Modern ships of war

by Sir Edward J. Reed; Edward Simpson

THE UNITED STATES NAVY.

IN TRANSITION.

BY REAR-ADMIRAL EDWARD SIMPSON, U.S.N.

The condition of the navy of the United States is not such as any citizen of the country would desire. Pride in their navy was one of the earliest sentiments that inspired the hearts of the people when the United States took their place as a nation, and the memory of its deeds has not faded during the subsequent years of the country’s aggrandizement. Time was when that section of the country most remote from the sea-coast was indifferent to it, owing to the more immediate demand on its attention for the development of internal resources; but the rapid settlement of our Western lands, and the annihilation of distance produced by rapid communication, have tended to preserve the unity of interests of the separate sections, and the happy system that obtains through which officers are appointed to the navy keeps it an object of personal concern to all the States of the Union.

The present condition of the navy is not such as to satisfy the desire of the people that it should be sustained on a footing commensurate with the position of the nation, and in keeping with its ancient reputation. For many years circumstances have intervened to prevent a judicious rehabilitation of the navy, notwithstanding that its needs have been faithfully presented to Congress year after year. The country has been wonderfully favored with peace at home and abroad, and no urgent call to arms has roused the nation to prepare for war. The rapidity with which a large fleet of cruising ships for blockading purposes was extemporized during our civil war has left a hurtful impression on the public mind that in an emergency a similar effort might prove equally efficacious—disregarding altogether the difference in circumstances of contending with an enemy possessed of a naval force and with one possessed of none. The economists have suggested that as all that relates to ships, guns, and motive forces was being rapidly developed by others, it would be a saving of the people’s money to await results, and to benefit by the experience of others; and, again, party rivalry and contentions have assisted to postpone action.

It has never been the intention that the navy should die from neglect and be obliterated. Yearly appropriations have been faithfully passed for the support of the personnel, and for such repairs as were found to be indispensable for the old ships that have been kept in commission; but it is now seen that this system of temporizing has been the poorest kind of economy. This money has been invested necessarily in perishable material, the amounts have been insufficient to compass new constructions, whether in ships or guns, and the only use that could be made of them was to repair wooden ships and convert cast-iron guns, whereas the work needed was to construct steel ships and to fabricate steel guns.

In referring to the navy of the past, it is impossible to avoid recalling the feeling of pride with which an American seaman—officer or man—walked the deck of his ship. This feeling was common to the naval and commercial marine. Our wooden ships that sailed the ocean from 1840 to 1860 were the finest in the world. The old frigate Congress in 1842 was the noblest specimen of the frigates of the day, and the sloop-of-war Portsmouth was unsurpassed as a corvette. The clipper ships of that period need no eulogy beyond their own record. These ships were the models for the imitation of all maritime nations, and among the constructors of the period can be recalled, without detriment to many others omitted, the names of Lenthall, Steers, Pook, and Delano. The poetry of sailing reached its zenith during this period.

But there is no sentiment in progress; its demands are practical and imperative, and the great motive power, steam, was being crowded to the front even during this the greatest development in the era of sails. Advanced ideas could not be resisted, and steam was admitted as an auxiliary; but our development in naval construction still stood us in good stead, and enabled us to supply ships with auxiliary steam-power, which continued to be prominent for many years as standards to which others found it to their advantage to conform.

Before the final abandonment in the navy of sailing-ships, pure and simple, an effort at a compromise was made by limiting steam to side-wheel vessels, and a number of fine ships were built in the forties which did good service, and were a credit to the country, answering as they did the demands of the time. The Mississippi, Missouri, Susquehanna, Saranac, and Powhatan carried the flag to all parts of the world for many years, some of them enduring to bear their share in the late war, while the Powhatan was borne on the list of vessels of the navy until within a few months.

U. S. SIDE-WHEEL STEAMER “POWHATAN.”

This vessel was built at Norfolk, Virginia, in the year 1850. Her length was 250 feet, beam 45 feet, draught of water 19.6 feet. She had a displacement of 3980 tons, and attained a speed of 10.6 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 1172. The capacity of her coal-bunkers was 630 tons. Her battery consisted of sixteen 9-inch smooth-bore guns. She was built of seasoned live-oak, and though frequently under repairs, retained so much of the strength of her original construction that she escaped the sentence of condemnation until recently.

The Princeton, of great fame, and the San Jacinto, were the only ships with screw-propellers that appeared in the period under consideration, the screw then being considered of such doubtful propriety as to need the test of tentative experiments. These ships have long since disappeared, but the screw remains, and side-wheels are mainly relegated to boats for inland waters.

Confidence being established in the screw-propeller, construction on the principle of auxiliary steam-power was decided on, and ships of different classes were added to the navy in such numbers as the varied duties required.

There were those at that time who, wise beyond their generation, recognized the full meaning of the advent of steam, and saw that it must supplant sails altogether as the motive power for ships. These advocated that new constructions should be given full steam-power, with sails as an auxiliary. But the old pride in the sailing-ship, with her taunt and graceful spars, could not be made to yield at once to the innovation; nor could the old traditions pointing to the necessity of full sail-power be dispelled; so it was considered a sufficient concession to admit steam on any terms, and thus the conservative and temporizing course was adopted of retaining full sail-power, and utilizing steam as an auxiliary.

The United States government was not alone in this policy. It was the course pursued by all other maritime nations, and for some years the United States retained the lead in producing the most perfect types in this new phase of naval construction.

In 1854 Congress passed an act authorizing the construction of the Merrimac class of frigates. The famous ships immediately built under this act were the Merrimac, Wabash, Minnesota, Roanoke, and Colorado. All of these vessels got to sea during 1856 and 1857, and were followed, at an interval of ten years, by the Franklin, which was a larger ship, and an improvement on the original type.

The Franklin was built at Kittery, Maine. Her length is 266 feet, beam 54 feet, draught of water 24 feet. She has a displacement of 5170 tons, and attains a speed of 10 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 2065. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 860 tons. Her frames are of seasoned live-oak, and she is in use as a receiving-ship.

U. S. FRIGATE “FRANKLIN,” OF THE “MERRIMAC” CLASS.

The Merrimac was the first vessel of this type which got to sea. She was sent to European waters, and on her arrival in England, early in 1856, she became at once the object of the closest scrutiny, resulting in the unqualified approval of foreign naval architects. The English Admiralty proceeded to imitate the type, and many keels were soon laid in order to reproduce it. The ships built after this model were the crack ships of the time in the English navy, and carried the flags of the commanders-in-chief of fleets.

In 1858, 1859, and 1860, the Hartford class of large corvettes appeared. These are full-rigged ships. The class comprises the Hartford, Brooklyn, Pensacola, Richmond, and Lancaster.

U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “HARTFORD.”

The Hartford was built at Boston in 1858. Her length is 225 feet, beam 44 feet, draught of water 18.3. She has a displacement of 2900 tons, and attains a speed of 10 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 940. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 241 tons. Her battery consists of one 8-inch muzzle-loading rifle (converted) and 12 9-inch smooth-bores. These ships were built of live-oak, and endure to the present day. They were reproduced by England and France when they made their appearance, and are now, except the Trenton, the only ships in service which can accommodate a commander-in-chief of a squadron. They are kept constantly employed showing the flag abroad, but it is with difficulty that they are retained in suitable repair for service.

U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “BROOKLYN.”

This class of ships has good speed under sail, with the wind free, but their light draught prevents them from being weatherly on a wind. Much of their cruising is done under sail, which tends to lengthen their existence. Under the late act of Congress prohibiting repairs on wooden ships when the expense shall exceed twenty per cent. of the cost of a new vessel, these ships must soon disappear from the navy list. When that time shall arrive, and steel cruisers shall be substituted, the name of the Hartford should be preserved as closely associated with the glory that Farragut shed upon the navy.

In 1859 a new type of sloop-of-war was introduced, of which the Kearsarge will serve as an example. This ship was built at Kittery, Maine; her length is 199 feet, beam 33 feet, draught of water 15.9 feet. She has a displacement of 1550 tons, and attains a speed of 11 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 842. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 165 tons. Her battery consists of two 8-inch muzzle-loading rifles (converted), four 9-inch smooth-bores, and one 60-pounder. This has proved a very handy class of vessel, and for the year in which they were built were considered as having very fair speed under steam, the proportion of space occupied by boilers and engines being more than had been assigned in previous constructions. Several ships of this class were launched and put in commission before the war, and gave a new impetus to construction.

U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “KEARSARGE.”

The types of vessels that were built during the war were selected for special purposes. The effort was made to multiply ships as rapidly as possible to blockade the coast and to enter shoal harbors; the “ninety-day gun-boats” and the “double-enders” were added to the navy list, and merchant-steamers were purchased, and were armed with such batteries as their scantling would bear. All of these vessels have disappeared, with the exception of the Tallapoosa. The Juniata and Ossipee, of the Kearsarge type, but of greater displacement, were launched in 1862, and are still in service; and at about the close of the war several vessels of large displacement and great speed were launched which were never taken into service, have been disposed of since, and form no part of our present navy.

The New Ironsides and the Monitor represented the two features of construction which, produced in that period of emergency, have continued to impress naval architecture.

U. S. IRON-CLAD “NEW IRONSIDES.”

As a sea-going iron-clad the New Ironsides was, for the time and service required, a success. She was built at the yard of Mr. Cramp, in Philadelphia, in 1862. Her length was 230 feet, beam 56 feet, draught of water 15 feet. She had a displacement of 4015 tons, and attained a speed of six knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 700. The capacity of the coal-bunkers was 350 tons. Her battery consisted of twenty 11-inch smooth-bore guns. She was built of wood, and was covered with armor four inches in thickness, which, with the inclination given to her sides, made her impervious to the artillery that was used against her during the war. In one engagement with the batteries on Sullivan’s Island, Charleston Harbor, lasting three hours, she was struck seventy times, but at the end of the action, except some damage to a port shutter or two, she withdrew in as perfect fighting condition as when the fight commenced. This ship does not appear on the navy list, as she was destroyed by fire off the navy-yard at League Island, Pennsylvania.

The Monitor was, without doubt, the most remarkable production of the constructive art that appeared during the war. The original Monitor was lost at sea, but our illustration presents the Passaic class of Monitors, which quickly followed the original of this type.

U. S. MONITOR “PASSAIC.”

The Passaic was built of iron, and was launched in 1862. Her length is 200 feet, beam 46 feet, draught of water 11.6 feet. She has a displacement of 1875 tons, and attains a speed of seven knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 377. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 140 tons. Her battery consists of one 15-inch smooth-bore and one 11-inch smooth-bore. Her sides are protected by five inches of laminated iron, and her turret by eleven inches of the same. This vessel and eleven others of her class constitute the entire armored fleet of the United States. Too much credit cannot be awarded to Captain Ericsson for his brilliant conception of this floating battery, and the navy must be ever grateful to him for preserving it from the dire disaster which was averted by the appearance of the original Monitor at the moment of a great crisis. These vessels bore themselves well through the storms of elements and battle during the war, proving capable of making sea-voyages, and of resisting the effects of the artillery that was in use during the period of their usefulness; but an interval of more than twenty years has produced such a change in artillery as to make the protection afforded by a few laminated plates of one-inch iron but a poor defence against weapons which have robbed this fleet of its once formidable character. Although many of the features of the original design may be retained in new constructions, most of the details will be changed, notably in the turret, in consequence of the greater weight resulting from the increased thickness of armor. The central spindle around which the Ericsson turret revolves must disappear, and the turret must turn on rollers under the base.

The effect produced abroad by the success of Ericsson’s Monitor is so familiar to all that it hardly needs more than a passing allusion here. There is no doubt that the Monitor was the progenitor of all the turreted vessels in the fleets of the world, though the essential principle of the vessel, however, was never viewed with favor. This principle consists in the low freeboard, which, besides reducing the size of the target, is intended to contribute to the steadiness of the hull as a gun-platform by offering no resistance to the waves that are expected to wash freely over the vessel’s deck: the horizontal overhang of the Passaic class is intended to contribute to resisting a rolling motion. The vessel was designed to be as a raft on the water, constantly submerged by the passing waves, hermetically sealed to prevent the admission of water, and artificially ventilated by means of blowers drawing air down through the turret. This was the most startling feature about the construction. The protection afforded to the battery by a circular turret having the form best suited to deflect projectiles, the employment of machinery to point the guns by the rotation of the turret, the protection to motive power, to anchoring apparatus, etc., all presented admirable points of advantage, but the almost perfect immersion of the hull, and the absence of motion due to the great stability, are the essential features in the construction.

U. S. DOUBLE-TURRETED MONITOR “TERROR.”

The double-turreted Monitors, of which the Terror indicates the class, were built with a sponson, and it would have been better for the navy if this had been the only deviation made from the original design of Captain Ericsson. But it was not; the great mistake was made of building this class of Monitors of wood—a style of construction which had been already condemned abroad, in consequence of the impossibility of repairing an armored vessel so constructed, it being necessary to remove the armor for that purpose.

The Miantonomoh, Monadnock, and Terror were completed and put in commission. The Miantonomoh made a cruise to European waters, spreading the fame of Ericsson, and proving the ability of a vessel of this type to navigate the high seas; the Monadnock made the voyage to the Pacific, passing through the Strait of Magellan; and the Terror was for a time on service on our eastern coast; but their lifetime was of short duration, and they are now being rebuilt, or rather new vessels, three of which bear their names, are now under construction of iron, which will serve to make them efficient and durable.

It will hardly be a digression at this point to call attention more particularly to these double-turreted Monitors now under construction. They bear the following names, viz., Puritan, Terror, Amphitrite, Miantonomoh, and Monadnock. There was much contention about the completion of these vessels, and imaginary defects were ventilated in the newspapers. It may be that these attacks and erroneous statements prejudiced the public mind, and that the idea was entertained by some whose opinion is valued that there were grounds for the doubts that had been expressed of their sea-worthiness. The practical effect of these statements was to prevent Congress from appropriating money for the completion of the vessels, and this course on the part of Congress might have confirmed some in their doubts. Several boards of officers, most competent experts, however, reported upon them, recommending their completion; of these that made by the Advisory Board may be regarded as a final decision, for it was accepted without question. The Advisory Board reported as follows:

“It is our opinion that it would be wise and expedient to finish these vessels at once, and for the following reasons, viz.:

“1. The hulls, as they are at present, are of excellent workmanship, fully up to the present standard condition of iron ship construction, whilst the flotation of the Puritan and the behavior of the Miantonomoh at sea confirm the correctness of the calculations of the designs.

“2. It is easily possible to complete the vessels by taking advantage of the recent developments in armor, guns, and machinery, without making any radical changes in the designs, so that their speed, endurance, battery power, protection, and sea-going qualities shall be fully equal to those of any foreign iron-clad of similar dimensions designed previous to 1879.

“3. The vessels may be finished so as to develop all the above-mentioned advantages without making their total cost, when completed, in any way exorbitant, compared with the results obtained; again, the interests of our sea-coast defence require a force at least equal to that which would be represented by these vessels.

“We take the liberty of calling your attention to a certain erroneous impression which now exists with regard to these vessels. In one of the reports of these hulls a doubt was thrown on the correctness of the calculations of the Puritan. This doubt has spread in the public mind until it includes all the ships. The actual flotation of the Puritan and the Miantonomoh proves beyond question not only the reliability of the calculations, but also that the hulls of these vessels are lighter in proportion to the total displacement than those of any iron-clad low freeboard hulls afloat, with two exceptions.

“It has been the unfortunate custom, in arguments as to the value of the results to be obtained, to compare these vessels with such foreign ships as the Inflexible and the Duilio, to the evident disadvantage of the Monitors, no account whatever being taken of the fact that these vessels are double the size of the Monitors. If these hulls be compared with foreign ones of similar dimensions, no such disparity will appear.”

These vessels, with the exception of the Monadnock, have their machinery in place; the Miantonomoh has her side armor on; the others are finished as to their hulls, except the interior fittings, side armor, and turrets. The estimated cost to complete them is about four millions of dollars. When we consider the very slight defence that the country now possesses in the single-turreted Monitors before alluded to, it would seem imperative to complete with all despatch these vessels, which would represent a force of real power.

These vessels are of iron as to the hulls, but they will be armored with steel or compound armor, and will be armed with the most powerful modern artillery that can be accommodated in their turrets. Their names appear in the navy list as “building.” They were launched in 1883.

U. S. FRIGATE “TENNESSEE.”

The double-decked ship Tennessee was the only frigate, or “first-rate,” borne, up to within a few months, on the list of vessels of the navy as available for sea service. She was for many years in commission as the flag-ship of the North Atlantic Station, but this year she reached that condition when the twenty per cent. law consigned her to “ordinary,” from which she has lately been removed under the operation of the hammer of the auctioneer. She was launched in 1865. Her length was 335 feet, beam 45 feet, draught of water 21.8 feet. She had a displacement of 4840 tons, and attained a speed of 11 knots with an indicated horse-power of 1900. The capacity of her coal-bunkers was 381 tons. Her battery consisted of two 8-inch muzzle-loading rifles (converted), sixteen 9-inch smooth-bores, and four 80-pounders.

The vessels next in order of construction are those of the Adams class, small sloops-of-war, which were launched in 1874.

U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “ADAMS.”

These vessels were built of wood. They are convenient and handy, and perform the duty required of a cruiser in time of peace. Engine-power is developed in them to a higher degree than in those preceding them, but in all else they are merely a repetition of earlier constructions. The Adams was launched in 1874. Her length is 185 feet, beam 35 feet, draught of water 14.3 feet. She has a displacement of 1375 tons, and attains a speed of 11.3 knots with an indicated horse-power of 715. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 140 tons. Her battery consists of one 11-inch and four 9-inch smooth-bores, and one 60-pounder.

U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “MARION.”

The Marion class of sloops, launched about the same period, are of an increased displacement and speed, and built of wood. The length of the Marion is 216 feet, beam 37 feet, draught of water 16.6 feet. She has a displacement of 1900 tons, and attains a speed of 12.9 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 966. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 135 tons. Her battery consists of one 8-inch muzzle-loading rifle (converted), six 9-inch smooth-bores, and one 60-pounder.

U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “ALERT” (IRON).

The Alert is one of three vessels that were built of iron in 1874, the exceptional and spasmodic indication of an effort to change the material for construction, much induced by pressure from the iron interests of the country. This effort was made in a very mild and tentative manner, and was limited to this small class of diminutive vessels. The length of the Alert is 175 feet, beam 32 feet, draught of water 12.9 feet. She has a displacement of 1020 tons, and attains a speed of ten knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 655. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 133 tons. Her battery consists of one 11-inch and four 9-inch smooth-bores, and one 60-pounder.

U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “TRENTON.”

The shock attending the first step towards a change in the material for construction was so great as to cause a suspension of the effort, and in 1876 was launched the Trenton, built of wood, which represents the latest of that type on the list of the navy. The length of this ship is 253 feet, beam 48 feet, draught of water 20.6 feet. She has a displacement of 3900 tons, and attains a speed of 12.8 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 2813. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 350 tons. Her battery consists of ten 8-inch muzzle-loading rifles (converted).

The above is a fair presentation of our old navy. Of such vessels we have, larger and smaller, twenty-five which are fit for service as cruisers, exclusive of the old single-turreted Monitors. These cruisers are built of wood, have low speed, and are armed with smooth-bore guns, with a sprinkling of rifled cannon, converted on the Palliser system from smooth-bore cast-iron guns. Of what service is this force, this relic of a past age?

The duties of a navy, apart from the consideration of war, are manifold. As stated by the first Advisory Board, it is required for “surveying, deep-sea sounding, the advancement and protection of American commerce, exploration, the protection of American life and property endangered by wars between foreign countries, and service in support of American policy in matters where foreign governments are concerned.”

With such a poor force it must be evident that it was impossible to discharge in an efficient manner all the duties of a navy. Our work in foreign surveys is limited to that of one small vessel on the west coast of North America; our deep-sea soundings are few and far between, dotted along the tracks pursued by our ships while going to and returning from distant stations; our commerce is protected; but we are unable to support any positive policy that the government might decide to declare in reference to, for example, the Monroe doctrine. To say nothing of European naval armaments, it is only necessary to point to some of the smaller powers in our own hemisphere that possess ships-of-war with which we have nothing fit to cope.

Our people cannot desire to assume a position in the society of naval powers without supporting the position with dignity; they cannot wish their navy to be cited as a standard of inefficiency; they cannot wish to force their representatives (the officers of the navy) into a position of humiliation and mortification such as is imposed by being called on to deprecate criticism by labored explanations. Better abolish the navy and lower our pretensions.

But the fact seems to be that the rapidity of naval development has not been properly appreciated, and it is after a long interval of indifference that, attention being at last centred on the subject, it is seen how rapid its strides have been, and how utterly we are distanced in the race. There is evidently now in the country a growing desire to repair the effects of the past oversight, and we see Congress has moved in the matter. As all political parties now unite in the necessity of effort in this direction, the hope is inspired that the subject is to be separated from those of a partisan character, and that the rehabilitation of the navy will be put on its proper level, and accepted as a national question in which all are alike interested.

Possessed as we are now of a navy such as has been indicated, the change that was instituted involved a most violent transition. In reviewing our work of construction for over thirty years we saw no new type of cruiser. The only types of ships that we produced were those that date before the war; since which we but reproduced the same in classes of differing dimensions. From the sailing-ship with auxiliary steam-power we passed to the steamer with auxiliary sail-power; but we had no full-powered steamers, with or without sails. As long as it was considered necessary to spread as much canvas as was used, the space assigned to boilers and engines was limited, and we failed to achieve full power; and a reduction to the minimum of sail-power had to be accepted before we could present a type of a full-powered steamer.

With the exception of two vessels of the Alert class built of iron, we had nothing but wooden hulls. We had continued to build in perishable material, requiring large sums to be spent in repairs, and ignoring the manufactures of the country which could have been aided in their development by the contrary course. We permitted the age of steel to reach its zenith without indicating that we were aware of its presence.

In these ships, with the exception of a few converted rifles of 8-inch calibre, our armaments consist of smooth-bore cast-iron guns which have composed our batteries for thirty years. These are now to be discarded, and their places to be filled with modern steel cannons.

Torpedoes, movable torpedoes, of which we know nothing practically, are to be brought to the front, and are to form part of our equipment. Torpedo-boats are to be brought into use, and details innumerable are now to be studied and worked out.

Conceive, then, a high-powered steamer with a minimum of canvas, built of steel, armed with modern steel artillery, and a secondary battery of Hotchkiss guns, fitted for launching movable torpedoes, with protective deck over boilers and engines, divided into many water-tight compartments giving protection to buoyancy, and compare such a ship with the old type of the United States cruiser, and an idea may be formed of the violence of the transition through which we had to pass. And there was nothing intermediate to break the suddenness of this change; there was no connecting link. The structure of to-day was placed in direct contrast with that of twenty-five years ago. This is the position in which we stood, and we could only accept a situation from which there was no escape.

From all appearances the navy is now to be given an opportunity of asserting itself, and the steps already taken to remedy the existing state of things can be stated in a few words.

The origin of the effort dates from June, 1881, when the first Advisory Board was appointed to consider and to report on the need of appropriate vessels for the navy. This Board, in its report of November 7, 1881, decided that the United States navy should consist of seventy unarmored cruisers of steel; it reported that there were thirty-two vessels in the navy fit for service as cruisers, and it indicated the character of the new vessels to be built. This Board confined itself to the consideration of unarmored vessels, as it did not consider that the orders under which it acted required that it should discuss the subject of armored ships, though it expressed the opinion that such vessels were indispensable in time of war.

Some time elapsed before any practical results followed from the action of this Board, but in an act of Congress approved March 3, 1883, the construction of three steam-cruisers and a despatch-boat was authorized. These vessels, the Chicago, Boston, Atlanta, and Dolphin, are, with the exception of the Chicago, now in commission.

In an act of Congress approved March, 1885, five additional vessels were authorized, and these, the Charleston, Baltimore, Newark, and gun-boats No. 1 and 2, are under construction.[49]

Up to the time of the inception of these cruisers no steel for ship-plates had been rolled in the United States. Construction in American iron plates had been extensively carried on, but if steel plating was required it had to be imported at great cost to the builder. Those who contemplated bidding on the proposals issued by the government for the first four vessels had to consider this matter. Mr. John Roach, of New York and of Chester, Pennsylvania, undertook the manufacture of this material, and finding that success attended his experiment, he was able to direct extensively the steel-works at Thurlow, Pennsylvania, to this line of business, and when the bids were opened it was found that this new industry, introduced through his enterprise, enabled him to underbid all competitors. After receiving the contracts for the ships, Mr. Roach contracted with the Phœnix Iron Company, of Phœnixville, with Messrs. Park Brothers, of Pittsburgh, and the Norway Iron and Steel Works, of South Boston, for supplies of similar material: thus the first step in this effort to rehabilitate the navy resulted in introducing a new industry into the country. The still more extensive development of industries that will attend the work of rehabilitation as it advances will be treated further on.

Before presenting the types of cruisers which are now to be introduced into the navy, it may be well to refer to an error that exists, or has existed, in the popular mind as to the signification of a steel cruiser. To many who are uninformed in technical language the word steel, in connection with a vessel of war, implies protecting armor, and such misapprehension would convey the idea that a cruiser of steel is able to contend with an armored vessel. This is a mistake; there is protection obtained by constructing a vessel of steel, but not such as is provided by armor. The destructive effect of shell-firing and the development in modern artillery have made armor necessary for all vessels which can carry it, and has also made it necessary to provide all other protection possible to vessels that cannot carry armor. Although this protection cannot be given absolutely to the hull of such ships and to the personnel, it is provided to the buoyancy by the introduction of water-tight compartments and protective decks, which limit the destructive effect of the fire of the enemy and localize the water that may enter through shot-holes. With a wooden hull it would not be possible to combine this precaution because of the difficulty in making joints water-tight between wood and metal, and in consequence of the weight that would be added to a wooden hull, which is already from sixteen per cent. to twenty per cent. heavier than if constructed of steel. The only defensive advantage possessed by a steel unarmored cruiser over a wooden one is derived from this system of construction.

U. S. FRIGATE “CHICAGO” (STEEL).

The Chicago is a steam-frigate, built throughout of steel of domestic manufacture, the outside plating being ⁹/₁₆ inch thick. Her length is 325 feet, beam 48.2 feet, draught of water 19 feet. She has a displacement of 4500 tons, and will attain a minimum speed of 14 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 5000. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 940 tons, and she carries a battery of four 8-inch steel breech-loading guns in half-turrets, and eight 6-inch and two 5-inch steel breech-loaders on the gun-deck. This ship has nine athwartships bulkheads, dividing the hull into ten main water-tight compartments, and the machinery and boilers are covered by a protective deck one and a half inches in thickness. When the bunkers are full of coal she has a coal protection nine feet thick from the water-line to eight feet above it.

DECK PLANS OF THE U. S. FRIGATE “CHICAGO,” SHOWING BATTERY.

The deck plans show the arrangement of the main battery, in addition to which she carries a powerful secondary battery of Hotchkiss rapid-firing single-shot, and revolving cannons and Gatling guns.

The bow of the vessel is strengthened for using the ram with which she is fitted. The rudder and steering-gear are under water. She has two screws—a subdivision of power which is given to all ships-of-war of over 3000 tons displacement—from which a great advantage is derived if one engine is broken down, as three-fourths of the speed can be maintained with the other. The advantage of this in a naval action is obvious.

U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “ATLANTA” (STEEL).

The Atlanta, of which the Boston is a counterpart, presents another type of a steel unarmored cruiser. She is a steam-corvette, or sloop-of-war, a single-decked ship. Her length is 276 feet, beam 42 feet, draught of water 16 feet 10 inches. She has a displacement of 3000 tons, and has attained a speed of 15.5 knots per hour with a maximum horse-power of 3482. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 580 tons, and her battery consists of two 8-inch steel breech-loading guns and six 6-inch, besides a secondary battery of Hotchkiss and Gatling guns.

DECK PLAN OF THE U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “ATLANTA,” SHOWING BATTERY.

In vessels of this class it is usual to have an open-deck battery, with a poop-deck and top-gallant forecastle at the extremities, but the effort has been made in this type to increase the effectiveness of the battery by giving the guns a more extended lateral train than is possible when a ship is arranged with a forecastle and poop-deck. These, with the accommodations which they provide, have been removed from the ends of the ship, and a superstructure has been erected amidships. This arrangement gives a clear sweep forward and aft for the powerful 8-inch guns, enabling the forward gun to cover an all-around fire of from 40° abaft the beam on the port side to 30° abaft the beam on the starboard side, the after 8-inch gun having a corresponding lateral sweep aft. Within the superstructure are mounted the six 6-inch guns, two on each side on the broadside, with a train of 60° before and abaft the beam, the other two being mounted at diagonally opposite corners in such a way as to admit of their use either on the broadside or for fire ahead or astern. This object is achieved by mounting the two 8-inch guns en échelon, the forward gun being on the port side of the centre line of the ship, and the after 8-inch gun on the starboard side of the same line. This is shown on the deck plan.[50]

It does not require the discrimination of a professional eye to see the increased power given to the battery by this arrangement. It is an innovation that was very startling to the conservative mind; but the more familiar the idea becomes, the more favorable opinion grows to the change, and the more apparent becomes the increased offensive power of the ship. The extremities of this type of ship will not, of course, be so dry in heavy weather as if it had a forecastle and poop, but it must be remembered that every part of the spar-deck is from nine to ten feet above the water. The rig of the Atlanta is that of a brig, but without head-booms; the fire ahead of the forward guns is thus unobstructed, and the ram with which she is fitted is always clear for use. The division of the hull into water-tight compartments by athwartship bulkheads, and a protective deck over engines and boilers, form a part of the construction.

U. S. DESPATCH-BOAT “DOLPHIN.”

The Dolphin, though not regarded as a vessel for fighting purposes, is the type of a class that is needed in all navies for duty as a despatch-boat, or for the temporary accommodation of a commander-in-chief of a squadron who may desire to communicate rapidly with his ships at distant points. She is well fitted for the service, and is now in commission, demonstrating her ability to perform the work required of her. She could also be of service as a commerce destroyer, for which service she is equipped with one gun of long range. Her length is 240 feet, beam 32 feet, draught of water 14.25 feet. She has a displacement of 1485 tons, and attains a speed of 15 knots per hour.

Her advent into the navy marks an epoch—the inauguration of the successful manufacture in the United States of American rolled steel ship-plating, equal to the best in the world, as shown by the most rigid government tests. The Dolphin, is the first vessel, whether for naval or commercial purposes, that is built entirely of steel of domestic manufacture, and is the pioneer representative of other similar industries which will be developed as the rehabilitation of the navy proceeds. She has proved herself eminently successful, and is the fastest sea-steamer of her displacement built in the United States, with perhaps the exception of the steam-yacht Atalanta. She is a stanch vessel of great structural strength, and does credit to the ship-building profession of the country.

Of the additional cruisers authorized by the late acts of Congress, particulars will be found in the Notes.

In one of the larger vessels the type of the Atlanta will be reproduced on a larger scale, while the other vessel of the same class will be provided with a poop and top-gallant forecastle, and will carry her forward and after guns on sponsons, by which means fire ahead and astern will be secured. This will make it necessary to limit the power of the battery of the second vessel to 6-inch guns, as the 8-inch gun cannot conveniently be carried on sponsons in a vessel of 4000 tons displacement.

The heavy gun-boat will carry six 6-inch guns, the forward and after ones on sponsons; and the light gun-boat will carry four of the same guns.

In the construction of these additional vessels advantage has been taken of all our experience in our initial effort, and of whatever developments may have been made by others since the earlier vessels were designed.

The absolute departure from the old standards is apparent in material, in armament, in speed, and in rig.

The causes that have led to this change in material may be found, first, in the change that has taken place in ordnance. The introduction of the rifled cannon, and its subsequent development, have increased very much the weight of this part of the equipment of a vessel-of-war, and the necessity of accommodating the stowage of charges of powder much increased in size, and of ammunition for the secondary batteries, which must be most liberally supplied, makes an absolute demand on an increased portion of space. Again, the increased speed now considered indispensable makes a similar demand for space, and carries with it as well an increased proportion of the total displacement. In a wooden hull it would be impossible to reconcile these demands, in consequence of the weight of the hull itself.

The hull and hull fittings of an unarmored cruiser built of wood will weigh from 49 per cent. to 52 per cent. of the total displacement. With high-powered engines it is doubtful if sufficient strength can be obtained with even 52 per cent. of the displacement for the hull, and this must suppose the absence of all protection to buoyancy, as water-tight compartments.

The hull and fittings of a steel cruiser, exclusive of protective decks, will weigh from 39 per cent. to 44 per cent. of the total displacement.

Suppose a 4500-ton ship built of wood weighing 50 per cent. of the total displacement, and the same ship built of steel weighing 40 per cent. of the total displacement, the respective weights of the hulls will be 2250 tons and 1800 tons, a difference of 450 tons, the steel hull being one-fifth, or 20 per cent., lighter than the wooden one. This will allow for increased weight of ordnance, protective deck, or increased coal endurance, as may be decided when considering the service on which the ship is to be employed.

But notwithstanding the saving thus obtained, the question of weights is still full of difficulties and embarrassments, and it is found impossible in the same structure to accommodate all demands from the different departments concerned in the equipment of a vessel-of-war. The sail-power has been reduced, so as to save weight of spars and sails, which have become of secondary importance, but this will not satisfy all the requirements of the problem. As articles appertaining to the old method of equipment are removed, those belonging to what are considered necessary under the new order of things are brought forward. Space is still to be found for movable torpedoes, for torpedo-boats, and for engines and appurtenances for electrical apparatus for lighting the ship, for search-light, and other ordnance purposes. It is evident that much study is needed to reduce weights in all the essential parts, so as to be able to accommodate all the devices which the progress of ideas continues to present. Much is yet to be done by the substitution of steel for iron in many parts of our engines, and experiments abroad lead to the hope that the weights of boilers may be much reduced, but as the question stands to-day it is impossible to provide any single ship with all the appliances that are considered necessary for a perfectly equipped vessel-of-war. Every ship, therefore, must present a compromise.

Another reason for the transition from wood to steel hulls is the durability of steel as compared with wood. Referring to the large sums of money that have been appropriated under the head of construction and repairs, for which there is now so little to show (and disregarding the question of administration, which of course is vital, but which has no place in this chapter), the main reason for the deficiency in the results is that all this money has been expended in perishable material. Every ship that has been built of wood since the war has been a mistake. The most serious error was committed when the wooden double-turreted Monitors of the Miantonomoh class were built, which, it is believed, was done against the protest of Captain Ericsson. The result was the early decay of these vessels, and the present defenceless condition of our sea-coast. The lifetime of a wooden ship is of short duration. It requires constant repairs, which amount in the long-run to rebuilding, and it is in this manner that so many of our old ships are still retained in service; but in the case of a wooden armored vessel these repairs are impossible without removing the armor. This was the condition of affairs with regard to these Monitors, and the consequence is that the country has to incur the expense of entirely new constructions. These are in durable material, and will give good account of themselves when called on.

The steel hulls that it is now the intention shall compose the fleet, will, if well cared for, endure in perfect condition for thirty years. In fact, the lifetime of an iron or steel hull is not defined to any limit, and if a perfect anti-corrosive and anti-fouling composition can be produced, the limit may be regarded as indefinite.

The foregoing remarks on our new navy apply to unarmored cruisers, a class of ships which supply a want in time of peace, but cannot fulfil the purposes of war. At such a time the armored ship is recognized as indispensable, and there is every reason why the construction of armored vessels should proceed simultaneously with that of the unarmored cruisers. These are a more intricate problem for study, need much more time to build, and are required, while at peace, as a school of instruction in which to prepare for war. Our selection of armor has been much assisted by the investigations of others, and we are in a favorable condition to make a decision on this point; and the type of vessel best suited for a cruiser seems to be settled, by the uniform practice of foreign nations, in favor of the barbette.[51]

It must be remembered, however, that six months since we were not in a condition to proceed with the construction of armored vessels, depending on our own resources. We had to go abroad to purchase armor, or set ourselves to the task of establishing works where it could be manufactured. The establishment of these plants was the first thing needful, and until this was done it was impossible to make ourselves independent in this matter. The construction of our first unarmored cruisers introduced into the country the industry of rolling steel ship-plates; the construction of our new ordnance and armored ships has, in turn, introduced the new industries of casting and forging large masses of war material.

This subject, so far as it relates to ordnance, was referred to a mixed board of army and navy officers, known as the Gun Foundery Board; this, with the aid and counsel of some of the ablest and leading steel manufacturers in the United States, submitted to Congress a report which presented a solution of the problem, and demonstrated on what terms the steel manufacturers of the country could be induced to work in accord with the government. The Board had under consideration only the subject of founderies and factories for gun construction, but the casting and forging facilities required for guns could be applicable to armor; thus in providing means for the manufacture of one, the other purpose was equally subserved.

With material of domestic manufacture at hand, it will be the duty of the government to provide the navy with a fleet of ten armored cruisers of the most approved type. These vessels would form the outer line of defence of the coast during war, and should be of such force as to be able to contend with any second-class armored vessel of other nations. Some of them should be always in commission during times of peace, if only for instruction and practice purposes, and one should be assigned to each squadron abroad to carry the flag of the rear-admiral in command, to assert our position in the society of naval powers, able to give substantial “support to American policy in matters where foreign governments are concerned.”

The ability to contend with armored vessels of the first class must be reserved for another type of ships, which are styled “coast-defence vessels,” and without which our new navy will not be thoroughly equipped for contributing its full share to defence at home. In considering armored vessels, what was said before as to the character of compromise that obtains in vessels-of-war must be borne in mind. All desirable features cannot be concentrated in any one ship; the special duty for which the vessel is to be used controls the selection. The sea-going armored cruiser is expected to keep the sea for a lengthened period: she must have large coal endurance. She may be called on to sustain more than one engagement: her supply of ammunition must be large. Her speed must equal that of the fastest sea-going vessels of similar type to enable her to pursue an equal or to avoid a superior force: hence much space and displacement must be assigned to engines and boilers. Thus the amount of her armor and the weight of her battery are affected by these other demands, which are the more imperative.

In the case of coast-defence vessels the conditions are changed, enabling in them the full development of both offensive and defensive properties. These vessels are assigned to duty on the coast: they must be as fit to keep the sea as are the armored cruisers, and they must be able to fight their guns in all weathers that the armored cruiser can fight; but as they do not require the coal endurance nor the speed of the ship that is to keep the sea for lengthened periods, the weight saved in coal and machinery can be utilized in battery and armor. Such vessels constitute the main line of naval defence, as they can be made almost absolutely invulnerable and irresistible.

Under an act of a late Congress a board on “fortifications and other defences” was occupied in considering the defences of the coast, and there were recommended by this Board two classes of “ floating batteries” (so called), coast-defence vessels, and one class of low freeboard vessels for harbor defence. An examination of the designs of these vessels shows that they are replete with merit, and present some novel and valuable features. A justifiable limitation is put on the coal endurance and speed, though fair speed is secured; and altogether the plans prove there can be designed vessels of comparatively small dimensions, light draught, great handiness and manœuvring power, which can carry the heaviest guns, and be capable of contending on equal terms with the heaviest European battle-ships. The cut below represents the smaller of the type of coast-defence vessels.

LIGHT DRAUGHT COAST-DEFENCE VESSEL, WITH DECK PLAN.

The largest class will be armed with two 107-ton guns in a turret, and two 26-ton guns in a barbette. The thickness of armor will vary from 16 to 18 inches.

The second class will be armed with two 75-ton guns in a turret, and two 26-ton guns in a barbette. The thickness of armor will be from 11 to 16 inches.

The smallest vessels, for harbor defence, modified Monitors, will be armed with two 44-ton guns in a turret, and two 26-ton guns in a barbette. The thickness of armor will be from 10 to 13 inches.

A fleet composed of such vessels as are represented in the largest type would be able to engage an enemy at some distance from the coast—an important object in these days when the range of heavy rifled cannons makes it possible to shell towns from a great distance, and at points remote from shore batteries.

Nominally we have now a fleet of vessels for coast defence, the old war Monitors of the Passaic class; but the contrast between them and the vessels recommended by the Fortifications Board is about equal in degree with that between our wooden fleet and the new steel cruisers.

It is intended that a movable automatic torpedo shall be utilized by all armored vessels, either by means of a torpedo-boat to be carried by armored cruisers, or by the vessel itself in the case of coast and harbor defence ships.

The torpedo that has mainly succeeded thus far in recommending itself to the naval powers is that invented by Mr. Whitehead. Numerous efforts have been made by others in this field, but the difficulties that surround it are made very apparent by the paucity of the results. It will be understood that the torpedo, when launched, is left entirely to automatic control; hence, apart from the motive power, it is necessary that it shall possess directive power, vertically to control immersion and horizontally to control direction in the horizontal plane. In the Whitehead torpedo the immersion is well regulated, and if no deflecting influences are encountered, the direction is also preserved; but it fails where deflecting influences intervene. During the Turko-Russian war valuable experience was gained, and instances are known where the torpedo failed to operate from want of directive power. An instance is cited where a torpedo was deflected by striking the chain of a vessel at anchor, causing it to pass harmlessly to one side. Another instance is cited where the torpedo was deflected from the side of a ship owing to the angle at which it struck. It is evident that perfection cannot be associated with a weapon of this class that has not a strong directive force inherent in it.

The torpedo invented by Captain J. A. Howell, of the United States navy, possesses this property to an eminent degree, and it is regarded by most competent experts as the successful rival of the Whitehead. In the Howell torpedo the power is stored in a fly-wheel revolving with great rapidity in a longitudinal vertical plane, and its gyroscopic tendency makes it impossible for the torpedo to deviate from its original course in a horizontal plane; the principle is the same as insures the accuracy of the rifle-bullet, enabling it to resist deflecting influences. The latest experiments of Captain Howell in controlling the immersion of his torpedo were very successful, and it is probable that the auto-mobile torpedo for our new navy will be an American invention. Liberality in experiments is indispensable in perfecting a device of this kind; it is to be hoped that such may be extended to the Howell torpedo.[52]

THE HOWELL TORPEDO.
B, fly-wheel. C, C, screw propellers. D, diving rudder. E, E, steering rudders.
F, water-chamber containing automatic apparatus.
G, firing pin. H, position of gun-cotton magazine.

The general reader is probably not aware of the effect on naval warfare produced by the introduction of the auto-mobile torpedo, affecting the constituents of the fleet itself. Formerly a fleet consisted of battle-ships alone, or with store-ships to provide consumable articles; to these were later added despatch-boats for the service indicated by their title; but since the introduction of the torpedo an additional fleet of torpedo-boats is considered necessary for the protection of the battle-ships. All armored ships are expected to carry at least one torpedo-boat, which is designed for operating against the enemy during an action at sea, and the universal adoption of this practice has led to the introduction into fleets of a new type of vessel called torpedo-boat catchers, whose primary duty it is to destroy the torpedo-boats of the enemy. For this purpose these vessels have phenomenal speed, and besides their equipment of auto-mobile torpedoes, are provided with powerful batteries of single-shot and revolving Hotchkiss guns, capable of penetrating all parts of a torpedo-boat. This type of vessel is now being tested by the English and the Continental governments, and forms one of the constituents of their fleets.

The torpedo-boat is undoubtedly one of the features that should be introduced into our new navy, not only for their possible use on the high seas, but for the purpose of supplementing the harbor-defence vessels, while the type of vessel known as the torpedo-boat catcher would be a powerful auxiliary to the armored cruisers on the first line, or the more powerful vessels forming the second line of the coast defence.