APPENDIX B
In order to illustrate the nature of the individual fighting carried out by the Australian Corps, during the period covered by this book, the following very small selection has been made from the official records of deeds of gallantry by individual soldiers. In every one of these twenty-nine cases, the Victoria Cross has been awarded by His Majesty the King:
No. 4061, Sergeant Stanley Robert MacDougall, 47th Battalion, A.I.F.
"At Dernancourt, on morning of 28th March, 1918, the enemy attacked our line, and his first wave succeeded in gaining an entry. Sergt. MacDougall, who was at a post in a flank company, realized the situation, and at once charged the enemy's second wave single-handed with rifle and bayonet, killing 7 and capturing Machine Gun which they had. This he turned on to them, firing from the hip, causing many casualties, and routing that wave. He then turned his attention to those who had entered, until his ammunition had run out, all the time firing at close quarters, when he seized a bayonet and charged again, killing three men and a German officer, who was just about to kill one of our officers. He then used a Lewis Gun on the enemy, killing many and enabling us to capture 33 prisoners. His prompt action saved the line and enabled us to stop the enemy advance."
Lieutenant Percy Valentine Storkey, 19th Battalion, A.I.F.
"Lieut. Storkey was in charge of a platoon which took part in the attack at Bois de Hangard on morning of 7th April, 1918. On emerging from the wood, the enemy trench line was encountered, and Lieut. Storkey found himself with 6 men. While continuing his move forward, a large enemy party—about 80 to 100 strong—armed with several machine guns, was noticed to be holding up the advance of the troops on the right. Lieut. Storkey immediately decided to attack this party from the flank and rear, and while moving forward to the attack, was joined by Lieut. Lipscomb and four men. Under the leadership of Lieut. Storkey, this small party of 2 officers and 10 other ranks charged the enemy position with fixed bayonets, driving the enemy out, killing and wounding about 30 and capturing the remainder, viz.: 3 officers and 50 men, also one machine gun."
Lieutenant Clifford William King Sadlier, 51st Battalion, A.I.F.
"For conspicuous gallantry on the night of 24-25th April, 1918, during a counter-attack by his Battalion on strong enemy positions south of Villers-Bretonneux, east of Amiens. Lieut. Sadlier's platoon, which was on the left of the Battalion, had to advance through a wood, where they encountered a strong enemy machine-gun post, which caused casualties and prevented the platoon from advancing. Although himself wounded, this officer at once collected his bombing section, and led them against the machine guns, succeeding in killing the crews and capturing two of the guns. By this time Lieut. Sadlier's party were all casualties, and he alone attacked a third enemy machine gun with his revolver, killing the crew of four and taking the gun. In doing so, he was again wounded, and unable to go on."
No. 1914, Sergeant William Ruthven, 22nd Battalion, A.I.F.
"For most conspicuous bravery and daring in action during the attack at Ville-sur-Ancre, near Albert, on 19th May, 1918. During the advance Sergeant Ruthven's Company suffered numerous casualties, and his Company Commander was severely wounded. He then assumed command of his portion of the assault, took charge of the Company Headquarters, and rallied the sections in his vicinity. As the leading wave approached its objective, it was subjected to heavy fire from an enemy Machine Gun at 30 to 40 yards' range, directly in front. This N.C.O., without hesitation, at once sprang out, threw a bomb which landed beside the post, and immediately rushed the position, bayoneting one of the crew and capturing the gun. He then encountered some of the enemy coming out of a shelter. He wounded two, captured six others in the same position, and handed them over to an escort from the leading wave, which had now reached the objective. Sergeant Ruthven then reorganized our men in his vicinity, and established a post in the second objective. Enemy movement was then seen in a sunken road about 150 yards distant. Without hesitation, and armed only with a revolver, he went over the open alone and rushed the position, shooting two Germans who refused to come out of their dug-out. He then single-handed mopped up this post, and captured the whole of the garrison, amounting in all to 32, and kept them until assistance arrived to escort them back to our lines. During the remainder of the day this gallant N.C.O. set a splendid example of leadership, moving up and down his position under fire, supervising consolidation and encouraging his men."
No. 1327, Corporal Phillip Davey, M.M., 10th Battalion, A.I.F.
"In a daylight operation against the enemy position near Merris on June 28th, 1918, Corporal Davey's platoon advanced 200 yards and captured part of enemy line. While the platoon was consolidating, the enemy pushed a machine gun forward under cover of a hedge, and opened fire from close range, inflicting heavy casualties and hampering work. Alone Corporal Davey moved forward in the face of a fierce point-blank fire, and attacked the gun with hand grenades, putting half the crew out of action. Having used all available grenades, he returned to the original jumping-off trench, secured a further supply and again attacked the gun, the crew of which had in the meantime been reinforced. He killed the crew, 8 in all, and captured the gun. This gallant N.C.O. then mounted the gun in the new post and used it in repelling a determined counter-attack, during which he was severely wounded in both legs, back and stomach."
No. 3399, Private (Lance-Corporal) Thomas Leslie Axford, M.M., 16th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For conspicuous gallantry and initiative during the operations against Vaire and Hamel Woods, east of Corbie, on the morning of the 4th July, 1918. When the barrage lifted and the Infantry advance commenced, the platoon of which he is a member was able to reach the first enemy defences through gaps which had been cut in the wires. The adjoining platoon got delayed in uncut barbed wire. This delay enabled the enemy machine guns to get into action, and enabled them to inflict a number of casualties among the men struggling through the wires, including the Company Commander, who was killed. L.-Corporal Axford, with great initiative and magnificent courage, at once dashed to the flank, threw his bombs amongst the machine-gun crews; followed up his bombs by jumping into the trench, and charging with his bayonet. Unaided he killed ten of the enemy and took 6 prisoners; he threw the machine guns over the parapet, and called out to the delayed platoon to come on. He then rejoined his own platoon, and fought with it during the remainder of the operations. Prior to the incidents above-mentioned, he had assisted in the laying out of the tapes for the jumping-off position, which was within 100 yards of the enemy. When the tapes were laid, he remained out as a special patrol to ensure that the enemy did not discover any unusual movement on our side."
No. 1936, Private Henry Dalziel, 15th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For his magnificent bravery and devotion to duty during operations near Hamel Wood, east of Corbie, on 4th July, 1918. He was No. 2 of a Lewis Gun Section, and at the commencement of our advance his Company met with determined resistance from Pear Trench strong point, which was strongly garrisoned and manned by numerous machine guns. This strong point, undamaged by our artillery fire, was protected by strong wire entanglements. A heavy concentration of machine-gun fire caused heavy casualties and held up our advance. His Lewis Gun came into action and silenced enemy guns in one direction, when another enemy gun opened up from another direction. Private Dalziel dashed at it, and with his revolver killed or captured the entire crew and gun, and allowed our advance to continue. He was severely wounded in the hand, but carried on and took part in the capture of the final objective. He twice went over open ground under heavy enemy artillery and machine-gun fire to where our aeroplanes had dropped some boxes of ammunition, and carried back a box on each occasion to his gun, and though suffering from considerable loss of blood, he filled magazines and served his gun until severely wounded through the head."
No. 1689A, Corporal Walter Ernest Brown, D.C.M., 20th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For gallant service on the morning of 6th July, 1918, north-east of Villers-Bretonneux, east of Amiens. This N.C.O. was one of an advanced party from his Battalion making arrangements with the Battalion then in the line for relief by his own Battalion. As such he was under no obligation to participate in any offensive operations before his Battalion took over the line. During the night of 5th-6th July the Company to which he was attached carried out a minor operation resulting in the capture of a small system of enemy trench. Early on the morning of 6th July an enemy strong post, about 70 yards distant, caused the occupants of the newly-captured trench great inconvenience by persistent sniping. It was decided to rush this post. Hearing of this, Corporal Brown, on his own initiative, crept out along the shallow trench towards the enemy post, and then made a dash across No Man's Land towards this post. An enemy machine gun opened fire from another trench, and he had to take cover by lying down. He later made another dash forward, and succeeded in reaching his objective. With a Mills grenade in his hand, he stood at the door of a dug-out and called on the occupants to surrender. One of the enemy rushed out, a scuffle ensued, and Corporal Brown knocked him down with his fist. Loud cries of 'Kamerad' were then heard, and from the dug-out an officer and eleven other ranks appeared. Driving them before him, Corporal Brown brought back the complete party as prisoners to our line."
Lieutenant Albert Chalmers Borella, M.M., 26th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For exceptional gallantry in the attack near Villers-Bretonneux, on the 17th-18th July, 1918. Whilst leading his platoon with the first wave, Lieut. Borella noticed an enemy machine gun firing through our barrage—he ran out ahead of his men into the barrage, shot two German machine gunners with his revolver, and captured the gun. He then led his party, now reduced to ten men and two Lewis Guns, further on, against Jaffa Trench, which was very strongly held, but using his revolver, and later a rifle, with great effect, Lieut. Borella shot down the enemy right and left, and set such a splendid example, that the garrison were quickly shot and captured. Two large dug-outs were bombed here and thirty prisoners taken. After reorganization the enemy counter-attacked twice in strong force, on the second occasion outnumbering Lieut. Borella's platoon by ten to one; but he showed such coolness and determination, that the men put up an heroic resistance, and twice repulsed the enemy with very heavy loss. It is estimated that from 100 to 150 Germans were killed in this vicinity. When Lieut. Borella refused his left flank about 40 yards during the first counter-attack he sent his men back one at a time, and was himself the last to leave, under heavy fire."
Lieutenant Alfred Edward Gaby, 28th Battalion, A.I.F.
"During the attack east of Villers-Bretonneux, near Amiens, on the morning of 8th August, 1918, this officer led his Company with great dash, being well in front. On reaching the wire in front of the enemy trench, strong opposition was encountered. The enemy were holding a strong point in force about 40 yards beyond the wire, and commanded the gap with four machine guns and rifles. The advance was at once checked. Lieut. Gaby found another gap in the wire, and entirely by himself approached the strong point, while machine guns and rifles were still being fired from it. Running along the parapet, still alone, and at point-blank range, he emptied his revolver into the garrison, drove the crews from their guns, and compelled the surrender of 50 of the enemy, with four machine guns. He then quickly reorganized his men and led them on to his final objective, which he captured and consolidated. On the morning of the 11th August, 1918, during an attack east of Framerville, Lieut. Gaby again led his Company with great dash on to the objective. The enemy brought heavy rifle and machine-gun fire to bear upon the line, but in the face of this heavy fire Lieut. Gaby walked along his line of posts, encouraging his men to quickly consolidate the line. While engaged on this duty he was killed by an enemy sniper."
No. 2742, Private Robert Matthew Beatham, 8th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the attack north of Rosières on 9th August, 1918. Private Beatham showed such heroism and courage, that he inspired all officers and men in his vicinity in a wonderful manner. When the advance was held up by heavy machine-gun fire, Private Beatham dashed forward and, assisted by one man, bombed and fought the crews of four enemy machine guns, killing ten of them and capturing ten others. The bravery of the action greatly facilitated the advance of the whole Battalion and prevented casualties. In fighting the crew of the first gun he was shot through the right leg, but continued in the advance. When the final objective was reached and fierce fighting was taking place, he again dashed forward and bombed the machine gun that was holding our men off, getting riddled with bullets and killed in doing so."
No. 506, Sergeant Percy Clyde Statton, M.M., 40th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For most conspicuous gallantry and initiative in action near Proyart on 12th August, 1918. The platoon commanded by Sergeant Statton reached its objective, but the remainder of the Battalion was held up by heavy machine-gun fire. He skilfully engaged two machine-gun posts with Lewis Gun fire, enabling the remainder of his Battalion to advance. The advance of the Battalion on his left had been brought to a standstill by the heavy enemy machine-gun fire, and the first of our assaulting detachments to reach the machine-gun posts were put out of action in taking the first gun. Armed only with a revolver, in broad daylight, Sergeant Statton at once rushed four enemy machine-gun posts in succession, disposing of two of them, killing five of the enemy. The remaining two posts retired and were wiped out by Lewis Gun fire. This N.C.O.'s act had a very inspiring effect on the troops who had been held up, and they cheered him as he returned. By his daring exploit he enabled the attacking troops to gain their objective. Later in the evening, under heavy machine-gun fire, he went out again and brought in two badly-wounded men."
Lieutenant Lawrence Dominic McCarthy, 16th Battalion, A.I.F.
"This officer is especially brought to notice for his wonderful gallantry, initiative and leadership on the morning of the 23rd August, 1918, when an attack was being made near Madame Wood, west of Vernandivukkers. The objectives of this Battalion were attained without serious opposition. The Battalion on the left flank were less fortunate. Here several well-posted machine-gun posts were holding up the attack, and heavy fire was being brought to bear on our left flank. When Lieut. McCarthy realized the situation, he at once engaged the nearest machine-gun post; but still the attacking troops failed to get forward. This officer then determined to attack the nearest post. Leaving his men to continue the fire fight, he, with two others, dashed across the open and dropped into a disused trench which had been blocked. One of his two men was killed whilst doing this. He was now right under the block over which the enemy machine gun was firing. The presence of head cover prevented the use of bombs. He therefore tunnelled a hole through the bottom of the block, through which he inserted his head and one arm. He at once shot dead the two men firing the gun. He then crawled through the hole he had made, and by himself charged down the trench. He threw his limited number of Mills bombs among the German garrison and inflicted more casualties. He then came in contact with two German officers, who fired on him with their revolvers. One of these he shot dead with his revolver, the other he seriously wounded. He then charged down the trench, using his revolver and throwing enemy stick bombs, and capturing three more enemy machine guns. At this stage, some 700 yards from his starting point, he was joined by the N.C.O., whom he had outdistanced when he crawled through the hole in the trench block mentioned above. Together they continued to bomb up the trench, until touch was established with the Lancashire Fusiliers, and in the meanwhile yet another machine gun had been captured. A total of 5 machine guns and 50 prisoners (37 unwounded and 13 wounded) was captured, while Lieut. McCarthy during his most amazing and daring feat had, single-handed, killed 20 of the enemy. Having cleared up a dangerous situation, he proceeded to establish a garrison in the line. Whilst doing this he saw a number of the enemy getting away from neighbouring trenches. He at once seized a Lewis Gun and inflicted further casualties on the enemy."
Lieutenant William Donovan Joynt, 8th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the attack on Herleville Wood, near Chuignes, on 23rd August, 1918. Early in the advance Lieut. Joynt's Company Commander was killed; he immediately took charge of the Company and led them with courage and skill. A great deal of the success of the operation in this portion of the sector was directly due to his magnificent work. When the advance was commenced the Battalion was moving into support to another Battalion. On approaching Herleville Wood, the troops of the leading Battalion lost all their officers and became disorganized. Under very heavy fire, and having no leaders, they appeared certain to be annihilated. Lieut. Joynt grasped the situation, and rushed forward in the teeth of very heavy machine-gun and artillery fire over the open. He got the remaining men under control, and worked them into a piece of dead ground, until he could reform them. He manœuvred his own men forward, and linked them up with the men of the other Battalion. He then made a personal reconnaissance, and found that the fire from the wood was holding the whole advance up, the troops on his flanks suffering very heavy casualties. Dashing out in front of his men, he called them on, and by sheer force of example inspired them into a magnificent frontal bayonet attack on the wood. The audacity of the move over the open staggered the enemy, and Lieut. Joynt succeeded in penetrating the wood and working through it. By his leadership and courage a very critical situation was saved, and on this officer rests to the greatest extent the success of the Brigade's attack. When the Battalion on our left was held up on Plateau Wood, and was suffering severe casualties, Lieut. Joynt, with a small party of volunteers, worked right forward against heavy opposition, and by means of hand-to-hand fighting forced his way round the rear of the wood, penetrating it from that side, and demoralizing the enemy to such an extent that a very stubborn and victorious defensive was changed into an abject surrender. He was always in the hardest pressed parts of the line, and seemed to bear a charmed life. He was constantly ready to run any personal risk and to assist flank units. He continually showed magnificent leadership, and his example to his men had a wonderful effect on them, causing them to follow him cheerfully in his most daring exploits. He continued to do magnificent work until he was badly wounded by shell fire in the legs."
No. 23, Private (Lance-Corporal) Bernard Sydney Gordon, 41st Battalion, A.I.F.
"During the operations of the 26-27th August, 1918, east of Bray, this N.C.O. showed most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in the face of the enemy. He led his section through heavy enemy shelling to its objective, which he consolidated. Then single-handed he attacked an enemy machine gun which was enfilading the Company on his right, killed the man on the gun, and captured the post, which contained one officer (a Captain) and 10 men. After handing these over at Company Headquarters, he returned alone to the old system of trenches, in which were many machine guns; entered a trench and proceeded to mop it up, returning with 15 prisoners in one squad and 14 in another, together with two machine guns. Again he returned to the system, this time with a Trench Mortar gun and crew, and proceeded to mop up a further portion of the trench, bringing in 22 prisoners, including one officer and 3 machine guns. This last capture enabled the British troops on our left to advance, which they had not been able to do owing to machine-gun fire from these posts. His total captures were thus 2 officers and 61 other ranks, together with 6 machine guns, and with the exception of the Trench Mortar assistance, it was absolutely an individual effort and done entirely on his own initiative."
No. 726, Private George Cartwright, 33rd Battalion, A.I.F.
"For most conspicuous valour and devotion to duty. On the morning of the 31st August, 1918, during the attack on Road Wood, south-west of Bouchavesnes, near Péronne, Private Cartwright displayed exceptional gallantry and supreme disregard for personal danger in the face of a most withering machine-gun fire. Two Companies were held up by a machine-gun firing from the south-western edge of the wood. Without hesitation, this man stood up, and walking towards the gun, fired his rifle from his shoulder. He shot the No. 1 Gunner; another German manned the gun, and he killed him; a third attempted to fire the gun and him he also killed. Private Cartwright then threw a bomb at the post, and on its exploding, he rushed forward, captured the gun and nine Germans. Our line then immediately rushed forward, loudly cheering him. This magnificent deed had a most inspiring effect on the whole line; all strove to emulate his gallantry. Throughout the operation Private Cartwright displayed wonderful dash, grim determination and courage of the highest order."
Lieutenant Edgar Thomas Towner, M.C., 2nd Australian Machine Gun Battalion.
"On 1st September, 1918, in the attack on Mont St. Quentin, near Péronne, this officer was in charge of 4 Vickers guns operating on a front of 1,500 yards. During the early stages of the advance an enemy machine gun was causing casualties to our advancing Infantry. Locating the gun, Lieut. Towner dashed ahead alone, and succeeded in killing the crew with his revolver, capturing the gun, and then, by turning it against the enemy, inflicted heavy casualties on them. Advancing then past a copse from which the enemy were firing, he brought his guns into action, placing his fire behind the enemy and cutting them off. On their attempting to retire before the advancing Infantry, and finding they were prevented by this machine-gun fire, the party of 25 Germans surrendered. He then reconnoitred alone over open ground exposed to heavy machine-gun and snipers' fire, and by the energy, foresight and the promptitude with which he brought fire to bear on further enemy groups, enabled the Infantry to reach a sunken road. On moving his guns up to the sunken road, he found himself short of ammunition, so went back across the open under heavy fire and obtained a German gun, and brought it and boxes of ammunition into the sunken road. Here he mounted and fired the gun in full view of the enemy, causing the enemy to retire further, and enabling Infantry on the flank, who were previously held up, to advance. Enemy machine gunners having direct observation, flicked the earth round and under this gun, and played a tattoo along the top of the bank. Though one bullet went into his helmet and inflicted a gaping scalp wound, he continued firing. Subsequently he refused to go out to have his wound attended to, as the situation was critical and his place was with his men. Later in the day the Infantry were obliged to retire slightly, and one gun was left behind. Lieut. Towner, seeing this, dashed back over the open, carried the gun back in spite of terrific fire, and brought it into action again. He continued to engage the enemy wherever they appeared, and put an enemy machine gun out of action. During the following night he insisted on doing his tour of duty along with the other officers, and his coolness and cheerfulness set an example which had a great effect on the men. To steady and calm the men of a small detached outpost, he crawled out among the enemy posts to investigate. He remained out about an hour, though enemy machine guns fired continuously on the sector, and the Germans were moving about him. He moved one gun up in support of the Infantry post, and patrolled the communication saps which ran off this post into the German line during the remainder of the night. Next morning, after his guns assisted in dispersing a large party of the enemy, he was led away utterly exhausted, 30 hours after being wounded."
No. 2358, Sergeant Albert David Lowerson, 21st Battalion, A.I.F.
"At Mont St, Quentin, north of Péronne, on the 1st September, 1918, this N.C.O. displayed courage and tactical skill of the very highest order during the attack on this village. Very strong opposition was met with early in the attack, and every foot of ground was stubbornly contested by the enemy located in very strong positions. This N.C.O.'s example during the fighting was of the greatest value. He moved about, regardless of the heavy enemy machine-gun fire, directing his men, encouraging them to still greater effort, and finally led them on to the objective. On reaching the objective, he saw that the left attacking party had not met with success, and that the attack was held up by an enemy strong post, heavily manned with 12 machine guns. Under the heaviest sniping and machine gun fire Sergeant Lowerson rallied seven men around him into a storming party, and deployed them to attack the post from both flanks, one party of three being killed immediately. He himself then rushed the strong point, and, with effective bombing, inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, and captured the post containing 12 machine guns and 30 prisoners. Though severely wounded in the right thigh, he refused to leave the front line until the prisoners had been dispatched to the rear, and the organization and consolidation of the post by our men had been completed. When he saw that the position was thoroughly secure, he returned to the rear, but refused to leave the Battalion until forced to evacuate two days later by the seriousness of his wound. This act was the culminating point of a series of most gallant performances by this N.C.O. during the fighting extending over a week."
No. 1584A, Private William Matthew Currey, 53rd Battalion, A.I.F.
"During the attack on Péronne, on the morning of 1st September, 1918, Private Currey displayed most conspicuous gallantry and daring. During the early stage of the advance the Battalion was suffering heavy casualties from a 77 mm. Field Gun, that was firing over sights at very close range. Private Currey, without hesitation, rushed forward, and despite a withering machine-gun fire that was directed on him from either flank, succeeded in capturing the gun single-handed after killing the entire crew. Later, when continuing the advance, an enemy strong point, containing 30 men and two machine guns, was noticed, which was holding up the advance of the left flank. Private Currey crept around the flank, and engaged the post with a Lewis Gun, causing many casualties. Finally, he rushed the post single-handed, killing four, wounding two, and taking one prisoner, the survivors running away. It was entirely owing to his gallant conduct that the situation was relieved, and the advance enabled to continue. After the final stage of the attack, it was imperative that one of the Companies that had become isolated should be withdrawn. This man at once volunteered to carry the message, although the ground to be crossed was very heavily shelled and continuously swept by machine-gun fire. He crossed the shell and bullet-swept area three times in the effort to locate the Company, and on one occasion his box respirator was shot through by machine-gun bullets, and he was gassed. Nevertheless, he remained on duty, and after finding the isolated Company, delivered the message, and returned with very valuable information from the Company Commander. Owing to the gas poisoning from which he was suffering Currey had shortly afterwards to be evacuated."
No. 6939, Private Robert Mactier, 23rd Battalion, A.I.F.
"On the morning of 1st September, 1918, during the operation entailing capture of Mont St. Quentin, this man stands out for the greatest bravery and devotion to duty. Fifteen minutes before zero two bombing patrols were sent to clear up several enemy strong points close to our line, but they met with very stubborn resistance and no success, and the Battalion was unable to move on to its Jumping Off Trench. Mactier, single-handed and in daylight, then jumped out of the trench from the leading Company, rushed past the block, closed with and killed the machine-gun garrison of 8 men with his revolver and bombs, and threw the enemy machine gun over the parapet. He rushed forward another 20 yards and jumped into another strong point held by a garrison of 6 men, who immediately surrendered. Continuing to the next block through the trench, an enemy gun, which had been enfilading our flank advancing troops, was swung on to him; but he jumped out of the trench into the open, and disposed of this third post and gun crew by bombing them from the rear. Before he could get into this trench, he was killed by enemy machine gun at close range. In the three posts which Mactier rushed, 15 of the enemy were found killed and 30 taken prisoners."
No. 1876, Corporal Alexander Henry Buckley, 54th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty at Péronne during the operations on 1st-2nd September, 1918. After passing the first objective, his half Company and part of the Company on the flank were held up by an enemy machine-gun nest. With one man he rushed the post, shooting 4 of the occupants and taking 22 prisoners. Later on, reaching a moat, another machine-gun nest commanded the only available foot-bridge. Whilst this was being engaged from a flank, this N.C.O. endeavoured to cross the bridge and rush the post, but was killed in the attempt. Throughout the advance he had displayed great initiative, resource and courage, being a great inspiration to his men. In order to avert casualties amongst his comrades and to permit of their advance, he voluntarily essayed a task which practically meant certain death. He set a fine example of self-sacrificing devotion to duty and bravery."
No. 2631, Corporal Arthur Charles Hall, 54th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For most conspicuous gallantry, brilliant leadership and devotion to duty during the operations at Péronne on 1st and 2nd September, 1918. A machine-gun post in the enemy front line was holding up the advance; alone, this N.C.O. rushed the position, shot 4 of the occupants as he advanced, and captured 9 others and 2 machine guns. Then, crossing the objective with a small party, he reconnoitred the approaches to the town, covering the infiltration of the remainder of the Company. During the mopping up he continuously—in advance of the main party—located enemy posts of resistance, and then personally led parties to the assault. In this way he captured many small parties of prisoners and machine-guns. On the morning of 2nd September, during a heavy barrage on the newly consolidated position, a man of his platoon was severely wounded. Seeing that only immediate medical attention could save him, Corporal Hall volunteered and carried the man out of the barrage, handed him to a stretcher-bearer, and immediately returned to his post. This Company was heavily engaged throughout the day, only one Officer remaining unwounded."
No. 1153, Private (Lance-Corporal) Laurence Carthage Weathers, 43rd Battalion, A.I.F.
"On the 2nd September, 1918, during operations north of Péronne, Lance-Corporal Weathers was one of an advanced bombing party operating well forward of our attacking troops. Just before the attack reached its final objective it was held up by the enemy, who occupied a trench in great numbers. After an hour's continuous fighting Lance-Corporal Weathers went forward alone in face of heavy enemy fire and located a large body of them. He immediately attacked the enemy with bombs and killed the senior officer; then made his way back to our lines and, securing a further supply of bombs and taking three men with him, he went forward and again attacked under very heavy fire. On reaching the enemy position, he jumped up on the parapet of the trench and threw bombs among the Bosche. He then signalled for his comrades to come up, and the remainder of the enemy, seeing this, surrendered. When counted, the number of prisoners totalled 100 and 3 machine guns."
No. 3244, Private James Park Woods, 48th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the operations near Le Verguier, north-west of St. Quentin, on the 18th September, 1918. Woods formed one of a party of three to patrol the right flank. He encountered a very formidable enemy strong point, consisting of about 25 men with four heavy and two light machine guns. This strong point commanded the greater portion of our position, and it was of the utmost importance to us, insomuch as it gave us a commanding view of the whole canal system. The strong point was situated at the junction of four enemy fire trenches, apparently sited with a view to protecting the approaches to the village of Bellenglise. Private Woods, appreciating the great importance of this position, and realizing the necessity for its immediate capture, fearlessly attacked with his rifle and bayonet, capturing one of the enemy and wounding the second with his bayonet, forcing the remainder to retire. After the capture of the strong point, it was found that one of the party was wounded. Private Woods, although himself slightly gassed, stubbornly defended the post. The enemy ascertaining that only two men opposed them, immediately attempted to recapture the strong point. The counter-attack by the enemy was carried out with at least 30 men attacking up the three trenches and across the open ground. This meant that Private Woods was attacked from both flanks and the front. He fearlessly jumped on the parapet, and opened fire on the attacking enemy, inflicting several casualties. During this operation he was exposed to very heavy machine-gun, rifle fire and bombing, but with dogged determination he kept up his fire, thus holding up the enemy until help arrived, enabling the enemy counter-attack to be repulsed with heavy losses. The capture of this strong post was the means of securing our flank, which had previously been in the air, and also enabled us to get in touch with the troops on our flank."
No. 6594, Sergeant Gerald Sexton, 13th Battalion, A.I.F.
"In the attack near Le Verguier, north-west of St. Quentin, on the 18th September, 1918, Sergeant Sexton displayed the most conspicuous bravery and performed deeds which, apart from their gallant nature, were in a great measure responsible for the Battalion's success. On the southern edge of the village of Le Verguier the enemy fought hard, and serious opposition had to be crushed. During the whole period of the advance, Sergeant Sexton was to the fore dealing with enemy machine guns by firing from the hip as he advanced, rushing enemy posts, and performing feats of bravery and endurance, which are better appreciated when one realizes that all the time he fired his Lewis Gun from the hip without faltering or for a moment taking cover. Immediately the attack commenced, Sergeant Sexton's Lewis Gun Section was confronted by an enemy machine gun. He called out to his section to follow, rushed the machine gun and killed the crew. He then called out to the rest of the Company to follow, but they had not gone far when they encountered some bombers and riflemen about 70 yards in front of the Company. Sexton rushed the trench, firing his gun from the hip, and killed or took prisoner all the members of the post. Continuing, he entered a copse, and killed or took prisoner another party of the enemy. The advance continued over the ridge at Le Verguier to where Sexton was met by Lieut. Price, who pointed out a party of the enemy manning a bank, and a field gun in action which was causing casualties and holding up a Company. There was also a trench mortar in action. Sergeant Sexton did not wait, but firing a few short bursts as he advanced, and calling out to his section to follow, rushed down the bank and killed the gunners on the field gun. Dashing out on to a flat under fire from two hostile machine guns directed on him, he killed 12 more of the enemy. Paying no heed to the machine-gun fire, he returned to the bank, and after firing down some dug-outs, induced about 30 of the enemy to surrender. Owing to his action the Company on the left of the Battalion was able to continue the advance where they had been definitely held up, and were suffering from the effects of the field gun. When the advance was continued from the first to the second objective, the Company was again held up by two machine guns on the right and one on the left. In conjunction with a Platoon, Sexton engaged the machine gun on the left, firing all the while from the upright position, a fearless figure which, according to eye-witnesses, inspired everyone. To have taken cover would have been more prudent, but Sexton realized that prompt action was essential, and did not wait to assume the prone position. Silencing this gun, he turned his attention to the two machine guns on the right and silenced them. He then moved forward into a trench, killing quite a number of the enemy and, advancing along a sap, took a few prisoners. Further on he was responsible for a few more small posts, and, on the final objective, being given a responsible post on the left of his Company, he engaged a machine gun which was firing across the Company front, and thus enabled his Company to dig in. This completed, he went forward down a sunken road and captured several more prisoners."
Major Blair Anderson Wark, D.S.O., 32nd Battalion, A.I.F.
"During the period 29th September-1st October, 1918, in the operations against the Hindenburg Line at Bellicourt, and the advance through Nauroy, Etricourt, Magny la Fosse and Joncourt, Major Wark, in command of the 32nd Battalion, displayed most conspicuous gallantry and set a fine example of personal bravery, energy, coolness, and control under extremely difficult conditions. On 29th September, under heavy artillery and machine-gun fire at very close range from all sides and in a dense fog, Major Wark, finding that the situation was critical, moved quickly forward alone and obtained sufficient information regarding the situation in front to be able to lead his command forward. At this time American troops were at a standstill and disorganized, and Major Wark quickly organized more than 200 of them, and attached them to his leading Companies and pressed forward. By his prompt action in the early stages of the battle he narrowly averted what would have resulted in great confusion on the part of the attack-troops. Still moving fearlessly at the head of his leading Companies, and at most times far out in advance, attended only by a runner, he cheered his men on, and they swept through the Hindenburg defences towards Nauroy. Pushing quickly through Nauroy, and mopping up the southern portion of the village, the process yielding 50 prisoners, the Battalion swung towards Etricourt. Still leading his assaulting Companies, he observed a battery of 77 mm. guns firing point-blank into his rear Companies and causing heavy casualties. Calling on a few of his men to him he rushed the battery, capturing the 4 guns and 10 of the crew; the remainder of the crew fled or were killed. Moving rapidly forward with only two N.C.O.'s, he surprised and captured 50 Germans near Magny la Fosse. Quickly seizing this opportunity, he pushed one Company forward through the village and made good the position. Having captured his objectives for the day, and personally reconnoitring to see that his flanks were safe, he found his command in a very difficult and dangerous position, his left flank being exposed to the extent of 3,000 yards on account of the 31st Battalion not being able to advance. He, after a strenuous day's fighting, set about the selection and reorganization of a new position, and effected a junction with British troops on the right and 31st Battalion on the left, and made his line secure. At 6 a.m. on 30th September, he again led his command forward to allow of the troops on the right being able to advance. The men were tired and had suffered heavily, but he personally led them, and his presence amongst them inspired them to further efforts. On October 1st, 1918, his Battalion was ordered to advance at very short notice. He gave his orders for the attack, and personally led his troops forward. A nest of machine guns was encountered, causing casualties to his men. Without hesitation and regardless of personal risk, he dashed forward practically into the muzzles of the guns and under an exceptionally heavy fire and silenced them, killing or capturing the entire crews. Joncourt and Mill Ridge were then quickly captured and his line consolidated. His men were practically exhausted after the three days' heavy fighting, but he moved amongst them from post to post, across country swept by heavy and continuous shell and machine-gun fire at point-blank range, urged them on and the line was made secure. Throughout he displayed the greatest courage and devotion to duty, coupled with great tact and skill, and his work, together with the reports based on his own personal observations, which he forwarded, were invaluable to the Brigade. It is beyond doubt that the success achieved by the Brigade during the heavy fighting on 29th and 30th September and 1st October was due to this officer's gallantry, determination, skill and great courage."
No. 1717, Private John Ryan, 55th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty, and for saving a very dangerous situation under particularly gallant circumstances during an attack against the Hindenburg defences on 30th September, 1918. In the initial assault on the enemy's positions this soldier went forward with great dash and determination, and was one of the first men of his Company to reach the trench which was their objective. Seeing him rush in with his bayonet with such exceptional skill and daring, his comrades were inspired and followed his example. Although the enemy shell and machine-gun fire was extremely heavy, the enemy trench garrison was soon overcome. In the assault the attacking troops were weakened by casualties, and, as they were too few to cover the whole front of attack, a considerable gap was left between Private Ryan's Battalion's left and the unit on the flank. The enemy counter-attacked soon after the objective was reached, and a few succeeded in infiltrating through the gap, and taking up a position of cover in rear of our men, where they commenced bombing operations. The section of trench occupied by Private Ryan and his comrades was now under fire from front and rear, and for a time it seemed that the enemy was certain to force his way through. The situation was critical and necessitated prompt action by someone in authority. Private Ryan found that there were no officers or N.C.O.'s near; they had become casualties in the assault. Appreciating the situation at once, he organized the few men nearest him, and led them out to attack the enemy with bomb and bayonet. Some of his party fell victims to the enemy's bombs, and he finally dashed into the enemy position of cover with only 3 men. The enemy were three times their number, but by skilful bayonet work they succeeded in killing the first three Germans on the enemy's flank. Moving along the embankment, Private Ryan alone rushed the remainder of the enemy with bombs. It was while thus engaged he fell wounded, but his dashing bombing assault drove the enemy clear of our positions. Those who were not killed or wounded by his bombs fell victims to our Lewis Gunners as they retired across No Man's Land. A particularly dangerous situation had been saved by this gallant soldier, whose display of determined bravery and initiative was witnessed by the men of the two attacking Battalions, who, inspired and urged by it, fought skilfully and bravely for two days."
Lieutenant Joseph Maxwell, M.C., D.C.M., 18th Battalion, A.I.F.
"On 3rd October, 1918, he took part as a Platoon Commander in an attack on the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line near Estrées, north of St. Quentin. His Company Commander was severely wounded soon after the jump off, and Lieut. Maxwell at once took charge of the Company. When the enemy wire was reached, they were met by a hail of machine-gun fire, and suffered considerable casualties, including all other officers of the Company. The wire at this point was six belts thick, each belt being 20 to 25 feet wide. Lieut. Maxwell pushed forward single-handed through the wire, and attacked the most dangerous machine gun. He personally killed three of the crew, and the remaining four men in the post surrendered to him with a machine gun. His Company followed him through the wire and captured the trenches forming their objective. Later, it was noticed that the Company on his left was held up in the wire by a very strong force on the left flank of the Battalion. He at once organized a party and moved to the left to endeavour to attack the enemy from the rear. Heavy machine-gun fire met them. Lieut. Maxwell again dashed forward single-handed at the foremost machine gun, and with his revolver shot five of its crew, so silencing the gun. Owing to the work of this party, the left Company was then able to work a small force through the wire, and eventually to occupy the objective and mop up the trenches. In the fighting prior to the mopping up, an English-speaking prisoner, who was captured, stated that the remainder of the enemy were willing to surrender. Lieut. Maxwell and two men, with this prisoner, walked to a post containing more than twenty Germans. The latter at once seized and disarmed our men. Lieut. Maxwell waited his chance, and then with an automatic pistol which he had concealed in his box respirator, shot two of the enemy and with the two men escaped. They were pursued by rifle fire, and one was wounded. However, Lieut. Maxwell organized a small party at once, attacked and captured the post."
Second Lieutenant George Morby Ingram, M.M., 24th Battalion, A.I.F.
"During the attack on Montbrehain, east of Péronne, on 5th October, 1918, this officer was in charge of a platoon. About 100 yards from the Jumping Off Trench severe enemy machine-gun fire was encountered from a strong post which had escaped our Artillery fire, and the advance was thus held up. Lieut. Ingram dashed out, and, under cover of the fire of a Lewis Gun, rushed the post at the head of his men. This post contained 9 machine guns and 42 Germans, who fought until our men were within 3 yards of them. They were killed to a man—Lieut. Ingram accounting for no less than 18 of them. A number of enemy posts were then observed to be firing on our men from about 150 yards further forward, and the Company moved forward to attack them, but severe casualties were sustained. The Company Commander had been badly wounded, and the Company Sergeant-Major and several others, who attempted to lead the advance, were killed. Our barrage had passed on, and no Tanks were near. Lieut. Ingram quickly seized the situation, rallied his men in the face of murderous fire, and, with magnificent courage and resolution, led them forward. He himself rushed the first post, shot 6 of the enemy, and captured a machine gun, thus overcoming a very serious resistance. By this time the Company had been reduced from 90 to about 30 other ranks; but this officer, seeing enemy fire coming from a quarry, to his left front, again led his men forward and rushed the quarry. He jumped into the quarry amongst enemy wire, and his men followed and proceeded to mop up a large number of the enemy who were in bivouacs there. He then observed an enemy machine gun firing from the ventilator of a cellar, through a gap in the wall of a house about 20 yards away. Without hesitation and entirely alone he scrambled up the edge of the quarry, ran round the rear of the house, and entering from the far side, shot the enemy gunner through the ventilator of the cellar. He fired several more shots into the cellar, then, seeing some enemy jumping out of the window of the house, he burst open a door, rushed to the head of the stairs leading into the cellar, and forced 62 of the enemy to surrender. He now found he was out of touch with the Company on his left flank, so went out alone and made a personal reconnaissance under heavy fire, and succeeded in gaining touch with the left Company, which had lost all its officers. Having returned to his Company, he personally placed a post on his left flank to ensure its safety, and then reconnoitred and established two posts on his right flank. All this was done in the face of continuous machine-gun and shell fire."
Australian Artillery—moving up to the front, through the Hindenburg wire, October 2nd, 1918.
Advance during Battle—Third Division Infantry and Tanks advancing to the capture of Bony, October 1st, 1918.
APPENDIX C
CORPS ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF AUGUST 8TH, 1918
The following were the complete orders issued by the Australian Army Corps for the Battle of August 8th, 1918. They form only a small part of the whole of the orders which were required for the operation. There were, in addition, detailed orders by the Corps Artillery Headquarters, the Heavy Artillery, the Chief Engineer, and each of the five Divisions and fifteen Brigades, and also by the Administrative Services of the Corps.
On the question of the form of the orders, the most expedient course was found to be the one here adopted—namely, that of issuing a numbered series of Battle Instructions, each dealing comprehensively with a separate subject matter:
Battle Instructions No. 1
1. The Australian Corps will attack the enemy from the Villers-Bretonneux—Chaulnes Railway exclusive to the River Somme, inclusive, at a date and hour to be notified.
The Canadian Corps will co-operate on the right, south of the railway (inclusive), and the Third Corps on the left, north of the Somme.
2. General Method of Attack.—The Australian Corps will attack on a two-division front. The attack will be carried out in three phases. Divisional boundaries and objectives are shown on the attached map.
(i) First Phase.—The 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions will form up on a taped line prior to ZERO, and will attack with Tanks under a creeping artillery barrage. Their objective is shown by a GREEN line on the attached map.
On arrival at their objective they will consolidate.
(ii) Second Phase.—The 5th and 4th Australian Divisions, organized in brigade groups, will advance in open warfare formations, from the first objective passing through 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions respectively. Their objective is shown in RED on the map.
(iii) Third Phase.—The 5th and 4th Australian Divisions will exploit their success and seize the old British line of Defences marked BLUE on the map, and establish themselves defensively on this line.
(iv) The 1st Australian Division will be in Corps Reserve.
(v) A detailed programme of the action will be issued.
3. Assembly.—In order to free as many troops from line duty as possible, 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions will arrange to hold the front with one infantry brigade on each Divisional sector. This will be completed before daybreak on 5th August.
To prevent any troops arriving at their objectives in an exhausted condition through a long march, troops detailed to the farthest objectives must be quartered nearest the starting line prior to ZERO.
The brigades of 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions not holding the line will be quartered in rear of all brigades of 5th and 4th Australian Divisions respectively prior to ZERO night. This will be completed before daybreak on 5th August.
The allotment of areas for quartering during this stage will be made by mutual arrangement between Divisional Commanders concerned. The allotment of routes and times of movement in accordance with the Corps programme will be arranged similarly.
On ZERO night the brigades of 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions not in the line will make their approach march to their tape lines through the area occupied by 5th and 4th Australian Divisions respectively.
4. Artillery.
(i) The Artillery available consists of:
18 Field Artillery Brigades.
12 Heavy Artillery Brigades.(ii) G.O.C., R.A., Aust. Corps, will command all artillery of the Corps during the first phase of the operation.
(iii) For the second phase G.O.C., R.A., Aust. Corps, will allot:
(a) Three Field Artillery Brigades to 5th and 4th Aust. Divisions for distribution to infantry brigade groups. These will include the 5th and 4th Aust. Divisional Artillery respectively.
(b) Three brigades of Field Artillery and one battery of 60-pdr. Heavy Artillery allotted to each of the 5th and 4th Aust. Divisions for employment as may be ordered by the Divisional Commanders.
(c) The remainder of the Field Artillery and the Heavy Artillery to Corps Reserve.
(iv) Heavy Artillery will be pushed forward by G.O.C., R.A., to protect the troops in the second objective.
(a) Three Field Artillery Brigades to 5th and 4th Aust. Divisions for distribution to infantry brigade groups. These will include the 5th and 4th Aust. Divisional Artillery respectively.
(b) Three brigades of Field Artillery and one battery of 60-pdr. Heavy Artillery allotted to each of the 5th and 4th Aust. Divisions for employment as may be ordered by the Divisional Commanders.
(c) The remainder of the Field Artillery and the Heavy Artillery to Corps Reserve.
5. Tanks.—Instructions for the distribution and employment of Tanks will be issued later.
6. Engineers.—Engineers and Pioneers will be distributed for work as follows from midnight on 6th-7th instant:
(i) Corps Pool under Chief Engineer—
1 Field Coy. from 4th Aust. Div.
1 Field Coy. from 5th Aust. Div.
2 Field Coys. from 2nd Aust. Div.
2 Field Coys. from 3rd Aust. Div.
3 Army Troops Coys. Engineers.
5th Aust. Pioneer Bn.
3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.(ii) With Divisions:
2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn. will serve 2nd and 3rd Aust. Divisions. 2 Coys. to each.
4th Aust. Pioneer Bn. will serve 4th and 5th Aust. Divisions. 2 Coys. to each.
Divisional Commanders will control:
2nd Aust. Division—1 Field Coy. and 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn. (less 2 Coys.).
3rd Aust. Division—1 Field Coy. and 2 Coys. 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
4th Aust. Division—2 Field Coys. and 4th Aust. Pioneer Bn. (less 2 Coys.).
5th Aust. Division—2 Field Coys. and 2 Coys. 4th Aust. Pioneer Bn.Tunnellers will be detailed to each division for dug-out exploration.
Chief Engineer, Aust. Corps, will arrange for the distribution in accordance with this.
Chief Engineer will issue instructions for the withdrawal and storing of demolition charges of bridges for which the Corps is responsible, and for the return of engineer personnel employed on this work to their units.
1 Field Coy. from 4th Aust. Div.
1 Field Coy. from 5th Aust. Div.
2 Field Coys. from 2nd Aust. Div.
2 Field Coys. from 3rd Aust. Div.
3 Army Troops Coys. Engineers.
5th Aust. Pioneer Bn.
3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
7. Deputy Director of Medical Services will arrange for the distribution of medical units.
Battle Instructions No. 2
SECRECY
(a) It is of first importance that secrecy should be observed and the operation carried out as a surprise.
Commanders will take all possible steps to prevent the scope or date of the operation becoming known except to those taking part. Any officer, N.C.O., or man discussing the operation in public, or communicating details regarding it to any person, either soldier or civilian, not immediately concerned, will be severely dealt with.
(b) All movement of troops and transport will take place by night, whether in the forward or back areas of the Australian Corps, on and after 1st August, except where absolutely necessary to move by day.
(c) O.C., No. 3 Squadron, A.F.C., will arrange for aeroplanes to fly over the Australian Corps Army area during days when flying is possible, and to report to Corps H.Q. any abnormal movement of troops or transport within our lines.
(d) Work on back lines will be continued as at present, so that there may be no apparent change in our attitude.
(e) Commanders will ensure that the numbers of officers reconnoitring the enemy's positions is limited to those for whom such reconnaissance is essential.
Nothing attracts attention to an offensive more than a large number of officers with maps looking over the parapet and visiting Observation Posts.
Commanding Officers of units holding the front line should report at once to higher authority any disregard of these orders.
Battle Instructions No. 3
COMMUNICATIONS AND HEADQUARTERS
1. Communications will be carefully organized to ensure the maintenance of communication throughout the advance and after its conclusion.
2. (i) Headquarters of Divisions will be established as follows:
2nd Australian Division—Glisy.
5th Australian Division—Blangy-Tronville Château. Advanced Headquarters in dug-outs at Railway cutting.
3rd Australian Division—Bussy.
4th Australian Division—Corbie.(ii) Headquarters of Brigades and battalions will be selected in advance, as far as this can be done, and all concerned will be notified of their proposed locations.
3. Report Centres in advance of the heads of buried cables will be selected in each Divisional Sector and details prepared for the organization of communications back to cable head.
4. The following mounted troops are detailed to Divisions:
To 2nd Australian Division—1 Troop 13th L.H.
3rd Australian Division—1 Troop 13th L.H.
4th Australian Division—2 Troops 13th L.H.
5th Australian Division—2 Troops 13th L.H.
Divisions will inform O.C., 13th Light Horse, as to the time and place at which the Light Horse will report.
The Cyclist Section now with Divisions will remain.
5. The employment of wireless will be exploited to the full.
6. Popham panels will be employed for communication between Infantry and Aeroplanes.
Battle Instructions No. 4
ARTILLERY
(a) Ammunition will be dumped at or near gun positions as follows:
| 18-pdr. | 600 rounds. |
| 4.5" Howitzer | 500 rounds. |
| 60-pdr. | 400 rounds. |
| 6" guns | 400 rounds. |
| 6" Howitzers | 400 rounds. |
| 8" Howitzers | 400 rounds. |
| 9.2" Howitzers | 400 rounds. |
| 12" Howitzers | 200 rounds. |
Arrangements should be made to commence dumping this ammunition as soon as feasible. Echelons will be kept full.
(b) Boundaries between Corps as regards bombardment and counter-battery work coincide with the boundaries between Corps shown on map issued with Australian Corps "Battle Instructions No. 1," dated 1st August, 1918.
Battle Instructions No. 5
TANKS
1. Tanks are available as follows:
5th Tank Brigade.
Mark V. Tanks—2nd Battalion—Lieut.-Col. E. D. Bryce, D.S.O.
Mark V. Tanks—8th Battalion—Lieut.-Col. The Hon. J. D. Y. Bingham, D.S.O.
13th Battalion—Lieut.-Col. P. Lyon.
Mark V. (Star) Tanks—15th Battalion—Lieut.-Colonel Ramsey-Fairfax.
No. 1 G.C.Coy. (24 Carrying Tanks)—Major W. Partington, M.C.
2. Mark V. Tanks are allotted as follows:
13th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Lyon), less one company, to 3rd Australian Division.
2nd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Bryce), plus one company 13th Battalion attached, to be employed with the two right Divisions—two companies to be allotted to each Division.
8th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. The Hon. J. D. Y. Bingham) to 4th Australian Division.
One company of the 8th Battalion will be employed in support. It will be specially charged with the function of maintaining the attack at the junction of Divisions throughout the advance as far as the second objective.
Command will be effected through Battalion Commanders in each case except that Lieut.-Col. Bryce will be responsible for command of all Mark V. Tanks allotted to both 2nd and 5th Australian Divisions.
3. After the capture of the first objective, Tanks detailed to 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions will rally and will be employed to support the advance of the 5th and 4th Australian Divisions respectively.
4. After the capture of the second objective, Tanks will rally. One company will remain in close support in each divisional sector; the remainder will be withdrawn to positions to be arranged between Divisional and Tank Commanders.
5. Mark V. (Star) Tanks are allotted as follows:
1½ companies (18 tanks) to the 5th Australian Division.
1½ companies (18 tanks) to the 4th Australian Division.
These tanks are allotted for the capture of the blue line.
6. Carrying Tanks are allotted as follows:
2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions—3 tanks each.
4th and 5th Australian Divisions—9 tanks each.
7. Orders for forming up and movement to the Start Line will be issued by G.O.C., 5th Tank Brigade.
Battalion Commanders detailed to Divisions will be responsible for all liaison duty in connection with the Tanks.
8. For tactical purposes Tanks will be placed under the command of Infantry Commanders to whose commands they are allotted.
Battle Instructions No. 5A
ASSEMBLY OF TANKS
1. Preliminary Movement.
Tanks will be assembled in concealed positions in the forward area under the orders of the 5th Tank Brigade prior to night Y/Z.
2. Advance to Start Line.
On night Y/Z the Tanks allotted to troops attacking the first objective will commence to move forward at 9.30 p.m. to the Tank Start Line. They will move with full engines to a line not nearer to the Tank Start Line than 3,000 yards. From there they will continue the movement forward to the Tank Start Line, moving at a slow rate and as quietly as possible. The Tank Start Line will be approximately 1,000 yards in rear of the Infantry taped line.
Tanks will leave the Tank Start Line at such times as will allow them to catch up to the Infantry as the barrage lifts at zero plus three minutes.
3. Concealment of Engine Noise.
To conceal the noise of the engines during the advance of the Tanks, the 5th Brigade R.A.F. will arrange to have planes flying continuously over the Corps area from 9.30 p.m. until midnight on Y/Z night, and from zero minus one hour onward to zero.
4. Tanks allotted to Second Objective.
The Tanks allotted to the second objective will form up independently under the orders of the 5th Tank Brigade in consultation with G.O.'s C., 4th and 5th Australian Divisions. These Tanks will be formed up when the aeroplanes are in the air during the hours laid down in para. 3.
5. Liaison Company.
The company of the 8th Tank Battalion detailed to act in support, and to ensure liaison in the battle line at the junction of Divisions, will detail a half-company to each wave of Tanks, vide paras. 2 and 4 above.
Divisions will detail special liaison parties of Infantry to work in co-operation with this company.
6. Re-assembly.
As soon as the blue line has been reached, G.O.C. 5th Australian Division will arrange to release the 2nd Tank Battalion, less the attached company. This battalion will then be withdrawn. The remainder of the Tanks, less one company allotted to remain in support of each of the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions, will be withdrawn when ordered by Divisional Commanders, vide Battle Instructions No. 5, para. 4.
7. Smoke Grenades.
Divisions will ensure that a proportion of smoke rifle grenades accompanies each Infantry detachment detailed to the blue line and which accompanies each of the Mark V. (Star) Tanks.
Battle Instructions No. 6
ARTILLERY
1. Preparation.
Active counter-battery work and harassing fire will be maintained.
Such registration as is necessary will be carried out under cover of this fire. A detailed programme for this will be arranged in each divisional sector.
The necessity for concealing the increase in the number of guns on the front must be borne in mind, and on no account should a large number of guns be employed at any one time. Counter preparation and S.O.S. plans during the period of preparation for the attack will be drawn up accordingly.
Normal fire should, so far as possible, be carried out from positions other than those in which batteries will be emplaced during the battle.
2. Heavy Artillery.
(a) In view of the nature of the enemy's defences, the fire of the majority of the heavy howitzers, employed for purposes other than counter-battery work, will be used during the barrage to engage special strong points or localities.
(b) Throughout the advance beyond the green line enemy centres of resistance will be kept under fire until such time as the progress of the Infantry renders this inadvisable. A map will be issued to show the times at which heavy artillery fire will cease on zones and special localities.
(c) At least two-thirds of the available Heavy Artillery will be employed for counter-battery purposes.
Heavy concentrations of fire will be directed on the different groups of enemy artillery.
3. G.O.C., R.A., will prepare plans for dealing with a heavy development of hostile fire on zero night. He will also prepare a plan to deal with any attempt at a deliberate gas bombardment of the Villers-Bretonneux area on zero night.
Battle Instructions No. 7
PROGRAMME OF ACTION
1. Capture of First Objective.
(a) Forming-up troops detailed to the capture of the first objective will be deployed on the Forming-up Line one hour before zero hour.
(b) Artillery Programme.
(i) The field artillery 18-pdr. barrage will open at zero 200 yards in advance of the forming-up line. At zero plus three minutes the barrage will commence to advance; lifts will be 100 yards at 2-minute intervals. There will be two lifts at this rate.
The rate will then decrease to lifts of 100 yards every 3 minutes. There will be eight lifts at this rate.
From the eleventh lift inclusive until the green line is reached lifts will be of 100 yards each at 4-minute intervals.
(ii) The 4.5" Howitzer barrage will move 200 yards in advance of the 18-pdr. barrage.
(iii) A protective barrage will be maintained in front of the green line until zero plus four hours. During this period approximately fifty per cent. (50%) of the guns remaining in the barrage will be employed in a protective line barrage; the remainder will be employed to search and sweep deeply into the enemy's position. At zero plus four hours all barrage fire will cease.
Barrage Maps will be issued later.
2. Capture of Second and Third Objectives.
(a) Assembly.—5th and 4th Australian Divisions will select and mark positions for the assembly of their troops.
These areas will be selected in liaison with Tank Commanders and with the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions respectively, to prevent movement to them clashing with the approach march of these divisions and that of the Tanks.
This requires careful co-ordination between each pair of Divisions and Tank Commanders.
(b) Command.—At zero plus four hours, responsibility for the battle front will pass to G.O.C., 5th Australian Division, in the right sector, and to G.O.C., 4th Australian Division, in the left sector.
(c) The Advance.—5th and 4th Australian Divisions will time their advance so that the leading troops cross the first objective (green line) at zero plus four hours.
(d) From zero plus four hours the advance will be continued under the conditions of open warfare.
Battle Instructions No. 8
ROADS
1. A map is forwarded herewith showing the organization of the road system in the captured territory.
2. The Chief Engineer will issue the necessary instructions for the preparation of these roads for traffic.
3. All light traffic which is capable of moving across country will do so and will avoid main roads.
4. Mule tracks will be a divisional responsibility.
5. Artillery advancing with the 5th and 4th Australian Divisions will carry forward a proportion of bridges. Arrangements should be made as soon as possible for the development of tracks, making use of the routes taken by the artillery over these bridges.
6. The Amiens—Longueau—Villers-Bretonneux main road, as far east as the cross roads in N.26.c., will be reserved for the exclusive use of the Cavalry Corps from 9.30 p.m. on Y/Z night until 8 a.m. on Z day. After 8 a.m. on Z day it will be available for the Australian and Cavalry Corps.
Assistant Provost Marshal, Australian Corps, will arrange for the control of the traffic on this road throughout.
Chief Engineer, Australian Corps, will prepare short avoiding roads at the cross roads at N.26.c. to cross the north-east or south-west corner to avoid congestion at this spot.
Battle Instructions No. 9
LIGHT SIGNALS, MESSAGE ROCKETS, SMOKE
1. Light Signals.
(a) Australian Corps.
The following Light Signals will be employed in the Australian Corps:
S.O.S. Signal, No. 32 grenade—showing green over green over green. Allotment 500 per Division.
Success Signal, No. 32 grenade—showing white over white over white. Allotment 600 per Division.
A small reserve of each of these grenades is held at Corps Headquarters.
No other Light Signals will be laid down by Corps. There is no objection to the use within Divisions of a Very Light for the local indication of targets between Infantry and Tanks.
(b) Other Formations.
Light Signals of other formations are as follows:
Formation. Signal. Meaning. (i) Cavalry Corps. White star turning "Advanced troops to red on a parachute of Cavalry are fired from here." 1½" Very pistol. (ii) Third Corps. No. 32 grenade, "S.O.S." green over green over green. No. 32 grenade, "Success signal, white over white i.e., we have over white. reached objective." One white Very "Barrage is about light. to lift." (iii) Canadian Corps No. 32 grenade, "S.O.S." will also red over red mean (a) "We are over red. held up and cannot advance without help." (b) "Enemy is counter-attacking." No. 32 grenade, "(a) Lift your fire. green over green We are going to over green. advance. (b) Stop firing." Three white Very "We have reached lights in quick this point." succession. Remark.—In the case of (a) a smoke rocket (No. 27 grenade) will also be fired in the direction of the obstruction to indicate its position.
(c) Special care must be taken by the Artillery on the right flank of the Corps that all officers and N.C.O.'s are acquainted with these signals, so that no mistake may arise as regards the difference in the S.O.S. Signals of the Australian and Canadian Corps.
S.O.S. Signal, No. 32 grenade—showing green over green over green. Allotment 500 per Division.
Success Signal, No. 32 grenade—showing white over white over white. Allotment 600 per Division.
| Formation. | Signal. | Meaning. |
| (i) Cavalry Corps. | White star turning | "Advanced troops |
| to red on a parachute | of Cavalry are | |
| fired from | here." | |
| 1½" Very pistol. | ||
| (ii) Third Corps. | No. 32 grenade, | "S.O.S." |
| green over green | ||
| over green. | ||
| No. 32 grenade, | "Success signal, | |
| white over white | i.e., we have | |
| over white. | reached objective." | |
| One white Very | "Barrage is about | |
| light. | to lift." | |
| (iii) Canadian Corps | No. 32 grenade, | "S.O.S." will also |
| red over red | mean (a) "We are | |
| over red. | held up and cannot | |
| advance without | ||
| help." (b) "Enemy | ||
| is counter-attacking." | ||
| No. 32 grenade, | "(a) Lift your fire. | |
| green over green | We are going to | |
| over green. | advance. (b) Stop | |
| firing." | ||
| Three white Very | "We have reached | |
| lights in quick | this point." | |
| succession. |
2. Message-carrying Rockets.
Allotment of Message-carrying Rockets is 80 per Division.
3. Smoke.
(a) Artillery smoke will be as follows:
(i) 3 rounds per gun will be fired during the first three minutes of the artillery barrage.
(ii) 3 rounds per gun will be fired in quick succession on the arrival of the field artillery barrage at the artillery halt line covering the first objective.
(iii) In the event of wet weather a small proportion of smoke will be used in the barrage to replace the smoke and dust caused by the burst of the shells in dry weather. This will not be sufficient to confuse the effect with that of the smoke shells prescribed in paragraph 3 (a) (i) and (ii).
(b) Screening beyond the First Objective.
15th Wing, Royal Air Force, will arrange to screen the advance of the Tanks and Infantry from special localities in advance of their first objective by dropping phosphorus bombs.
Divisions and G.O.C., 5th Tank Brigade, will inform Australian Corps Headquarters as early as possible of the localities which they desire screened.
A map will be issued showing times at which it is anticipated that the Infantry will make good certain zones. Phosphorus bombs will not be dropped within these zones at any time after it is anticipated that the Infantry will have occupied them.
(i) 3 rounds per gun will be fired during the first three minutes of the artillery barrage.
(ii) 3 rounds per gun will be fired in quick succession on the arrival of the field artillery barrage at the artillery halt line covering the first objective.
(iii) In the event of wet weather a small proportion of smoke will be used in the barrage to replace the smoke and dust caused by the burst of the shells in dry weather. This will not be sufficient to confuse the effect with that of the smoke shells prescribed in paragraph 3 (a) (i) and (ii).
Battle Instructions No. 10
INTELLIGENCE AND DISPOSAL OF PRISONERS OF WAR
1. Battalion Intelligence Police.
One German speaker and two searchers will be allotted to each battalion for use as follows:
(a) German Speaker.
(i) To secure immediate identifications quickly, so that identifications will reach Corps Headquarters as speedily as possible of enemy units on the battle front.
(ii) To secure immediate information required by the Battalion Commander as regards enemy dispositions, assembly positions, orders for counter-attack, etc.
(iii) To be in charge of the two searchers and separate important documents, orders, maps, etc., translate and convey information of moment to the immediate Commander.
(b) Two Searchers.
The two searchers under the German speaker systematically search the battlefield, enemy positions, suspected headquarters, dead, etc., for papers, documents, maps, etc., have them packed in sandbags, and sent through the usual channels to the Corps Cage as quickly as possible.
This personnel should carry torches and, besides rifles or revolvers, bombs are recommended as being useful for dealing with any of the enemy who may be found in dug-outs.
(i) To secure immediate identifications quickly, so that identifications will reach Corps Headquarters as speedily as possible of enemy units on the battle front.
(ii) To secure immediate information required by the Battalion Commander as regards enemy dispositions, assembly positions, orders for counter-attack, etc.
(iii) To be in charge of the two searchers and separate important documents, orders, maps, etc., translate and convey information of moment to the immediate Commander.
2. Divisional Intelligence Officers.
Divisional Intelligence Officers will go forward to an Advanced Divisional Collecting Cage, with a view to obtaining, as soon as possible, information of immediate tactical importance.
The Cage will be connected by telephone to Divisional H.Q., and important information obtained should be transmitted as quickly as possible to Divisional and Brigade H.Q.
The main points on which immediate information is required from prisoners are: The Order of Battle, Units seen, Distribution of the Enemy's Forces, Method of holding the Line, Assembly Positions, Counter-attack Orders and Intentions.
This information will be wired to their respective Divisional Headquarters and repeated to Corps Headquarters and Corps Cage by Divisional Intelligence Officers.
Divisional Intelligence Officers will not detain prisoners longer than is necessary to obtain this tactical information of immediate importance.
In case a large number of prisoners are captured, they will detain only one or two from each regiment, and will not delay the passage of the remainder to the Corps Cage.
Any further information required from prisoners by Divisions or lower formations can always be obtained by telephone from the Corps Cage.
3. Searching of Prisoners.
(a) Officers and N.C.O.'s.
Officers and N.C.O.'s will be searched as soon as possible after capture by a responsible officer or N.C.O., and all documents taken from them sent back with them (in sacks, labelled by regiments, if a number are captured) to the Divisional Intelligence Officer, at such place as this officer has prearranged.
It is left to the discretion of Divisional Intelligence Officers as to what documents, maps, etc., taken from prisoners they hold back for the information of Brigade and Divisional Commanders. When this is done, Corps "I" will be informed by wire, priority if necessary, of the nature of the documents, etc., held back, and of any points of immediate tactical importance they may contain.
As soon as possible after information has been extracted from them, the documents will be forwarded on to the Corps Cage. Arrangements can be made by Corps, if notified that documents are ready to be sent on, to fetch them by motorcyclist or cycle.
(b) Other Ranks.
Prisoners other than officers and N.C.O.'s will be searched on their arrival at the Corps Cage. Their papers, etc., will be taken from them and put into sacks labelled according to regiments.
(c) All ranks should understand that a prisoner's pay-book, identity disc, and personal belongings should not be taken from him. Escorts and guards will be warned to take special precautions to prevent prisoners from destroying papers.
4. Separation of Officers, N.C.O.'s and Men.
Care will be taken that officers, N.C.O.'s and privates are all separated from one another at once, and are not allowed to communicate with one another. Prisoners who have been interrogated should not be allowed to mix with those who have not yet been interrogated.
5. Notification of Locality of Capture.
It is essential that, when prisoners are sent back, information be sent with them which will show where they were captured. Information as to the battalion which made the capture is a useful indication.
6. Authorized Persons only to converse with Prisoners.
It is most important that no officer or N.C.O., except those duly authorized, be allowed to interrogate or converse with prisoners.
7. Prisoners of War Cage.
The Advanced Corps Cage will be situated at Vecquemont, N.11.b.8.7. and the Rear Corps Cage at N.2.c.3.7.
Intelligence Officers and personnel will be stationed here, and will carry out a more detailed interrogation and sort out captured documents.
The Advanced Corps Cage will be connected by telephone to Corps H.Q.
8. Prisoners.
The following procedure will be adopted for the disposal of prisoners:
After capture they will be escorted to the Advanced Divisional Collecting Cage, for examination by the Divisional Intelligence Officer, who, after he has finished with them, will send them back to the Advanced Corps Cage.
The sending back of prisoners should be carried out as quickly as possible, and several escorts should be arranged for them to be passed back without any unusual delay. Instructions should be issued to ensure that too many men are not employed on escort duty.
In the forward area directing notices should be placed to show the route to be taken to the Advanced Divisional Collecting Cage.
Traffic control personnel should be conversant with the method of disposing of prisoners.
9. Identifications.
The importance of passing on all identifications as speedily as possible to Corps "I" cannot be too strongly impressed on all concerned. It is essential that special efforts be made to wire at once, as soon as identifications are made and the locality in which obtained.
10. Maps and Photographs.
The following maps are being issued:
(i) A large issue of 1/20,000 No. 62.D. South-East regular series for distribution to all officers.
(ii) 1/20,000 Map Message Form, for distribution down to N.C.O.'s.
(iii) A small issue of 1/10,000 Maps of forward area only.
(iv) 1/20,000 Barrage Map, for distribution down to Company Commanders.
(v) 1/40,000 Organization Map, together with notes on the enemy.
The following special photographs are being issued:
(a) A Mosaic of each Divisional front, squared and contoured and freely annotated, for distribution down to N.C.O.'s.
(b) Oblique Photographs of each Divisional front, for distribution to all officers.
Battle Instructions No. 11
CO-OPERATION OF INFANTRY AND AIRCRAFT
1. Contact Aeroplanes.
(i) Indication of position by flares.
(a) Red ground flares will be used to indicate the infantry positions to contact aeroplanes. They will be lit by infantry in the most advanced line only.
(b) A contact aeroplane will fly along the line of the first objective at zero plus 2 hours 30 minutes. Flares will be called for by the aeroplane sounding a succession of "A's" on the Klaxon horn and by firing a white Very Light. If the aeroplane fails to mark the line accurately, it will repeat its call ten minutes later.
Should the infantry not have reached the line of the objective at the time laid down above, the contact aeroplane will return at half-hour intervals until flares are shown.
(c) A contact aeroplane will fly along the line of the second objective at zero plus 6 hours 30 minutes. It will call for flares, and the same procedure will be followed on this objective as on the first objective until the flares are seen.
(d) A contact aeroplane will fly over third objective at zero plus 7 hours, when the procedure laid down for the first objective will be observed until the flares are shown.
(e) Divisions will organize message-dropping stations in the vicinity of their Headquarters.
(ii) Other means of identifying the position of the Infantry.
(a) Rifles.—Three or four rifles laid parallel across the top of the trench.
(b) Metal Discs.—Metal discs will be used as reflectors by flashing in the sun. This method has been successful even on days which have not been particularly bright.
The disc is most easily carried sewn to the Small Box Respirator, and can be used in this way without inconvenience.
2. Counter-attack Planes.
(a) From zero hour counter-attack planes will be constantly in the air, with the object of observing hostile concentrations or abnormal movement.
(b) In the event of an enemy concentration indicating a counter-attack, the counter-attack aeroplane will signal this information to the Artillery by wireless. In the case of a counter-attack actually developing a white parachute flare will be fired by the aeroplane in the direction of the troops moving for the impending counter-attack, for the information of the Infantry.
3. Ammunition-carrying Aeroplanes.
(a) Aeroplanes will be detailed to transport ammunition from zero plus 2 hours 30 minutes.
(b) Vickers guns will display a white "V" at the point where ammunition is to be dropped. The arms of the "V" to be 6 feet in length and 1 foot in width. The apex of the "V" to point towards the enemy.
(c) Ammunition aeroplanes will have the under-side of the lower planes painted black for a distance of 2½ feet from the tips.
(a) Red ground flares will be used to indicate the infantry positions to contact aeroplanes. They will be lit by infantry in the most advanced line only.
(b) A contact aeroplane will fly along the line of the first objective at zero plus 2 hours 30 minutes. Flares will be called for by the aeroplane sounding a succession of "A's" on the Klaxon horn and by firing a white Very Light. If the aeroplane fails to mark the line accurately, it will repeat its call ten minutes later.
Should the infantry not have reached the line of the objective at the time laid down above, the contact aeroplane will return at half-hour intervals until flares are shown.
(c) A contact aeroplane will fly along the line of the second objective at zero plus 6 hours 30 minutes. It will call for flares, and the same procedure will be followed on this objective as on the first objective until the flares are seen.
(d) A contact aeroplane will fly over third objective at zero plus 7 hours, when the procedure laid down for the first objective will be observed until the flares are shown.
(e) Divisions will organize message-dropping stations in the vicinity of their Headquarters.
(a) Rifles.—Three or four rifles laid parallel across the top of the trench.
(b) Metal Discs.—Metal discs will be used as reflectors by flashing in the sun. This method has been successful even on days which have not been particularly bright.
The disc is most easily carried sewn to the Small Box Respirator, and can be used in this way without inconvenience.
(a) From zero hour counter-attack planes will be constantly in the air, with the object of observing hostile concentrations or abnormal movement.
(b) In the event of an enemy concentration indicating a counter-attack, the counter-attack aeroplane will signal this information to the Artillery by wireless. In the case of a counter-attack actually developing a white parachute flare will be fired by the aeroplane in the direction of the troops moving for the impending counter-attack, for the information of the Infantry.
(a) Aeroplanes will be detailed to transport ammunition from zero plus 2 hours 30 minutes.
(b) Vickers guns will display a white "V" at the point where ammunition is to be dropped. The arms of the "V" to be 6 feet in length and 1 foot in width. The apex of the "V" to point towards the enemy.
(c) Ammunition aeroplanes will have the under-side of the lower planes painted black for a distance of 2½ feet from the tips.
Battle Instructions No. 12
CONSOLIDATION
1. Divisions allotted to First Objective.
(a) Consolidation.—As soon as the first objective has been captured troops will dig in.
(b) Troops holding present front line.—The brigades of 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions holding the line on the night prior to zero will remain in their battle positions until all troops detailed to the attack have passed through. They will then be organized and prepared to move to meet any emergency.
2nd Australian Division will be prepared to detach its brigade to act in support of 5th Australian Division, and 3rd Australian Division to detach its brigade in support of 4th Australian Division.
(c) Reorganization of Troops on First Objective.—As soon as the whole of the troops detailed to the capture of second (red line) and third (blue line) objectives have passed through the line of the first objective, 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions will organize the defence of their sectors on the first objective in depth in each brigade sub-sector. Units will be reorganized, and those not detailed to the defence of the line will be withdrawn into support and held in readiness for eventualities. At least one battalion in each brigade sub-sector should be withdrawn in this way.
2. Second Objective.
Consolidation.—As soon as the second objective (the red line) has been captured, the position will be thoroughly consolidated. Arrangements will be made to ensure a supply of engineering material for this.
3. Main Line of Resistance.
(a) When the third objective (the blue line) is attained, it will be organized and consolidated as the main line of resistance.
(b) If the enemy is able to develop an immediate counter-attack, or if he has a definite plan, and the troops available in close reserve for the defence of the blue line, it may not be possible to reach the third objective. In this case the second objective (red line) will become the main line of resistance, and will be consolidated and organized in depth accordingly.
(c) Definite plans will be prepared to deal with either case. The Corps must be prepared, as early as possible, to fight a stiff defensive battle on the main line of resistance.
Battle Instructions No. 13
1. The 5th Australian Division will move into its assembly area by Brigade Groups as follows:
"A" Brigade Group on the night 4th-5th August from Montières to Camon and Rivery area. Quarters have been arranged for one brigade, less one battalion. Shelters will be drawn from Area Commandant, Camon, for this battalion.
"B" Brigade Group from Allonville area to forward area.
"C" Brigade Group from Vaux area to Allonville area.
2. For the purposes of staging, Poulainville will be included as one of the battalion areas of the Allonville brigade area.
The camp in Bois de Mai has been allotted for the use of the 5th Division nucleus.
It is left to the discretion of the G.O.C., 5th Australian Division, as to whether the Battalion at Poulainville moves on the night of 4th August.
3. On the night 5th-6th August the 5th Australian Division will continue its move into its allotted assembly grounds in the forward area.
4. Rear parties are to be left in charge of all camps until handed over to the Area Commandant.
Battle Instructions No. 14
ARMOURED CAR BATTALION
1. The 17th Armoured Car Battalion has been placed at the disposal of the Australian Corps, and will join the 5th Tank Brigade shortly.
2. This battalion is organized in two companies of eight (8) armoured cars each. Each armoured car carries one forward and one rear Hotchkiss gun.
3. One and a half (1½) companies are allotted to the 5th Australian Division, and half (½) a company will remain in Corps Reserve.
The half company detailed to remain in Corps Reserve will select a position of assembly in Square 0.26, and will occupy this position by 9.30 p.m. on Y/Z night. During the action its orders will be transmitted through the 5th Australian Divisional Signal Service. The Commander will arrange with the 5th Australian Division accordingly.
4. As soon as the Battalion Commander or his representative reports to the 5th Tank Brigade, he will be instructed to report to the General Staff, Australian Corps, and then to Headquarters, 5th Australian Division.
Battle Instructions No. 14a
ARMOURED CAR BATTALION
1. The 17th Armoured Car Battalion is being given definite rôles in accordance with paragraph 3 of Battle Instructions No. 14. The rôles assigned to this battalion may carry the cars forward for a considerable distance into enemy territory, and may necessitate their returning through other Divisional Sectors than that of the 5th Australian Division.
2. British Armoured Cars can be recognized by the red and white band markings which are similar to those of the British Tanks.
3. All troops will be warned of the possibility of our armoured cars coming into our own sector, and of the way in which they are marked.
Battle Instructions No. 15
ZERO HOUR—SYNCHRONIZATION OF WATCHES
1. Zero Hour.
Zero hour will be notified in writing from Australian Corps Headquarters by noon on the day prior to zero.
2. Synchronization of Watches.
Watches will be synchronized by officers detailed by Australian Corps Headquarters, who will visit Headquarters in the following order, leaving Corps Headquarters shortly after noon and 6 p.m. on Y day:
(a) One officer to Headquarters Heavy Artillery, 3rd Australian Division and 4th Australian Division.
(b) One officer to 2nd Australian Division and 5th Australian Division.
Battle Instructions No. 16
AIRCRAFT
1. The Air Forces which will operate on the Australian Corps front during the battle will be as follows:
(a) Corps Squadron—3rd Australian Squadron.
(b) 5th Tank Brigade—8th Squadron.
(c) The 22nd Wing, consisting of eight Scout Squadrons, which will be exclusively employed in engaging ground targets by bombing and machine-gunning along the whole Army front.
(d) One night-bombing squadron—101st Bombing Squadron.
(e) One Reconnaissance Squadron—48th Squadron.
Four additional day-bombing squadrons and three additional night-bombing squadrons are being obtained from other Wings for co-operation with the above, making 19 Squadrons in all.
2. Low-flying Scouts.
The low-flying scouts of the 22nd Wing are being detailed on an even distribution to the Corps front. They will operate in two phases, viz.:
(a) From zero to zero plus four hours eastward from the green line.
(b) From zero plus four hours onwards eastwards from the red line.
In each phase favourable targets will be engaged in addition to the targets marked by the green and red lines.
3. Markings on Planes.
The following will be the special markings of machines allotted to special duties:
(a) Contact patrol machines—Rectangular panels 2' by 1' on both lower planes about three feet from the fuselage.
(b) Machines working with Tanks—Black band on middle of right side of tail.
4. Ammunition-carrying Squadron.
Aeroplanes carrying small arms ammunition will drop it at points as laid down in Battle Instructions No. 11, para. 3 (b). The first ammunition-carrying planes will arrive over the battlefield at zero plus seven hours.
5. Aeroplane Smoke Screens.
In addition to carrying small arms ammunition, this Squadron will be employed to drop phosphorus smoke bombs to obstruct the enemy's view. The areas to be screened and the time at which the screening in each case shall cease in order not to interfere with the advance of the Infantry will be shown on a map to be issued later.
Battle Instructions No. 17
ARTILLERY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE LAST NIGHT BEFORE ZERO
1. S.O.S.
(i) Each line division will arrange for four field artillery brigades, or an equivalent number of guns, to fire on S.O.S. lines at any time up to zero minus fifteen minutes.
(ii) From zero minus fifteen minutes until zero hour S.O.S. arrangements will be inoperative.
2. Heavy Artillery.
In the event of the enemy opening a gas bombardment on the Villers-Bretonneux area, arrangements have been made for the co-operation of the Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery in an artillery counter-attack on enemy batteries. The Canadian Corps will deal with the enemy artillery about Wiencourt and Marcelcave. Fire will be opened, on application, direct between the two Corps Headquarters.
G.O.C., R.A., Australian Corps, will arrange details with G.O.C., R.A., Canadian Corps.
Battle Instructions No. 18
These are not reproduced. They refer only to Wireless Code Calls prescribed for all units.
Battle Instructions No. 19
LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS
1. Officers are detailed for liaison duties as follows:
(a) At Canadian Corps Headquarters—Capt. Shearman, D.S.O., M.C.
(b) At Third Corps Headquarters—Major R. Morrell, D.S.O.
(c) With 1st Australian Division—To be notified.
(d) With 2nd Australian Division—Major H. Page, M.C.
(e) With 3rd Australian Division—Lt.-Col. A. R. Woolcock, D.S.O.
(f) With 4th Australian Division—Major G. F. Dickinson, D.S.O.
(g) With 5th Australian Division—Lt.-Col. N. Marshall, D.S.O.
2. The main function of the liaison officer is to relieve the Staff of the fighting formation of the necessity of:
(a) Supplying information to Australian Corps Headquarters.
(b) Collecting information from Corps Headquarters for transmission to the formation for whom they are carrying out liaison duties. It is their function to save the Staff as far as possible, and not to get in the way. At the same time, they are expected to keep Corps Headquarters and the formation to which they are attached fully informed of events.
3. Direct telephone lines exist between Australian Corps Headquarters and neighbouring Corps.
For the battle there is a special General Staff switchboard with direct lines to 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Australian Divisions.
4. An information bureau will be established in a marquee to be erected on the lawn in front of the Headquarters offices. Major W. W. Berry will be in charge of this bureau. It will be provided with a telephone, writing material, maps, etc.
Liaison officers from other formation at Australian Corps Headquarters will be accommodated in this marquee.
During the battle officers whose business does not require them to visit the General Staff Office will make all inquiries at this office for information as to the progress of the operations.
Battle Instructions No. 20
CAVALRY
1. The First Cavalry Brigade, plus one company of Whippet Tanks attached, comes under the command of the Australian Corps Commander at 9 p.m. on Y/Z night.
2. Its function is to assist in carrying out the main Cavalry rôle by seizing any opportunity which may occur to push through this Corps front.
3. The First Cavalry Brigade will operate north of the Amiens—Chaulnes railway in conjunction with 5th Australian Division. It will move from its assembly position in Square n.32 under orders of G.O.C., 1st Cavalry Division, via the southern side of Bois de l'Abbé.
It will cross to the north side of the railway east of Villers-Bretonneux.
It will push forward patrols to keep in touch with 8th and 15th Australian Brigades.
After crossing the railway the main body of 1st Cavalry Brigade will march roughly parallel to it, keeping close touch with the remainder of 1st Cavalry Division to the south.
4. If a break in enemy's resistance occurs, the remainder of the 1st Cavalry Division may be employed in support of 1st Cavalry Brigade.
5. Command of 1st Cavalry Brigade will pass from Australian Corps to the 1st Cavalry Division when the Infantry reaches the red line unless the brigade is required in the area south of the Australian Corps to exploit success gained before that hour. This will be determined by G.O.C., 1st Cavalry Division, who will inform Australian Corps and 5th Australian Division, and issue orders direct to 1st Cavalry Brigade.
Battle Instructions No. 21
NOTIFICATION OF DATE AND TIME OF BATTLE
1. Reference paragraph 1 of General Staff Memo. No. AC/42, dated 7th instant, ZERO will be 4.20 a.m. 8th instant.