APPENDIX I.
SUBMARINE WARFARE.
The practicability of submarine navigation was established by the Dutch over two hundred and fifty years ago. Then, as now, its underlying idea, its claim for recognition, was the advantages the system gave in marine warfare. Nor is its battle value overestimated; for such a boat, if successful, exercises an influence that is great in material uses, that is enormous in moral effects. Its development has been slow; for though the problem was solved long ago, no practical results were attained until within the last thirty years. During the late war submarine boats were for the first time employed with such sufficient success that the great maritime powers have considered the type to have an importance which justified investigation. They reached this conclusion because no plan of defence exists which could defy the operations of a weapon that attacks not only matter but mind.
There is no danger which sailors will not face; because their environments are always perilous, and their traditions are rich with glorious records of seeming impossibilities overcome by pluck and dash. They are willing always, even against the heaviest odds, to accept any fighting chance. They know that the unexpected is sure to happen. The spirit that made Farragut take the lead of his disorganized line in Mobile Bay still lives; his clarion call of “Damn the torpedoes! Follow me!” is a sea instinct, born of brine and gale, which never dies.
Whatever coast fighting or port blockading may demand, sea battles are unchanged. History teaches that ships always closed for action, and that vessels fighting each other from beyond the circling horizons, or hull down, with long-range guns, are the dreams of shore inventors. Guns and ships have changed, but men and the sea are changeless. The fighting distance of to-day is not much greater than it was in Nelson’s or in Perry’s time; and the next naval war will surely prove that battle will be nearly as close as in Benbow’s age, when the gallant tars combed innocuous four-pound shots out of their pigtails, and battered each other within biscuit-throwing distance with deftly shied chocking quoins.
It is fortunate, in the interest of good, square fighting, that the operative sphere of submarine boats is limited to coast work. Fortunate, because while the bravery and the grit are the same, the threatening of a danger which cannot be squarely met is apt to benumb the heart of the stoutest. A sailor hates to run; he does not care to fight another day when the chance of the present is open before him; but of what avail are the highest courage and skill against a dull, venomous dog of an enemy who crawls in the darkness out of the deeps, and, silently attaching a mine or torpedo, leaves his impotent foe to sure destruction?
Submarine mines may be countermined; when necessary, defied; guns may be silenced and torpedo-boats so riddled by rapid-fire guns that they will be disabled beyond the radius of their effective action; automatic torpedoes may be checked by netting, or by the prompt manœuvrings of the attacked vessel; ship may always fight ship. But what is the chance for brain or brawn against a successful submarine boat, when the mere suspicion of its presence is enough in itself to break down the blithest, bravest heart of oak. It is here that their moral effects are enormous.
The history of their development may be briefly told. In 1624 Cornelius Van Drebble, a Hollander, made some curious experiments under the Thames. His diving-boat was propelled by twelve pairs of oars and carried a dozen persons, among them King James I. In 1771 Bushnell, of Connecticut, constructed a boat which Washington described in a letter to Jefferson as being a “machine so contrived as to carry the inventor under water at any depth he chose, and for a considerable time and distance with an appendage charged with powder, which he could fasten to a ship, and give fire to it in time sufficient for his returning, and by means thereof destroy it.” Fulton borrowed Bushnell’s idea, and in 1801 experimented successfully with it in the Seine. He descended under water, remained for twenty minutes, and after having gone a considerable distance, emerged. In 1851 a shoemaker named Phillips launched in Lake Michigan a cigar-shaped boat forty feet long and four feet in its greatest diameter. This was his first attempt, but in the course of a few years he so far perfected his arrangements for purifying the air that on one occasion he took his wife and children, and spent a whole day in exploring the bottom of the lake. In the history of these boats, as told in the report of the Board on Fortifications, Phillips afterwards descended in Lake Erie, near Buffalo, and never reappeared.
Many other attempts were made, the most successful being that of a Russian mechanic, who in 1855 built a diving-boat which was under such perfect control that he could remain submerged for eight hours. The boat which sank the Housatonic was a remarkable submarine vessel; it was about thirty-five feet long, built of boiler iron, and had a crew of nine men, of whom eight worked the propeller by hand, while the ninth steered and governed the boat. She could be submerged to any desired depth or could be propelled on the surface. After various mishaps she went out of Charleston harbor, attacked and sank the United States steamer Housatonic, then on blockade duty; as she never returned, it is supposed that the reflex action of the torpedo destroyed her.
In the report quoted above the results already attained in submarine navigation are thus summarized by Captain Maguire, U.S.A.:
1. Submarine boats have been built in which several persons have descended (with safety) for a great distance below the surface of the water.
2. Submarine boats have been propelled on and under the surface in all directions.
3. The problem of supplying the necessary amount of respirable air for a crew of several persons for a number of hours has been solved.
4. Steam, compressed air, and electricity have been used as the motive power.
5. The incandescent electric light has been used for illuminating the interior of submarine boats.
6. Seeing apparatus have been made by which the pilot, while under water, may scan the horizon in all directions.
7. A vessel has been in time of war destroyed by a submarine boat. The latter, it is true, was also sunk, but it was for reasons that are no longer in force.
As yet no perfectly successful boat of this type has been tried in any naval war, but there is no question that they will be used at the very first opportunity. Compared with a surface boat, the submarine has the following advantages:
1. It does not need so much speed. The surface boat demands this quality so as to get quickly within striking range of its torpedo, and then to escape speedily out of range of machine guns, etc.
2. Its submersion in the presence of the enemy prevents the engines being heard.
3. There is no smoke nor glare from the fires to cause its detection.
4. The boat and crew, being under water, are protected from the fire of machine guns and rifles.
5. It is enabled to approach the enemy near enough to make effective even an uncontrollable fish torpedo.
6. It can be used with safety as a reconnoitring or despatch-boat.
7. It can examine the faults in the lines of submarine mines, and replace mines exploded in action. Abroad, the Nordenfeldt boat has awakened the most interest, and here the American submarine monitor holds the first place.
The form of the Nordenfeldt boat is that of a cigar or of an elongated cylinder tapering away to a fine point at each end. The outer case, built of stout steel, is calculated in its construction to resist such a pressure as would enable the boat to descend even beyond a depth of fifty feet, although that is set as the maximum for its diving operations. The cigar shape does not at first sight commend itself, even in the eyes of nautical men, on account of its supposed tendency towards a rolling motion. The experience, however, gained with the boat exhibited for the benefit of naval experts at Carlscrona, in September, 1885, has shown that very good sea-going qualities can be developed in a craft built upon such lines; for this small vessel has weathered more than one gale in the Baltic, to say nothing of the severe storm it encountered at the entrance to the Kattegat when proceeding from Gottenburg to Copenhagen for the experimental trials.
This quality results from the fact that each end of the boat forms a tank, which is filled with water, and as there is no extra buoyancy in those directions, and consequently no tendency to lift at those parts as with an ordinary vessel in a sea-way, the vessel rises and falls bodily instead of pitching. It has been found that by going at a moderate speed and taking the seas a point or so on the bows the boat makes very good weather, as the waves, breaking on the snout, sweep over the fore part and expend their force before any portion of them can reach the central section.
Steam, which is employed as motive power, is perfectly trustworthy as an agent. There is nothing about its action, or the appliances connected with it, that is beyond the grasp of an ordinary engineer, whereas such can hardly be said as yet in respect either to electricity or the other agencies by which inventors have sought to obtain motion. The difficulty, however, has always been how to retain steam pressure for any great length of time without carrying on combustion. This in the Nordenfeldt boat is secured in the following ingenious manner: A large reservoir or hot-water cistern (marked Q in the plate) is placed in the fore part of the boat, in communication with the boiler. The steam from the latter passes through a number of tubes in the reservoir N, thus raising the temperature of its contents until the pressure stands at the same degree in both. While the boat is at the surface, the maximum pressure once attained, as long as combustion is carried on, supplies quite enough steam both for driving the engines at full speed and for maintaining the contents of the cistern in the proper superheated condition. When the boat is submerged and the furnace doors are closed combustion ceases, and the steam given off by the hot-water in the boiler and cistern is sufficient to keep the engines going for several hours.
LONGITUDINAL PLANS OF NORDENFELDT BOAT.
Submersion to the various depths required is secured by the motion of the vertically acting screws, S S, driven by small three-cylinder engines. The boat is so ballasted as always to have spare buoyancy, and while a few revolutions of the screws will send her under water, the arrest of their motion is all that is required to bring her to the surface again. In this arrangement, as even the non-technical reader will readily understand, there is a great element of safety, the rising motion being entirely independent of any machinery which might refuse to act at the required moment. Another advantage is also gained in the ease with which the horizontal position is maintained by regulating the speed of the screws. To assist in keeping this position there is a horizontal rudder or fin, R, at the bows, which, by a very ingenious arrangement of a plumb weight with other mechanism in connection with the steering tower, works both automatically and by hand. The torpedoes are carried on the outside of the boat, as shown at F. They are Swartzkoph or Whitehead, as the case may be, and are released by electrical action under the control of the captain, standing on the platform at P. C is a cupola of stout glass by which a view is obtained occasionally when the boat is running submerged.
Construction Details.—The following are the dimensions of the Turkish boat: length 100 feet, beam 12 feet, displacement 150 tons, speed 12 knots, and coal endurance sufficient for travelling 900 miles. The engines (E) are of the ordinary inverted compound surface-condensing type, with two cylinders, and with 100 pound pressure indicate 250 horse-power. The circulating and air pumps being actuated by a separate cylinder, the main engine is left free to work or not, while a vacuum is always maintained to assist the various other engines with which the boat is fitted. In this respect it should be mentioned that all the engines are specially designed with such valve arrangements as will make the utmost use of the vacuum, it having been found that while the boat is running beneath the surface as much power can be developed below the atmospheric line as above it.
The boiler, B, is of the ordinary marine return-tube type, with two furnaces, and the heating surface is about seven hundred and fifty square feet. The tanks at each end of the boat contain about fifteen tons each, and there is a third of seven tons capacity at the bottom of the central compartment for regulating buoyancy. The coal is stored around the hot-water cistern as well as at the sides of the boiler and over the central ballast tank.
Three men and the captain can efficiently work this boat, although she may carry a crew of seven, who could remain in her for over seven hours beneath the water without experiencing any difficulty in respiration. No attempt is made as in some systems to purify the atmosphere by chemical means, as it is said to be quite unnecessary.
The Practical Management.—The boat is operated in the following manner: Steam having been raised to the required pressure, the funnel is lowered, and water is let into the ballast tanks to bring the craft down to the proper trim for action. In this condition the screws, S S, are sufficiently under water to obtain the requisite thrust. The boat may still proceed at the surface for some time if the enemy be distant, but the conning-tower should be closed, and the cupola hatch and the furnace doors shut, before there is any chance of discovery. The vertically acting screws being started, the boat is then submerged to the cupola, and continues approaching until, according to circumstances, it becomes prudent to disappear entirely. The direction is taken at the last moment, and maintained by compass until within striking distance, when a torpedo is released, and the boat immediately turns in another direction.
In May of this year there was launched at Barrow a Nordenfeldt boat 110 feet in length and 13 feet in diameter. The engines are capable of developing good power, and a speed of 12 knots on the surface was realized. The boat was tried on the Bosporus during July under government supervision, and as these were satisfactory, it seems likely that a number of similar vessels will be built next year for the Ottoman navy.
The original submarine monitor Peacemaker is well known through its trials on the Hudson River in 1886, but since then so many improvements have been made in the direction of increased efficiency that it is confidently expected the boat just designed will surpass its former successes. It must be understood in the beginning that its essential principle remains the same, all the important improvements being the outgrowth of the experience gained in previous experiments.
Broadly defined, the new craft has a midship section, which through its high centre of buoyancy and low centre of gravity gives great stability of form, or, to make it plain to the non-technical reader, it differs from the ordinary cigar and tortoise shaped boat in being more nearly like the section of a pear, the apex of which forms the keel. Its longitudinal section is not unlike the form generally used, though the lines are such as have been found to give the form of least resistance and the highest speed.
It is built of steel, with frames and spacings sufficient to stand the pressure of the lowest depth to which the boat is or can be expected to go. The old dimensions were: length 30 feet, depth 7 feet, and beam 8 feet. In order to obtain increased speed the present vessel will be 50 feet in length, 8 feet in beam, and 8 feet in depth, with a displacement of from thirty-five to forty tons, or an amount sufficient to carry the weights of the interchangeable boiler, of the sixty horse-power engine, and of the provisions and fuel necessary for a surface cruise of one week, and, when necessary, for a constantly submerged cruise of twelve hours.
The advantages claimed for the new boat are that she is so self-sustaining as not to need the assistance of any other vessel; that she is not an accessary, but has in herself all essentials of defence; and that she answers all possible necessities for submarine work of any kind whatever, whether in peace or war. The increased speed will, it is hoped, give her power to attack modern vessels under way. When submerged, as was proved last summer, she sent no bubbles of air to the surface, and had neither a wake nor a wash to militate against the possibilities of an absolutely secret attack. Besides these advantages, the boat is said to be a safe surface-cruising vessel, forming no target for the destructive action of an enemy’s attack, and at the same time having a capacity for disappearing so readily under water and avoiding the possibility of discovery that the enemy will be unable to tell when, where, or how the assault upon him may be made.
As in a former trial an accident proved the danger of an exposed conning-tower, the Submarine Monitor Company have provided a fin or guard for protecting the new helmsman’s lookout and companion-hatches. The waterlock appliance employed in the original boat has now an additional use in supplying a mode of egress and ingress, the opening being made telescopic, so as to permit surface runs in comparatively rough water. When submerged, the smoke-stack acts telescopically, and is closed with a water-tight valve. To avoid the necessity of divers going out of the boat when under water, there are various openings at places in the exterior skin to which rubber sleeves or arms, with a radius sufficient to cover almost all practical necessities, will be fitted. These apertures do not constitute planes of weakness or danger, because they are normally closed by stout water-tight dead-lights.
THE SUBMARINE MONITOR “PEACEMAKER.”
The Westinghouse engine is employed, as its construction prevents, by the packing used, any radiation of heat and the consequent elevation of temperation below. The air-tight doors and bulkheads work laterally, and the conning-dome is made of steel, with such apertures as will enable the helmsman to have, when on the surface, an all-round view, and when submerged, a sufficient light to let him in the daytime read, at a depth of thirty feet, the time by his watch.
Should the necessity arise, when submerged, the purity of the atmosphere below is preserved by passing the air through caustic soda, thus eliminating carbonic acid gas, and by reinforcing the loss of oxygen from tanks of compressed air. In the original experiments the boat was frequently submerged six hours at a time, and the crew of two men had no other air supplied than that which the boat carried down with her.
Besides these chemical means there are rubber tubes floated by buoys, with nozzles which protrude above the wash of the surface water. There is in each tube an automatic valve, which prevents water coming through the pipe at the time the air is being pumped in, and the depth below the surface to which outside air can be supplied is limited only by the length of the pipe.
In the plate, A represents a patented interchangeable boiler, in which either hydro-carbonate fuel or caustic soda can be used, in both cases steam being the motive power. The interior boiler for the use of the caustic soda is surrounded by a jacket, into which the steam exhausted from the engine can be used before it becomes so saturated as to create a back pressure on the engine, that is, for a period of twelve hours. When this limit is attained, and the surface is reached, the soda can be blown off into an outer receptacle provided for the purpose, and then reheated and recharged. The hydro-carbon fuel is ordinary mineral oil, carried in tanks of sufficient capacity for a surface run of a week. It may be emphasized as an important fact that this method of exhausting into the jacket of the boiler avoids the possibility of any bubbles appearing on the surface, as was notably the case with the earlier Lay boats.
Before diving, the caustic soda, which has been already heated by the combustion of the oil to the proper degree, acts in place of the ordinary fuel, thus constituting a sort of perpetual motion, until the point of saturation is reached, and back pressure in the engine results.
The boat, when on the surface, is run with the oil fuel, but as soon as it becomes necessary to dive this fire is extinguished, the after-hatch is opened by unlocking the door of the bulkhead separating the after from the bulkheaded end of the vessel, and by a system of fans the hot air from the fire-room is driven outboard. Then the after telescopic hatch is reefed and secured, the soda is thrown from the receptacle where it has been heated into the jacket of the caustic-soda boiler, the fires are put out, the smoke-stack is taken in and securely fastened, and the machinist, leaving the engine-room, goes through the bulkhead door into the forward compartment, where he has complete control of the machinery and boiler by means of a duplicate set of gauges and levers. In case of an attack, the man detailed for operating the main torpedo is left in the after compartment, where he has access to that weapon and to the buoy, reel, and other mechanical appliances employed in its operation.
The helmsman, who controls the steering apparatus that governs the horizontal and perpendicular rudders, also operates with his feet the levers which are connected by links to the throttle that supplies steam to cylinders K K. These last function like the Westinghouse brake, and are connected with pistons to the cylinders J J. Through their agency water is at will admitted into or forced out of the larger receptacles, either from one end or from both ends simultaneously. The effect of discharging water is of course to increase the buoyancy of the vessel; and of admitting it, to decrease this quality so that without changing structural weights the boat is enabled to rise or sink perpendicularly, or, by admitting more water in one end than in the other, to take a downward or an upward course. Though this does away with the necessity of the horizontal rudder, it is kept as an additional resource for steering. In case of accident to the connecting pipes or machinery the vessel is supplied with water receptacles and hand-pumps, which are able to govern its submergence so that should all other mechanism break down the boat is so completely under the control of the operator that it can at all times be brought to the surface. As an additional safeguard, there is on the outside of the boat a quantity of ballast which can be readily detached by the arms or sleeves previously described, and so effectively that the reserve buoyancy thus gained will alone carry the boat to the surface.
In addition to the main torpedo and buoy resting in the cylindrical apertures aft, other torpedoes, connected by spans, are carried on deck. The method of their employment in attack is to go under the body of the vessel athwartship, and to liberate them. As they are fitted with magnets, they will, it is claimed, when freed, attach themselves to the bilges of the enemy’s vessel, while the Peacemaker can continue her cruise and let them act automatically, or, backing off to a distance greater than the depth of water in which she then is, safely explode them by conventional electrical appliances. With the increased speed of the present boat there are various methods of attacking vessels of war when under way, among them one which is somewhat similar to that described above.
The Peacemaker, when under the body of the vessel athwartship, would liberate a buoy, B, that is connected with a torpedo, T, by a chain, the length of which depends upon the depth beneath the buoy the torpedo is desired to float. The steel tow-line to the torpedo is payed out from reel G to a sufficient length, and then by going ahead with the boat the torpedo is drawn close under the opposite side of vessel from buoy B. In this position the torpedo can be exploded by electricity.
If necessary, by liberating buoy B, while crossing the bow on the starboard side of the fore-foot of a vessel, the forward motion will draw the torpedo, T, close in to the opposite side; then, by a system of push-pins on the torpedo, the operator learns that it is in close contact and ready for explosion by electricity. Should the enemy’s vessel be at anchor the tide can be employed for the purpose of bringing the buoy on one side of the vessel while the torpedo is on the other.
The boat is supplied with the ordinary incandescent lights, or apparatus for lighting the interior for night attacks.
TORPEDOES.
America has contributed to modern warfare many of its most valuable inventions. In the decade of 1850-60 the steam frigates of the Merrimac class revolutionized the naval constructions of the world, and became the models for the war-ships of the great maritime powers. In the same period our coast defences reached the high-water mark of modern development, and, soon to be crystallized, there were seething in the brains of American inventors ideas of guns, ships, and projectiles which made history. Though to-day our created contributions to quick peace through arrested or irresistible war are meagre, still many of the theories which make possible modern ordnance and ships are the fruits of American genius and industry.
Is the future to be as fertile in thought and deed? Are the destroyers of Ericsson, the dynamite safety shells of Hayes, the guns of Zalinski, the torpedoes of Howell, Sims, or Berdan, the turrets of Timby, the submarine monitors of Tuck, the gun-carriages of King or Buffington, the ordnance of Sicard, Benét—are these to prove that Yankee brain and brawn are potent yet for the mastery of the problem?
The country has no plainer duty than to foster by every care American ideas working in national ways of thought. It is rich, public sentiment is ripe and responsive, and Congress should encourage in peace the experiments which may make war impossible. In the question of ship armament and sea-coast fortifications notably, the value of torpedoes is now so generally recognized that the definite selection of some type has attained an importance which demands most careful consideration. All experts agree that they are vital, but there is not that consensus of opinion which within limits affirms exactly what should be done.
The Fortification Board in their report say: “It is not generally considered possible to bar the progress of an armored fleet by the mere fire of a battery; some obstructions sufficient to arrest the ships within effective range of the guns is necessary. The kind of obstruction now relied upon is the torpedo, in the form of a submarine mine, and, except in special cases, exploded by electric currents which are so managed that the operator on shore can either ignite the mine under the ship’s bottom, or allow the ship to explode it by contact. In deep channels the submarine mines are buoyant; in comparatively shallow waters they are placed upon the bottom—the object in both cases being to touch or nearly approach the hull of the vessel. Submarine mines are not accessaries to defence, but are essential features wherever they can be applied.”
The Senate Committee on Ordnance and War-ships reported: “Concerning another class of torpedoes, ‘fixed’ or ‘anchored’ or ‘planted,’ technically known as submarine mines, there is a great popular misapprehension. Their value is greatly overestimated. They require picked and trained men for their management, electrical apparatus for their discharge and for lighting up the approaches, stations on shore secure against sudden assault, a flanking fire of canister and case shot and of machine guns (themselves protected), light draught picket-boats, and the overshadowing protection of armored forts and heavy guns. None of these things can be extemporized. The submarine mine alone is of little use, and it must accompany, not precede, more costly and less easily prepared means of defence.”
There is, however, a more definite agreement as to the value of torpedo-boats. The Fortification Board declare: “Among the most important means of conducting an active defence of the coast is the torpedo-boat, which, although recently developed, has received the sanction of the nations of Europe, each one of which now possesses a large number of these vessels. Their use will be quite general. First, in disturbing blockades, and preventing these from being made close, as no fleet would like to lie overnight within striking distance of a station of these boats; secondly, in attacking an enemy’s ship enveloped in fog or smoke; thirdly, in relieving a vessel pursued by the enemy; and fourthly, in defending the mines by night and by day against attempts at counter-mining, and in many other ways not necessary to recapitulate.” Impressed with the utility of this mode of defence, the Board recommended the construction of one hundred and fifty of these boats, and the organization of a special corps of officers and men from the navy trained to their use.
In England, Commander Gallwey does not hesitate to say that the torpedo-boat is for harbor defence so superior to the submarine mine that he would not be surprised if before long it superseded the latter altogether. In France, Charmes insists that an armored vessel will run the most serious risk if a torpedo-boat is allowed to approach unobserved to within one thousand to fifteen hundred feet; that the torpedo will surely triumph over the iron-clad, and that armor has been vanquished, not by the gun, but by the torpedo.
A NAVAL RESERVE.
Among the problems to be solved by an efficient naval administration there is none more difficult or of greater importance than the formation of reserves of seamen. Our late war exposed the nation’s weakness in sailors. At the beginning of hostilities the fleet, on paper, consisted of forty-two ships of all classes, mainly sailing-vessels, with a few paddle-wheel steamers, and less than ten screw-vessels with auxiliary power. Its personnel comprised seven thousand of all grades. And yet, to blockade a coast of over three thousand miles in length, the Secretary of the Navy had at his disposal but three effective vessels, and a reserve of only two hundred seamen on all the receiving-ships and at all the naval stations.
As late as the first of July, 1863, there were not men enough to carry out efficiently the work imposed upon the navy, and of the thirty-four thousand blue-jackets twenty-five thousand were landsmen. Secretary Welles, at the end of the same year, complained that there were no reserve seamen, that the supply for immediate and imperative duties was so inadequate that one of the largest and fastest steamers destined for important foreign service had been detained for months in consequence of the need of a crew, and that many other vessels were very much short of their complements. The cause of this was want of foresight, of prudence, of national common-sense even. We did not lack the material from which crews could have been drawn, for in 1860 over seventy-five thousand men sailed in the American merchant marine, fifty thousand of whom, under any system of enrolment suited to our national instincts and prejudices, would, before the end of 1861, have been available for duty on shipboard.
In peace there had been no organization, so when war came we were almost helpless, and as late as the end of 1863 not twenty per cent. of the men who should have been ready for service were in government ships. Let doctrinaires theorize as they may, this was not the fault of our maritime class, for thousands of sailors and fishermen who had already entered the army were by force of law denied the opportunity either of enlisting in, or of being transferred to, the navy. In addition, the operation of the draft was made detrimental to the naval interests of the country, for it violated the Act of May, 1792, which exempts from military duty all mariners actually employed in the sea service of any citizen or merchant within the United States. Furthermore, the government unjustly discriminated against the seaboard towns, for not only was the seafaring class, which is fostered and cherished by all maritime governments, withdrawn from the element to which it has been accustomed, but in addition sailors actually afloat were taken from their ships and compelled, under the penalty of law, to enter the land service. It was not until 1864 that Congress finally enacted the law which enabled seamen serving as soldiers to be drafted into the navy.
How different would have been the state of affairs had there existed in 1861 some system of government administration as to the creation of naval reserves, or, more far-reaching still, had we been free from that illogical distrust which possessed the whole country! The fear of too much centralization was the stock in trade of professional patriots, and the people, hampered by traditions which had come down to us from our English ancestors, saw in any attempt towards efficient war preparation in times of peace all the dangers they had been taught to believe existed in standing armies.
England acted more wisely, for she had been taught a grim lesson by her adversities, and without fear we might have profited by her example. In the history of the Peninsula war, Napier, after picturing the horrors of the fearful April night when Badajoz was stormed, asked, bitterly,
“And why was all this striving in blood against insurmountable difficulties? Why were men sent thus to slaughter when the application of a just science would have rendered the operations comparatively easy?
“Because the English ministers, so ready to plunge into war, were quite ignorant of its exercises; because the English people are warlike without being military, and, under the pretence of maintaining liberty which they do not possess, oppose in peace all useful martial establishments. In the beginning of each war England had to seek in blood for the knowledge necessary to insure success.”
Equally has this always been the attitude of the American people towards every attempt made in peace to prepare for war. Besides this national distrust, prejudices had to be overcome which have existed both in the navy and the merchant marine. Our naval officers have never made any determined effort to create a reserve, either because they have not fully grasped the correlation and interdependence of the navy and the merchant marine, or because they have doubted the wisdom of spending upon an outside issue appropriations which, given to the navy, would produce a more immediate and tangible result. But from both points of view they are wrong, “for a navy unsupported by a merchant marine is a hot-house plant which may produce great results for a while, but cannot endure the strain of a long protracted campaign.” From the merchant marine the personnel of the navy in war must come, and it is a fallacy to believe that by a small addition to our ordinary naval resources we would be able to cope with the navies of other maritime powers, or that in a long war an efficient and numerous reserve is not of greater importance than a few more seamen permanently maintained in the navy during peace.
To the merchants and ship-owners the question is one of vital importance. The earliest and most disastrous consequence of war will fall upon the shipping interest. Under any system of defence the necessities of the navy must withdraw seamen from the merchant service and raise the rate of wages. If, then, by timely precautions during peace, we can diminish the probability that war can occur at all; if we are ready upon the outbreak of war to show that our homeward-bound ships are safe; if we can abolish or modify the risk that the employment of seamen would be abruptly suspended by embargo or interfered with by impressment or draft; if we can attach the sailor to his country, and prevent him from seeking employment under other flags, surely the owners of our ships and merchants will reap the greatest advantage. Abroad the importance of the subject has been fully recognized. France, under a system which has existed for over two hundred and fifty years, maintains a reserve of 172,000 men, who are between the ages of eighteen and fifty; 65,000 of these are between the ages of twenty and twenty-six, 15,000 are usually kept afloat, and 6000 more are quartered on shore. Germany has 15,000, and England nearly the same number.
Notwithstanding the decadence of our shipping interest we have a large force from which to draw. The maritime population of this country numbers over 350,000, of whom 180,000 are available for the fleet. This number of course includes all those in any way connected with sea industries, and embraces coasters, fishermen, whalers, yachtsmen, boatmen, and all workmen in ship-building yards and equipment shops and stores.
To man our ships in time of war three means are open: voluntary enlistment, draft or impressment, or employment of men enrolled in a naval reserve. It would be unreasonable to depend altogether upon the loyal and unselfish patriotism of necessitous men serving before the mast, and there is a chance that mere enthusiasm would not induce a seaman to join the navy if employment was being offered elsewhere at increasing rates of pay. Impressment under any name is unpopular. In its common form it is illegal, and the draft is ever a last resort and always a dangerous measure. Nothing, then, remains as a certainty but to turn towards the naval reserve as the best means of manning our fleet. In time of war not only would the men enrolled come forward willingly and be immediately available, but deserters would have the machinery of the law put in motion for their apprehension, and popular feeling would be as earnest in support of their arrest as it would be opposed to all attempts which enforced the arbitrary powers of draft or impressment.
No system exists abroad entirely suited to our necessities and our national instincts; but, generally speaking, that adopted in England comes nearest to what we should employ. Naturally our lake sailors, coasters, fishermen, and yachtsmen would form the main body of the reserve. These should be enrolled, divided into classes, be given each year a certain fixed sum of pay, with an increase for each day’s drill, and at stated times they should be embarked for great gun practice at sea, so they might learn something of man-of-war routine and discipline. The officers could be drawn from the merchant marine, from the graduates of the school-ships, and from former officers of the regular and volunteer services who are now in civil life.
FORCED DRAFT.
The subject of forced draft is of great importance, and, as a corollary of high-speed development, is being studied with keen interest. There are wide differences of opinion not only as to the proper systems, but even as to the value of the principle. The literature as yet is rather meagre, but an excellent compilation of existing material will be found in the latest publication of the Naval Intelligence Office.
“A forced draft in the furnaces,” explains the Marine Engineer of September, 1887, “can be generated in two ways: first, by exhausting the uptakes and funnels of the products of combustion, when a greater flow of air will necessarily take place through the fire-bars; and secondly, by increasing the pressure of the air in the furnaces beyond that of the atmosphere. The steam-blast in marine boilers is well known to engineers as a means of quickly getting up the steam after its pressure has dropped; but the locomotives on our railways afford a very good illustration of how boilers may be continuously worked under forced combustion through a jet of steam exhausting the smoke-box and funnel of the products of combustion. This system of creating a draft involves a very large expenditure of steam and water, and as it is a sine qua non in these days of high pressure that only fresh water should be used in boilers, and also as only a limited supply of this element can be carried in a ship, it follows that the plan of inducing a forced draft by means of a steam jet in the funnel cannot be well adopted in marine boilers.
“Mr. Martin, the inventor of the well-known furnace doors, substitutes a fan in the uptake for the steam jet, and so arranges his funnel that in the event of the forced draft not being required the gases of combustion arising from natural draft will not be impeded in their exit to the atmosphere. He claims for his invention that it does away with all necessity for closing in the stoke-holds or furnaces, and that in war-ships funnels could be dispensed with, as the gases and smoke could be discharged anywhere from the fans. He also claims that by his plan of producing a draft the boiler-tubes become much more efficient as heating surfaces, and that the ends of the tubes in the fire-box are not so liable to be burned away, and that therefore there will be less chance of the boiler leaking round the tubes. There appears to be some grounds for these latter assumptions, for it is a well-known fact that the tubes of locomotive boilers, which are worked, as we have seen, on the exhaust principle, do very much more work than those of marine boilers before they are ferruled or rolled. It can also be shown by a very simple experiment that when the gases are sucked or drawn through the tubes the flame extends a much greater distance along the tube than when the gases are driven through the tubes. In this latter case the flame impinges on the tube-plates before separating into tongues and entering the tubes; but when sucked through the tongues of flame commence at some little distance from the plate before penetrating the tubes, and the ends are not therefore burned as when the flame impinges directly on them. It may be urged, however, against Martin’s system that owing to the greatly increased volume of the products of combustion due to their temperature, fans of from three to four times the size of those used in other systems are required; also, that the uptakes have to be made larger and heavier to take in the fans; and lastly, that the fans themselves are likely to be quickly rendered inefficient through working in a temperature of at least a thousand degrees. These objections prove so formidable that up till the present time Martin’s plan of creating a forced draft has made little or no headway.
“The other plan for creating an artificial draft in marine furnaces is to force air into them by means of fans. This is done either by closing in the whole of the stoke-hold and filling it with air of a pressure greater than that of the atmosphere, or by pumping the air direct into the furnace. This latter is the usual practice in the mercantile marine, where economy of fuel is sought after. Mr. Howden seeks, by first heating the air, and then forcing it by means of fans into the furnaces and ash-pits, to insure a very rapid and complete combustion of the coal. His plan has been carried out in the Atlantic liner Ohio quite recently, and the results as published lead one to expect that with a little more progress in the direction in which he is working our ships will be driven across the Atlantic without the expenditure of any fuel whatever. The fact of heating the air to a temperature of two hundred degrees before it enters the furnace cannot go very far in affecting either the rapidity or the completeness of the combustion of the fuel, and it certainly cannot affect the economy. Where the fire-grate area is small compared with the total heating surface, good evaporative results are likely to be obtained; and in the Ohio the fire-grate area was certainly smaller than is usual for the same sized boilers fitted with forced draft. The trip of the Ohio to America has given somewhat different results to those of the official trials, and it is a question whether any saving in weight, either in the apparatus required to produce forced draft under this system, or in the economy of fuel to be derived from it, has been obtained more than exists in the system of closed stoke-holds.
“The only plan that seems to hold its own is the closed stoke-hold system, and the results that have been obtained with it in the navy are so satisfactory that Messrs. J. & G. Thomson are about to adopt it in the two large Inman liners they are now building; and also several other firms are about to introduce it in preference to all other plans for increasing the efficiency of their boilers and promoting greater economy. In the Royal Navy space and weight are of such vital importance that the boilers have to be constructed on principles the very reverse of those which exist in boilers specially designed for high evaporative work per pound of fuel; and it is not, therefore, to be wondered at that the consumption of fuel per indicated horse-power has not been reduced since the introduction of forced draft; but, on the other hand, the capabilities of the boilers have been expanded far beyond the expectations of a few years ago. In the mercantile marine there is no reason whatever why the system of closed stoke-holds for creating a forced draft should not combine economy with greater efficiency in the boilers.”
These conclusions are not universally accepted, as will be seen in the following extract from the article contributed by Assistant Engineer R. S. Griffin, United States Navy, to the Naval Intelligence Office publication mentioned at the beginning of this subject.
“The forced-draft trials of the Archer class,” he writes, “go far towards sustaining the objections raised by Mr. Howden against the closed stoke-hold system. The trials of the Archer, Brisk, and Cossack had to be discontinued on several occasions, owing to leakage of the boiler-tubes; and when it is remembered that these trials are for only four hours, and that no provision is made for hoisting ashes, it becomes a question of serious consideration whether the maintenance of this high power for such a short period brings with it advantages at all comparable with the continued development of a reasonably high power with an economical expenditure of coal, such as is possible with the closed ash-pit system.
“A number of steamers have been fitted with Howden’s system during the past year, among others the Celtic, of the White Star Line, and the Ohio, of the International Navigation Company. One of the latest steamers fitted with this system is the City of Venice, whose engines were converted from compound to quadruple expansion. Her boilers were designed to develop 1800 indicated horse-power with eighty square feet of grate, but on trial she could only work off 1300 indicated horse-power, owing to some derangement of the valves. She was afterwards tried with half the grate surface in use, when it was demonstrated that there would be no difficulty in developing the power so far as the boilers were concerned. Unfortunately, no data as to weight of boilers, space, or heating surface are obtainable.
“In 1886 the Alliance was supplied with new boilers, fitted with a system of forced draft designed by the Bureau of Steam Engineering. It was originally the intention of the Department to put six boilers in this vessel, as in the Enterprise and Nipsic, but with the introduction of the forced-draft system, which was purely experimental, this number was reduced to four, having a total grate surface of 128 square feet. The boilers were designed to burn anthracite coal with natural draft, and were of course unsuited to the requirements of forced draft, the ratio of heating to grate surface being only 25.6 to 1, and the water surface and steam space being small. The maximum indicated horse-power developed on trial was 1022, but any attempt to run at this or at increased power for any length of time was attended with so much priming of the boilers that the trial had to be discontinued. Alterations were made in the boilers to prevent the priming, but no continuous trial was had previously to the sailing of the Alliance. The results obtained on a measured base were, however, sufficient to demonstrate the practicability of the system, and to show that a higher power could be maintained with the four boilers at forced draft than with the original eight boilers at natural draft.
“The practical working of the system at sea presents no difficulty, as a recent run of the Alliance has demonstrated. On a continuous run of ten hours, using only two boilers with sixty square feet of grate (the grate surface of each boiler having been reduced to thirty), the mean indicated horse-power was 668 and the maximum 744, being respectively 11.1 and 12.4 indicated horse-power per square foot of grate. There was an entire absence of priming, and no difficulty was experienced in operating the forced-draft apparatus, the length of the trial having been determined by the arrival of the vessel in port. The coal burned was Welsh, of fair quality, the consumption being 29.9 pounds per square foot of grate.
“The efficiency of the system may be judged by the results obtained from an experimental boiler at the Washington Navy-yard. The boiler was of the marine locomotive type, and had a ratio of heating to grate surface of 32.73 to 1, with a water space of 245 and a steam space of 163 cubic feet. The coal burned was ordinary Cumberland Valley bituminous, and the evaporation, when burning as much as forty pounds per square foot of grate, was 6.61, while with 37.5 it was 7.24, and this with a moderate air pressure—1.5 inches in ash-pit and one inch on furnace door.”
It is unfair to attempt the explanation of this system without accompanying drawings, but it may be stated that the air, drawn by fan-blowers from the heated portion of the fire-room, is forced through a passage into the ash-pit and furnace, a portion of the current being directed by an interposed plate through the holes in the furnace frame. By the agency of a double row of holes the greater portion of the air which enters the furnace passes around the frame, thence through other apertures to the space between the furnace door and lining, and finally to the furnace through the space between the lining and furnace frame. The supply of air when firing or hauling ashes is shut off by a damper.
APPENDIX II.[61]
THE QUESTION OF TYPES.
The following letter appeared in the Times (London) of April 4, 1885:
“Sir,—May I request the favor of space in the Times in which to comment upon the opinions recently expressed by Sir Edward Reed and other writers respecting the designs of the Admiral class of ships in the Royal Navy, and the four central-citadel ships which were laid down subsequently to the Inflexible?
“Having been closely associated with Mr. Barnaby in the designing of all these ships, with the exception of the Ajax and Agamemnon, I can speak with full knowledge of both the history and intentions of the designs.
“Moreover, my share of the responsibility for the professional work involved in those designs remains, although my official connection with the constructive department of the Admiralty was severed years ago. It need hardly be added that the remarks which follow simply embody my own opinions, and that I write neither as an apologist for Mr. Barnaby nor as a champion of the ship-building policy of the Admiralty.
“The sweeping condemnation which has been pronounced against the most recent English battle-ships is based upon the consideration of one feature only in their fighting efficiency, viz., the extent of the armor protection of their sides in the region of the water-line. There has been no discussion in the letters to which I have referred of the comparative speeds, armaments, or other qualities of the French and English ships. But the fact that the French ships are armor-belted from end to end, while the English ships have no vertical armor on considerable portions of the length at the region of the water-line, is considered by Sir Edward Reed so serious a matter that he says, ‘The French armored ships must in all reason be expected to dispose of these English ships in a very few minutes by simply destroying their unarmored parts.’
“From this opinion I most strongly dissent, for reasons which are stated below; and I venture to assert that if attention is directed simply to the possible effects of gun-fire, while the possibly greater risks incidental to attacks with the ram and torpedo are altogether neglected, then there is ample justification for the belief that the English ships of recent design can do battle on at least equal terms with their contemporaries in the French or any other navy.
“In all recent armored ships, if the wholesale and extremely rapid destruction of the unarmored portions of the ships which Sir Edward Reed contemplates actually took place, very considerable risks would undoubtedly result; but in my judgment these risks are not sensibly affected by the different distribution of the armor on the ships of the two great navies. And, further, there is every reason for doubting whether such wholesale destruction of the unarmored parts could be effected with the appliances which are now available, not merely in ‘a few minutes,’ but in a very considerable time, and under the most favorable conditions for the attack. Nor must it be forgotten that armor, even of the greatest thickness, applied to the sides or decks of ships is not impenetrable to the attack of guns already afloat, while the mitraille, which is driven back into a ship when armor is penetrated, is probably as destructive as any kind of projectile can be, and attacks directly the vital parts which the armor is intended to protect.
“In support of these assertions I must ask permission to introduce certain detailed statements which appear to be absolutely necessary to a discussion of the subject, but which shall be made as brief and untechnical as possible.
“It appears that the points raised by the discussion may be grouped under two heads. First, does the shortening of the belt in the English ships introduce such serious dangers if they have to do battle with the French ships? Secondly, what should be considered the principal uses of armor-plating in modern war-ships? The second question may be considered to include the first; but it will be convenient to take the questions in the order in which they have been placed, as, after all, the greatest immediate interest centres in the comparison between existing ships.
“At the outset it is important to remark that in the most recent designs of armored ships for all navies, increase in speed, armament, and thickness of armor has been associated with a decrease in the area of the broadside protected by armor. Further, it has been considered important in most cases to distribute the armored positions of the heavy guns in the ships in order to reduce the risks of complete disablement of the principal armament by one or two lucky shots which may happen when the heavy guns are concentrated in a single citadel or battery. This distribution of the heavy guns also gives greater efficiency to the auxiliary armament of lighter guns, and enables these heavy guns to be placed at a considerably greater height above water than was usual in former days, so that the chances of the guns being prevented from being fought in heavy weather are diminished, and their power as compared with the lower guns in earlier ships is increased, especially when firing with depression.
“The days of the ‘completely protected iron-clad,’ with the broadside armored throughout the length from the upper deck down to five or six feet below the water-line, have long gone by. The ‘central battery and belt’ system has also been practically dropped, whether the battery contained broadside guns or formed a citadel protecting the bases of the turrets. In short, on modern battle-ships there now remains only a narrow belt of armor, rising from five or six feet below the load-line to two or three feet above it. This narrow strip of armor in the French ships extends from end to end, and is associated with a protective deck worked at the height of the top of the belt, and forming a strong roof to the hold spaces beneath. In the English ships of the Admiral class the belt of armor extends somewhat less than half the total length, protecting one hundred and forty to one hundred and fifty feet of the central portion of the ship (in which are situate the engines and boilers), and protecting also the communications from the barbette towers to the magazines. At the extremities of the belt strong armored bulkheads are built across the ships. The protected deck is fitted at the upper edge of the belt over the central portion. Before and abaft the bulkheads, where there is no side armor, the protection consists of a strong steel deck, situated from four to five feet below water, and extending to the bow and stern respectively. Upon this under-water deck are placed coal-bunkers, chain-lockers, fresh-water tanks, store-rooms, etc., the spaces between it and the deck next above being subdivided into a large number of water-tight compartments or cells by means of longitudinal and transverse bulkheads. A water-tight top or roof to these compartments is formed by plating over the main deck-beams with thin steel at the same height above water as the top of the armor-belt. In this manner the unarmored ends above the protective deck are not merely packed to a large extent with water-excluding substances when the vessel is fully laden, but they are minutely subdivided into separate compartments, which can only be thrown into communication with one another by means of very extensive injuries to the partitions.
“In all the modern French ships, as well as in the Admiral class, a light steel superstructure of considerable height is built above the level of the belt-deck; the living quarters of the crew and the stations of the auxiliary armament are contained within this light erection, which also surrounds the armored communications from the barbette towers to the magazines. In this manner a ship with a small height of armored freeboard is converted into a high-sided ship for all purposes of ordinary navigation, sea-worthiness, and habitability; while spaces are provided in which a more or less considerable number of light guns can be fought concurrently with the heavy guns placed in the armor-protected stations. The radical difference, therefore, between the French ships and the Admiral class, independently of other considerations than the armor protection of the water-line, consists in the omission of the side armor at the extremities, and the use instead of the side armor of the strong under-water deck with cellular subdivision and other arrangements for adding to the protection and securing the buoyancy of the spaces at the ends, into which water may find access through the thin sides if they are shot through and seriously damaged in action. If the completely belted French ship has to fight a vessel of the Admiral class, the latter has obviously the greater chance of damage to the narrow strips of the sides lying above the under-water deck before and abaft the ends of the belt. If the action takes place in smooth water, when the ships are neither rolling nor pitching, but are simply in motion, the chances of hitting these narrow strips in the water-line region might not be very great; but it must be admitted that even the lightest guns would penetrate the thin sides of the English ships and admit more or less considerable quantities of water into the ends. If, on the other hand, the fight takes place in a sea-way, with the ships lolling and pitching, then the relative importance of penetration of these narrow’ strips of the ends of the English ships becomes much less, because the belt armor of the French ships will be brought out of water for a considerable length of the bow and the stern by a very moderate angle of pitching, or by the passage of a comparatively low wave, and because rolling motion of the ships will alternately immerse or emerge the belt armor, even at the midships part, where it has its greatest thickness. In fact, as I have more than once said publicly, it is clearly an error to limit criticism to the longitudinal extent of the belt armor in modern ships, and to exclude consideration of the vertical extent of the armor above and below the load-line. Apart from any discussion of the question from the artillerist’s point of view, or any attempt to determine the probability or otherwise of the wholesale destruction of the unarmored portions of modern battle ships by shell-fire from large guns, or by the projectiles from rapid-firing and machine guns, it is perfectly obvious to any one who will examine into the matter that the risk of damage to the light superstructures situated above the belt must be greater than the corresponding risk of damage to the narrow strips of side area exposed at the unarmored ends of the Admiral class, between the level of the belt-deck and the water-line.
“Sir Spencer Robinson, after his inspection of the models shown him at the Admiralty, recognizes the fact that in the French belted ships (of which the Amiral Duperré is an example), if the light sides above the belt-deck are destroyed or very seriously riddled in action, the ship would be capsized in a very moderate sea-way. He further emphasizes the statement that the ships of the Admiral class in the English navy, if similarly treated, would also capsize under the same conditions, and he appears to be surprised at the admission having been made. The fact is that there has never been any assertion that the Admiral class would be safe against capsizing independently of assistance given to the armor-belted portions by the unarmored structure situated above. On the contrary, from the first, in the design of these ships, it was recognized that their stability, in the sense of their power to resist being capsized, if inclined to even moderate angles of inclination, was not guaranteed by the armor-belts. In this respect they were in identically the same position as all other armored ships with shallow water-line belts and isolated armored batteries placed high above water.
“What has been said respecting the Admiral class is this: If the unarmored ends above the protective deck were completely thrown open to the sea, then the initial stability (that is to say, the stiffness of the ships or their power to resist small inclinations from the upright) would still be guaranteed by the central armored portions. So fully did we appreciate the fact that the life of the ship in action (as determined by her power to resist large inclinations) depends greatly upon the assistance given by the unarmored superstructures to the armor-belted parts, that we were careful to make the structural arrangements of the superstructures above the belts such that they could bear a very considerable amount of riddling and damage from shot and shell without ceasing to contribute in the most important degree to the buoyancy and stability.
“There are double cellular sides between the belt and upper decks; the main bulkheads are carried up high above water; hatches and openings are trunked up and protected by coffer-dams. In short, every possible precaution is taken to subdivide into compartments, and thus limit the spaces to which water can find access when the outer sides are penetrated or shattered, as well as to facilitate the work of stopping temporarily shot-holes in the sides.
“Now, without in the least intending to discredit the work of the French designers, I have to state that no corresponding or equal precautions have been taken in the portions of their ships lying above the belt-decks. And the absence of these features in the French ships is a great relative advantage to the English ships. Of course there is nothing to hinder the French from imitating our practice, but they are content to take the risks involved in a simpler construction, and in so doing they show their practical disbelief in the doctrine of armor-protected stability. I am aware that some eminent authorities do not concur with this view, and maintain that stability and buoyancy should be guaranteed by armor. To this point I will revert hereafter, but for the present I am content to say that, as between the French ships and the Admiral class, the most serious risks of damage by gun-fire in action are of the same kind, and, practically, are not affected by the shortening of the armor-belts in the English ships.
“Next I would refer to the differences which are undoubtedly involved in shortening the belts of the English ships. In the first place, by dispensing with the side armor towards the extremities a very considerable saving is effected in the weight and the cost of the armor fitted to the ships. Mr. Barnaby has recently given an illustration of this, where a ship, in other respects unchanged, has to be increased from 10,000 to 11,000 tons in displacement in order to carry the shallow armor-belt to the ends. In the Collingwood herself quite as large a proportionate increase of size would be involved in having a thick armor-belt from stem to stern. This saving in weight and cost of armor might, of course, be purchased too dearly, if dispensing with the armor involved possibly fatal risks to the ship. However the result may be attained, there is universal agreement that a ship-of-war should have her buoyancy, stability, and trim guaranteed as far as possible against the effects of damage in action. Now, in the Admiral class this matter was very carefully investigated before the design was approved. In order to prevent derangement of the trim of the vessels by penetration of the light sides above the protective deck at one end, arrangements were made in the design by means of which water can be introduced into the spaces occupied by coal-bunkers, etc., before the ships go into action.
“The extent to which water may be introduced is a matter over which the captain would necessarily have control. But even if the whole of the unoccupied spaces were filled with water, the increase in draught would not exceed fourteen to eighteen inches, and the loss in speed would not exceed half a knot. If only the coal-bunkers were flooded as a preliminary to action, the chance of any serious disturbance of trim, and consequent loss of manœuvring power or speed by damage to the light sides above the protective deck and near the water, would be very small, and the ‘sinkage’ of the vessel would be decreased considerably. But taking the extreme case, with the ends completely filled and a sinkage of fourteen to eighteen inches, a ship of the Admiral class would go into action with practically her full speed available, and with her ends so protected by under-water deck and the water admitted above that deck that damage to the thin sides by shot or shell penetrating at or near the water-line would not produce changes of trim or alterations of draught to any greater extent than would be produced if the armor-belt had been carried to the stem and stern. Nor would the admission of water into the ends render the vessel unstable.
“It has been urged that the sinkage due to filling the tank ends with water is a disadvantage, because it brings the upper edge of the belt armor in the Admiral class about fourteen to eighteen inches nearer the water than the upper edge of the belts of the French ships. If the greatest danger of the ships was to be measured by the smallness of their ‘reserve’ of ‘armor-protected buoyancy’ (that is to say, by the buoyancy of the part of the ship lying above her fighting water-line and below the belt-deck), then the Admiral class would not compare favorably with the fully belted French ships. But I have already explained that this is not the true measure of the greatest danger arising from the effects of gun-fire, and that it would be a mistake to assume that in either the French or the English ships the armor-belted portions of the vessels guarantee their safety when damaged in action.
“As between the Admiral class and the central-citadel ships of the Inflexible type there is a difference in this respect which has been much commented upon. When the ends of the citadel ships are filled with water, the armored wall of the citadel still remains several feet above water; whereas, in the Admiral class, the top of the belt under similar conditions is very near the water-level. All that need be said on this point is that, notwithstanding the greater height of the armored wall above water, the citadel ships have practically no greater guarantee of safety against capsizing by means of armor-protected stability than the Admiral class. In both classes the armored portions require the assistance of the unarmored to secure such a range and amount of stability as shall effectually guarantee their security when damaged in action. And, as has been stated above, this condition is true of all armor-clads with narrow armor-belts.
“One other objection to the shortened belts yet remains to be considered.
“It is urged that when the thin ends are broken through or damaged by shot or shell, jagged or protruding holes will be formed in the plating near the water-line, and then if the ships are driven at speed, the water will flow into the holes in large quantities, and produce serious changes of trim and loss of speed. In support of this contention, reference is made to the published reports of experiments made with the Inflexible’s model about eight years ago. It is impossible to discuss the matter fully, and I must therefore content myself with a statement of my opinion, formed after a careful personal observation of these model experiments. First, it cannot be shown from the experiments that the presence of a shallow belt of armor reaching two to three feet above the still-water line would make any sensible difference in the dangers arising from the circumstances described. Holes in the thin sides above this belt would admit water in large quantities on the belt-deck when the vessel was under way, and if it could flow along that deck changes of trim and other disagreeable consequences would result. Secondly, it is certain that the numerous bulkheads and partitions, coffer-dams, etc., built above the belt-deck level in the Admiral class for the very purpose of limiting the flow of entering water would greatly decrease any tendency to check the speed or change the trim. Whether the belt be short or long, it is evident that gaping holes low down in the light sides will make it prudent for a captain to slow down somewhat if he wishes to keep the water out as much as possible. But between such prudence and the danger of disaster there is a wide gulf.
“Summing up the foregoing statements, I desire to record my opinion, based upon complete personal knowledge of every detail in the calculations and designs for the Admiral class, that the disposition of the belt armor (in association with the protective decks and cellular sides, water-tight subdivision, etc., existing in the unarmored portions of the vessels situated above the protective decks) is such that the buoyancy, stability, trim, speed, and manœuvring capabilities are well guaranteed against extensive damage from shot and shell fire in action. And, further, that in these particulars the Admiral class are capable of meeting, at least on equal terms, their contemporary ships in the French navy.
“I must add that I am not here instituting any comparison between the ‘fighting efficiencies’ of the ships of the two fleets; nor have I space in this letter to do so. Opinions have differed, and will probably always differ, as to the relative importance of the different qualities which go to make up fighting efficiency. There is no simple formula admitting of general application which enables the comparative fighting values of war-ships to be appraised. As the conditions of naval warfare change and war material is developed, so the balance of qualities in ship-designing has to be readjusted, and estimates of the fighting powers of existing ships have to be revised. And, further, different designers, working simultaneously, distribute the displacement, which is their sum total of capital to work upon, according to their own judgments of what is wisest and best for the particular conditions which the ships built from those designs have to fulfil. The designer who has the larger displacement to work upon has the better opportunity of producing a more powerful ship; but it by no means follows that he will secure so good a combination of qualities as a rival obtains on a smaller displacement. And hence I cannot but dissent from the doctrine that displacement tonnage is to be accepted as a fair measure of relative fighting efficiency, or that recent English ships are necessarily unable to fight recent French ships because they are of smaller displacement.
“In the preceding remarks I have been careful to confine myself chiefly to the naval architect’s side of the subject, as it would clearly be out of place for me to say much respecting the artillerist’s side. But, having had the great advantage of knowing the views of some of the most experienced gun-makers and gunnery officers, and having studied carefully what has been written on the subject, I would venture to say a few words.
“First, there seems, as was previously remarked, every reason for doubting, in the actual conditions of naval gunnery, whether it would be possible, not merely in a few minutes, but in a considerable time, to produce the wholesale destruction of the unarmored parts of modern war-ships which has been assumed in the condemnation of the Admiral class. If the Collingwood, or one of her successors, were simply treated as a moving target in a sea-way for the Amiral Duperré or one of her consorts, this would be a most improbable result. But, remembering that the Collingwood would herself be delivering heavy blows in return for those received, the chances of her disablement would necessarily be decreased. Secondly, it does not seem at all evident that the introduction of rapid-fire guns has such an important influence on the question of shortened belts as some writers have supposed. So far as machine guns are concerned, I well remember at the board meeting which decided to approve the building of the Collingwood the possible effects of machine-gun fire were discussed at some length, both in reference to the adoption of the barbette system and to the system of hull protection. The rapid-firing gun which has since been introduced is now a formidable weapon; but it may be questioned whether its effects upon the unarmored portions of modern war-ships would be so serious as those resulting from the shell-fire of heavier guns, and therefore it cannot with certainty be concluded that it would be advantageous to make arrangements for keeping out the projectiles from the rapid-firing guns now in use at the ends of the Admiral class. More especially is this true when it is considered that already rapid-fire guns of much larger calibre and greater power than the 6-pounder and 9-pounder are being made. To these guns three inches of steel would be practically no better defence than the existing thin sides, and the real defence lies in the strong protective deck. Shell-fire from heavier guns will probably be found the best form of attack against the unarmored or lightly armored portions of battle-ships, especially now that the use of steel shells with thin walls and large bursting charges is being so rapidly developed.
“I would again say that on this side of the subject I do not profess to speak with authority, and it is undoubted that great differences of opinion prevail; but it must not be forgotten that the Board of Admiralty, by its recent decision announced in the House of Commons, has reaffirmed the opinion that from the artillerist’s point of view the existing disposition of the armor in the Admiral class is satisfactory. This has been done after the attention of the Board and the public has been most strongly directed to the supposed dangers incidental to the rapid destruction of the light superstructures lying above the under-water decks of the Admiral class. It would be folly to suppose that in such a matter any merely personal considerations would prevent the Board from authorizing a change which was proved to be necessary or advantageous. With respect to the possibility of making experiments which should determine the points at issue, I would only say that considerable difficulties must necessarily arise in endeavoring to represent the conditions of an actual fight; but in view of the diametrically opposite views which have been expressed as to the effect of gun-fire upon cellular structures, it would certainly be advantageous if some scheme of the kind could be arranged.
“There still remains to be considered the question of the uses of armor in future war-ships. This letter has already extended to too great a length to permit of any attempt at a full discussion. It will be admitted by all who are interested in the questions of naval design that an inquiry into the matter is urgently needed, even if it leads only to a temporary solution of the problem, in view of the present means of offence and defence.
“Armor, by which term I understand not merely vertical armor, but oblique or horizontal armor, is regarded in different ways by different authorities. For example, I understand Sir Edward Reed to maintain that side-armor should be fitted in the form of a water-line belt, extending over a very considerable portion of the length, and that such armor, in association with a strong protective deck, and armored erections for gun-stations, etc., should secure the buoyancy, trim, and stability of the vessel. At the other extreme we have the view expressed in the design of the grand Italian vessels of the Italia class. In them the hull-armor is only used for the purpose of assisting the cellular hull subdivisions in protecting buoyancy, stability, and trim, taking the form of a thick protective deck, which is wholly under water, and above which comes a minutely subdivided region, which Signor Brin and his colleagues consider sufficient defence against gun-fire.
“In these Italian vessels the only thick armor is used to protect the gun-stations, the pilot-tower, and the communications from those important parts to the magazines and spaces below the protective deck. The strong deck, besides forming a base of the cellular subdivision, is of course a defence to the vital parts of the ship lying below it.
“Between these two types of ships come the Admiral class of the English navy and the belted vessels of the French navy, whose resemblances and differences have been described above.
“In addition, there are not a few authorities who maintain that the development of the swift torpedo-cruiser, or the swift protected cruiser, makes the continued use of armor at least questionable, seeing that to attempt to protect ships by thick armor either on decks or sides, and to secure high speeds and heavy armaments, involves the construction of large and expensive vessels, which are necessarily exposed to enormous risks in action from forms of under-water attack, against which their armor is no defence. In view of such differences of opinion, and of the heated controversies which have arisen therefrom, the time seems certainly to have arrived when some competent body should be assembled by the Admiralty for the purpose of considering the designs of our war-ships, and enabling our constructors to proceed with greater assurance than they can at present. Questions affecting the efficiency of the Royal Navy clearly ought not to be decided except in the most calm and dispassionate manner. The work done by the Committee on Designs for Ships of War fourteen years ago was valuable, and has had important results. What is now wanted, I venture to think, is a still wider inquiry into the condition of the navy, and one of the branches of that inquiry which will require the most careful treatment is embraced in the question, ‘What are the uses of armor in modern war-ships?’
“My own opinion, reached after very careful study of the subject, is that very serious limitations have to be accepted in the disposition and general efficiency of the armaments, if the principle of protecting the stability at considerable angles of inclination by means of thick armor is accepted, the size and cost of the ships being kept within reasonable limits. There is no difficulty, of course, apart from considerations of size and cost, in fulfilling the condition of armor-protected stability; but it may be doubted whether the results could prove satisfactory, especially when the risks from under-water attacks, as well as from gun-fire, are borne in mind, and the fact is recognized that even the thickest armor carried or contemplated is not proof against existing guns. No vessel can fight without running risks. It is by no means certain, however, that the greater risks to be faced are those arising from damage to the sides in the region of the water-line and consequent loss of stability. So far as I have been able to judge, it appears possible to produce a better fighting-machine for a given cost by abandoning the idea of protecting stability, buoyancy, and trim entirely by thick armor, and by the acceptance of the principle that unarmored but specially constructed superstructures shall be trusted as contributories to the flotation and stability. Thick vertical side armor, even over a portion of the length, appears to be by no means a necessary condition to an effective guarantee of the life and manageability of a ship when damaged in action; and it seems extremely probable that in future the great distinction between battle-ships and protected ships will not be found in the nature of their hull protection in the region of the water-line, but in the use of thick armor over the stations of the heavy guns in battle-ships.
“The decisions as to future designs of our battle-ships is a momentous one. It can only be reached by the consideration of the relative advantages and disadvantages of alternative proposals. It cannot be dissociated from considerations of cost for a single ship.
“On all grounds, therefore, it is to be hoped that a full and impartial inquiry will be authorized without delay; for it may be assumed that, however opinions differ, there is the common desire to secure for the British navy the best types of ships and a sufficient number to insure our maritime supremacy.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
“W. H. White.
“Elswick Works, March 26th.”
The following reply by Sir Edward Reed appeared in the Times of April 8, 1885, the omitted portions being personal allusions which have very little bearing upon the discussion, and which are of no interest to a professional reader outside of England:
“It is not Mr. White’s fault but his misfortune that he is compelled to admit the perfect correctness of the main charge which I have brought against these six ships, viz., that they have been so constructed, and have been so stripped of armor protection, that their armor, even when intact and untouched, is wholly insufficient to prevent them from capsizing in battle. Mr. White expends a good deal of labor in attempting to show that their unarmored parts would have a better chance of keeping the ships upright and afloat than I credit them with, which is a secondary, although an important, question; but he frankly admits that these six ships of the Admiral type are, and are admitted to be, so built that their ‘stability in the sense of the power to resist being capsized if inclined to even moderate angles of inclination is not guaranteed by their armor-belts.’
“I have no doubt it would suit the purposes of all those who are or who have been responsible for those ships if I were to allow myself to be drawn, in connection with this question, away from the essential points just adverted to into a controversy upon the efforts made by the Admiralty to give to these ships, which have been denied a reasonable amount of armor protection, such relief from the grave dangers thus incurred as thin sheet compartments, coffer-dams, coals, patent fuel, stores, etc., can afford. (Cork is what was at first relied upon in this connection, but we hear no more of it now.) But I do not intend to be drawn aside from my demand for properly armored ships of the first class by any references to these devices, and for a very simple reason, viz., all such devices, whether their value be great or small, are in no sense special to armored ships; on the contrary they are common to all ships, and are more especially applied to ships which are unable to carry armor. The application of these devices to ships stripped of armor does not make them armored ships, any more than it makes a simple cruiser or other ordinary unarmored vessel an armored ship; and what I desire, and what I confidently rely upon the country demanding before long, is the construction of a few line-of-battle ships made reasonably safe by armor, in lieu of the present ships, which, while called armored ships, in reality depend upon their thin unarmored parts for their ability to keep upright and afloat. Besides, I do not believe in these devices for ships intended for close fighting. I even believe them likely, in not a few cases, to add to their danger rather than to their safety. If, for example, a raking shot or shell should let the sea into the compartments on one side of the ship, while those on the other side remain intact and buoyant, this very buoyancy upon the uninjured side of the ship would help to capsize her.
“Mr. White says that no vessel can fight without running risks, and thinks that thick, vertical side-armor, even over a portion of the ship’s length, is not a necessary guarantee of the life of a ship. Well, sir, we are all at liberty to think, or not think, what we please, so far as our sense and judgment will allow us; but Mr. White, like all other depreciators of side-armor, fails utterly to show us what else there is which can be relied upon to keep shell out of a ship, or what can be done to prevent shell that burst inside a ship from spreading destruction all around. He refers us to no experiments to show that the thin plate divisions and coffer-dams, and like devices, will prove of any avail for the purpose proposed. In the absence of any such experiments, he tells us, as others have told us, that Signor Brin and colleagues in the Italian Admiralty consider ‘a minutely subdivided region’ at and below the water-line ‘sufficient defence against gun-fire.’ But I do not think Signor Brin believes anything of the kind; what he believes is that the Italian government cannot afford to build a fleet of properly armored line-of-battle ships for hard and close fighting, and that, looking at their limited resources, a few excessively fast ships, with armor here and there to protect particular parts, and with ample capabilities of retreat to a safe distance, will best serve their purpose. I do not say that he is wrong, and I certainly admire the skill which he has displayed in carrying out his well-defined object. But that object is totally different from ours, and our naval habits, our traditions, our national spirit, the very blood that flows in our veins, prevent such an object from ever becoming ours.
“Mr. White all through his letter, in common with some of his late colleagues at the Admiralty, thinks and speaks as if naval warfare were henceforth to be chiefly a matter of dodging, getting chance shots, and keeping out of the enemy’s way; and this may be more or less true of contests between unarmored vessels. But why is not the line-of-battle ship Collingwood to be supposed to steam straight up to the enemy, I should like to know? and if she does, what is to prevent the enemy from pouring a raking fire through her bow, and ripping up at once, even with a single shell, every compartment between the stem and the transverse armored bulkhead?
“It distresses me beyond measure to see our ships constructed so as to impose upon them the most terrible penalties whenever their commanders dare, as dare they ever have, and dare they ever will, to close with their foe and try conclusions with him. Why, sir, it has been my painful duty over and over again to hear foreign officers entreat me to use all my influence against the adoption in their navy of ships with so little armored surface as ours. On one occasion the Collingwood herself was imposed upon them as a model to be imitated, and I was besought to give them a safer and better ship. ‘How could I ever steam up to my enemy with any confidence,’ said one of the officers concerned, ‘with such a ship as that under my feet?’
“Mr. White coolly tells us that the Collingwood, with five hundred tons of water logging her ends to a depth of seven or eight feet, will not be much worse off than a ship whose armored deck stands two and a half or three feet above the water’s surface, and his reason is that even above this latter deck the water would flow in when the ship was driving ahead with an injured bow. Well, sir, I will only say that sailors of experience see a very great difference between the two cases, and I can but regard such theorizings as very unfortunate basis for the designs of her Majesty’s ships.
“I have said that Mr. White’s assumptions as to the immunity of the above-water compartments and coffer-dams from wide-spread injury by shell-fire rest upon no experimental data; I go on to say that such data as we have to my mind point very much the other way. The Huascar was not an unarmored vessel, and such shell as penetrated her had first to pass through some thin armor and wood backing; yet after the Cochrane and Blanco Encaloda had defeated her she presented internally abundant evidence of the general destruction which shell-fire produces. An officer of the Cochrane, who was the first person sent on board by the captors, in a letter to me written soon afterwards, said: ‘It requires seeing to believe the destruction done.... We had to climb over heaps, table-high, of débris and dead and wounded.... We fired forty-five Palliser shell, and the engineers who were on board say that every shell, or nearly so, must have struck, and that every one that struck burst on board, doing awful destruction.’
“Speaking of the injury which the Cochrane received from a single shell of the Huascar, he said: ‘It passed through the upper works at commander’s cabin, breaking fore and aft bulkhead of cabins, breaking skylight above ward-room, thwartship bulkhead of wood, passed on, cut in two a 5-inch iron pillar, through a store-room, struck armor-plate, glanced off, passing through plating of embrasure closet at corner, finishing at after gun-port, and went overboard. This shell passed in at starboard part of stern and terminated at after battery port on port side, which is finished with the wide angle-iron, carrying out a part of the angle-iron in its flight.’
“This was a shell of moderate size, from a moderate gun, but it is obvious that it would have made short work of penetrating those very thin sheets of steel which constitute the compartments, coffer-dams, etc., upon the resistance of which, to my extreme surprise, those responsible for the power and safety of our fleets seem so ready to place their main dependence.
“For resistance to rams and torpedoes, and for the limitation of the injuries to be effected by them, as much cellular subdivision as possible should be supplied; but, as against shot and shell, subdivision by their sheet-steel is no guarantee whatever of safety in any ship, least of all in line-of-battle ships, which must be prepared for fighting at close quarters.
“I must now ask for space to remark upon a few minor points in Mr. White’s letter. He seems to consider that the scant armor of the Admiral class is somehow associated with the placing of the large, partly protected guns of these ships in separate positions, ‘in order to reduce the risks of complete disablement of the principal armament by one or two lucky shots, which may happen when the heavy guns are concentrated on a single citadel or battery.’ Suffice it to reply that in the proposed new designs of the Admiralty ships now before Parliament, which have almost equally scant partial belts of armor, the guns are nevertheless concentrated in a single battery.
“Again, Mr. White says the Admiralty have declined to adopt my advice to protect the Admiral class in certain unarmored parts with 3-inch plating, and declares that such plating would practically be no better defence against rapid-fire guns than existing thin sides; but has he forgotten the fact that my suggestion has been adopted in the new designs for the protection of the battery of 6-inch guns, although it is perversely withheld from those parts of the ship in which it might assist in some degree in prolonging the ship’s ability to float and to resist capsizing forces?
“Mr. White makes one very singular statement. He takes exception to my claiming for the Inflexible type of ship, on account of their armored citadel, a much better chance of retaining stability in battle than the Admiral type possesses, because, he says, ‘in both classes the armored portions require the assistance of the unarmored to secure such a range and amount of stability as shall effectually guarantee their security when damaged in action.’ The fair inference to be drawn from this would be that where the principle long ago laid down by me, and supported by Mr. Barnaby in the words previously quoted, is once departed from, the danger must in all cases be so great as to exclude all distinctions of more or less risk. Mr. White can hardly mean this; but if he does not, then on what grounds are we told that a ship which has no armor at all left above water at an inclination say of six or eight degrees is no worse off than a ship which at those angles and at still greater ones has a water-tight citadel over one hundred feet long to help hold her up?
“I am not at all disposed to enter into a discussion as to the relative stabilities of the English and French ships under various conditions. The French ships have armored belts two and a half to three feet above water from end to end. That fact, other things being presumed equal, gives them an immense advantage over our ships, which in battle trim have belts scarcely more than a foot wide above water, and for less than half their length. It is quite possible that the French constructors may have given their ships less initial stability than ours; from such information as I possess I believe they have; but in so far as the ship below the armor-deck, and the action of shot and shell upon that part of her, are concerned, whatever stability they start with in battle they will retain until their armor is pierced; whereas our ships may have a large proportion of theirs taken from them without their armor being pierced, and their armored decks are then less than half the height of those of the French ships above water.
“I will add that I doubt if the French ships are dealt fairly by at Whitehall. I lately heard a good deal of the extreme taper of their armor-belts at the bow, and the Amiral Duperré was always quoted in instance of this. It is true that this ship’s armor does taper from fifty-five centimetres amidships to twenty-five centimetres at the stem, but she stands almost alone among recent important ships in this respect, as the following figures will show:
| Name of Ship. | Thickness of Armor Amidship. | Thickness of Armor at Bows. |
|---|---|---|
| Centimetres. | Centimetres. | |
| Amiral Baudin | 55 | 40 |
| Formidable | 55 | 40 |
| Hoche | 45 | 40 |
| Magenta | 45 | 40 |
| Marceau | 45 | 40 |
| Caiman | 50 | 35 |
| Fulminant | 33 | 25 |
| Furieuse | 50 | 32 |
| Indomptable | 50 | 37 |
| Requin | 50 | 40 |
| Terrible | 50 | 37 |
“A friend writes me: ‘Comparing the Amiral Duperré with the Amiral Baudin, Dévastation, Formidable, and Foudroyant, which are ships of about her size, the following peculiarities are observable: The Duperré is about three feet narrower than the other ships mentioned, and has fully fifteen inches less metacentric height. She is also slightly deeper in proportion to her breadth than the other ships.’
“As narrowness, small metacentric height, and excessive depth all tend to reduce stability, it would appear that the Admiralty office has, as I supposed, been careful to select a vessel not unfavorable to their purpose. But however this may be, it is no business of mine to defend the French ships in the details of their stability, nor even to defend them at all; and, as a matter of fact, the French Admiralty, although stopping far short of ours, has in my opinion gone much too far in the direction of reducing the armored stability at considerable angles of inclination. But their falling into one error is no justification for our falling into a much greater one, and deliberately repeating it in every ship we lay down. In this connection I will only add that the experiments performed at our Admiralty on models must be viewed with great distrust for a reason not yet named. They deal only, so far as I am acquainted with them, with models set oscillating or rolling by waves or otherwise. But the danger thus dealt with is a secondary one; the primary one is that due to ‘list’ or prolonged inclination to one side. What sort of protection against the danger of capsizing from this cause can be possessed by a ship the entire armor on each side of which becomes immersed even in smooth water when the ship is inclined a couple of degrees only, and which then has no side left to immerse, save such as single shells can blow into holes ten by four feet?
“It is to be observed that although Mr. White does not venture to join the only other apologist for these deficiently armored ships in stating that India-rubber umbrella shot-stoppers are to be employed for their preservation in battle, he does go so far as to tell us that the spaces into which water would enter when the unarmored parts have been penetrated have been subdivided ‘to facilitate the work of stopping temporarily shot-holes in the sides,’ and I know independently that a good deal of reliance is placed at the Admiralty upon the presumed ability to stop such holes as they are made. But the whole thing is a delusion. The officer of the Cochrane, before quoted, said, ‘I wish to state that shot-plugs are out of the question after or at such a fight. They are entirely useless. Not a hole was either round, square, or oval, but different shapes—ragged, jagged, and torn, the inside parts and half-inch plating being torn in ribbons; some of the holes inside are as large as four by three feet, and of all shapes. There are many shot-plugs on board here, all sizes, conical shapes and long, but they are of no use whatever.’
“Mr. White’s letter invites many other comments, but I have said enough to show that it in no way changes my view of the question of armor-plated line-of-battle ships. In so far as it advocates a further abandonment of armor and a further resort to doubtful devices in lieu thereof, it is already answered by anticipation by the Admiralty itself. Until I wrote my recent letters to you, our Admiralty thought as Mr. White still thinks, and tended as he still tends. In the case of all our recent cruisers but two they had abolished side-armor altogether. To my public appeal for armor-belted cruisers they have, however, responded, and are about to order six of such ships. So far, so good. We ought to be grateful for this concession to a most reasonable demand. I wish these cruisers were to be faster, much faster, but in Admiralty matters the country must be thankful for small mercies.
“It only remains for me to note with satisfaction one or two of the points upon which Mr. White is in agreement with myself. He admits that it ‘would certainly be advantageous’ to carry out those experiments which I regard the Admiralty as afraid to make, viz., experiments to test the effect of gun-fire upon the subdivided but unarmored parts of ships.
“It may be taken for what it is worth, but I declare that the abandonment of armor has not at all been forced upon us by unavoidable circumstances, nor is it from any intrinsic necessity that we go on refusing to provide our ships with torpedo defence. On not immoderate dimensions, at not immoderate cost, ships might be built, still practically invulnerable to gun, ram, and torpedo alike, ships which could dispose of the Admiral class of ships more quickly and certainly than she could dispose of the feeblest antagonist that she is likely to encounter. But in order to produce such ships we must revive the now abandoned principle that armor, and armor alone can save from destruction those ships whose business it is to drive our future enemies from the European seas and lock them up in their own ports.”
The Committee on Designs of 1872, previously alluded to, contained sixteen members, of whom six were naval officers. Two of those members, Admiral George Elliot, R.N., and Rear-admiral A. P. Ryder, R.N., dissented so far from their colleagues that they could not sign the report, and accordingly they submitted a very able minority report embodying their views.
The first of the “general principles” laid down in their report is as follows:
“That it is of the last importance that the modifications in existing types of men-of-war which the committee have been invited to suggest should be calculated not merely to effectually meet the necessities of naval warfare now and in the immediate future, but in full view of the probable necessities of naval warfare in the more remote future.”
It must be a source of satisfaction to these gallant officers to observe in some designs of the present day a confirmation of their forecast in many particulars.
The following extracts from a letter bearing upon the present controversy, by Admiral Elliot, appeared in the Times (London) of April 24, 1885, and contain the pith of his oft-quoted arguments:
“My first impression on reading these letters in the Times is one of disappointment that the point at issue between these two experts has not been more closely confined to the comparative merits of side-armor versus cellular-deck armor, but that their attention has been directed to this feature of design only as connected with a particular type of ship, namely, the Collingwood, which vessel is a hybrid, or cross between the two systems of protection to buoyancy, and therefore not truly representative of either. Mr. White’s defence of the unarmored ends of the Collingwood is so far unsatisfactory that it treats of a very imperfect development of the cellular-deck mode of protection, and therefore he is not an exponent of the real merits of this system.
“I am quite aware that the main point at issue between these two distinguished naval architects has been more closely confined to the question of stability than to that of flotation as displayed in the design of the Collingwood, and in this scientific view of the case I do not feel competent to offer any opinion, except to point out that the cellular-deck principle per se does not involve any such danger as regards stability as is produced by the top weight of a central citadel. Mr. White acknowledges that this top weight will capsize his ship if deprived of the buoyancy afforded by the unarmored ends, and on this danger point Sir Edward Reed fixes his sharpest weapon of attack.
“The great issue at stake is how the weights available for the protection of buoyancy and for gun defence are to be distributed to the best advantage for defensive purposes, and in order to discuss Sir Edward Reed’s opinions in a concise form I will deal with the question solely as concerning the use of side-armor of less than twelve inches, beyond which limit of thickness I will, for the sake of argument, admit its practical advantages; and looking to the demand for increased speed and coal-carrying capacity, it does not appear probable that if combined with adequate gun protection, and if of sufficient depth, an all-round belt of thicker than ten inches can be carried by any vessels of war except those of much greater displacement than the Collingwood class. I feel justified, however, in discussing the question on this basis, because Sir Edward Reed includes in his category of approved armored ships our recent belted cruisers, having a narrow belt of ten inches maximum thickness, and takes credit for having induced the Admiralty to abandon their original intention of cellular-deck water-line protection in this class of war-ship in favor of this thin armor-belt.
“The relative value of these two systems of water-line protection, namely, an all-round belt versus a raft body, must not only be ruled by the displacement decided upon for each class of vessel, and by the power of the gun which has to be encountered, but by such tactical expedients as can be resorted to in battle, as being those best suited to the known offensive and defensive properties of the combatants.
“Looking at this disputed question entirely from the point of view of an artillerist and a practical seaman, I can perceive very great tactical advantages to be obtained by the adoption of the mode of protection proposed as a substitute for obsolete armor, and I view with much regret the one-sidedness of the conclusions arrived at by the opponents of this system, and the disparaging terms in which it is sought to turn it into ridicule, such as ‘doubtful devices’ and ‘useless contrivances,’ etc., because they indicate prejudice and a want of mature consideration of the incidents of naval battles. I cannot, also, help observing that while, on the one side, prophesying the most fatal consequences to ensue from what is called ‘stripping ships of armor,’ on the other side no admission is made of the disastrous results which must follow from placing reliance on such a delusive defensive agency as an armor-plate known to be penetrable by guns certain to be encountered; and in order to support this theory we are called upon to believe that gunners will be so excited in action or so unskilful that in no case will they hit the large object aimed at, namely, the water-line of an adversary passing even at close quarters on their beam, but I shall refer to this feature of assumed impunity hereafter.
“Sir Edward Reed’s comparative remarks on the effect of shot-holes as between the two systems of defence are of the same one-sided character, notwithstanding the evidence of the fractured condition of armor-plates subjected to experimental firing; and it is almost apparent that in decrying the one mode of protection he has lost sight of the fact that a ten-inch armor-plate is all that will stand between the life and death of a ship—that is to say, between one well-directed shell and the magazines and boilers—which plate can be easily penetrated and smashed up by the guns which similar vessels will assuredly carry if so invited. Also, in referring to the baneful effects of raking fire and shell explosion inboard, the assumed inferiority is misplaced because one prominent advantage of the cellular-deck system is that by economizing weight at the water-line it enables the bow and stern to be armor-plated—a matter of the highest tactical importance as a defence against raking fire, which is unobtainable in a belted ship of the same displacement, at least without entailing a considerable reduction of the thickness of armor on the belt. This feature of end-on defence is not only an essential element of safety, but must prove most effective as enabling a combatant to close his adversary at an advantage, and enforce the bow-to-bow ram encounter, or compel him to resort to a stern fight, or otherwise to pass him at such close quarters as will insure direct hits and depressed fire at the water-line belt, and by these tactics the opportunities for riddling the raft body will be few and far between.
“I may also express the opinion that for repairing damages in a raft-bodied ship at the water-line far more efficacious means can be resorted to than the ordinary shot-plugs, and that the use of cork bags for closing shot-holes in the coffer-dam sides, if they are open at the top, is far from being an unreasonable or ‘stupid contrivance,’ as it is called, considering that, as a general rule, the perforations through thin plating would not be ragged or extensive. Sir Edward Reed’s wise suggestion to make the outer skin of the coffer-dam of two-inch steel plates would render machine-gun fire of little avail. The injurious effects of shell fire would, I reckon, be far more fatal if the projectile exploded in passing through the ten-inch belt than if it burst at some distance inboard after penetrating thin plating. I think it will be admitted without dispute that this feature of design must be governed to a great extent by tactical considerations, the object sought for being to secure out of a given weight of steel the greatest amount of fighting vitality consistent with the power of manœuvring available between skilful antagonists. This view of the case is especially applicable to single actions at sea, when a clever tactician will select his mode of fighting according to the offensive and defensive properties known to be possessed by his opponent, and in this respect an armor-plated bow and stern will afford enormous advantages, both for attack and defence, if the plating is extended as high as the upper deck.
“In fleet actions the ram and torpedo will require more attention than the gun attack, and that feature of battle introduces another disputed point, namely, the limit of size of ship; but that question is outside the scope of the present discussion, and I shall conclude my arguments by a strong expression of opinion that, as gunpowder has so completely mastered the pretensions of outside armor protection, the direction in which prudence leans towards defensive properties in future designs for ships-of-war is that of deflection rather than of direct resistance, and that in this respect science has not reached its utmost limit of invention.
“The prevailing disposition to regulate the power of the gun by the size of the vessel is, I consider, a great mistake, seeing that the additional weight of a powerful gun is not inadmissible, even in such vessels as our belted cruisers, and looking to the strong inducement held out by the continued use of armor-plating, even of such moderate thickness as ten inches. In the splendid steamers purchased from the mercantile marine, which are being armed with light guns only, one 25-ton gun would greatly add to their fighting power, but the cause of this omission may probably be found in the answer to the question, Where are the guns?”
The following reply appeared in the Times (London) of May 1, 1885:
“Sir.—The letter of Admiral Sir George Elliot ... deals ably and candidly with a subject of such fundamental importance to our navy that I venture to offer a few observations upon it.
“I am glad to see that the gallant admiral separates his case and the cellular or raft-deck system from any connection with the Collingwood or Admiral type of ship, but I regret that he has treated my criticisms of that kind of ship just as if I had applied them in the abstract to the system which he advocates. This is not fair either to the gallant officer himself or to me, as will presently appear.
“If Sir George Elliot will remove the cellular or raft-deck question completely away from the very unsatisfactory and unpleasant region of Admiralty practice, and let it be treated upon its merits, while I shall still have to respectfully submit to him some cautionary considerations, I shall also be prepared to make to him some very considerable concessions. One thing I should find it desirable to press upon him is the absolute necessity of giving closer attention to the provision of stability. He treats the subject mainly as a question of ‘buoyancy,’ and wisely so from his point of view; but ‘stability,’ or the power of resisting capsizing, comes first, and on this he declines to offer an opinion. Again, when the gallant officer speaks of a ‘raft’ deck, I would point out that this may be a very different thing from a cellular-deck. The characteristic of a raft is that it is usually formed of solid buoyant materials; you may make it of cellular steel if you please, but in that case wherever injury lets in water the steel so far ceases to be a raft, which helps to float its load, and becomes a weight to help sink it. Now, cells formed of thin steel do not upon the face of the matter appear to be safe materials for a raft which is to be subject to the multitudinous fire of small guns and the explosions of shells of all sizes. It needs a very skilful artificer to build a safe floating raft of thin steel for such a purpose, especially when regard is had to the dangers of raking fire, against which bow and stern armor would not sufficiently provide.
“Having expressed these cautions, I will go on to say that in my opinion the main idea of your gallant correspondent, which he has so long and so steadily developed, is nevertheless a sound one, and one which has a great future. I do not, of course, for a moment admit with him that the gun has yet mastered the armor. I believe the Dreadnought, though of old design, would still fight a good action against all ships now ready for sea, and have to fear only a very exceptional, and therefore either a very skilful or very fortunate, shot. The recent Admiralty ships, where they are armored, are practically proof against almost every gun afloat. Further, I have satisfied myself that if the existing restrictions imposed upon us by the absence of floating docks adapted to receive ships of great breadth were removed (these restrictions crippling us to a most unfortunate degree), and if certain professional conventionalities as to the forms of ships were set aside, it would be perfectly practicable to build war-ships no larger and no more costly than the Inflexible, with enough side-armor more than a yard (three feet) thick to preserve their stability, and at the same time made ram-proof and torpedo-proof. Meanwhile, of all the vulnerable objects afloat, the recent guns themselves, by reason of their absurdly long and slender barrels, left fully exposed to all fire, are among the most vulnerable.
“Still, the raft-deck system has a wide field before it, and I am quite prepared to admit that I believe in its practicability and in its sufficient security for certain classes of vessels if properly carried out. This it has not yet been in any single instance. Even in the case of the great Italian ships, as in our own, there are elements of weakness which would be fatal to the system in action, but which are not unavoidable. Allow me to assure Sir George Elliot that I have largely and closely studied this subject, and that my main objections to it are not objections of principle.
“If the raft-deck system is to be adopted, it must in my opinion be carried out in a much fuller and more satisfactory manner than hitherto, and with the aid of arrangements which I have for a long time past seen the necessity of, and been engaged upon.
“To my mind the Admiralty, while protecting certain parts and contents of their largest ships from injury from shell fire, have made the fatal error of failing to protect the ship itself, which contains them all, from being too readily deprived of stability and made to capsize. The advocates of the alternative system must not repeat this error, or, if they do, they must not expect me to become their ally. On the other hand, if they will join me in despising what are merely specious elements of safety, and in demanding those which are real, if they will insist that our principal and most costly ships at least shall be so constructed as to keep afloat and upright for a reasonable length of time in battle, in spite of any form of attack, so as to give their gallant crews a fair chance of achieving their objects, they will not find me averse to any improvement whatever. When a suitable opportunity offers I shall be happy to show to Admiral Sir George Elliot that he has not been alone in seeking to develop the cellular or raft-deck system, and that it has, in fact, capabilities which possibly he himself may not yet have fully realized.”
The same number of the Times contains a reply to Mr. Reed’s letter of April 8, 1885, by Mr. White, mainly devoted to a refutation of certain charges of no interest to us, but containing the following paragraphs:
“I must refer to the passage in which Sir Edward Reed quotes a description of the damage done to the Huascar in her action with the two Chilian iron-clads.
“This description seems to me one of the best possible illustrations of a remark in my previous letter, that ‘the mitraille which is driven back into a ship when armor is penetrated is probably as destructive as any kind of projectile can be.’ Had the Huascar not had weak armor, but light sides only, the local injuries might have been less. The other case cited of a shell which entered the unarmored stern of the Cochrane shows how little damage may be done when a projectile passes through thin plating. At the bombardment of Alexandria there were many such examples on board our ships, although it must be frankly admitted that the engagement is no sufficient indication of what shell fire may do. A good deal of use has been made of the single case where a shell in bursting blew a hole ten by four feet in the thin side-plating of the Superb. The case was quite exceptional, whether it be compared with the other hits on the same ship or with the injuries done to the unarmored sides of other ships. Moreover, in that case exceptional injury is traceable to special structural arrangements at the embrasure near the battery port, where the shell struck. These cases do not prove that the light unarmored structures in the Admiral class are likely to be destroyed in such a rapid and wholesale manner as has been asserted. Nor, on the other hand, do they indicate conclusively what damage shell-fire may do in future actions. On these points, as I have before remarked, experiment might be made with advantage. But, on the other hand, there is good evidence that armor so thin as to be readily penetrable to many guns may be a serious danger, and that armor over the vital parts of ships should be strong if it is to be a real defence.
“In matters of ship design the constructors of the navy are only the servants of the Board, and while they must take sole responsibility for professional work, the governing features in the designs are determined by higher authorities, among whom are officers of large experience, both as seamen and gunners. And it is certainly not the practice of the constructive department to intrude themselves or their advice into matters for which neither their training nor their experience fits them to give an opinion.
“I make no attempt to be either a sailor or a gunner, but am content to seek information from the best authorities in both branches. As the result of this study of tactics and gunnery, I have been led to the belief that the sea-fights of the future are not likely to be settled altogether or chiefly by the effects of gun-fire. This is not quite the same thing as Sir Edward Reed attributes to me when he says that ‘Mr. White thinks and speaks as if naval warfare henceforth were to be merely a matter of dodging, getting chance shots, and keeping out of an enemy’s way.’
“Nor do I think that the designers of the Italian war-ships will indorse the description of their views and intentions, with which Sir Edward Reed has favored us in his letter and elsewhere. I have the honor of knowing his excellency Signor Brin (now Minister of Marine) and other members of the constructive corps of the Italian navy, and from their statements, including the powerful publications of Signor Brin, ‘La Nostra Marina Militaire,’ I have no hesitation in saying that in spending larger sums on single ships than have ever before been spent, the Italian authorities think, and are not alone in thinking, that they are producing the most powerful fighting-ships afloat.”