B.—EVOLUTION AND CREATION BY LAW.
Evolutionist writers have a great horror of what they term "intervention." But they should be informed that the idea of a planning Creator does not involve intervention in an extraordinary or miraculous sense, any more than what we call the ordinary operations of nature. It is a common but childish prejudice that every discovery of a secondary cause diminishes so much of what is to be referred to the agency of God. On the contrary, such discoveries merely aid us in comprehending the manner of his action. But when evolutionists, in their zeal to get rid of creative intervention, trace all things to the interaction of insensate causes, they fall into the absurdity of believing in absolute unmitigated chance as the cause of perfect order. Evidences of this may be found by the score in Darwin's works on the origin of species. I quote, however, from another and usually clear thinker, Wallace, in a review of the Duke of Argyll's "Reign of Law," which appeared some years ago, but represents very well this phase of thought:
"'It is curious,' says the Duke of Argyll, 'to observe the language which this most advanced disciple of pure naturalism [Mr. Darwin] instinctively uses, when he has to describe the complicated structure of this curious order of plants [the Orchids]. Caution in ascribing intentions to nature does not seem to occur to him as possible. Intention is the one thing which he does see, and which, when he does not see, he seeks for diligently until he finds it. He exhausts every form of words and of illustration by which intention or mental purpose can be described. 'Contrivance'—'curious contrivance'—'beautiful contrivance'—these are expressions which occur over and over again. Here is one sentence describing the parts of a particular species: 'the labellum is developed into a long nectary, in order to attract lepidoptera, and we shall presently give reason for suspecting that the nectar is purposely so lodged that it can be sucked only slowly, in order to give time for the curious chemical quality of this viscid matter setting hard and dry.'" Many other examples of similar expressions are quoted by the duke, who maintains that no explanation of these "contrivances" has been or can be given, except on the supposition of a personal contriver, specially arranging the details of each case, although causing them to be produced by the ordinary processes of growth and reproduction.
"Now there is a difficulty in this view of the origin of the structure of orchids which the duke does not allude to. The majority of flowering plants are fertilized, either without the agency of insects, or, when insects are required, without any very important modification of the structure of the flower. It is evident, therefore, that flowers might have been formed as varied, fantastic, and beautiful as the orchids, and yet have been fertilized by insects in the same manner as violets or clover or primroses, or a thousand other flowers. The strange springs and traps and pitfalls found in the flowers of orchids can not be necessary per se, since exactly the same end is gained in ten thousand other flowers which do not possess them. Is it not, then, an extraordinary idea to imagine the Creator of the universe contriving the various complicated parts of these flowers as a mechanic might contrive an ingenious toy or a difficult puzzle? Is it not a more worthy conception that they are some of the results of those general laws which were so co-ordinated at the first introduction of life upon the earth as to result necessarily in the utmost possible development of varied forms?"
A moment's thought is sufficient to show that there is no essential difference between the Creator contriving every detail of the structure of an orchid and his producing it through some intermediate cause, or his commanding it into existence by his almighty word. The same mental process, so to speak, of the contriver is implied in either case. But there is an immeasurable difference between any of those ideas and that of the orchid producing its parts spontaneously under the operation of insensate physical law, whatever that may be, alone. Again, in the same review, Wallace writes:
"The uncertainty of opinion among naturalists as to which are species and which varieties is one of Mr. Darwin's very strong arguments that these two names can not belong to things quite distinct in nature and origin. The reviewer says that this argument is of no weight, because the works of man present exactly the same phenomena, and he instances patent inventions, and the excessive difficulty of determining whether they are new or old. I accept the analogy, and maintain that it is all in favor of Mr. Darwin's views; for are not all inventions of the same kind directly affiliated to a common ancestor. Are not improved steam-engines or clocks the lineal descendants of some existing steam-engine or clock? Is there ever a new creation in art or science any more than in nature? Did ever patentee absolutely originate any complete and entire invention no portion of which was derived from any thing that had been made or described before? It is, therefore, clear that the difficulty of distinguishing the various classes of inventions which claim to be new is of the same nature as the difficulty of distinguishing varieties and species, because neither are absolute new creations, but both are alike descendants of pre-existing forms, from which and from each other they differ by varying and often imperceptible degrees. It appears, then, that however plausible this writer's objections may seem, whenever he descends from generalities to any specific statement his supposed difficulties turn out to be in reality strongly confirmatory of Mr. Darwin's view."
Now that improved steam-engines are lineal descendants of other steam-engines is absolute nonsense, in any other aspect than that the structure of one suggested the structure of another to a contriving mind. We need not affirm this of God; but we may affirm that the plans of the creative mind constitute the true link of connection between the different states and developments of inorganic and organic objects. This is the real meaning of creation by law, as distinguished from mere chance on the one hand, and arbitrary and capricious intervention on the other. Both of these extremes are equally illogical; and it can not be too frequently repeated that divine revelation avoids both by maintaining with equal firmness the agency of the Creator, and that agency not capricious, but according to plan and purpose; embracing not merely the action of the divine mind itself, but under it of all the forces and material things created.