PEACE AND DEMOCRACY
There is no more unsafe politician than a conscientiously rigid doctrinaire, nothing more sure to end in disaster than a theoretic volume of policy that admits of no pliability for contingencies.—J.R. LOWELL.
It is often assumed that a change in the form of Government in Germany would completely alter the attitude and conduct of the nation, and secure permanent peace, but that alone would not be sufficient. It would undoubtedly help; for under a more popular Government it would be easier for a different spirit in the German nation to assert itself. Democracies, however, have from time to time been aggressive, and have claimed to dominate their neighbours. A change far deeper than a change in the form of Government is needed. The claim put forward both by word and deed to impose the German will on others by organised force of any kind must be abandoned utterly, if the world is to be really at peace with Germany and with those whom Germany has been able to compel or to beguile into alliance with her. The conflict is not simply between autocracy or oligarchy and democracy, but between different ideals and diametrically opposed notions of duty. The conception of their State as an organisation carefully arranged to impose its will on others regardless of their feelings and their rights must be eradicated. Democracy and Liberty do not necessarily go together. There may be democracy without liberty, and it is possible though not probable that there may be real liberty without the form of democracy. An enlightened monarch, governing as well as reigning, may express the real will of a nation more truly than
the vote of a majority of representatives; and individual liberty may be more secure under such a monarch than when it is dependent on the result of divisions taken when party passion is running high. But such a rule must lack the element of stability. The Antonines pass away and Commodus and Heliogabalus rule in their place. Permanent strength and settled liberty are best secured when the acts of Government are the expression of the conscious will of the nation as a whole, where the people think out for themselves the general lines of action and the Government is their minister. It is not enough that there should be a just rule in which they acquiesce, but it is they themselves who should act—through agents, no doubt—and learn the habit of forming right judgments and acting justly. To deny him a share in political life—that is, in deciding the action of the State to which he belongs—is to deprive a man of one of those "activities of the soul which constitute happiness," to take from him one of the things that makes a full life for those who really live among their fellows. There may always be a few who live apart, contemplative souls
insphered
In regions mild, of calm and serene air,
Above the smoke and stir of this dim spot
Which men call earth.
Some may build themselves a Palace of Art where they may live alone; some may sink themselves in luxury or repose in sluggish indifference, careless of the life of others round them, with neither the heart to feel nor head to understand anything beyond their own immediate wants. But the highest aim and fullest life for man generally—as "an animal more social than the bee"—is
To go and join head and heart and hand,
Active and firm to fight the bloodless fight
Of science, freedom, and the truth in Christ.
Political action may be one of the means of carrying on that fight. Is it not one of the "rights of man" to be allowed to join in it?
It is, however, not to be forgotten that men acting in the mass, just as men acting individually, may act under sudden impulse, may do under the influence of temporary passion, even of a generous emotion, things which they would regret afterwards, and feel to be an error. Some checks on such sudden action are most essential in a democracy, because there is no appeal from its decision. A reverence for tradition, for those rules of conduct which have stood the test of time, is one restraining influence, but more formal restraints on sudden decisions and violent changes are necessary. A single vote of a popular assembly may not represent the well-considered judgment and permanent will of the people. Steps may be taken which it is impossible to recall. To insist on an appeal from "Philip drunk to Philip sober" is not to deprive him of his real liberty. It is a safeguard, not an infringement of the principles of true democracy, to provide some body of men of experience who can exercise an independent judgment, and who, when some violent change is proposed, have the right and the duty to reply in effect:
Old things may not be therefore true,
Oh brother men, nor yet the new;
Ah, still awhile the old thought retain,
And yet consider it again.
Such a justification, such a statement of the function of a Second Chamber, not directly elected, may provoke a histrionic smile among extreme advocates of so-called popular rights, but has never evoked an argument which can displace it as based on sound reason and common sense. There are some changes, too, which ought not to be made without a specific appeal to the people on that particular issue. To make them as part of the programme, as one plank in the platform of a party dominant for the moment, is not to execute but to evade the real will of the nation. We know by experience how the vote of a popular representative assembly may represent the opinion of "a bare majority of a bare majority;" conceivably anything
over one-eighth of the nation. A committee is elected by some eager partisans supposed to represent a party. That party perhaps represents a bare majority of the constituency. The caucus chooses a candidate whose views suit a bare majority of its members who hold the most extreme views. He and others go to Parliament as representing one party, and a majority of such members decides what policy shall be adopted. Party discipline compels the acquiescence of the rest. The machine is cleverly constructed to make the will of certain party managers of mere sections of the constituencies the dominant factor. No wonder that they denounce Proportional Representation as a dangerous fad. Undoubtedly the will of the people must prevail, but the exercise of that will should depend on and be the result of their own deliberate judgment. Whether what is done is a blessing or curse depends not on whether it is the act of an autocrat, of an aristocracy, or of a democracy, but on the character of the act and the spirit which prompts it. A great audience in London recently heard the true position summed up in few words—I quote Dr. Campbell Morgan from memory—"It is said we want to make the world safe for democracy. What we really need is to make democracy safe for the world."