FOOTNOTES:
[79] We can discover none from Colonel Baynes on the subject.
[80] This dispatch was published in a Gazette Extraordinary, in London, on the 6th of October. See page [240].
[81] Captain Glegg was made a brevet-major for the capture of Detroit. Sir George Prevost's aide-de-camp, Captain Coore, was also made a brevet-major for taking the dispatches to England.
[82] Created a baronet on the 30th November, 1818.
[83] This letter is apparently written with the left hand, as if the writer had lost his right.
[84] Henry Frederick Brock, Esq., jurat of the Royal Court of Guernsey; and Lieutenant Henry Brock, R.N. In his letter, (see page [194],) Sir Thomas Saumarez, speaking of the latter, says: "He was a most promising young officer, and, had the poor fellow lived, my brother James would probably have made him a commander this summer."
[85] His nephew, John E. Tupper, Esq., aged twenty, perished at sea in January, 1812, in the Mediterranean, the vessel in which he was a passenger from Catalonia to Gibraltar having never been heard of after sailing. He was educated at Harrow at the same time as Lord Byron, Sir Robert Peel, &c.
CHAPTER XIII.
After issuing a proclamation to the inhabitants of the Michigan territory, by which their private property was secured and their laws and religion confirmed, and leaving as large a force under Colonel Proctor as could be spared at Detroit, Major-General Brock hastened to return to the Niagara frontier; and while on his voyage across Lake Erie, in the schooner Chippewa, he was met on the 23d of August by the provincial schooner Lady Prevost, of 14 guns, the commander of which, after saluting the general with seventeen guns, came on board and gave him the first intelligence of the armistice which Sir George Prevost had unfortunately concluded with the American general, Dearborn. Major-General Brock could not conceal his deep regret and mortification at the intelligence, which he feared would prevent his contemplated attack on Sackett's Harbour. Sir George Prevost, early in August, on hearing of the repeal of the British orders in council, which were the principal among the alleged causes of the war, had proposed a suspension of hostilities until the sentiments of the American government were received on the subject; and to this suspension General Dearborn readily agreed, with the exception of the forces under General Hull, who, he said, acted under the immediate orders of the secretary at war. But, by the terms of the truce, General Hull had the option of availing himself of its provisions if he thought fit, and that he would gladly have done so there can be no doubt. Happily, however, owing to the rapidity of Major-General Brock's movements, the news of the armistice did not reach the belligerent commanders in time to prevent the surrender of the one, or to snatch well-earned laurels from the brow of the other.[86] This armistice was attended with very prejudicial consequences, as it not only marred the attempt on Sackett's Harbour, but it rendered unavailing the command of the lakes, which was then held by the British.[87]
The successful commander, in transmitting by Captain Glegg his dispatches to the governor-general at Montreal, expressed, through his aide-de-camp, his intention of proceeding immediately to Kingston, and from thence to the attack of the naval arsenal at Sackett's Harbour, on Lake Ontario. Had its destruction been accomplished—and no one can doubt that this was the proper period to attempt it, as the enemy, dispirited by the capture of Detroit, would probably have offered but a feeble resistance—the Americans could not, without much additional difficulty and future risk of destruction, have built and equipped the fleet which subsequently gave them the naval ascendancy on that lake, and enabled them twice in 1813 to capture the capital of Upper Canada. The armistice, however, caused a delay of nearly a fortnight in the necessary preparations, as Major-General Brock returned from Detroit to Fort George on the 24th of August, and the cessation of the truce was not known to him until his arrival at Kingston, on the 4th of September. The distance by water between Fort George and Kingston is about 160 miles, and from Kingston to Sackett's Harbour only 35 miles; so that the destruction of the arsenal might have been effected early in September, had not the armistice prevented the attempt. But, unhappily for the interests of his country and the credit of his own fame, Sir George Prevost disapproved of the proposition, and commanded Major-General Brock to relinquish all idea of the contemplated enterprize, although the official intelligence of the president's refusal to continue the suspension of hostilities reached him at Montreal on the 30th of August, a day or two before Captain Glegg, with the dispatches and trophies of the capture of Detroit. At the commencement of the war, a defensive attitude was perhaps excusable, especially as the British cabinet seems to have been anxious to accommodate the differences between the two countries; but after the American government had refused to continue the armistice, it appears to us that Sir George Prevost was pursuing a suicidal course, as to wait for the enemy till he shall have prepared his forces and passed your frontiers, to plunder your towns and occupy your country, is a very recent expedient recognized by no government, and practised by no people of ancient or modern times. But notwithstanding the delay caused by the armistice, the proposed attack could still have been carried into effect after its cessation; and it was only relinquished by express orders from the commander-in-chief. We seek not to impugn his motives, as they probably originated in a mistaken sense of duty, and evidently from an impression that to attack the Americans again on their own frontier would be to render the contest more popular among them. It was under this impression that, in a general order[88] issued at Montreal on the 31st of August, the commander-in-chief was weak enough to offer an indirect apology to the American people for the invasion of their territory at Detroit. Whether this continued defensive policy was such as, under all the circumstances, ought to have been observed, we leave it to others to determine; but certainly the result did not justify its expediency, and the tree is usually judged of by its fruit. Forbearance in war, where success is probable, strikes us as a positive evil that a very doubtful good may ensue—it is seldom properly appreciated; and the governor-general appears to have seen his error when too late, as in the following year he was himself ignobly foiled in an attack on Sackett's Harbour. We cannot understand why the attack under Sir George Prevost, in May, 1813, was more politic than it would have been in September the year preceding, under Major-General Brock; and although Captain Glegg met with a very chilling reception from the former officer, yet we would willingly acquit him of any jealous feeling where such important interests were at stake. At the same time it is due to the memory of this unfortunate officer to add, that his civil administration was as able as his military one in Canada was inglorious; and that although his conduct as a soldier was on more than one occasion the subject of much and just animadversion in England, yet he acquired the warm attachment of the French Canadians, who speak highly of him to this day. Those leading men who, during the administration of Sir James Craig, had been considered almost as enemies, were treated with confidence by his successor, who gradually appointed them to situations of trust, and by this wise measure secured their aid and influence in the defence of the province. Certain it is, on the other hand, that Major-General Brock did not approve of the defensive warfare to which he was restricted, and subsequent events too truly proved that had he been permitted to pursue that course which his zeal and foresight dictated, his valuable life might have been spared, and a very different series of incidents in that war claimed the attention of the historian. The high-minded soldier could not brook a state of inaction with such promising prospects before him. His best feelings revolted at being compelled to languish within the strict pale of military obedience, when so rich a field for doing good service presented itself; and in place of becoming the assailant, he was soon doomed, by awaiting the attacks of his opponents, to sacrifice not only life, but, what is far dearer, the opening prospects of honorable ambition.
On the 16th December, 1812, the inhabitants of the Niagara district addressed a spirited letter to Sir George Prevost, from which we copy the following extract, as confirming what we have already stated on the same subject: "Nevertheless, such was the popularity of the general, such the confidence he had inspired, that he was enabled to carry with him to Detroit, though under great privations, a large body of volunteers, which, in addition to the small regular force at Amherstburg, enabled him to capture an entire army of our invaders, with the fortress from which they had made their descent into Canada—a success unparalleled in the annals of war. Here, for the first time, we got a supply of good arms. The success of this first enterprize, in which the militia were engaged, acted like an electric shock throughout the country: it awed the disaffected, of whom there were many; it confirmed the timid and the wavering; and it induced the Six Nation Indians, who had until that time kept aloof, to take an active part in our favor. At that moment such was the energy and confidence that had been excited by our illustrious chief and the success of his plans, that had he been permitted, he could, and would, have destroyed and laid waste the whole American frontier, from Sandusky to St. Regis. Your excellency doubtless recollects the armistice which immediately preceded the capture of Detroit, which gave the enemy an opportunity to recover from their consternation, to fortify and strengthen their lines, to accumulate in security the means of annoying us at pleasure along our whole frontier, and which sent at least 800 of our Indian allies in disgust to their own homes."
Colonel Baynes to Major-General Brock.
MONTREAL, August 13, 1812.[89]
I wrote to you from Albany on the 8th instant, but as my letter was submitted to the inspection of General Dearborn, I of course confined myself to the sole subject of the armistice entered into with that officer.... A clause, admitting reinforcements to pass with stores, was readily agreed to on my part. General Dearborn told me that a considerable reinforcement with stores was on its way to Niagara, and that he could not delay or alter its destination. I informed him that we were also forwarding reinforcements and stores, and that it would be advisable to agree that all movements of that nature on either side should be suffered to proceed unmolestedly by troops under instructions to preserve defensive measures. I am apprehensive that General Dearborn may not explicitly explain all these points; and I have therefore cautioned all the officers, to whom I have communicated them, to act with the utmost caution, and to be prepared for all events that may arise. I feel extremely prepossessed in favor of General Dearborn, whose manners appear to evince great candour and sincerity: he assured me that no event of his life would afford him so much satisfaction and happiness as resigning his command in consequence of our honorable adjustment of differences. He told me that General Hull was placed under his orders merely for form sake, but that he acted by particular instructions from the war department, and would not consider himself bound to obey any order that was not in conformity to them.
[Colonel Baynes describes at length the incipient state of military preparation for the invasion of Lower Canada, which he witnessed on his journey; and after mentioning that the Americans had sent the most efficient of their forces to the Niagara frontier, he adds:]
Under all these circumstances, which I have represented to Sir George, I have strongly urged his sending you further reinforcements, which I am sure can be spared: we are at present checked from the want of conveyance, but I trust after the corps, now on their route, are dispatched, that Sir George will be induced to send you further aid, and that of the best description. I think it of the highest importance, particularly if we are likely to arrange matters with the States, that the balance of military events should be unequivocally in our favor. I found a very general prejudice prevailing with Jonathan, of his own resources and means of invading these provinces, and of our weakness and inability to resist, both exaggerated in a most absurd and extravagant degree—a little practical correction of this error would be attended with the best effects.
The 1st battalion of the royals are upwards of 1,100 strong, but sickly, having suffered from their long residence in the West Indies, and they are in consequence marked for the Quebec garrison.
Major-General Brock to Colonel Proctor.
FORT GEORGE, August 25, 1812.
I wrote to you yesterday, informing you that a cessation of hostilities had been agreed upon between Sir George Prevost and General Dearborn, and requesting you in consequence to postpone any attempt upon Fort Wayne, or any other post of the enemy. I consider the present forbearance may lead to such consequences that I cannot refrain from sending a second express, to urge you to restrain the Indians likewise in their predatory excursions: this, however, ought to be done with the utmost caution, and on grounds foreign from the present considerations.
Colonel Myers tells me that he forwarded on the 11th instant a dispatch received from Sir George Prevost to me, in which his excellency so clearly stated the principles of moderation upon which he thought it expedient to act, that I fully expect, should you have received the dispatch and perused his sentiments, you will forbear from any hostile aggression; in fact, act completely upon the defensive.
Should every thing remain quiet in the vicinity of Detroit, you will proceed hither, bringing to Fort Erie the detachments which Captain Chambers and Lieutenant Bullock took to Amherstburg. All the spare ordnance is to be transported to Fort Erie without delay.
I should also think that Lieutenant Troughton and a few of his men could be spared for some time from the duties at Amherstburg; in that case, you will have the goodness to order them to accompany you.
Major-General Brock arrived at Kingston on the 4th of September, and left it on the 6th for Fort George. During this hasty visit he reviewed the militia, and expressed his satisfaction at its evolutions and appearance. He also received a flattering address from the magistrates, officers of militia, and other inhabitants; and in reply he told them with much tact, that it was the confidence inspired by the admirable conduct of the York and Lincoln regiments of militia which had induced him to undertake the expedition which terminated in the capture of Detroit, and that from the report of the officers of the garrison at Kingston, he relied with the same confidence on the bravery and the discipline of the militia of that district. In the same manner, in an address a few days before from the inhabitants of York, he said: "Gentlemen,—I cannot but feel highly gratified by this expression of your esteem for myself; but, in justice to the brave men at whose head I marched against the enemy, I must beg leave to direct your attention to them, as the proper objects of your gratitude. It was a confidence, founded on their loyalty, zeal, and valour, that determined me to adopt the plan of operations which led to so fortunate a termination. Allow me to congratulate you, gentlemen, at having sent out from among yourselves a large portion of that gallant band; and that at such a period a spirit had manifested itself, on which you may confidently repose your hopes of future security. It will be a most pleasing duty for me to report to our sovereign a conduct so truly meritorious."
Major-General Brock, to Sir George Prevost.
KINGSTON, September 4, 1812.
Upon my arrival here an hour ago, Captain Fulton delivered me your excellency's dispatch, dated the 31st ultimo, enclosing a letter from General Dearborn, in which the president's disapproval of the armistice is announced. I am in consequence induced to return without loss of time to Fort George. Captain Fulton having expressed a wish to accompany me, I have the more readily consented, as he will be able to give you full information of our actual state. The enemy was very busy upon Fort Niagara, and appeared inclined to erect additional batteries. I may perhaps think it proper to stop their career.
I enclose several documents lately received from Colonel Proctor, at Detroit. That officer appears to have conducted himself with much judgment. I likewise transmit a memorial which I have received from some merchants in the Niagara district, but of course I cannot judge of its merits.
I shall be obliged to your excellency to direct the remittance of the £5,000, for which I sent a requisition some time ago, on account of the civil expenditure of this province, either in government paper or specie, as you may deem most convenient. I doubt not the former meeting a ready currency.
The very flattering manner in which your excellency is pleased to view my services, and your kindness in having represented them to his majesty's ministers in such favorable light, are gratifying to my feelings, and call for my grateful acknowledgments.
Major-General Brock to Sir George Prevost.
FORT GEORGE, September 9, 1812.
I have been honored with your excellency's dispatch, dated the 24th ultimo, and have to thank you for ordering a company of the Glengary regiment to strengthen Colonel Lethbridge at Prescott, whose force you have been led to believe was weakened in consequence of my interference, but which, I beg leave to state, was done without my knowledge, and contrary to my intention.
The enclosed copies of letters will inform you of the state of affairs to the westward. It appears evident the enemy meditates a second attempt on Amherstburg. The greater part of the troops, which are advancing, marched from Kentucky with an intention of joining General Hull. How they are to subsist, even for a short period, in that already exhausted country, is no easy matter to conceive. This difficulty will probably decide them on some bold measure, in the hope of shortening the campaign. If successfully resisted, their fate is inevitable.
The Indians, it appears by the accompanying documents, were adverse to retreating without first making a trial of their strength. Taking, however, every circumstance into consideration, I am inclined to think that Captain Muir acted judiciously. Should the Indians continue to afford a willing co-operation, I entertain not the smallest doubt of the result that awaits this second attempt to turn my right; but your excellency will easily perceive that doubts and jealousies have already seized their minds. The officers of the Indian department will, I trust, be able to remove all such impressions. Although, from the daily observations of what is passing on the opposite shore, a single man can ill be spared from this line, I have notwithstanding determined to send the two flank companies of the royal Newfoundland regiment to Amherstburg. Fresh troops are daily arriving, supposed to belong to the Pennsylvania quota of 2,000 men, known to be intended for this frontier. After the whole arrive, an attack, I imagine, cannot be long delayed. The wretched state of their quotas, and the raggedness of the troops, will not allow them to brave the rain and cold, which during the last week have been so severely felt.
Between 200 and 300 Indians have joined and augmented the force on the other side. Their brethren here feel certain that they will not act with any spirit against us—so I imagine, if we continue to shew a bold front; but in the event of a disaster, the love of plunder will prevail, and they will then act in a manner to be the most dreaded by the inhabitants of this country.
I beg leave to recommend to your excellency's indulgent consideration, Colonel Proctor's application for an increase of pay as commanding a district, which I request may commence from the 16th August last.
Colonel Baynes to Major-General Brock.
MONTREAL, September 10, 1812.
Sir George writes to you so fully upon the several subjects to which your letters refer, that I have little left to communicate to you. Major Heathcote leaves this to-day, with all the small description of ordnance stores intended for Amherstburg, but we have detained the 12-pounders and shot; as you have helped yourself so amply at Detroit, it is imagined you do not now want them. I enclose a letter from Captain Roberts, who was, I suppose, induced to address himself direct to head quarters, by an opportunity of doing so offering itself at the moment. The North-West gentlemen are very urgent in recommending a reinforcement in that quarter; but Sir George has told them that their representation must be addressed to you, who will act as you deem proper.
Your friend, Mr. Isaac Todd, is arrived, and looking much better for his trip; he was suffered to pass by Albany and the lake. He tells me that Mr. M'Donell is confirmed attorney-general, and that the governor's salary is increased, £1,000 a year. I sincerely trust that it will soon be your own. Sir George has in his official dispatches, after paying that tribute of praise so justly your due, stated as his confirmed opinion, that the salvation of the Upper Province has in a very great measure arisen from the civil and military authority being combined in able hands. The prisoners, with their general, arrived here on Sunday night; as they had not halted since they left Kingston, and were in a very dirty state, we kept them here on Monday, and they yesterday proceeded to William Henry, on their way to Quebec; the officers are to be on parole in Charlesbourg, and the men confined on board two transports in the river. Sir George has permitted most of the officers, who have families with them, to return on their parole; four of them are proposed to be exchanged for the officers of the Royal Scots, taken by the Essex frigate. Sir George has also consented to allow General Hull to return upon his parole: he is loud in his complaints against the government at Washington, and the general thinks that his voice, in the general cry, may be attended with beneficial effects, and has allowed him to return and enter the lists. General Hull appears to possess less feeling and sense of shame than any man in his situation could be supposed to do. He seems to be perfectly satisfied with himself, is lavish of censure upon his government, but appears to think that the most scrupulous cannot attach the slightest blame to his own immediate conduct at Detroit. The grounds upon which he rests his defence are not, I fancy, well founded, for he told us that he had not gunpowder at Detroit for the service of one day. Sir George has since shown him the return of the large supply found in the fort; it did not create a blush, but he made no reply. He professes great surprise and admiration at the zeal and military preparation that he has everywhere witnessed; that it was entirely unlooked for, and that he has no doubt that his friend, General Dearborn, will share his fate, if he has the imprudence to follow his example. Hull seems cunning and unprincipled: how much reliance is to be placed on his professions, time will shew.
General Dearborn has certainly left Albany for Skeensborough, at the head of the lake, where great preparations have been making in collecting boats and sending the regulars from Greenbush to the stations in our vicinity. Major Cotton, with about 300 men, half of the king's regiment, is stationed at Isle aux Noix,[90] and two gun-boats have been carried into that river, as the enemy's preparations seem to indicate that quarter as their point of attack. Colonel Murray commands at St. John's, and will give them a warm reception. I do not feel a doubt of Jonathan's complete discomfiture and disgrace if he make the attempt: we could, I fancy, bring as many men as he will be able to persuade into the field, and of very superior stuff, for our militia have really improved beyond all expectation in discipline, and with it in spirit and confidence. This town would turn out 2,000 volunteer militia, a great proportion of whom are clothed and very tolerably drilled. We have destroyed all the roads of communication in our front, leaving open the water route only, and these woody positions will be shortly occupied by the Indians of this neighbourhood and a corps of volunteer voyageur Canadians. The enemy's preparations, however, may be a feint to cover some plans in agitation against your province.
I send you a long letter from Kempt for your perusal, with a sketch of Badajos, though no longer recent news. I am sure the interest you take in the success of our arms, and in his share in particular, will induce you to read it with pleasure.
Sir George Prevost to Major-General Brock.
MONTREAL, September 14, 1812.
Captain Fulton arrived on the 11th instant with your letter of the 7th; the intelligence you have communicated by it convinces me of the necessity of the evacuation of Fort Detroit, unless the operations of the enemy on the Niagara frontier bear a character less indicative of determined hostile measures against your line in their front than they did when you last reported to me. You will therefore be pleased, subject to the discretion I have given you under the circumstances to which I have alluded, to take immediate steps for evacuating that post, together with the territory of Michigan; by this measure you will be enabled to withdraw a greater number of the troops from Amherstburg, instead of taking them from Colonel Vincent, whose regular force ought not on any account to be diminished.
I have already afforded you reinforcements to the full extent of my ability; you must not, therefore, expect a further supply of men from hence until I shall receive from England a considerable increase to the present regular force in this province: the posture of affairs, particularly on this frontier, requires every soldier who is in the country.
In my last dispatch from Lord Bathurst, dated the 4th of July, he tells me, "that his majesty's government trusts I will be enabled to suspend with perfect safety all extraordinary preparations for defence which I may have been induced to make in consequence of the precarious state of the relations between this country and the United States; and that as every specific requisition for warlike stores and accoutrements which had been received from me had been complied with, with the exception of the clothing of the corps proposed to be raised from the Glengary emigrants, he had not thought it necessary to direct the preparation of any further supplies." This will afford you a strong proof of the infatuation of his majesty's ministers upon the subject of American affairs, and shew how entirely I have been left to my own resources in the event which has taken place.
Judging from what you have already effected in Upper Canada, I do not doubt but that, with your present means of defence, you will be able to maintain your position at Fort George, and that the enemy will be again foiled in any further attempts they may make to invade the province.
I leave to your discretion to decide on the necessity of sending a reinforcement to Michilimakinack.
Major-General Brock to Colonel Proctor.
FORT GEORGE, September 17, 1812.
I have had before me your several communications to the 11th instant, addressed to myself and to Major-General Sheaffe. I approve of your having detached a party to aid in the reduction of Fort Wayne, not only because its destruction will render your position more secure, but also from the probable result of saving the garrison from sharing the fate of that of Chicago; but it must be explicitly understood, that you are not to resort to offensive warfare for purposes of conquest. Your operations are to be confined to measures of defence and security. With this view, if you should have credible information of the assembling of bodies of troops to march against you, it may become necessary to destroy the fort at Sandusky, and the road which runs through it from Cleveland to the foot of the rapids: the road from the river Raisin to Detroit is perhaps in too bad a state to offer any aid to the approach of an enemy, except in the winter; and if a winter campaign should be contemplated against you, it is probable that magazines would be formed in Cleveland and its vicinity, of all which you will of course inform yourself. In carrying on our operations in your quarter, it is of primary importance that the confidence and good-will of the Indians should be preserved, and that whatsoever can tend to produce a contrary effect should be most carefully avoided. I therefore most strongly urge and enjoin your acting on those principles on every occasion that may offer, inculcating them in all those under your influence, and enforcing them by your example, whether in your conduct towards the Indians or what may regard them, or in your language when speaking to, or of, them. I am aware that they commit irregularities at times, which will make this a difficult task; but you must endeavour to perform it—attending at the same time to the means already suggested to you for preventing, as much as possible, a repetition of disorderly conduct.
Colonel E—— is a respectable, gentlemanly man, but he by no means possesses the influence over the Indians which Captain M'K—— does. I recommend to you to promote, as far as in you lies, a good understanding with and between them, and to observe a conciliating deportment and language towards the latter, that his great influence may be secured and employed in its fullest extent for the benefit of your district, and for the general good. In conversation with him, you may take an opportunity of intimating, that I have not been unmindful of the interests of the Indians in my communications to ministers; and I wish you to learn (as if casually the subject of conversation) what stipulations they would propose for themselves, or be willing to accede to, in case either of failure or of success.
I understand that salvage has been demanded from individuals on several accounts; for property recovered or restored, for patents, &c. &c. I lament that such a course has been adopted, for it was my intention, and it is now my wish, that our conduct in those matters should be governed by the broadest principles of liberality. You will, therefore, be pleased to have returned to the several individuals the amount which each may have paid as salvage on any account.
With respect to calling out the militia, I am particularly desirous that it should not be resorted to but in case of urgent necessity, and then only in such numbers as shall be actually required. It appears to me that the cavalry employed exceed the number that may be indispensably necessary: if, without risk or detriment to the public service, any of either of those corps can be spared, let them be dismissed.
I wish the engineer to proceed immediately in strengthening Fort Amherstburg, his plan for which I shall be glad to see as soon as possible.
Of the ordnance stores of every description, you will reserve such proportions as may be absolutely required for the public service in your district, and cause the remainder to be embarked and sent down to Fort Erie with the least possible delay.
I cannot at present make the change in the distribution of the 41st regiment which you propose, but, whenever circumstances may permit, I shall be happy to accede to your wishes.
Major-General S.V. Rensselaer to Major-General Brock.
Head Quarters, Lewiston, Sept. 17, 1812.
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday evening; an extract of a letter addressed to you on the 15th instant by Captain Dyson, of the United States regiment of artillery; also a packet addressed to the Honorable Albert Gallatin, secretary of the treasury of the United States.
Colonel Van Rensselaer will have the honor to deliver this communication, and I have entrusted him to solicit your permission for an interview with Captain Dyson, for the purpose of ascertaining, particularly, the condition of the prisoners of war under his charge, to the end that they may be relieved from Fort Niagara, if practicable; and if not, that I may, without delay, state their condition to the government, that they may receive from the proper department the earliest possible supplies.
The women and children, and such other persons as have accompanied the detachment from Detroit, and ought to be here received, I will immediately receive at Fort Niagara, or such other convenient place as you may order them to be landed at.
In a communication which I some time since had the honor of receiving from Lieut.-Colonel Myers, he assured me that it had been the constant study of the general officer commanding on this line to discountenance, by all means in his power, the warfare of sentinels; yet the frequent recurrence of this warfare within a few days past, would warrant the presumption that a different course has been adopted. I wish to be assured of this fact.
Major-General Brock to Major-General S.V. Rensselaer.
Head Quarters, Fort George, Sept. 17, 1812.
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date. Captain Dyson has obtained my permission to cross on his parole to the United States; he has, however, requested to remain till to-morrow, to settle with the men of his detachment. He shall in the mean time have an interview with Colonel Van Rensselaer.
Measures will be immediately taken to land the women and children at Fort Niagara.
It has been with the utmost regret that I have perceived within these few days a very heavy firing from both sides of the river. I am, however, given to understand, that on all occasions it commenced on yours; and from the circumstance of the flag of truce, which I did myself the honor to send over yesterday, having been repeatedly fired upon, while in the act of crossing the river, I am inclined to give full credit to the correctness of the information. Without, however, recurring to the past, you may rest assured on my repeating my most positive orders against the continuance of a practice, which can only be injurious to individuals, without promoting the object which both our nations may have in view.
We cannot find the dispatch from Sir George Prevost of the 7th of September, to which the next letter is an answer, but it could not have been of a very pleasing character, and certainly Major-General Brock's implicit obedience to such instructions is most creditable to him.
Major-General Brock to Sir George Prevost.
FORT GEORGE, September 18, 1812.
I have been honored with your excellency's dispatch, dated the 7th instant. I have implicitly followed your excellency's instructions, and abstained, under great temptation and provocation, from every act of hostility. The information received from a deserter, and which I had the honor to detail in my last, is far from correct, and, where credit is to be given, the facts apply solely to the regular force. The militia, being selected from the most violent democrats, are generally inclined to invade this province—provisions are in tolerable plenty—the only complaint arises from a want of vegetables. It is currently reported that the enemy's force is to be increased to 7,000, and that on their arrival an attack is immediately to be made. I am convinced the militia would not keep together in their present situation without such a prospect, nor do I think the attempt can be long deferred. Sickness prevails in some degree along the line, but principally at Black Rock.
The flank companies of the royal Newfoundland have joined me. A sergeant and twenty-five rank and file of the Veterans arrived at the same time, whom I propose sending to Michilimakinack.
The enclosed letter from Colonel Proctor will inform your excellency of a force having been detached, under Captain Muir, for the reduction of Fort Wayne.[91] I gave orders for it previous to my leaving Amherstburg, which must have induced Colonel Proctor to proceed, upon receiving intelligence of the recommencement of hostilities, without waiting for further directions. I regret exceedingly that this service should be undertaken contrary to your excellency's wishes; but I beg leave to assure you, that the principal object in sending a British force to Fort Wayne is with the hope of preserving the lives of the garrison. By the last accounts, the place was invested by a numerous body of Indians, with very little prospect of being relieved. The prisoners of war, who know perfectly the situation of the garrison, rejoiced at the measure, and give us full credit for our intentions.
The Indians were likewise looking to us for assistance: they heard of the armistice with every mark of jealousy, and, had we refused joining them in the expedition, it is impossible to calculate the consequences. I have already been asked to pledge my word that England would enter into no negociation in which their interests were not included, and, could they be brought to imagine that we should desert them, the consequences must be fatal.
I shall be obliged to your excellency to direct £5,000 to be transmitted to the receiver-general, for the civil expenditure of this province. Army bills, I make no doubt, will answer every purpose.
This dispatch is entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Nichol, quartermaster-general of this militia, whom I take the liberty to introduce to your excellency, as perfectly qualified, from his local knowledge and late return, to afford every information of the state of affairs in the western district. He is instructed to make extensive purchases of necessaries for the use of the militia, and I have to entreat your excellency to indulge him with the means of a speedy conveyance back to this place.
Major-General Brock to his brother Savery.
FORT GEORGE, September 18, 1812.
You doubtless feel much anxiety on my account. I am really placed in a most awkward predicament. If I get through my present difficulties with tolerable success, I cannot but obtain praise. But I have already surmounted difficulties of infinitely greater magnitude than any within my view. Were the Americans of one mind, the opposition I could make would be unavailing; but I am not without hope that their divisions may be the saving of this province. A river of about 500 yards broad divides the troops. My instructions oblige me to adopt defensive measures, and I have evinced greater forbearance than was ever practised on any former occasion. It is thought that, without the aid of the sword, the American people may be brought to a due sense of their own interests. I firmly believe I could at this moment sweep every thing before me between Fort Niagara and Buffalo—but my success would be transient.
I have now officers in whom I can confide: when the war commenced, I was really obliged to seek assistance among the militia. The 41st is an uncommonly fine regiment, but wretchedly officered. Six companies of the 49th are with me here, and the remaining four at Kingston, under Vincent. Although the regiment has been ten years in this country, drinking rum without bounds, it is still respectable, and apparently ardent for an opportunity to acquire distinction: it has five captains in England, and two on the staff in this country, which leaves it bare of experienced officers. The U.S. regiments of the line desert over to us frequently, as the men are tired of the service: opportunities seldom offer, otherwise I have reason to think the greater part would follow the example. The militia, being chiefly composed of enraged democrats, are more ardent and anxious to engage, but they have neither subordination nor discipline. They die very fast. You will hear of some decisive action in the course of a fortnight, or in all probability we shall return to a state of tranquillity. I say decisive, because if I should be beaten, the province is inevitably gone; and should I be victorious, I do not imagine the gentry from the other side will be anxious to return to the charge.
It is certainly something singular that we should be upwards of two months in a state of warfare, and that along this widely extended frontier not a single death, either natural or by the sword, should have occurred among the troops under my command, and we have not been altogether idle, nor has a single desertion taken place.
I am quite anxious for this state of warfare to end, as I wish much to join Lord Wellington, and to see you all.
Has poor Betsey recovered the loss of my young and dear friend, John Tupper?
Sir George Prevost to Major-General Brock.
MONTREAL, September 25, 1812.
It no longer appears, by your letter of the 13th, that you consider the enemy's operations on the Niagara frontier indicative of active operations. If the government of America inclines to defensive measures, I can only ascribe the determination to two causes: the first is, the expectation of such overtures from us as will lead to a suspension of hostilities, preparatory to negociations for peace; the other arises from having ascertained, by experience, our ability in the Canadas to resist the attack of a tumultuary force.
In consequence of your having weakened the line of communication between Cornwall and Kingston, a predatory warfare is carrying on there very prejudicial to the intercourse from hence with Upper Canada. I have ordered a company of the Glengary to Prescott to strengthen Colonel Lethbridge, and, under present circumstances, you are not to expect further aid.
I agree in opinion with you, that so wretched is the organization and discipline of the American army, that at this moment much might be effected against them; but as the government at home could derive no substantial advantage from any disgrace we might inflict on them, whilst the more important concerns of the country are committed in Europe, I again request you will steadily pursue that policy which shall appear to you best calculated to promote the dwindling away of such a force by its own inefficient means.
I shall receive with much satisfaction Colonel Proctor's report of having saved the garrison of Fort Wayne from the inhuman fury of the Indians. I am particularly anxious that class of beings should be restrained and controlled as much as possible, whilst there exists a pretence of implicating the national character in their cruelties.
The following letter not only explains the impolicy of obeying Sir George Prevost's provisional orders for the evacuation of Detroit and the Michigan territory, but also ably deprecates any abandonment of our Indian allies. With such leaders as its author and Tecumseh, what might not have been done in this war to obtain the security and regeneration of this much injured people? But alas! these "kindred spirits" lived not long enough to plead their cause, and in the negociations for peace their interests were shamefully overlooked or cruelly forgotten;[92] although, in the first American war, the Indians had also, with few exceptions, taken part with Great Britain against the colonists in their contest for independence. It is true that their mode of warfare is abhorrent to Europeans, as differing from the more honorable slaughter of civilized enemies; but Sir Isaac Brock proved that they were to be restrained, and Tecumseh was as humane as he was brave. Moreover, we should not condemn their previous excesses without remembering the many injuries they had received. They knew from sad experience that they could place no faith in the whites, who had long considered them as legal prey, and too often treated them as the brute animals of the forest. Expelled from the coasts, and dispossessed of their hunting grounds, they had been gradually driven westward, until they had too much cause to apprehend that the cupidity of their invaders would be satisfied only with their utter extermination. "The red men are melting," to borrow the expressive metaphor of a celebrated Miami chief of the last century, "like snow before the sun." Indeed, it is melancholy to reflect, that the aborigines of both continents of America have, from their first intercourse with Europeans or their descendants, experienced nothing but fraud, spoliation, cruelty, and ingratitude.
Major-General Brock to Sir George Prevost.
YORK, September 28, 1812.
I have been honored with your excellency's dispatch, dated the 14th instant.[93] I shall suspend, under the latitude left by your excellency to my discretion, the evacuation of Fort Detroit. Such a measure would most probably be followed by the total extinction of the population on that side of the river, or the Indians, aware of our weakness and inability to carry on active warfare, would only think of entering into terms with the enemy. The Indians, since the Miami affair, in 1793, have been extremely suspicious of our conduct; but the violent wrongs committed by the Americans on their territory, have rendered it an act of policy with them to disguise their sentiments. Could they be persuaded that a peace between the belligerents would take place, without admitting their claim to an extensive tract of country, fraudulently usurped from them, and opposing a frontier to the present unbounded views of the Americans, I am satisfied in my own mind that they would immediately compromise with the enemy. I cannot conceive a connection so likely to lead to more awful consequences.
If we can maintain ourselves at Niagara, and keep the communication to Montreal open, the Americans can only subdue the Indians by craft, which we ought to be prepared to see exerted to the utmost. The enmity of the Indians is now at its height, and it will require much management and large bribes to effect a change in their policy; but the moment they are convinced that we either want the means to prosecute the war with spirit, or are negociating a separate peace, they will begin to study in what manner they can most effectually deceive us.
Should negociations for peace be opened, I cannot be too earnest with your excellency to represent to the king's ministers the expediency of including the Indians as allies, and not leave them exposed to the unrelenting fury of their enemies.
The enemy has evidently assumed defensive measures along the strait of Niagara. His force, I apprehend, is not equal to attempt, with any probability of success, an expedition across the river. It is, however, currently reported that large reinforcements are on their march; should they arrive, an attack cannot be long delayed. The approach of the rainy season will increase the sickness with which the troops are already afflicted. Those under my command are in perfect health and spirits.
I have the honor to transmit the purport of a confidential communication[94] received in my absence by Brigade-Major Evans from Colonel Van Rensselaer. As your excellency's instructions agree with the line of conduct he is anxious I should follow, nothing of a hostile nature shall be attempted under existing circumstances.
The unlettered Tecumseh well knew the wrongs of the red men when he endeavoured, several years before the war, to induce the Osages to unite in a general Indian confederacy against the continued encroachments of the Americans, and gave extemporaneous utterance before a large assemblage to the following simple but faithful narration of their grievances. The harangue, eloquent as it is, suffers under all the disadvantages of translation, and is but the shadow of the substance, because the gestures, and the interests and feelings excited by the occasion, which constitute the essentials of its character, are altogether wanting.
Brothers,—We all belong to one family; we are all children of the Great Spirit; we walk in the same path; slake our thirst at the same spring; and now affairs of the greatest concern lead us to smoke the pipe around the same council fire!
Brothers,—We are friends; we must assist each other to bear our burdens. The blood of many of our fathers and brothers has run like water on the ground, to satisfy the avarice of the white men. We, ourselves, are threatened with a great evil; nothing will pacify them but the destruction of all the red men.
Brothers,—When the white men first set foot on our grounds, they were hungry; they had no place on which to spread their blankets, or to kindle their fires. They were feeble; they could do nothing for themselves. Our fathers commiserated their distress, and shared freely with them whatever the Great Spirit had given his red children. They gave them food when hungry, medicine when sick, spread skins for them to sleep on, and gave them grounds, that they might hunt and raise corn.—Brothers, the white people are like poisonous serpents: when chilled, they are feeble and harmless; but invigorate them with warmth, and they sting their benefactors to death.
The white people came among us feeble; and now that we have made them strong, they wish to kill us, or drive us back, as they would wolves and panthers. Brothers,—The white men are not friends to the Indians: at first, they only asked for land sufficient for a wigwam; now, nothing will satisfy them but the whole of our hunting grounds, from the rising to the setting sun.
Brothers,—The white men want more than our hunting grounds; they wish to kill our old men, women, and little ones.
Brothers,—Many winters ago, there was no land; the sun did not rise and set; all was darkness. The Great Spirit made all things. He gave the white people a home beyond the great waters. He supplied these grounds with game, and gave them to his red children; and he gave them strength and courage to defend them.
Brothers,—My people wish for peace; the red men all wish for peace; but where the white people are, there is no peace for them, except it be on the bosom of our mother.
Brothers,—The white men despise and cheat the Indians; they abuse and insult them; they do not think the red men sufficiently good to live.
The red men have borne many and great injuries; they ought to suffer them no longer. My people will not; they are determined on vengeance; they have taken up the tomahawk; they will make it fat with blood; they will drink the blood of the white people.
Brothers,—My people are brave and numerous; but the white people are too strong for them alone. I wish you to take up the tomahawk with them. If we all unite, we will cause the rivers to stain the great waters with their blood.
Brothers,—If you do not unite with us, they will first destroy us, and then you will fall an easy prey to them. They have destroyed many nations of red men, because they were not united, because they were not friends to each other.
Brothers,—The white people send runners amongst us; they wish to make us enemies, that they may sweep over and desolate our hunting grounds, like devastating winds, or rushing waters.
Brothers,—Our Great Father, over the great waters, is angry with the white people, our enemies. He will send his brave warriors against them; he will send us rifles, and whatever else we want—he is our friend, and we are his children.
Brothers,—Who are the white people that we should fear them? They cannot run fast, and are good marks to shoot at: they are only men; our fathers have killed many of them: we are not squaws, and we will stain the earth red with their blood.
Brothers,—The Great Spirit is angry with our enemies; he speaks in thunder, and the earth swallows up villages, and drinks up the Mississippi. The great waters will cover their lowlands; their corn cannot grow; and the Great Spirit will sweep those who escape to the hills from the earth with his terrible breath.
Brothers,—We must be united; we must smoke the same pipe; we must fight each other's battles; and, more than all, we must love the Great Spirit: he is for us; he will destroy our enemies, and make all his red children happy.
Conclusion of Major-General Brock's general order, Detroit, 16th August, 1812: "The conduct of the Indians under Colonel Elliott, Captain M'Kee, and the other officers of that department, joined to that of the gallant and brave chiefs of their respective tribes, has since the commencement of the war been marked with acts of true heroism, and in nothing can they testify more strongly their love to the king, their great father, than in following the dictates of honor and humanity, by which they have been hitherto actuated. Two fortifications have already been captured from the enemy, without a drop of blood being shed by the hands of the Indians: the instant the enemy submitted, his life became sacred."