THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES.

The Continental navy next in present interest to that of France is the Italian, owing to the fact that the Italian government, although largely abstaining from the use of armor, has applied itself urgently to developments of gun-power and speed in large war-ships. The Duilio and Dandolo (illustrated on [page 105]) were considered in the chapter on the French navy, and their resemblance to the Inflexible type pointed out. They are nearly as large as the Inflexible, although differing greatly in proportions and form from her. They appear to me to be more objectionable, from the want of armored stability, if one may so speak, than even the Ajax and Agamemnon, which are themselves, as we know, more objectionable than the Inflexible. The cause of this is to be found in the fact that in designing the British ships, whatever else they may have lost sight of, the Admiralty constructors saw that the more you contracted the length of the armored citadel, the more necessity there was for giving the ship great breadth. The reason of this can be made clear. The fractional expression which represents the statical stability of a ship has in its numerator the quantity y3x, in which y represents the half-breadth of the ship at the water-line, and x the length of the ship. If we regard the stability of the armored citadel only, and neglect the unarmored ends, x represents the length of that citadel, and y its half-breadth. Now if we take two rectangular citadels, one, say, 100 feet long and 60 feet broad, the other the same length, but only 50 feet broad, then the value of x will be the same for both, but the values of y3 will be 216,000 and 125,000 respectively, the ship 60 feet broad having, cæteris paribus, nearly double the citadel stability of the 50-feet broad ship. On the other hand, if you wish to give the narrower ship the same citadel stability as the broader one, it will be necessary to make her citadel no less than 172 8/10 feet long. Now the citadel of the Duilio is 107 feet in length,[31] and the breadth is 64 feet 9 inches—say 65 feet. The citadel of the Inflexible is 110 feet long, and its breadth 75 feet, the figures for the Ajax being 140 feet and 66 feet. Now presuming the citadels to be rectangular in each case, we shall have,

Inflexible y3x = 618,750 Ajax y3x = 453,024 Duilio y3x = 452,075

From which it would appear that the Duilio of 11,000 tons derives from this element of stability only about as much as the Ajax of 8500 tons derives from it, and only about three-fourths of that which the Inflexible of 11,400 had allowed to her. There are other circumstances, of course, which enter into the stability of these ships, but nothing which I know of or can imagine to enable the Duilio to compare much more favorably in this respect with the other vessels, deficient as they themselves are. All this applies, of course, solely to the ability of these ships to depend upon their armored citadels for safety in war: in peace they are all safe enough as regards stability, because they have their unarmored ends to add largely to it, although I should doubt if the Duilio is greatly over-endowed with stability even with her long unarmored ends intact.


THE “DUILIO.”

I now come to a series of ships in which the question of the amount of their armored stability does not arise, because they have no armored stability at all. For some reason or other Lloyds, in their Universal Register, following bad examples, have arrayed the Italia and her successors under the heading of “Sea-going Armor-clads.” These ships are nothing of the kind, in any reasonable sense of the word, but are, as ships, wholly unarmored, although carrying elevated armored towers, and some armor in other places. Mr. King (in his work previously referred to) puts the facts correctly when he says:

“The armor is only used” (in the form of a curved deck, be it understood) “to keep out shot and shell from the engines and boilers, the magazines, shell-room spaces, and the channels leading therefrom to the upper deck, and to protect the guns in the casemate when not elevated above the battery, and the gunners employed in firing them. But all other parts of the ship above the armored deck” (which is below water, be it said), “all the guns not in the casemate, and all persons out of the casemate, and not below the armored deck, will be exposed to the enemy’s projectiles.”

Mr. King takes note of this total abandonment of side armor as a means of preserving stability when a ship is pierced at the water-line, and regards this abandonment as a bold defiance of the principles which I have laid down for some years past. I cannot say that I take this view of the matter. I have always discussed this matter from the British navy point of view, and had these ships of the Italia type been built for the British navy in substitution of real iron-clads, while France, Russia, and other European countries were still building such iron-clads, I should have certainly condemned them. The primary requirement of British first-class ships is that they shall be able to close with and fight any enemy of the period whatever, and any defect which unfits them for this work, or makes it extremely dangerous to perform it, is a disgrace to England. Even if armor were given up by other powers, it would be a matter for careful consideration in England whether enough of it for the protection of their existence against contemporary guns should not be retained in her principal ships. England’s ability to live as a nation and as the head of an empire is dependent upon her naval superiority, and no price to purchase that can be too great for her to pay. But with Italy the case was and is wholly different. She could not compete with England in naval power, and would not wish to if she could, for she is without an ocean empire to preserve. But Italy has European neighbors, and when she began to build these Italias and Lepantos she had for neighbor one power, France, which had unwisely persisted for years in building wooden armor-clads, neither strongly protected nor swift, nor very powerfully armed; and I am not at all sure that, to such a navy as France then had, a few extremely fast and very powerfully armed ships such as Italy built were not excellent answers. The Italia would have been available also against a very large proportion of the British iron-clad fleet, and of the fleets of Austria, Turkey, and Russia. The idea of the Italian ministers clearly was to give weaker ships no time for long engagements with them, but to pounce upon them by means of enormous speed, and to destroy them at a blow by means of their all-powerful ordnance. They might well expect to have with such ships so great a command over the conditions under which they would give battle as to be well able to repair in time, and at least temporarily, such dangerous wounds as they might receive. But more than this cannot be said for such ships: they are not fit to engage in prolonged contests, or to fight such actions as by their assaults on superior numbers and their endurance of close conflict have won that “old and just renown” of which England is so deservedly proud. It seems to me as obvious as anything can possibly be that such ships as the Italia, if once adopted as models for other great powers, would admit of easy and cheap answers. Ships of equal speed, merely belted with very thick armor, and armed with an abundance of comparatively light shell-guns, would effectually defy them. There would be no need of enormous and costly armaments, or of ponderous armored towers, or of huge revolving turrets, for giving battle to ships which any shells would be able to open up to the inroads of the sea, and which, being opened up, would lose their stability, and insist upon turning bottom upward. But for the purposes of the Italian government, as I conjecture them, the Italia class of ships, large as they are, have probably been excellent investments, and may continue to be, so long as the priceless value of impregnable belts and interior torpedo defence is understood by so very few.

The Italian government, having completed the Italia, is now pressing forward with four other equally large ships (of over 13,000 tons each) of similar type, and with three others of 11,000 tons. Curiously enough, it keeps with these among the “war vessels of the first class” not only the Palestro and Principe Amedeo, of about 6000 tons, launched in 1871-72, but also the Roma, a wooden vessel of 5370 tons, launched twenty years ago, and some four or five iron ships, of 4000 tons and of 12 knots speed, launched more than twenty years ago. I will not occupy time and space by regarding the particulars of these old vessels (having omitted similar ones from my French tables), but will here give the particulars of the modern vessels of the Italian first class, which alone deserve notice:

MODERN ITALIAN WAR-SHIPS OF THE FIRST CLASS.

Name of Ship.Displace-
ment.		Indicated
Horse-power.		Speed.Length.Breadth.Draught
of Water.		Greatest
Thickness
of Armor.		Heaviest Guns carried.
Tons.Knots.Feet.Feet. In.Feet. In.Inches on Sides.
Duilio11,140 7,70011.134064 426 8224 of 101 tons.
Dandolo11,200 7,70011.234064 427 224 ” 101 ”
Inches on Towers.
Italia13,90018,0001840074 27 8194 ” 103 ”
Lepanto13,55018,0001840073 427 8194 ” 103 ”
Re Umberto 13,25019,5001840074 928 7194 ” 106 ”
Sicilia13,25019,5001840074 928 7194 ” 106 ”
Sardegna13,25019,5001840074 928 7194 ” 106 ”
Lauria11,00010,0001632867 27 144 ” 103 ”
Morosini11,00010,0001632867 27 144 ” 103 ”
Doria11,00010,0001632867 27 144 ” 103 ”

The manner in which the towers and guns of the Italia type are arranged is shown in section and in plan, which are taken for convenience from the works of Mr. King and of Lord Brassey, and were prepared, I believe, from official drawings.[32]

SECTION OF THE “ITALIA.”

Among her unarmored vessels, in addition to a large number of old and slow small craft, Italy possesses some fast modern war-ships of the second and lower classes which are deserving of notice. In the first place, she has eight steel vessels ranging from 2500 tons to 3600 tons, which Lloyds describe as “deck-protected cruisers,” with a total absence of any justification, I think, excepting that other people have doubtless done so before.[33]

There certainly are people who for business or other purposes would call anything a “protective deck,” but why these eight vessels should be removed from the category of unarmored ships, and constitute a class by themselves, is more than I can imagine even the slightest reason or justification for. I do not know any modern naval gun which will not penetrate an inch steel plate when presented to it as it is in the curving down decks of these vessels. It appears to me a trifling with serious matters to try and induce naval authorities, officers, and seamen to believe that these vessels, and similar ones wherever they are to be found, have any pretensions to be regarded as “protected.”

DECK PLAN OF THE “ITALIA.”


THE “ITALIA.”

These unarmored vessels are, however, notable for high speed, three of them being of fifteen knots, and the other five of seventeen knots. One of these 17-knot vessels, the Giovanni Bausan, built by Sir William Armstrong & Co., at Newcastle-on-Tyne, so closely resembles the Chilian vessel Esmeralda that the engraving of the latter vessel on this page may be taken to illustrate the general character of both. The breadth (42 feet) is the same in each, and so is the draught of water (18½ feet), but the Bausan is a few feet longer than the other. The armament is almost precisely the same, being two guns of about twenty-five tons, mounted one forward and one aft, and six of four tons. I have chosen the Esmeralda for the illustration of both vessels because (by the favor of Sir William Armstrong & Co.) I am in possession of an instantaneous photograph of her at full speed, from which the engraving has been made. This is very interesting, because it exhibits what few readers are likely to have seen, but what most will be glad to see, viz., the form which is taken by the permanent waves that accompany such a ship when steaming at the full speed of seventeen knots in comparatively still water. The engraving also well represents the position of the bow and stern guns.

THE “ESMERALDA.”

The 15-knot vessels of Italy are named Giojà, Amerigo Vespucci, Savoia, and Colombo, of which the Amerigo Vespucci is illustrated from a drawing by De Martino on [page 115]. Those of seventeen knots, besides the Bausan, are the Etna, Vesuvio, Stromboli, and Fieramosca. All the last-named vessels carry the same armament as the Bausan; the others an armament of 4-ton guns only. The Italian government also possesses (built or building) eight other vessels exceeding or reaching fifteen knots in speed, of which two are built of wood and the remainder of iron or steel. It has likewise of fast torpedo craft a 2000-ton vessel of nineteen knots, which mounts six 6-inch guns and nine 6-pounders; and four others of twenty knots, to carry machine guns, viz., the Tripoli and Goito, of 741 tons, and the Folgore and Saetta, of 317 tons. It is also proposed to build six others, of 741 tons and twenty knots, two of which, the Monzambano and Montebello, have been laid down at Spezzia. They have sixty-two complete first-class torpedo-boats of over one hundred feet in length, and twenty-one second-class, already built, of less than one hundred feet.


THE “AMERIGO VESPUCCI.”

It will be seen from the foregoing statement that the Italian navy is one of much importance, capable of working great destruction upon an enemy’s fleet of ordinary ships, able to cope with no inconsiderable number of modern vessels, and such as would enable the Italian people and government to speak with a voice that would have to be attentively heeded by any possible ally or any probable enemy in the event of European complications arising, or of a European war becoming imminent. This does great credit to successive Italian political administrations.

Of late the German government has been very active in promoting commercial ship-building and ocean enterprise, but it has been very slack in the development of its imperial navy, and for this reason the Russian navy next claims our notice. Russia, with the continent of Europe interposed between its northern and its southern ports, is compelled to divide its naval strength into two, concentrating one part upon the Baltic and the other upon the Black Sea; and both these divisions of its navy are under restrictions which approach pretty nearly to the conditions of blockades. With winter comes the natural blockade of Cronstadt and St. Petersburg on the Baltic, and this sometimes lasts so long that I have myself seen the first merchant-vessel of the year approach Cronstadt on the 29th of May, or within a very few weeks of midsummer. In the South, Sebastopol and Nikolaiev are under the permanent domination of the Bosporus forts and fleets, and of European treaties, which are stronger still. The disasters of the war of 1854 and the political engagements which ensued have also borne heavily upon the naval spirit of Russia, and it says much for the greatness of that country that again, in spite of all these hinderances, it is raising its navy into a position of European importance.

THE “CATHERINE II.”

Considering the Black Sea fleet first, the entire interest excited by its armor-clads centres in the three new 16-knot ships, the Catherine II., Sinope, and Tchesme. These three ships are belted throughout with 18-inch armor, and are armed with six guns of forty tons and seven of four tons, this battery being fought en barbette in towers plated with armor fourteen inches thick. The Universal Register and the French Carnet agree in assigning to the Catherine II. a length of 320 feet and a tonnage of 10,000, and to the other two ships a length of 314 feet and a tonnage of about 8600. They also agree in describing the horse-power of each of the three ships as 9000 indicated, and the speed as 16 knots. The Admiralty Return previously quoted gives them a speed of 15 knots, and equal tonnages of 10,800 tons.[34] I am unable to give the tonnage decisively, but I know that the tonnage originally intended for these ships was 9990, and I am in possession of the details of the corresponding weights. The discrepancies as to steam-power and speed are matters of great moment. I believe that both the Universal Register and the French Carnet are wrong in associating a power of only 9000 horses with a speed of sixteen knots, the fifteen knots given by the Admiralty being the speed expected with 9000 indicated horse-power; but this power is to be obtained with natural draught, while with forced draught the power is to be increased to 11,400, and the speed increased to sixteen knots. The formidable character of these ships needs no comment, although I cannot regard them as nearly equivalent to or as well designed as the somewhat larger Nile and Trafalgar of the British navy. The only other Black Sea armored vessels are the slow and small, but somewhat powerful, circular ships Novgorod and Vice-admiral Popoff, of which the latter is surrounded by 18-inch armor, and carries two guns of forty tons. A torpedo-vessel of the 600 ton class, developing 3500 horse-power, and 20 knots speed has been built at Nikolaiev.

The Baltic fleet of Russia contains only one finished iron-clad of much importance, the Peter the Great, of 9340 tons and 14 knots speed, carrying four guns of 40 tons; but two other ships, the Emperor Alexander II. and the Nicholas I., of 8400 tons, are now under construction at St. Petersburg. No interest attaches to the Pojarsky, the four Admirals, and several other old, weak, and slow armor-clads of the Baltic navy. This fleet comprises, however, eight belted cruisers, of which five are important. These are as follows:

Name of Ship.Displacement.Indicated
Horse-power.		Speed.Armor.Principal
Armament.
Tons.Knots.Guns
Vladimir Monomach5800700015.4 7-inch.4 of 9 tons.
Dmitri Donsköi5800700016.25 7-inch.3 ” 29 ”[35]
Admiral Nachimoff778080001610-inch.8 ” 9 ”
Alexander Nevsky757280001610-inch.8 ” 9 ”
Emperor Nicholas800080001610-inch.2 ” 40 ”

The only fast armored cruisers of the Baltic fleet are the Rynda and Vitias, of 2950 tons, 3500 horse-power, and 15 knots speed; and another, the Admiral Korniloff, now being completed at Nantes, to be much larger and faster. Among torpedo-vessels there is the twin-screw steel Iljin, of 600 tons, which has steamed 20 knots, and carries 19 machine guns; another, of only 140 tons, but to steam 20 knots, has been built at Glasgow; and a third, of like size, but of 17 knots, at St. Petersburg. The torpedo-boats of the Russian navy are given in the Parliamentary Return as below:

Baltic Torpedo-boats.

Completed: 4 over 100 feet in length; 74 over 70 feet in length; 20 under 70 feet in length. Completed and building: 6 over 100 feet in length, of which 4 are over 150 feet long—total, 104.

Black Sea Torpedo-boats.

Completed: 5 over 100 feet in length; 8 over 70 feet in length; 6 under 70 feet in length. Completed and building: 7 over 100 feet in length—total, 26.

Russia has also a volunteer fleet consisting of ten vessels of no great fighting value; a Siberian flotilla comprising nine gun-boats and other small craft; a Caspian flotilla of seven small vessels; and an Aral flotilla of still less moment.

In the German armored navy four citadel vessels figure as having the heaviest (16-inch) armor, but these are of that objectionable Sachsen type to which I previously adverted. In order to let the reader see under what slight pretexts some people are prepared to regard ships as powerful iron-clads, I give engravings which represent the Sachsen in side view and in plan, these illustrations being taken from Captain J. F. von Kronenfels’s “Das Schwimmende Flottenmaterial der Seemächte.” The shaded portion in the middle exhibits the extent of this ship’s armor; the long white ends are left to depend upon walls of cork, etc., which are very poor—nay, almost imaginary—defences against the effects of explosive shells.

In observing the limitation of the armor in this and similar ships one is tempted to ask, Why stop there? Why not shorten the armor, say to twenty or thirty feet of length, and make it a yard thick, and then enter her in the list of iron-clads as a vessel with armor three feet thick? Deck-plating, according to such constructors, is ample for the protection of engines and boilers, and everything else which is below water.

HALF-DECK PLAN OF THE “SACHSEN.”
SIDE ELEVATION OF THE “SACHSEN.”

The remaining three ships of this class are the Baiern, the Baden, and the Würtemberg. The engraving of the Sachsen represents their general appearance. Their dimensions and other particulars will be given presently in table on [page 125], but it will be observed that the armament is arranged in a forward and in a midship battery, giving right-ahead fire with four guns, a stern fire with two, and beam fire with three.

THE “SACHSEN.”

The largest iron-clad of the German navy is the König Wilhelm, of 9750 tons, which steams at 14¾ knots. She is also the most thickly armor-plated (armor, twelve inches); but having been launched eighteen years ago, her guns, although numerous, are only of fourteen tons weight. I designed this ship for his Majesty, the late Sultan of Turkey, Abdul-Aziz, but before she was much advanced in construction she was purchased by the Prussian government, and passed from under my care. A few years later I designed the Kaiser and Deutschland for the Prussian government; and these vessels, built on the Thames, and launched in 1874, although 2000 tons smaller than the Wilhelm, steamed but one-fourth of a knot less (14½ knots). They carry 10-inch armor and 10-ton guns.

HALF-DECK PLAN OF THE “KAISER.”
SIDE ELEVATION OF THE “KAISER.”

These ships are described on [page 125]. The principal ships built in Germany are the Preussen and the Friedrich der Grosse, which, although designed by the German Admiralty constructors, are but reproductions on a less scale, and with some variations, of the British turret-ship Monarch, designed by myself. Lord Brassey (in “The British Navy,” vol. i., page 22) says: “In the mean time Germany had constructed three turret-ships of precisely the same type as the Monarch, but of somewhat smaller dimensions. These were the Preussen, the Friedrich der Grosse, and the Grosser Kurfürst.”[36] His lordship goes on to say (what I do not understand), “Their armor at the water-line is six inches thicker, while at the turrets it is two inches less, than that of the Monarch.” Now, as Lord Brassey elsewhere says (page 326), “the Monarch is protected with 8-inch armor,” and (page 333), writing of the Preussen, “that the armor-plates at the water-line are 9¼ inches thick, below the water 7¼ inches, and above the water 8¼ inches,” it is obvious that there cannot be the difference of six inches which his first-quoted statement alleges. There doubtless was a difference of an inch, or possibly of two inches, in so far as a few of the armor-plates were concerned, but not more, and how far this difference extended is very doubtful, seeing that nowadays if the constructor of a ship thickens but two or three plates on each side of his ship he feels entitled to speak of her as being armored with plates of the maximum thickness, and to mislead mankind accordingly. Nor is this surprising, when we see in a late return to the British Parliament ships like the British Collingwood class, the French Brennus class, and the German Sachsen class gravely included in the lists of “armored vessels.”

The particulars of the German armored fleet, leaving out the Hansa, a weak and weakly armed ship of only 3500 tons and 12 knots speed, and all smaller armored craft, are as follows:

SEA-GOING ARMORED SHIPS OF GERMANY.

Name of Ship.Displacement.Indicated
Horse-power.		Speed.Maximum
Armor.		Principal
Armament.
Tons.Knots.Inches.Guns.
König Wilhelm9750830014¾1218 of 14 tons.
Kaiser7550800014½10 8 ” 18 ”
Deutschland7550800014½10 8 ” 18 ”
Friedrich der Grosse 6600493014 9½ 4 ” 18 ”
Preussen6600438014 9½ 4 ” 18 ”
Baden7280560014 16 6 ” 18 ”
Baiern7280560014 16 6 ” 18 ”
Sachsen7280560014 16 6 ” 18 ”
Würtemberg7280560014 16 6 ” 18 ”
Oldenburg5200390013½12 8 ” 18 ”
Friedrich Karl6000350013½ 516 ” 9 ”
Kronprinz5480480014¼ 516 ” 9 ”

All the above German ships are completed, and have been for a long time, with the exception of the Oldenburg, which was not launched until 1884. The Baden was launched in 1880, the Baiern and Würtemberg in 1878, and all the rest earlier—the Friedrich Karl and Kronprinz nearly twenty years ago. Germany appears to have no iron-clad, large or small, under construction at present. It is unnecessary to set forth in detail her small armored gun-vessels; suffice it to say that she has one iron turret-ship, the Arminius, of 1560 tons, with 7½-inch armor, but only carrying four 9-ton guns, and steaming 10 to 11 knots; and eleven iron vessels of 10 feet draught of water, 1090 tons displacement, 700 horse-power, 9 knots speed, and 8-inch armor, each carrying one 12-inch gun of 37 tons. These were all built at Bremen, and launched between 1876 and 1880, inclusive. They are named after such agreeable creatures as basilisks, crocodiles, salamanders, scorpions, etc., but owing to their small speed would probably prove of less aggressive habits than their names imply. They would nevertheless be very useful in defending the coasts and harbors.

The abstention for the present of the German government from the construction of armored ships must not be taken as implying that it prefers the fast unarmored cruiser as a type of war-ships, for it has no such cruiser built, and is building but three of very high speed, and one of 16 knots.[37] The particulars of these are as follows:

Name of Ship.Displacement.Indicated
Horse-power.		Speed.Armament.
Tons.Knots.Guns.
Elisabeth450080001814 8-inch.
Ariadne480080001814 8-inch.
Charlotte3360....16....
Loreley2000540019 2 4-inch.

The Admiralty Return makes no mention of the last ship, as she is but a despatch-vessel, but she is mentioned and particularized in the Universal Register. It is to be further observed that the first two vessels on this list are each to have a 3-inch deck, for the protection of the engines, boilers, etc., which fact has induced the Admiralty officers to designate them “protected ships,” as they do their own ships of this really unprotected type, and as they have not designated the French cruisers Tage and Cécile.

The German navy comprises a few modern and fast frigates, some of which have been honored with illustrious names, as will be seen from the following list:

GERMAN UNARMORED FRIGATES.

Name of Ship.Displacement.Indicated
Horse-power.		Speed.Principal
Armament.
Tons.Knots.Guns.
Bismarck2850250013½ 16 of 3½ tons.
Moltke2850250013½ 16 ” 3½ ”
Stosch2800250013½ 16 ” 3½ ”
Stein2800250013½ 16 ” 3½ ”
Prinz Adalbert 3860480015 { 2 ” 6 ”
{10 ” 3½ ”
Leipzig3860480015 10 ” 3½ ”
Charlotte3310300015 18 ” 4 ”
Gueisenau2810300015 16 ” 3½ ”

There are also some modern corvettes in this navy which may be classed in point of speed with the above frigates; these are,

GERMAN UNARMORED CORVETTES.

Name of Ship.Displacement.Indicated
Horse-power.		Speed.Principal
Armament.
Tons.Knots.Guns.
Alexandrine 2330240015[38]10 of 4 tons.
Arcona233024001510 ” 4 ”
Carola216021001410 ” 4 ”
Marie21602100 13½10 ” 4 ”
Olga216021001410 ” 4 ”
Sophie216021001410 ” 4 ”
Freya2000250015 8 ” 4 ”

There are about a dozen other smaller and slower gun-vessels and gun-boats in the German navy, but they need not be considered here. As to sea-going torpedo-vessels, the German government took the lead in the production of this type of ship, and had the Ziethen launched at Blackwall as a despatch-vessel ten years ago, for a torpedo armament, and with a speed of 16 knots—an example of naval enterprise worth remembering to the credit of Germany. The Bletz and Pfeil, of 50 per cent. larger tonnage, have since been produced in Germany, but only with a speed about equal to the Ziethen’s. Two torpedo gun-vessels of 855 tons and nearly 2000 horse-power, and 15 knots speed (of which vessels the Admiralty Return makes no mention), were launched at Bremen in 1884. The following is the Admiralty statement as to German torpedo “boats:” Completed, 58 (43 over 100 feet in length). Completing and building, 2 torpedo division boats; 30 torpedo-boats over one hundred feet in length.—Total, 90.

Money was voted in 1884-85 for seventy torpedo-boats. When these have been built, the number of German torpedo-boats will be one hundred and five, and these are to be increased to one hundred and fifty.

Reviewing the condition of the German navy as set forth above, it becomes obvious that for some years past the policy of the imperial German government (contrary to that of the Prussian government, which, before the empire, built several large and powerful sea-going ships) has been to avoid all competition in naval matters with the great naval powers, and to apply its moderate expenditure to vessels of a defensive class, such as armored gun-boats and coast torpedo-boats—a policy which, in view of the limited interests of Germany in the Mediterranean and across the seas, has much to commend it.[39]

The Austrian government also, which with less necessity for naval strength now than it had when it possessed Lombardy and Venice, has slackened greatly in the production of iron-clads of late years, and has but two, and these of very moderate size, under completion. These are the barbette-battery ships Kronprinz Rudolph, of 6900 tons, and the Kronprinzessin Erzherzogin Stefanie, of 5150 tons. The former vessel is to carry 12-inch armor, and to be armed principally with three 48-ton guns; and the latter to carry 9-inch armor, and to be armed with two such guns. There is much uncertainty about even the intended speed of these vessels, neither the French Carnet nor the Universal Register stating the speed, while the Admiralty assigns a speed of 14 knots to the Rudolph only. But while the Carnet gives the indicated horse-power of each as 6500, the Register gives that of the Rudolph as 8000, and that of the smaller vessel as much as 11,000. If these latter figures be correct, the Rudolph will exceed 14 knots and the Ferdinand 16.[40] Austria already possesses two powerful iron-clads in the Custoza and the Tegetthoff, but her Kaiser, Lissa, Ferdinand Max, and Hapsburg are old wooden vessels, lightly armored and armed, and need not be further considered. Besides the iron-clads already named, she has likewise the three iron central-battery and belted ships Don Juan d’Austria, Kaiser Max, and Prinz Eugen, each of 3500 tons, 2700 indicated horse-power, and 13½ knots speed, with 8-inch armor (the thickest) on the belt, and each carrying eight guns of 9 tons. The unarmored vessels of Austria (other than those classed as torpedo craft) are numerous, but most of them are small and slow. Those of thirteen knots and upward are but three in number, the Laudon, Radetzky, frigates of 3380 tons and 14 knots speed, and the wooden gun-vessel Hum, of 890 tons and 13¼ knots speed. Austria is providing herself with several of Sir W. Armstrong & Co.’s light steel vessels of eighteen knots speed for torpedo service, of which she has one, the Panther, completed, and two others, the Leopard and Seehund (all of 1550 tons), under construction. She had also four 14-knot torpedo-vessels, built at Pola and Trieste. Of torpedo “boats” she has the following: Completed, First class, 135 feet in length, 2; second class, over 100 feet in length, 18; third class, from 85 to 90 feet in length, 8. Incompleted, First class, 135 feet in length, 2; second class, over 100 feet in length, 8.—Total, 38.[41]

The navy of Turkey, which was formidable a few years ago, possessing as it did some of the most powerful and efficient iron-clads in the world at that period, both large and small, is rapidly declining in importance in presence of the powerful ships constructed or constructing in England, France, Russia (Black Sea), and Italy. The Turkish navy would not have held its high position so long had it not been for the foresight of the late Sultan Abdul-Aziz, having all his armored ships built of iron. There is not a wood-built iron-clad in the Turkish navy. The largest Turkish armored ship, and one still very powerful, is the frigate Mesoodiyeh, of 9000 tons, built at Blackwall, which in her main features resembles the German König Wilhelm, being, like her, of English design, but instead of having eighteen main-deck guns of fourteen tons, she has twelve of eighteen tons, and her battery is consequently of less length. Her speed is fourteen knots. Next to her comes the Hemidiyeh, launched in 1885 at Constantinople, of similar type to the other vessel, but of only 6700 tons, and therefore carrying but 9-inch armor, and ten guns of fourteen tons, and steaming at a knot less speed. Turkey has no less than thirteen other iron-clads, ranging in tonnage from 2000 to over 6000, in speed from 11 to 14 knots, and in armor from 5½ to 9 inches. The most notable of these, if I may be allowed as its designer to say so,[42] has been the Feth-i-Bulend (“Great Causer of Conquest”), built at the Thames Iron-works in 1869. This little vessel, although of only 2700 tons displacement, carried a 9-inch armor-belt, and a main-deck battery of 6-inch armor protecting four 12-ton guns, placed at the four oblique sides of an octagonal battery, and steamed at fourteen knots—a speed unexampled at that time for an iron-clad of her small tonnage. It is a well-known fact that whenever of late years Turkey has had naval work to do, the Feth-i-Bulend, on account of her speed, handiness, and general efficiency, was selected by the late lamented Hobart Pasha to perform its most active part.

Of unarmored vessels Turkey has few worth mentioning as fighting ships, beyond three composite corvettes now under construction at Constantinople, one of 1960 and one of 1160 tons, both of which are to steam at fourteen knots, their armament consisting of eight and six light guns respectively; and one other of 670 tons which is to steam fifteen knots[43] and to carry five light and four machine guns. A steel torpedo-vessel which is to steam at twenty-one knots, and three torpedo cruisers complete the list of new vessels laid down. Turkey has six torpedo “boats” one hundred feet long, built in France; six more of larger size, one hundred and twenty-five feet long, building in Germany; and five of one hundred feet, building in Turkey and France—in all, seventeen torpedo-boats.

This review of Turkish naval force bears out the remark with which I introduced it, and shows that, either from lack of support from the Western European powers or from some other cause, fighting superiority in the Black Sea is being effectually abandoned by Turkey to Russia.

Captain Lord Charles Beresford, R.N., M.P. (now a sea lord of the Admiralty), who moved for the Admiralty Return to Parliament to which I have made repeated reference, included Greece among the powers whose “fleets” were to be reported on; but as Greece has but two small and weak iron-clads, and they are nearly twenty years old, and as she has no other at present even under construction, the pretensions of her “fleet” are scarcely proportional to her political ambitions. She has but one fast cruiser, the Admiral Miaulis, and she is only a 15-knot vessel, and carries nothing more in the way of guns than three of six tons and one of five tons. Greece’s only “torpedo-vessel” steams no more than fourteen knots, and the Admiralty Return assures Lord Charles Beresford and the world that she has but twenty-seven torpedo-boats, of which seventeen are over and ten under one hundred feet in length, and that she is not building any more. Considering the island interests of Greece and her situation in the Mediterranean, no one can pronounce her naval force as excessive, or regard her government as being tempted to any high heroic policy by her possession of an imposing navy.

I have not mentioned the Spanish or Portuguese “fleets,” nor is it necessary to do much more than mention them now. Spain has only one finished iron-clad, of over thirteen and less than fourteen knots speed, and that is the Vitoria, which was launched at Blackwall, on the Thames, more than twenty years ago. She has thin armor, and could attempt but little in war. Spain is, however, building a large steel turret-ship, the Pelayo, of 9650 tons, at La Seyne, to carry two 38-ton and two 48-ton guns, with 18-inch armor on a citadel and 19½ on her turrets. She is to steam at sixteen knots. This one ship will, I presume, when finished, compose the armored “fleet” of Spain—that country once so great upon the sea. Of unarmored vessels of war Spain is building several, of which three are to have the advantage of stout steel decks, and one is to be very fast. It will be well to assemble these unarmored vessels of fourteen knots and upward in a table:

Table G.—UNARMORED WAR-VESSELS OF SPAIN.

VESSELS OF FOURTEEN KNOTS AND UPWARD, INCLUDING TORPEDO-VESSELS.

Name of Ship.Displacement.Indicated
Horse-power.		Speed.Principal
Armament.
Tons.Knots.Guns.
Reina Regente430011,000 19 4 of 8 inches.
Alfonso XII30004,40014 8 ” 6 tons.
Aragon (wood)33004,40014{4 ” 6 ”
{4 ” 3 ”
Castilla ”33004,40014 8 ” 4 ”
Navarra ”33004,40014{4 ” 6 ”
{4 ” 3 ”
Reina Cristina30004,40014 8 ” 6 ”
Reina Mercedes30004,40014 8 ” 6 ”
Cristabel Colón11001,60014 3 ” 4 ”
Don Antonio Ulioa11001,60014 3 ” 4 ”
Don Juan d’Austria11001,50014 5 ” 4¾ inches.
Infanta Isabel11001,50014 5 ” 4¾ ”
Isabel II11001,60014 5 ” 4¾ ”
Velasco11001,600 14.3 3 ” 4 tons.
Isla de Cuba10002,20015 6 ” 4¾ inches.
Islas Filipinas10002,20015 6 ” 4¾ ”
Destructor (torpedo-catcher) 4004,00024 Machine guns.
Alcon (sea-going torpedo-boat) 1081,20023” ”
Azor ” ” 1081,20023” ”
Orion ” ” 881,00020” ”

Spain has likewise four 125-feet torpedo “boats” of 19 knots; one, 105 feet long, of 18 knots; and three or four smaller ones.[44]

Portugal has but one iron-clad, central-battery type, of 2480 tons, 13½ knots speed, with 9-inch armor, and two 28-ton guns. Of unarmored vessels she has but three exceeding twelve knots, in speed, viz.:

Name of Ship.Displacement.Indicated
Horse-power.		Speed.
Tons.Knots.
Liberal 500 50016
Zaire 500 50016
Alfonso de Albuquerque 1100136013.3

All the rest are very slow, and available for little else than harbor defence in time of war.

This concludes our review of the navies of the Continent. The impressions which it has made upon my own mind are mainly these: The minor naval powers are falling more or less completely out of the lists of naval competition. Spain and Portugal have ceased to be, and Greece has not become, of any naval importance—Spain alone making some small effort to keep respectable, but even that effort is chiefly expending itself—as that of the United States government is about to expend itself, by-the-bye—in the production of very fast vessels, which may be useful in preying upon commerce, but which are scarcely fit to fight even pirates, and which a real war-ship would dispose of with a single round of her battery fire. They will be efficient in running away, no doubt, when danger arises; but “running away” was not the method by which the United States won naval distinction, nor that by which Spain once became great and Greece immortal. The naval policy of Germany is defensive; she is almost without pretensions upon the open sea. Turkey is slowly but surely succumbing to Russia, and in the near future the Russian Black Sea fleet will hold unquestioned mastery over Turkey. Italy has a naval rôle of her own to play in Europe, and on the whole is playing it well. Austria would do well to hesitate in her present naval condition before again exposing herself to the swift and destructive onslaughts which the tremendously armed and excessively fast Italian ships could make upon her. France is a really great naval power, and there are circumstances which would make a naval conflict between her and England one of the most uncertain in the history of the world. The French have very largely abandoned the protection of their guns by armor; we, most unhappily, have still more largely abandoned the protection of our ships, and it remains to be seen which has been the most foolish. In such a conflict the French would have this advantage over England—the overthrow of their guns, or the destruction of their gunners at them, would not prevent their ships themselves from withdrawing from action and repairing their injuries. What would become of our Ajaxes, Agamemnons, our Collingwoods and Benbows (both these latter with guns as much exposed as the French, by-the-bye), when their long, fragile ends had been smashed and water-logged, and their high speed consequently gone, is a question which I prefer not to speak of further. There was, there is, there ever will be, but one sound policy for a nation that desires to command the seas, and can afford to do so, and that is to reject all doubtful fads, all dangerous fancies, and to insure without ceasing pronounced superiority in every known and measurable element of naval power. New inventions will and must be made; new sources of power, new means of attack, will and must be discovered; but these things take time and money and skill to develop, and that power is the greatest and safest which from time to time and always prefers the thing which must succeed to that which may, and which others fear will, fail in the hour of trial. One hope I, the present writer, have, and it is that the terrible development of the weapons of war—for terrible it is with all its shortcomings—and the enormously increasing cost alike of single actions and of conflicts between squadrons and fleets, will tend to further, and to greatly further, those influences which are happily operating in favor of peace and good-will among men.