be thus given, viz. in order to show definitely, that Jesus was in the most full and perfect sense a descendant of David: not only by law in the royal line of kings, through his reputed father, but also in fact by direct personal descent through his mother.
“That Mary, like Joseph, was a descendant of David, is not indeed elsewhere expressly said in the New Testament. Yet a very strong presumption to that effect is to be drawn from the address of the angel in Luke 1, 32; as also from the language of Luke 2, 5, where Joseph, as one of the posterity of David, is said to have gone up to Bethlehem, to enroll himself with Mary his espoused wife. The ground and circumstances of Mary's enrolment must obviously have been the same as in the case of Joseph himself. Whether all this arose from her having been an only child and heiress, as some suppose, so that she was espoused to Joseph in accordance with Num. 36, 8, 9, it is not necessary here to inquire. See Michaelis ‘Commentaries on the Laws of Moses,’ Part II. § 78.
“It is indeed objected, that it was not customary among the Jews to trace back descent through the female line, that is, on the mother's side. There are, however, examples to show that this was sometimes done; and in the case of Jesus, as we have seen, there was a sufficient reason for it. Thus in 1 Chr. 2, 22, Jair is enumerated among the posterity of Judah by regular descent. But the grandfather of Jair had married the daughter of Machir, one of the heads of Manasseh, 1 Chr. 2, 21. 7, 14; and therefore in Num. 32, 40. 41, Jair is called the son (descendant) of Manasseh. In like manner, in Ezra, 2, 61, and Neh. 7, 63, a certain family is spoken of as ‘the children of Barzillai;’ because their ancestor ‘took a wife of the daughters of Barzillai the Gileadite, and was called after their name.’
“3. A question is raised as to the identity, in the two genealogies, of the Salathiel and Zorobabel named as father and son, Matth. 1, 12. Luke 3, 27. The Zorobabel of Matthew is no doubt the chief, who led back the first band of captives from Babylon, and rebuilt the temple, Ezra c. 2-6. He is also called the son of Salathiel in Ezra 3, 2. Neb. 12, 1. Hagg. 1, 1. 2, 2. 23. Were then the Salathiel and Zorobabel of Luke the same persons? Those who assume this, must rest solely on the identity of the names; for there is no other possible evidence to prove, either that they were contemporary, or that they were not different persons. On the other hand, there are one or two considerations, of some force, which go to show that they were probably not the same persons.
“First, if Salathiel and Zorobabel are indeed the same in both genealogies, then Salathiel who, according to Matthew, was the son of Jechoniah by natural descent, must have been called the son of Neri in Luke either from adoption or marriage. In that case, his connection with David through Nathan, as given by Luke, was not his own personal genealogy. It is difficult, therefore, to see Luke, after tracing back the descent of Jesus to Salathiel, should abandon the true personal lineage in the royal line of kings, and turn aside again to a merely collateral and humbler line. If the mother of Jesus was in fact descended from the Zorobabel and Salathiel of Matthew, she, like them, was descended also from David through the royal line. Why rob her of this dignity, and ascribe to her only a descent through an inferior lineage? See Spanheim Dubia Evangel. I. p. 108, sq.
“Again, the mere identity of names under these circumstances, affords no proof; for nothing is more common even among contemporaries. Thus we have two Ezras; one in Neh. 12, 1. 13, 33; from whom Ezra the scribe is expressly distinguished in v. 36. We have likewise two Nehemiahs; one who went up with Zorobabel, Ezra 2, 2; and the other the governor who went later to Jerusalem, Neh. 2, 9, sq. So too, as contemporaries, Joram son of Ahab, king of Israel, and Joram (Jehoram,) son of Jehoshaphat, king of Judah; 2 K. 8, 16, coll. v. 23, 24. Also Joash king of Judah, and Joash king of Israel; 2 K. 13, 9, 10. Further, we find in succession among the descendants of Cain the following names: Enoch, Irad, Mehujael, Methusael, Lamech, Gen. 4, 17, 18; and later among the descendants of Seth these similar ones: Enoch, Methusalah, Lamech, Gen. 5, 21-25.” See Dr. Robinson's Greek Harmony of the Gospels, pp. 183-187.
Matthew says that the disciples were called by Christ while walking by the sea, because that calling followed the walk by the sea. “We say that a thing was done by one walking in this or that place, because he took such a walk, whether he who did the act was then walking, or sitting or standing.” Spanb. dub. lxxii. v. 2. This remark reconciles “walking,” Matth. iv. 18 with “stood,” Luke v. 1. A like remark may be made with respect to the passages placed parallel to Luke v. 6. Jesus is concisely represented as if he had at first seen Peter and Andrew casting a net into the sea, because they were employed thus in consequence of the interview.
Luke does not deny that more than Simon were seen, nor does he affirm that Simon was seen. Indeed our Lord is said to have seen two ships by the lake. The calling of others beside Simon not only is not denied by Luke, but is sufficiently indicated in v. 11. The words of Matthew (v. 21) “going on from thence,” are not to be understood as implying a great distance, but as relating to the neighbouring shore. Matthew relates the principal fact, the calling and the following; Luke has the accompanying circumstances. And there is a remarkable harmony between them. Matthew records the repairing of their nets by the fishermen; Luke shows how they became broken,—by the great draught they had taken. What is related by Luke, is not denied by Matthew, but omitted only. Nothing, indeed, is more common than to find the omission of some supplied by the other Evangelists. newcome.
Thaddeus, Theudas and Judas (or Jude) are probably names of the same signification, the Greek termination being added to different forms of a Hebrew verb. “The Canaanite,” Matth. x. 4, is the same with “Zelotes” in Luke. “Cognomen erat Chald. quod Lucas reddidit Zelotem.” Wetstein. Thus, Thomas is rendered Didymus, or, the twin; Cephas, Peter; and Silas, Tertius. Some suppose that this name had been given to Simon on account of his religious zeal; or, because he had been of a Jewish sect called Zealots, who were addicted to the Pharisees, and justified themselves by the example of Phinehas, for punishing offenders without waiting for the sentence of the magistrate. Newcome.
“Between Matthew (x. 2,) and Mark (iii. 16,) we observe a strict correspondence, but the catalogue in St. Luke (vi. 14,) differs from both the first-mentioned writers, in two particulars. 1, ‘Simon the Canaanite,’ of Matthew and Mark is introduced as ‘Simon called Zelotes.’ Now if any difference was admitted in this place, we might expect it to extend no farther than to the order of the names, or the addition of a surname; as, for instance, Matthew calls the ‘Thaddeus’ of Mark also ‘Lebbeus;’ but here we have one surname changed for another. It is indeed easy to conceive, that Simon might have been commonly distinguished by either appellative, but this we can only conjecture; neither Evangelist adds a word to explain the point. 2, The other discrepancy, however, appears more serious. The Lebbeus or Thaddeus of St. Matthew and Mark, is entirely omitted in the list of St. Luke, who substitutes ‘Judas the brother of James.’ Here is certainly a marked difference, for it would not seem very probable, that the Apostle in question passed by three distinct names. Nor could this be a mere oversight in St. Luke, for, in Acts i. 13, where a catalogue of the eleven is inserted, he mentioned this individual in exactly the same manner. Are we to suppose then that the Evangelist commits a deliberate error in this particular? We have distinct and satisfactory witnesses to prove that there really was an Apostle, besides Iscariot, who bore the name of Judas. Both Matthew (xiii. 55,) and Mark (vi. 3,) concur in speaking of James and Jude as the near relations of Christ, and part of this statement is incidentally confirmed by St. Paul, who calls James ‘the Lord's brother.’ (Gal. i. 19.) But farther, St. John (xiv. 22,) presents us with a remark made by ‘Judas not Iscariot;’ evidently one of the Apostles; and St. Jude himself, in the first verse of his Epistle, styles himself ‘the brother of James.’ There is thus amply sufficient evidence, that all the Gospel writers acknowledge an Apostle of this name, though St. Matthew, with his usual simplicity, familiarly mentions him by two of his appellations, omitting that of Judas, and St. Mark sees no occasion to depart from his language, in a matter of such general notoriety. Luke, on the other hand, usually studious of accuracy, distinguishes this Apostle by the name generally current in the Church, when his Gospel was written. This variation then may, upon the whole, convince us how undesignedly the writers of Scripture confirm each other's statements; yet can this only be the result of a minute examination upon our part, and upon the probability of this, a cautious writer would hardly stake his reputation for truth or exactness.” See Roberts's “Light shining out of Darkness,” pp. 91-93.
It may be objected that Matthew, in saying that this discourse was delivered sitting on a mountain, is contradicted by Luke, who says, that Jesus was standing on a plain. Luke vi. 17. But Dr. Clarke, on this latter place, has suggested that Jesus “being pressed with great multitudes of people, might retire from them again to the top of the hill.” And Dr. Priestley observes that “Matthew's saying that Jesus was sat down after he had gone up the mountain, and Luke's saying that he stood on the plain, when he healed the sick before the discourse, are no inconsistencies.” Harm. p. 83.
The whole picture is striking. Jesus ascends a mountain, employs the night in prayer, and having thus solemnly invoked the divine blessing, authoritatively separates the twelve apostles from the mass of his disciples. He descends, and heals, in the plain, all among a great multitude, collected from various parts by the fame of his miraculous power. Having thus created attention, he satisfies the desire of the people to hear his doctrine; and retiring first to the mountain whence he came, that his attentive hearers might follow him, and might better arrange themselves before him. Sacro digna silentio Mirantur omnes dicere. Hor. Newcome.
The different accounts of the Sermon on the Mount may be reconciled, by considering that Mathew wrote chiefly for the Hebrew Christians; and it was therefore important for him to bring out, in full, the manner in which our Lord enforced the spiritual nature of his dispensation and doctrine, in opposition to the mere letter of the Jewish law, and the teaching and practice of Scribes and Pharisees; which he does particularly and with many examples; while Luke, on the contrary, wrote chiefly for Gentile Christians, to whom the contrast with the Jewish law was of less interest; and therefore he omits those parts of the discourse, and dwells only upon those which were of practical importance to all. Robinson. Newcome.
Calvin says that Matthew, being more brief, introduces the centurion himself as speaking; and that Luke expresses more at large his sending by his friends; but that the sense of both is the same. Harm. p. 124.
(Toinard quotes Exod. xviii. 6, where the words related as spoken by Jethro, were evidently a message sent by him to Moses. Harm. 147.) Considering then the sameness of the scene, of the person, of the words, and of the transaction, I cannot but conclude with Grotius, that the miracle is one and the same, related in general by Matthew, and with greater accuracy by Luke. newcome.
This is made consistent with the other Evangelists, by reading “Gadarenes.” If Gergasa was subordinate to Gadara, the metropolis of Perea, as Cellarius and Reland judge, and St. Mark did not write in Judea, what wonder that he chose the more general name, which was best known in the world? But Cellarius from Eusebius takes notice that some esteemed Gergasi, so Eusebius writes it, and Gadara two names of the same city; and this he thinks was the sentiment of the Syriac translator. To this Sir Richard Ellis most inclines, in his “Fortuita Sacra.” Townson, p. 72.
In Matthew mention is made of two demoniacs; in Mark and Luke of one only. Here Le Clerc's maxim is undoubtedly true: Qui plura narrat, pauciora complectitur: qui pauciora memorat, plura non negat. Harm. p. 524.
We may collect a reason from the Gospels themselves, why Mark and Luke mention only one demoniac; because, one only being grateful for the miracle, his cure only was recorded by the two Evangelists, who mention this gratitude, and who are more intent on inculcating the moral, than on magnifying our Lord's power. Newcome.
The traditions of the elders were unwritten ordinances of indefinite antiquity, the principal of which, as the Pharisees alleged, were delivered to Moses in the mount, and all of which were transmitted through the High Priests and Prophets, down to the members of the great Sanhedrim in their own times; and from these, as the Jews say, they were handed down to Gamaliel, and ultimately to Rabbi Jehudah, by whom they were digested and committed to writing, toward the close of the second century. This collection is termed the Mishna; and in many cases it is esteemed among the Jews as of higher authority than the law itself. In like manner, there are said to be many Christians, at the present day, who receive ancient traditionary usages and opinions as authoritative exponents of Christian doctrine. They say that the preached gospel was before the written gospel; and that the testimony of those who heard it is entitled to equal credit with the written evidence of the Evangelists; especially as the latter is but a brief record, while the oral preaching was a more full and copious announcement of the glad tidings.
These traditions, both of the Jewish and the Christian Church, seem to stand in pari ratione, the arguments in favour of the admissibility and effect of the one, applying with the same force, in favour of the other. All these arguments may be resolved into two grounds, namely, contemporaneous practice subsequently and uniformly continued; and contemporaneous declarations, as part of the res gestæ, faithfully transmitted to succeeding times. It is alleged that those to whom the law of God was first announced, best knew its precise import and meaning, and that therefore their interpretation and practice, coming down concurrently with the law itself, is equally obligatory.
But this argument assumes what cannot be admitted; for it still remains to be shown that those who first heard the law, when orally announced, had any better means of understanding it than those to whom the same words were afterwards read. The Ten Commandments were spoken in the hearing of Aaron and all the congregation of Israel; immediately after which they made and worshipped a golden calf. Surely this will not be adduced as a valid contemporaneous exposition of the second commandment. The error of the argument lies in the nature of the subject. The human doctrine of contemporaneous exposition is applicable only to human laws and the transactions of men, as equals, and not to the laws of God. Among men, when their own language is doubtful and ambiguous, their own practice is admissible, to expound it; because both the language and the practice are but the outward and visible signs of the meaning and intention of one and the same mind and will, which inward meaning and intention is the thing sought after. It is on the same ground, that, where a statute, capable of divers interpretations, has uniformly been acted upon in a certain way, this is held a sufficient exposition of its true intent. In both cases it is the conduct of the parties themselves which is admitted to interpret their own language; expressed, in cases of contract, by themselves in person, and in statutes, through the medium of the legislators, who were their agents and representatives; and in both cases, it is merely the interpretation of what a man says, by what he does. But this rule has never been applied, in the law, to the language of any other person than the party himself; never, to the command or direction of his superior or employer. And even the language of the parties, when it is contained in a sealed instrument, is at this day held incapable of being expounded by their actions, on account of the greater solemnity of the instrument. See Baynham v. Guy's Hospital, 3 Vesey's Rep. 295. Eaton v. Lyon, Ibid. 690, 694. The practice of men, therefore, can be no just exponent of the law of God. If they have mistaken the meaning of his command from the beginning, the act of contravention remains a sin in the last transgressor, as well as the first; for the word of God cannot be changed or affected by the gloss of human interpretation.
The other ground, namely, that the testimony of those who heard Jesus and his apostles preach, is of equal authority with the Scriptures, being contemporaneous declarations, and parts of the res gestae, and therefore admissible in aid of the exposition of the written word, is equally inconsistent with the sound and settled rules of law respecting writings. When a party has deliberately committed his intention and meaning to writing, the law regards the writing as the sole repository of his mind and intention, and does not admit any oral testimony to alter, add to, or otherwise affect it. The reasons for this rule are two; first, because the writing is the more solemn act, by the party himself, designed to prevent mistake, and to remain as the perpetual memorial of his intention; and, secondly, because of the great uncertainty and weakness of any secondary evidence. For no one can tell whether the by-standers heard precisely what was said, nor whether they heard it all, nor whether they continued to remember it with accuracy until the time when they wrote it down, or communicated it to those who wrote it; to say nothing of the danger of their mixing up the language of the speaker with what was said by others, or with their own favourite theories. And where the witnesses were not the original auditors of what was said, no one knows how much the truth may have suffered from the many channels through which it has passed, in coming from the first speaker to the last write or witness. On all these accounts, the law rejects oral testimony of what the parties said, in regard to anything that has already been solemnly committed to writing by the parties themselves, and rejects the secondary evidence of hearsay, when evidence of a higher degree, as, for example, a written declaration of the party, can be obtained.
Now, inasmuch as the writings of the Evangelists and Apostles were penned under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, why should not the documentary evidence of the Gospel, thus drawn up by them, be treated with at least as much respect as other written documents? If they were inspired to write down those great truths for a perpetual memorial to after ages, then this record is the primary evidence of those truths. It is the word of God, penned by his own dictation, and sealed, as it were, with his own seal. If it were a man's word and will, thus solemnly written, no verbal or secondary evidence could be admitted, by the common law, to explain, add to, or vary it; nothing could be engrafted upon it; nor could any person be admitted to testify what he heard the party say, in regard to what was written. The courts would at once reject all such attempts, and confine themselves strictly to the writing before them, the only inquiry being as to the meaning of the language contained in that document, and not as to what the party may elsewhere have spoken. The law presumes that the writing alone is the source to which he intended that resort should be had, in order to ascertain his meaning. But by calling in the fathers, with their traditions, to prove what Christ and his Apostles taught, beyond what is solemnly recorded in the Scriptures, the principle of this plain and sound rule of law is violated; resort is had to secondary evidence of the truths of our religion, when the primary evidence is already at hand; and the pure fountain is deserted for the muddy stream.
The phrase three days and three nights is equivalent to three days, three natural days of twenty-four hours. Gen. i. 5; Dan. viii. 14. Comp. Gen. vii. 4. 17.
(It is a received rule among the Jews, that a part of a day is put for the whole; so that whatsoever is done in any part of the day, is properly said to be done that day. 1 Kings xx. 29; Esth. iv. 16. “When eight days were accomplished for the circumcision of the child,” &c. Yet the day of his birth and of his circumcision were two of these eight days. Whitby, quoted by Scott, on Matth. xii. 40.) Grotius establishes this way of reckoning the parts of the first and third days for two days, by Aben Ezra on Lev. xii. 3.
(In proof that the phrase “after three days,” is sometimes equivalent to “on the third day,” compare Deut. xiv. 28 with xxvi. 12; 1 Sam. xx. 12 with v. 19; 2 Chron. x. 5 with v. 12; Matth. xxvi. 2 with xxvii. 63, 64; Luke ii. 21 with i. 59.)
St. Luke omits our Lord's sharp reproof of Peter, and the occasion of it; though he records the discourse in consequence of it. Le Clerc's 12th canon is “Qui pauciora habet, non negat plura dicta aut facta; modo ne ulla sit exclusionis nota.” Perhaps the disciple and companion of that apostle who had withstood Peter to his face, Gal. ii. 11, willingly made this omission, as he omits some aggravating circumstances in Peter's denial of Christ, Luke xxii. 60, though he carefully records the greatness of his sorrow, v. 62. Newcome.
It has been shown, § 74, that “after six days” may signify on the sixth day. But we are not hence to conclude that the phrase has always such a signification. Here it means six days complete, after the discourse recorded in § 74. The eight days mentioned by St. Luke include that of Peter's reproof and of the transfiguration; which two days Matthew and Mark exclude. Macknight furnishes us with the following apposite reference to Tacitus: Hist. i. 29. Piso says, Sextus dies agitur—ex quo—Cæsar adscitus sum; and yet, § 48 of the same book, Tacitus speaks of Piso as quatriduo Cæsar.
Grotius on Matth. xvii. 1, has another solution; Quod Lucas dicit, tale est quale cum vulgò dicimus post septimanam circiter. Nam Judæos octo dies appellasse id quod ab uno sabbato est ad alterum apparet, Joan. 20, 26, &c. Newcome.
According to St. Mark, Jesus comes to Jericho; by which may be meant that he is a temporary inhabitant of that city. See Mark vi. 1, and viii. 22. Jesus therefore may be represented, (Matt. xx. 29; Mark x. 46,) not as finally leaving Jericho for Jerusalem, but as occasionally going out of Jericho; in which city he had made some abode, it matters not for how few days. See Mark xi. 19. Jericho was a very considerable city; and we do not read that it was visited by our Lord at any other time. We may therefore suppose that Jesus, accompanied by his disciples and the multitude, and intent on his great work of propagating the gospel, went out of this city, knowing that a fit occasion of working a miracle would present itself; and that on his return, as he drew nigh unto Jericho, (Luke xviii. 35,) he restored the blind men to sight. It is likewise probable that Jesus, having given this proof of his divine mission, or foreseeing that so great a miracle would create too much attention in the people, prudently and humbly passed through Jericho on his return to it, (Luke xix. 1,) and continued his journey to Jerusalem.
As to the remaining difficulty, that Matthew mentions two blind men, and the other Evangelists only one, I must refer to Le Clerc's maxim, before quoted; (see § 57, note): adding that Bartimeus may have been the more remarkable of the two, and the more eminent for his faith in Jesus. Newcome.
In the East, where the fashions of dress rarely if ever change, much of their riches consists in the number and splendour of their robes, or caffetans. Presents of garments are frequently alluded to in Scripture. Gen. xlv. 22. 2 Chron. ix. 24. Judges xiv. 12. 2 Kings v. 5. Ezra ii. 69. Neh. vii. 70, where “the Tirshatha gave five hundred and thirty priests' garments.”
Presents were considered as tokens of honour;—not meant as offers of payment or enrichment, (1 Sam. ix. 7); and especially presents of dresses. 1 Sam. xviii. 4. Luke xv. 22. Tavernier, p. 43, mentions a nazar, whose virtue so pleased a king of Persia, that he caused himself to be disappareled, and gave his own habit to the nazar, which is the greatest honour a king of Persia can bestow on a subject.
Such presents are given by kings on great occasions, especially at the marriages of their children. The Sultan Achmet, at the marriage of his eldest daughter, “gave presents to above 20,000 persons.” Knolles's Hist. of the Turks, p. 1311. So Ahasuerus “gave gifts, according to the state of the king.” Esth. ii. 18.
The king gives his garment of honour before the wearer is admitted into his presence;—De la Mottraye's Trav. p. 199; (Does this illustrate Zech. iii. 3, 4?)—and would resent it if any, having received robes of him, should appear in his presence without wearing these marks of his liberality. And to refuse such favours, when offered, is considered as one of the greatest indignities. Sir John Chardin relates an instance where such a refusal cost a vizier his life. See 4 Calm. Dict. pp. 64, 126, 514.
The use of the word testament, (diatheke,) in a sense involving also the idea of a covenant, and in connexion with the circumstances of a compact, has greatly perplexed many English readers of the Bible. The difficulty occurs in Matt. 26, 28, and the parallel places, where our Lord employs the word testament, or last will, in connexion with the sacrificial shedding of his own blood; a ceremony which, by means of a suitable animal, usually was adopted among the ancients, upon the making of the most solemn engagements; and instead of which, the mutual partaking of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, by the contracting parties, was substituted among Christians in later times. The same embarrassment occurs, perhaps in a greater degree, in the exposition of several passages in the eighth and ninth chapters of the Epistle to the Hebrews, (manifestly written by a profound lawyer, be he Paul or Apollos), where he uses language applicable indifferently both to a covenant inter vivos and a last will. For with us, a testament is simply a declaration of the last will of the testator, in regard to the disposition of his property after his decease, irrespective of any consent, or even knowledge, at the time, on the part of him to whom the estate is given; while a covenant requires the mutual consent of both parties, as essential to its existence. The one is simply the ultima voluntas of an individual, the other is the aggregatio mentium of both or all.
The solution of this difficulty belongs rather to theologians, whose province it is by no means intended here to invade; but perhaps a reference to the laws and usages in force in Judea in the times of our Saviour and his Apostles may furnish some aid, which a lawyer might contribute without transgressing the limit of his profession.
It is first to be observed that the municipal laws of Greece and Rome were strikingly similar; those of Greece having been freely imported into the Roman jurisprudence. In like manner, the similarity of the Grecian laws and usages with those extant in Asia Minor, indicated a common origin; and thus, what Greece derived from Egypt and the states of Asia Minor, these states, after many ages, received again as the laws of their Roman masters. It should also be remembered that Palestine had been reduced to a Roman province some years before the time of our Saviour; long enough, indeed, to have become familiar with Roman laws and usages, even had they been previously unknown; and that Paul, to whom the Epistle to the Hebrews is generally attributed, was himself a thorough-bred lawyer, well versed in the customs of his country, whether ancient or modern. Among those nations, the civil magistrate often exercised the functions of the priesthood, these dignities being in some respects identical; and thus, whatever was transacted before the magistrate, might naturally seem to partake of the character of an act of religion. Covenants were always made with particular formalities, and to those of graver nature, religious solemnities were often superadded. They were frequently confirmed by an oath, the most solemn form of which was taken standing before the altar; and whosoever swore by the altar, swore by the sacrifice thereon, and was held as firmly bound as though he had passed between the dismembered parts of the victim. Of the latter kind was the oath, by which God confirmed his covenant with Abraham (Gen. xv.) when the visible light of his presence passed between the pieces which the patriarch had divided and laid “each piece one against another.”
With these things in view, we may now look at some of the modes of transferring property, practised by the nations alluded to.
Among the methods of alienation or sale of property by the owner, in his lifetime, was that which in the Roman law was termed mancipatio; a mode by which the vendor conveyed property to the purchaser, each party being present, either in person or by his agent, representative, or factor. Five witnesses were requisite, one of whom was called libripens, or the balance-holder. This form had its origin in the sale of goods by weight, but was gradually extended to all sales; and the practice was for the buyer to strike the balance with a piece of money called a sestertius, which was immediately paid over to the vendor as part of the price; and hence the expression per æs et libram vendere.
Wills or testaments were made with great solemnity. One method among the Romans, probably common, in its principal traits, to the other nations before mentioned, was termed the testament per æs et libram, it being effected in the form of a sale. This mode seems to have been resorted to whenever the estate was given to a stranger, (hæres extraneus,) to the exclusion of the hæres suus, or necessarius, or, as we should say, the heir at law; and it was founded on the purchase of the estate by the adopted heir, who succeeded to the privileges of the child. The forms of a sale by mancipatio were therefore scrupulously observed; the presence and agreement of the purchaser, either in person or by his representative or negotiator, being necessary to its validity. The reason for requiring this form was because it involved a covenant on the part of the adopted heir or legatee, by which he became bound to pay all the debts of the testator. Having entered into this covenant, he had the best possible title in law to the inheritance, namely, that of a purchaser for a valuable consideration. Among the Greeks, and probably among the Romans also, this was transacted in the presence of a magistrate, who sanctioned it by his sentence of approval. This was the most ancient form of a will; and it does not seem to have been abrogated until the time of Constantine.
Now, when our Saviour speaks of the new testament in his blood, or of his blood of the new testament, and when Paul uses similar forms of expression may not the figure have reference to the custom above stated? And if so, may not this custom guide us to the true meaning of the words? Does it intimate to us that the promised inheritance was first given to man, as it were by a testament in this ancient form, upon a covenant of his own perfect obedience to every part of the law of God; that having broken this covenant, his title became forfeited; that the inheritance was afterwards promised, in the same manner, to every one, Jew or Gentile, upon a new covenant and condition, namely of a true faith in Christ; a faith evinced in the fruits of a holy life; that this inheritance by a new testament and covenant was negociated, as it were, and obtained for man by the mediation of Jesus Christ, (“the mediator of the new testament,” Heb. 9. 15,) as the representative of all who should accept it by such faith, and their surety for the performance of its conditions; that it was purchased by his obedience and solemnized by the sacrifice of himself as the victim?
This solution is suggested with much diffidence. That it carries these passages clear of all difficulty is not pretended. The very nature of the subject renders it difficult of illustration by any reference to human affairs; and the embarrassment is proportionally increased, whenever the simile is pressed beyond its principal point of resemblance.
See Ayliffe's Pandect, pp. 349, 393, 367-369. Book iii. tit. xii. xv. Leges Atticæ, De Testamentis, &c. tit. vi. S. Petit. Comm. in Leges Attic. p. 479-481. Justin, Inst. lib. 2. tit. 10, § 1. Ibid. tit. 19, § 5, 6. Cooper's Justinian, p. 487. Cod. lib. 6. tit. 23, 1. 15. Fuss's Roman Antiq. ch. 1, § 87, 97, 103, 107, 183. Michaelis, LL. Moses, vol. 4, art. 302. Bp. Patrick, quoted in Bush's Illustrations, p. 254.
Matthew and Mark relate Peter's denials of Christ after his condemnation, and the insults consequent upon it. It is plain that they happened while the High Priest and council were sitting in judgment. But instances of recurring in this manner to what had been omitted in its proper place are common in the Gospels; and in this place the thread of the narration is preserved unbroken.
It having been expressly mentioned by each Evangelist, that Peter would thrice deny Jesus, we may conclude that each has related the three denials which Jesus foretold.
Peter's first denial. Peter was without, or beneath, in the hall of Caiaphas's house. Dr. Scott, on Matth. xxvi. 3, observes that aule signifies an house, (Luke xi. 21,) and that emphatically it signifies the king's house, or palace. But in Luke xxii. 55, it seems to signify a spacious apartment, probably the High Priest's judgment-hall. It was the place in which Jesus stood before the High Priest, (Luke xxii. 61,) and had an atrium or vestibulum at its entrance. This was an unfit place for the tribunal of the High Priest at such an hour, (John xviii. 18.) Sir John Chardin says, “In the lower Asia the day is always hot; and in the height of summer the nights are as cold as at Paris in the month of March.” It remains therefore that we understand it of a spacious chamber, such as Shaw mentions, Travels, 4to. pp. 207, 8.
Peter was not in the higher part, where Jesus stood before the High Priest; but without that division of the hall, and in the lower part, with the servants and officers. The damsel, who kept the door, had entered into the hall when she charged Peter.
Peter's second denial. Peter, having once denied Jesus, naturally retired from the place where his accuser was, to the vestibule of the hall, (Matt. xxvi. 71); and it was the time of the first cock-crowing, or soon after midnight. After remaining here a short time, perhaps near an hour, another damsel sees him, and says to those who were standing by in the vestibule, that he was one of them. Peter, to avoid this charge, withdraws into the hall, and stands and warms himself, (John xviii. 25.) The damsel, and those to whom she had spoken, follow him; the communication between the places being immediate. Here a man enforces the charge of the damsel, according to Luke; and others urge it according to John, (though by him the plural may be used for the singular,) and Peter denies Jesus vehemently.
Peter's third denial. Peter was now in the hall. Observe Matt. xxvi. 75, and Luke xxii. 62. He was also within sight of Jesus, though at such a distance from him that Jesus could know what passed only in a supernatural way. About an hour after his second denial, those who stood by founded a charge against him on his being a Galilean, which, Luke says, one in particular strongly affirmed, (though here Matthew and Mark may use the plural for the singular,) and which, according to John, was supported by one of Malchus's relations. This occasioned a more vehement denial than before; and immediately the cock crew the second time. The first denial may have been between our twelve and one; and the second between our two and three. We must further observe, that Matt. xxvi. 57, lays the scene of Peter's denials in the house of Caiaphas; whereas the transactions of John xviii. 15-23 seem to have passed in the house of Annas. But John xviii. 24 is here transposed to its regular place, with Le Clerc. Newcome.
As to the title itself, the precise working may have differed in the different languages; and MSS. represent it differently.
But the same verbal exactness is not necessary in historians, whose aim is religious instruction, as in recorders of public inscriptions. It is enough that the Evangelists agree as to the main article, “the King of the Jews,” referred to, John xix. 21. That their manner is to regard the sense, rather than the words, appears from many places. Compare Matt. iii. 17, and ix. 11, and xv. 27, and xvi. 6, 9, and xix. 18, and xx. 33, and xxi. 9, and xxvi. 39, 64, 70, and xxviii. 5, 6, with the parallel verses in this Harmony. Compare also John xi. 40, with ver. 23, 25. One of the most solemn and awful of our Lord's discourses is, in some parts, variously expressed. See Matt. xxvi. 28, Mark xiv. 24, Luke xxii. 20, 1 Cor. xi. 25. Now as each of these writers has, beyond all doubt, faithfully represented the meaning of Christ, we see that it might be truly done in different words, or in a different form of the same words. His sentences also, sometimes admitted a difference of arrangement; for the order in which two sentences, or the several members of the same sentence, are disposed by St. Matthew, is, in several places, inverted by St. Mark. And with regard to his actions, though the most material parts of whatever they were going to relate must command their attention, yet there was no such superior attraction in one specific number and order of secondary circumstances, as could turn their thoughts absolutely and exclusively to them. This is plain from instances to the contrary. One Evangelist is sometimes distinct, while another is concise; and describes what the other passes over. Townson, pp. 60-1.
We may reasonably suppose St. Matthew to have cited the Hebrew,—St. John the Greek,—and St. Mark the Latin, which was the shortest, and without mixture of foreign words. St. Mark is followed by St. Luke; only that he has brought down “THIS IS” from above, as having a common reference to what stood under it. Newcome.
Tacit. Annal. xv. 31. See M. Dupin's Trial of Jesus, p. 57-59, (Amer. Ed.) Chr. Thomasius, Dissertatio de injusto Pilati judicio, § 12, 60. The want of this power was admitted by the Jews, in their reply to Pilate, when he required them to judge Jesus according to their own law, and they replied, “It is not lawful for us to put any man to death.” John xviii. 31.
This point has been held in different ways by learned men. Some are of opinion that the Sanhedrim had power to inflict death for offences touching religion, though not for political offences; and that it was with reference to the charge of treason that they said to Pilate what has just been cited from St. John. They say that, though the Sanhedrim had convicted Jesus of blasphemy, yet they dared not execute that sentence, for fear of a sedition of the people:—that they therefore craftily determined to throw on Pilate the odium of his destruction, by accusing him of treason; and hence, after condemning him, they consulted further, as stated in Matt. xxvii. 1, 2. Mark xv. 1, how to effect this design:—that when Pilate found no fault in him, and directed them to take and crucify him, some replied, “We have a law, and by our law he ought to die,” (John xix. 7,) to intimate to Pilate that Jesus was guilty of death by the Jewish law also, as well as the Roman, and that therefore he would not lose any popularity by condemning him. See Zorrius, Hist. Fisci Judaici, ch. 2, § 2, (in Ugolini Thesaur. tom. 26, col. 1001-1003.) The same view is taken by Deylingius, De Judæorum Jure Gladii, § 10, 11, 12, (in Ugolin. Thesaur. tom. 29, col. 1189-1192.) But he concludes that in all capital cases, there was an appeal from the Sanhedrim to the Prætor; and that without the approval of the latter, the sentence of the Sanhedrim could not be executed. Ibid. § 15, col. 1196. Molinæus understood the Jewish law in the same manner. See his Harmony of the Gospels, note on John xviii. 31. C. Molinæi Opera, tom. 5. pp. 603, 604. But this opinion is refuted by what is said by M. Dupin, Trial, &c., § 8, and by Thomasius, above cited.
We will cite here the words of one of the finest laws of the Romans: Vanæ voces populi non sunt audiendæ, quando aut noxium crimine absolvi, aut innocentum condemnari desiderant—The idle clamour of the populace is not to be regarded, when they call for a guilty man to be acquitted, or an innocent one to be condemned. Law 12, Code de Pœnis. Pilate might also have read in Horace: Justum et tenacem, &c.—
“The man in conscious virtue bold,
Who dares his secret purpose hold,
Unshaken hears the crowd's tumultuous cries,
And the impetuous tyrant's angry brow defies.”