The Policy to be Adopted
In spite of all that was done, 1,344 men were returned to Australia disabled, and 450 were sent to Malta. If a calculation be made of the cost of sending these men to Egypt and back, and of their pay before they were infected, some idea may be formed of the enormous sum of money the Australian Commonwealth wasted on men who were a drag and hindrance to the army machine.
The Government should, on the raising and equipping of a volunteer army, treat it as older countries treat a standing army by issuing instructions to the men.
When the Hospitals left Australia neither officers nor men received instructions, and not until the arrival of Surgeon-General Williams in Egypt was any serious collective action taken. He at once called a conference of medical officers and did what he could to limit the extent of disease.
The governmental action—or lack of action—is unsound, since the man who contracts disease is severely punished, but adequate attempts are not made to prevent him acquiring it. The notable departure made in the case of Cairo was the effort to make the men understand clearly what these diseases meant to them as soldiers and as citizens; to remove temptation from them as far as possible, and with the aid of the Australian Red Cross to give them a reasonable, healthy, and decent alternative. Nothing the Australian Red Cross has done (or is likely to do) is more important than the establishment of the Soldiers' Clubs. Nothing has been more successful or is likely so to redound to the credit of that great institution. And yet, under the new Constitution of the Australian Red Cross, not a shilling can be devoted in the future to such purposes.